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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates and questions Uganda’s development claims and the choice 
between confrontation and mutual respect among the people, using Paul VI’s notion of 
integral human development in Populorum Progressio and the requisite development 
principles, virtues and conditions or factors presented therein.  In the study I have argued 
that the development claims of Uganda do not, to a significant degree, meet the standards 
of human development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. The study shows 
that human dignity and its universality and equality precipitate the significance of the 
question of integral human development, and consequently necessitate a relevant 
anthropology. 
 
The structure of the work is as follows: First, I espoused the influences behind Paul VI’s 
vision of human development. These influences shaped his notion of development and 
the principles he proposed for authentic human development. They facilitate the 
understanding of his doctrine in Populorum Progressio. 
 
Secondly, I highlighted the problems Paul VI was addressing, and thereafter his proposed 
solutions, and his understanding of the notion and nature of true development as being 
integral – the development of the entire person and of all people. The principle 
underlying this vision of development is human dignity. On the basis of the universal 
character of this underlying principle, I have argued that integral human development 
ought to promote the human dignity of all people irrespective of age, sex, socio-economic 
and political status, tribe, nation, race and color. I highlighted and explained other 
principles and factors necessary for integral human development and related them to the 
most fundamental principle.  
 
Thirdly, I reconstructed an anthropology for integral human development which Paul VI 
proposed in Populorum Progressio. This aimed to build and reaffirm the cohesive and 
fundamental principle. I argued and concluded that human dignity is de facto the most 
fundamental principle that ought to be understood, acknowledged, and underscored. All 
other principles or factors for human development are important but they revolve around 
human dignity. 
 
Finally, I applied the development principles and factors presented in Populorum 
Progressio to the mediating structures of pastoral or religious, socio-economic and 
political life and community development in Uganda. Based on an understanding and 
respect for human dignity and its relation to other development principles, virtues and 
conditions I concluded that the application of the principles of integral human 
development is a failure in modern Uganda, to a significant extent, because the 
recognition and respect for human dignity is minimal in almost every context or sector of 
life. Consequently, among other recommendations, I have proposed education about 
human dignity and moral principles that promote human dignity as necessary, and one of 
the most crucial challenges to Uganda in this opening decade of the Twenty-First century 
and later. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
Paul VI introduced the issue of true human development by way of reaffirming 
the notion of integral human development initially used by Louis Joseph Lebret. Human 
development is a crucial and a perennial notion many people have questioned and 
attempted to re-define in the course of human history. In his 2006 Lenten message, 
apparently re-echoing Paul VI’s teaching in the encyclical Populorum Progressio about 
authentic human development, Benedict XVI referred to the question of development as a 
debatable issue.1 Similarly Mark Leopold alludes to development and describes the 
notion of development as being often “vague and contested.”2 
 This work is a study of Populorum Progressio, Paul VI’s ground-breaking 
Catholic social encyclical about the development of peoples to which Benedict was 
alluding in the 2006 Lenten message. The work treats especially Paul VI’s doctrine of 
integral human development, the requisite principles, virtues and conditions to achieve 
such a development; and an application of the teaching and the suggestions of the 
document to the context of Uganda. It is an attempt to espouse and question the 
development claims of Uganda. This will be realized in the attempts to apply the teaching 
of the document in the context of Uganda, but the study can help one to interpret other 
contexts too. The work is in no way exhaustive of the understanding of the doctrine and 
application of Populorum Progressio. It is an attempt to provoke further reflection on the 
document and the possibilities for its application in other developmental contexts.  
                                                 
1 Benedictus PP. XVI, “Jesus at the Sight of the Crowds, was Moved with Pity (Mt.9:36)”: Message of 
Pope Benedict XVI for Lent 2006 in Arua Diocese Bulletin, No.69, (Arua: Arua Diocese Communication 
Department, March 2006), 1. 
2 Mark Leopold, Inside West Nile: Violence, History and Representation on an African Frontier, (James 
Currey: Oxford, 2005), 147. 
  2
Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio was written just two years before he 
visited Uganda in 1969, which was the first visit of a Roman Catholic Pontiff to Uganda; 
and the first papal visit to Africa. A critical reading of the encyclical and a careful 
relating of its doctrine to the situation in Uganda, before that visit and since then, would 
suggest that in Populorum Progressio Paul VI was only directly addressing the problems 
of Uganda when he wrote the encyclical. However, this is not the case because from the 
history of his international travels and visits he was never in Uganda before he wrote the 
encyclical. His direct intention was to address world problems of human development in 
general but the very problems he addressed were and are still obvious in Uganda. The 
work reverses the scope of Paul VI’s teaching. While Paul VI dealt with the international 
development issues, this work attempts to limit the development issues on national level, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is inevitable mutual exchange and relationship 
between the two levels – national and international. 
Reflecting on some of Uganda’s problems, Anna Mary Kayonga made the 
following intriguing and comprehensive statement about Uganda: 
It is paradoxical that Uganda, the ‘Pearl of Africa’, so richly endowed with an abundance of 
natural resources: in terms of favourable climate, fertile soil; in terms of human resources; as well 
as in traditional and Christian values, should have such a large number of poor people. The factors 
that have reduced many Ugandans to destitution, are the series of incompetent, corrupt 
governments, and civil wars, especially since independence in 1962.3 
 
The above statement almost summarizes the situation, the problems and the needs 
of Uganda. It is true even of the Uganda of today. Despite their struggles to develop their 
country and the claims that the country - so much blessed by natural resources and good 
climate - is developing, Ugandans face development problems. The country is rich in 
                                                 
3 Anna Mary Kayonga, “The Church’s Role in the Care of Orphans and Destitutes” in Church Contribution 
to Integral Development. Ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. Zabajungu (Eldoret, Kenya: 
AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1989), 215-216. 
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many ways. Uganda lies astride the equator, about 2 degrees south and 4 degrees north of 
the equator, and stretches “about 400 miles from north to south” and “about 350 miles 
from east to west”, covering an area of about “91,134 square miles, of which 16,386 
square miles is open water and swamp,” rising from 2000 feet in the north to 4000 feet in 
the southwest above sea level, currently with a population of about 27.7 million people.4  
Generally, it is agreed that after its independence in 1962 “until 1971, the 
Ugandan economy enjoyed a fairly robust growth.”5 The conditions of people were at 
least tolerable if not good. When Idi Amin came to power in 1971 the situations changed. 
Development was hampered by many factors – exodus of experts from Uganda, the 
collapse of the parastatal sector, corruption, incompetence and mal-administration and 
ravages caused by war.6 After the collapse of the Amin regime international bodies such 
as the IMF financially supported the Obote II regime which soon slipped into mistakes 
similar to what prevailed during Amin’s reign. The relapse retarded development and 
prompted rebel insurgencies that terminated Obote II regime and four other short-lived 
regimes.7 The IMF and Western financial institutions and organizations resumed support 
after Yoweri K. Museveni took over power in 1986. According to Ayittey, “by African 
standards, Uganda has performed well and President Museveni has made credible, 
                                                 
4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The First Five Year-Development  Plan, 
1961/62-1965/66, ( Entebbe, Uganda: Uganda Government, 1961), 1. Also see The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Uganda, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1962), 5. Also see Tom McKnight., Gen.Ed.Graphica: The Complete Illustrated Atlas of the World, (New 
York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2004), 366. Also see Oxford World Encyclopedic World Atlas, 6th Edition, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 222. Also see Kakaire A. Kirunda, “Population growth 
may fail Development Goals” in Daily Monitor Kampala, Uganda, September 21, 2006. 
5 George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The Blue Print for Africa’s Future, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 204. 
6 Ibid., 205. 
7 Ibid., 206. 
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serious and continued efforts at reform.”8 It is true that comparatively speaking, after 
learning from some of the past mistakes of Uganda’s presidents, Museveni has done 
better than his predecessors. Suggestively he raised the level of Uganda’s development.  
However, in this work the developmental contributions of all Uganda’s different 
governments since its independence will be questioned by the doctrine of Populorum 
Progressio. 
Human development has consistently been a crucial issue in history. Its notion has 
constantly been contentious, a matter of differences of opinions, because diverse views 
and fundamental principles of human development have been propounded, some of 
which are appealing and others not. Historically, to implement the various views has 
practically proven to be difficult or impossible in various countries, including Uganda. 
Everywhere there are problems related to the understanding of human development. 
With the help of the insights of Louis Joseph Lebret, the protagonist of the 
doctrine of authentic human development and personal critical reflections, Paul VI 
developed a more comprehensive notion of human development. He termed integral 
human development - an holistic development of individuals and all peoples. However, 
the application of this notion is fraught with difficulties. This raises the question: Why 
has it been and why is it still difficult to implement Paul VI’s teaching about integral 
human development? This is one of the central questions to which this work attempts to 
suggest answers. Therefore, it is important to examine the theme of integral human 
development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio, and to apply it to a specific 
context such as that of Uganda where development claims are questionable in light of the 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 207. 
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teaching of the document.  
The encyclical is related to other Catholic social teachings about human 
development but it is different from them, especially those that preceded it, because its 
notion of human development and social justice is broader than what earlier documents 
advocate. Many authors refer to it as the Magna Carta of Catholic Church’s teaching on 
human development. This means Populorum Progressio is a great charter, a fundamental 
document of the Catholic Church’s teaching about human development even though it is 
not the first Catholic document to deal with this issue. Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII 
(1891), Quadragessimo Anno of Pope Pius XI (1931), Mater et Magistra of Pope John 
XXIII (1961), Pacem in Terris of Pope John XXIII (1963), and Gaudium et Spes of the 
Second Vatican Council (1965) treated some of the same issues Paul VI grappled with in 
Populorum Progressio but they were more limited than what Paul VI advocated. The 
document is representative of a remarkable advancement in the Catholic Church’s 
teaching about human development, although its advance and novelty is a conceptual 
one.9 This means Paul VI never articulated or suggested a framework and model for 
achieving what he called integral human development.  
The notion of human development conceived by Paul VI as presented in 
Populorum Progressio is a major contribution, relevant for the time he wrote it and for 
the world and time after the encyclical was promulgated. This is suggested by the 
Pontiff’s notion of human development and social justice, and his treatise of diverse 
issues related to the question of development. He gave a more comprehensive definition 
of human development than ever before in any Catholic social teaching on development, 
                                                 
9 Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching (New York: Orbis Books, 
1992), 180. 
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and viewed justice both nationally and globally.10 All human development-related 
Catholic social doctrine preceding Populorum Progressio gravitates toward the doctrine 
of the document and, those that succeeded it, such as Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, emanated 
from the document.11  
This study affirms that Paul VI’s vision of human development is directed to the 
development of the human person and the practical application of theological 
anthropology and other theological principles. It is not as utopian as some critics of Paul 
VI claim, because the ultimate purpose of Christ and of theology is integral salvation.12 
The human development advocated by Paul VI is, in fact the one reiterated by Benedict 
XVI, the salvation of body and soul - material or social and internal salvation.13 It is 
development at the service of people. Paul VI himself also emphatically affirmed this. 
Theology’s goal is the perfection of human life, vision of God and the ultimate union 
with God, using resources God has made available to people. He further said: 
Added to this is the fact that the noble harmony of this human nature, which each one by his own 
effort and awareness of his duty brings to ever greater perfection, is destined for a higher dignity. 
Ingrafted in Christ, the giver of life, man receives a new dimension of life and attains to a 
humanism as it is called which transcends his nature and confers on him the greatest fullness of 
life to which the perfecting of man looks as to its final goal.14 
 
This work centers the doctrine of Populorum Progressio on a more emphatic 
theological anthropology than Paul VI employed. It emphasizes the value of human life, 
                                                 
10 David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds, Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage, 
(Maryknoll New York: Orbis Books,1992), 238. Also see Dorr, 184. 
11 John Paul II (Pope), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, On Social Concerns, (Rome, 1987), 2-4. Also see O’Brien 
and Shannon, 396 and Donal Dorr “Solidarity and Integral Human Development” in The Logic of 
Solidarity: Commentaries on John Paul II’s Encyclical On Social Concerns, ed. Gregory Baum and Robert 
Ellsberg (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989), 3-4,143-144. 
12 Benedictus PP.XVI, , “Jesus at the Sight of the Crowds, was Moved with Pity (Mt.9:36)”: Message of 
Pope Benedict XVI for Lent 2006 in Arua Diocese Bulletin, No.69, (Arua: Arua Diocese Communication 
Department, March 2006), 2. 
13 Ibid. , 1. 
14 Paul VI (Pope), Populorum Progressio, On the Development of Peoples (Washington, D C: United States 
Catholic Conference, 1967), 16,8. 
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the human person, human dignity and rights. In the Proposition on the Dignity and Rights 
of the Human Person, the International Theological Commission underscores the gravity 
of theological anthropology by affirming that “it is not possible for the Church to omit 
preaching the dignity and rights of the human person.”15 Anthropology contributes 
greatly to the practice of theological knowledge, especially to a relevant development 
education of the masses. Consequently, this study will attempt to advance the 
understanding, acknowledgement and appreciation, and the practical application of the 
teaching of Populorum Progressio based on the human person, human dignity and human 
rights. Therefore, a relevant and compelling anthropology is crucial. 
The study will attempt to, specifically, make an application of the doctrine of 
Populorum Progressio to Uganda’s development claims. The work attempts to show how 
Paul VI’s doctrine in the document challenges Uganda’s development claims; and how it 
could best be applied in the context of Uganda. The significance of the study should be 
seen in light of Paul VI’s comprehensive teaching about integral human development. It 
surpasses most, if not all, teachings on human development. He consistently taught that 
integral human development addresses the problem of both material and spiritual poverty. 
This teaching is relevant for all people. Therefore, the treatise is relevant to and 
significant for the situation in Uganda. People in other contexts can also learn from it and 
use it for reflection about their own development.  
Denis Goulet, one of the renowned development ethicists, explicitly states that the 
United Nations’ documents, development plans and manifestos talk about or deal with 
better life, greater equity in the distribution of wealth, and the need to assure social 
                                                 
15 International Theological Commission, Propositions on the Dignity and Rights of the Human Person 
(Washington, D C : United States Conference, 1986), 1.1.0. 
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improvement of all. He further says: “Here is a clear proof of the existence of a ‘demand’ 
for development ethics.”16 Such concerns outside ecclesial circles, such as of the United 
Nations, underscore the importance of the question of human development and indicate 
how enduring, all embracing and efficacious the teaching of Populorum Progressio has 
been and continues to be. 
The work will attempt to establish the foundation for all other principles for 
integral human development. The understanding of the human person, human dignity and 
human rights is a significant question that touches all people at the core elements of their 
being, and they constitute this foundation. Paul VI argued that the centrality of the human 
person demands that in our vision of the world the human person must always be at the 
center.17 For the human person to be the purpose and center of every activity, education is 
necessary. Consequently, the study will advocate that a careful education about integral 
human development based on the value of human life, the human person, human dignity 
and rights could make a significant difference in efforts to promote human development. 
The understanding of the human person and human dignity are crucial for a change of 
attitude. It is through this understanding that human dignity can be acknowledged as an 
inalienable (God-given) element of the human person.18 This enables people to see the 
sense of mutual claims they make. It also helps people to rethink the ways of working for 
human development. They may also be helped to adjust their conception of human 
development and their action plans and procedures for human development. This way 
                                                 
16 Denis Goulet, A New Moral Order: Studies in Development Ethics and Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 15.  
17 Giovanni, Cardinal Battista Montini (Paul VI), The Christian in the Material World (Baltimore: Helicon 
Press, 1963), 47. 
18 Reichmann, 213. 
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human development becomes an activity that challenges and transforms people’s thinking 
and practical life. Education of all categories of people about their rights, duties, human 
ability and moral or ethical responsibility to alleviate and treat maladies that confront 
individuals and society promotes individual and human community.  
The study is intended to help educate believers or members of religious 
communities, and understanding people, that Theology and Ministry are directed towards 
the protection, promotion and enhancement of human life, human person, human dignity 
and human rights. The duo are directed to the salvation of the entire person and all 
people. As people can be self-destructive or invite suffering and degradation upon 
themselves and others, they are also able to reconstruct and develop themselves and 
others. Theology and Ministry facilitate this process. The International Theological 
Commission succinctly summarized the significance of such and similar assertions when 
it stated that 
This duty and right of God’s people to proclaim and defend actively the dignity of the human 
person is particularly urgent today because of the simultaneous appearance of two challenging 
factors: On one hand, there is a deep crisis as to the nature of human and Christian values. On the 
other, the modern conscience is profoundly sensitive to injustices perpetrated against human 
beings.19  
 
The treatise on Populorum Progressio is significant in the general context of 
Christian teaching. This assertion is implied in the preceding paragraphs, in terms of the 
relation of the document to other Church social teachings. Populorum Progressio is 
foundational in this regard, and a resource to seek out when questions regarding 
development are raised. The long-standing Catholic tradition and teaching about love as 
the fundamental and the ultimate commandment, the dignity of the human person, 
                                                 
19 International Theological Commission, 1.1.0. 
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ownership of property, justice, peace and the confrontation of suffering are related to the 
question of development. This study attempts to deal with these and similar issues. 
The efforts to elaborate, develop and apply Paul VI’s notion of and principles for 
integral human development are not in vain, at least, from a Christian or theological point 
of view. Even outside this context there are conflicts, socio-economic and political 
differences, imbalances, injustices and violations against the human person; and there is 
global suffering including that found in Uganda.  
This study offers some insights for reflection in the endeavor to resolve some of 
the problems in Uganda; and to make some recommendations to alleviate such problems. 
The work reiterates Catholic social teaching and human rights tradition and, in particular, 
suggests some ways to confront the renewed challenges presented by Populorum 
Progressio and other Catholic social documents dealing with human development. 
The work is divided into four chapters. Chapter One deals with the foundations 
for understanding integral human development. It espouses the influences behind Paul 
VI’s vision of human development: childhood experiences, key personalities behind his 
vision, his personal, professional and international experiences; and the encyclical, 
conciliar and pastoral tradition that preceded the document. All of these affected him, his 
profession and vision of human development. The chapter is vital because it shows the 
forces that influenced Paul VI’s trend of thoughts and shaped his notion of true human 
development. It shows the implicit and gradual development of the notion of the human 
person, dignity, rights and other related notions which culminated in his view of integral 
human development. The chapter outlines and explains the notion of human development 
and ownership of property in response to human need and suffering. It includes the 
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teaching of the Magisterium, papal encyclicals, pastoral letters and reflections of some 
theologians.  
Chapter Two treats the interpretation and understanding of Paul VI’s teaching in 
Populorum Progressio. It outlines and explains the main issues treated by Paul VI in the 
document and states how Paul VI attempted to resolve these issues. The chapter reiterates 
Paul VI’s vision of true development, which is precisely his acknowledgement of the 
vision of Louis Joseph Lebret, one of the drafters of Populorum Progressio, who 
advocated the notion and nature of true development as being integral – the development 
of the entire person and of all people in a similar fashion. It suggests the necessary 
development principles that can, at least, be inferred from a general reading of 
Populorum Progressio, and explains the requisite principles for integral human 
development.  
The thrust of Chapter Three is the anthropology for integral human development. 
It underscores the understanding and emphasis of the human person, human dignity and 
human rights as forces that compound the significance of Paul VI’s teaching on integral 
human development. These will be treated as the most fundamental principles running 
through all other principles in the document. One principle is stated and emphasized as 
the most outstanding and fundamental – namely, human dignity. Consequently, in the 
work I have argued that an anthropology for integral human development as advocated in 
Populorum Progressio is an imperative. The anthropology presented in this Chapter 
facilitates the acknowledgement of the need for integral human development and the 
implementation of all other principles for integral human development. All other 
principles stated or implied in Populorum Progressio are necessary for human 
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development but human dignity is de facto the basic principle to be understood, 
acknowledged and underscored. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that much has already been written about Uganda’s 
religious, cultural, socio-economic and political history, Chapter Four delves into a 
general outline of the problems in Uganda without a detailed presentation of Uganda’s 
situation and the historical factors that impacted development in Uganda. The chapter 
attempts to make an application of the teaching of Populorum Progressio to the Ugandan 
context and to demonstrate how it challenges the status quo in Uganda. It is also part of 
the task of this chapter to show the implications of the teaching of the document and to 
make some recommendations to Uganda. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
  
FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING INTEGRAL HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO: THE TRADITION THAT 
IMPACTED PAUL VI’S LIFE AND THOUGHTS  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The phenomenon of human development, historically, is initiated by human 
activity and directed to the human person and the human community. It is also 
consequent to the prevalent events. Chapter One explains the foundations for 
understanding the notion of integral human development as presented by Paul VI in 
Populorum Progressio written in 1967. The principal thesis of this chapter is that a 
thorough comprehension of Populorum Progressio requires an understanding of the Sitz 
im-leben of the author and factors that influenced his thoughts, orientations, aspirations 
and personality. The origin of the doctrine of Populorum Progressio is Rerum Novarum: 
On the Condition of Labor written by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, but other successive social 
encyclicals and church documents also influenced its teachings. Rerum Novarum is 
fundamental because it was the first Catholic social encyclical which radically influenced 
other ecclesiastical social documents. Commentators on Catholic social thought are 
explicit on this issue. Peter Riga says of Pope Paul VI in relation to Populorum 
Progressio: 
His encyclical continues the clear teaching of his predecessors, from Leo XIII to John XXIII, in 
the matter of social justice, that man has been called by God to live in a total fashion: socially, 
politically, culturally, economically, morally, and spiritually. 1 
 
Paul VI himself relates Populorum Progressio to preceding encyclicals such as 
Rerum Novarum, Quadragessimo Anno, Mater et Magistra, Pacem in Terris and Pope 
                                                 
1 Peter J. Riga, The Church of the Poor: A Commentary on Paul VI’s Encyclical On the Development of 
Peoples (Techny, Illinois: Divine Word Publications, 1968) , 5.  
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Pius XII’s radio addresses.2 Pope John Paul II is explicit about such a relationship in his 
statement that “. . . the encyclical Populorum Progressio follows directly in the line of 
the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, which deals with the condition of the workers.” 3  
The document is evidently related to Gaudium et Spes, The Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World, which expanded the range of the social question to all 
human relations.4 We shall trace the evolution of Catholic social doctrine about human 
development beginning with Rerum Novarum, notwithstanding the fact that other 
documents prior to that document and period, including Early Christian teachings, 
touched upon the issues of human development in various ways.5 The rationale behind 
this genesis is that Rerum Novarum made the initial modern breakthrough in the question 
of integral human development with which Populorum Progressio, the magna carta of 
Catholic social teaching on human development, fundamentally deals.6 The documents 
on Catholic social teaching advocate care for both the material and spiritual dimensions 
of the human person, hence, underscoring the significance of integral human 
development based on the dignity of the human person. This means that all documents on 
Catholic social teaching are founded on the principle of imago Dei, that is the principle of 
                                                 
2 Paul VI (Pope), Populorum Progressio: On the Development of Peoples (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Catholic Conference, 1967), 2,2. Also see Populorum Progressio, 9,4 and 23-24,10-11. Also see John J. 
Kelley, Freedom in the Church: A Documented History of the Principle of Subsidiary Function (Dayton 
Ohio: Peter Li, Inc., 2000) , 13. 
3 John Paul II (Pope), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On the Social Concerns (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 
1987), 8,14. The document makes reference to Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum which primarily dealt with the 
condition of workers. 
4 Populorum Progressio, 3,2 and 4,2-4. 
5 Charles Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1983), 102-
103. 
6 Mary Snyder Hembrow, “Development” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, ed. Judith A. 
Dwyer (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1994), 280. Also see William Murphy, “Rerum 
Novarum” in A Century of Catholic Social Thought: Essays on ‘Rerum Novarum’ and Nine Other Key 
Documents, ed. George Weigel and Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
1991), 1. 
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the dignity of the human person created in the image of God, whether this is explicitly 
stated or just implied.7 Therefore, it is appropriate and necessary to start this treatise 
about integral human development with the examination, analysis and understanding of 
the corpus of Catholic social literature related to human development. 
 Catholic social teaching is a compendium of works covering a diversity of areas 
dealing with issues affecting the human person. This work will treat themes that deal only 
with integral human development: development, justice, common good, subsidiarity, 
human dignity and human rights, preferential option for the poor, women and feminism, 
affirmative action, ownership of property, participation and peace. The most central of 
these issues is that of the human person: human dignity and human rights. The 
significance of the human person, rights and dignity cannot be emphasized enough 
because a relevant political, social, economic and religious system is one that provides 
goods and services essential to a life of human dignity.8  
 This chapter will treat different documents in relation to development principles 
presented in Populorum Progressio. The principles feature in Paul VI’s biography, his 
pre-pontifical and pontifical writings and the documents that impacted his trend of 
thought in Populorum Progressio such as Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum. The study of Paul 
VI’s biography and these documents helps in the grasping of his personality and what 
influenced him to write Populorum Progressio  in the way he did. 
The chapter presents the gradual development of the notion of human 
development in Catholic social teaching preceding and immediately after Populorum 
                                                 
7 David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition, 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 108ff. 
8 Avila, 43 and 154. Also see Stephen Everson, ed. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thoughts 
Aristotle, The Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), xvi. 
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Progressio. It explains the development of ideas such as the human person, human 
dignity, human rights, ownership of property, and the response to human need and 
suffering. This chapter includes a biography of Paul VI, the social teaching of the 
Magisterium in papal encyclicals and pastoral letters, and reflections of some 
theologians. Its principal purpose is to demonstrate the centrality of the notion of the 
human person in articulating the question of development. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals with the life of Paul VI. 
The second addresses the encyclical, conciliar and pastoral tradition which preceded 
Populorum Progressio. The third is about the influence of Louis Joseph Lebret on the 
document. The fourth section treats significant papal doctrines and statements during the 
pontificate of Paul VI.  
II. THE BIOGRAPHY OF GIOVANNI BATTISTA MONTINI (PAUL VI) 
 
 Social interactions and circumstances at a particular period influence and shape 
individuals’ thoughts and responses to the phenomena of life, though they do so 
differently. A thorough understanding of Populorum Progressio depends on an 
understanding of the influences that affected the author. In the case of Paul VI there was 
no logical pattern of life. Peter Hebblethwaite notes this about him: 
Ordained priest without having been a seminarian he was made archbishop of the most prestigious 
diocese of Italy without having being a parish priest, and his name was put forward as a candidate 
for the papacy in 1958 though he was not even a cardinal. His election as pope in 1963 was the 
single “logical” event in his life.9  
 
 It was the circumstances of Paul VI’s upbringing and life that influenced the 
course of these events. Many other contemporary forces helped shape the life of Paul VI 
(Giovannni Battista Montini) and made him an important personality in the life of the 
                                                 
9 Peter Hebbelthwaite, Paul VI: The First Modern Pope, (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 13.  
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Church and society in general. He personally experienced them as he grew up and 
interacted with the world in which he lived. According to Hebblethwaite, Giovanni 
Battista Montini “…had first-hand knowledge of Modernism, Futurism, Facism, Nazism, 
Communism, Thirdworldism, Feminism, Ecology - all the movements that shook and 
shaped the century now closing [20th century].”10 All these phenomena impacted Paul 
VI’s thoughts, life and actions. 
A. Childhood, Educational and Vocational Developments (1897- May 29,1920) 
 
Pope Paul VI, christened Giovanni Battista Enrico Antonio Maria Montini, the 
second of three sons, was born on September 26, 1897 at Concesio, Brescia in Lombardy, 
in northern Italy, of Giorgio Montini and Guiditta Alghisi, a family initially of lesser 
nobility that rose to higher status.11 Giovanni Battista Montini was born to a wealthy 
family of ancient and respected elites, professionals, and intellectuals of a profoundly 
Catholic background which eventually emerged as upper class nobility. His father, 
Giorgio Montini, “was a principal editorial writer and reporter. . . .” 12 though he was 
actually a professional lawyer. Clancy had this to say of Giorgio’s influence on his son: 
He had profound influence on young Giovanni Battista. The latter’s gifts as an organizer, his 
involvement in social questions, his charity, his intense interest in art and philosophy, his love of 
writing, his commitment to all the aspects of modern life - these were to come to him from his 
father, as in his home he received the most modern educations [sic] free from narrowness and 
provincial flavor which characterized so many homes in those years before the First World War.13  
 
The above claim alludes to elements Paul VI would later articulate in Populorum 
Progressio: charity and participation, involvement, the diverse social questions and open-
                                                 
10 Ibid.,1. 
11 Alden Hatch, Pope Paul VI (New York: Random House, 1966), 12-13. Also see Hebbelthwaite, 17-18; 
William E. Barrett, Shepherd of Mankind: A Biography of Pope Paul VI (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1964), 45; John G. Clancy, Apostle for Our Time: Pope Paul VI (New York: 
P.J.Kennedy and Sons, 1963), 2. 
12 Hatch, 15. 
13 Clancy, 7. 
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mindedness, which would be expressed in his idea of integral human development. 
Charity or generosity to the poor and interest in public affairs were also qualities that 
Giovanni Battista’s mother, Guiditta, exhibited, and so his qualities were partly a blend of 
the qualities of both parents.14 This is the trend of life Giovanni Battista Montini would 
follow most of his life.  
Battista Montini had two brothers and no sisters, yet he grew in the company of 
three experienced women - his mother, paternal grandmother and an unmarried aunt - 
who probably helped to shape his attitude towards women. Hebblethwaite suggests such 
influence on him and says that “from his student days in 1919 he welcomed women at 
conferences, and was always on the lookout for talented women to serve the Church in 
what today would be called ‘ministry’.”15  
Battista Montini’s early educational life was surrounded by a diversity of 
experiences. He was not very outgoing in the early years of his childhood and school. 
Initially, he “was only completely at ease in the insulated serenity of his family circle.”16 
However, this phenomenon eventually changed. As he grew he became more open and 
less shy. 
 Giovanni Battista Montini was raised in a unique environment, compared to other 
places in Italy, because the region was rich and fertile, industrially wealthy, a 
reconciliation of diversities, which produced a macrocosm and a “political barometer of 
Italy.”17 His family closely associated with advocates and lovers of modernism and 
people who looked forward to the day of active involvement and contribution of 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 8. 
15 Hebbelthwaite, 5-6. Paul VI personally assigned prominent positions to women in different capacities. 
16 Hatch, 16. 
17 Hebbelthwaite, 21. 
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Catholics to the socio-economic and political life of Italy, and to an age of harmonious 
working of science and religion. The home of his parents had more influence on his 
personality than the school environment. It was very hospitable, open to all calibers of 
people - clerics, lawyers, politicians and writers - and the family discipline was strict yet 
carefully moderated, and it was comprised of various aspects of life including practices 
that were spiritual, religious, traditional and cultural. 18 
Battistta Montini was a frail and sickly child but intelligent. He received his early 
education from the Jesuits of Brescia, his home place.19 In 1903, at the age of six 
Giovanni Battista Montini started school at the Jesuit school, Collegio Cesare Arici, 
where he studied until 1914.20  
In 1914, in accordance with the decision of his parents, Giovanni Battista Montini 
had to “leave the Jesuit College of Arici, for health reasons, and finish his education 
privately, taking exams at the state high school, Arnaldo da Brescia.”21 He completed his 
studies at the Jesuit Institute of Liceo Arnaldo da Brescia at the age of 19. It was during 
this same year that he disclosed his intention to become a priest, though this was not “a 
surprise but neither was it inevitable” for as a child he never thought of being a priest and 
his grandmother, Francesca, wanted him to serve the secular world.22 By making this 
decision Battista Montini departed from his family’s traditional vocations of medicine, 
law and public service. Initially his dreams were patriotic but were  frustrated by his poor 
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health despite his efforts to improve it through vacation and rest.23 When he wanted to 
join the Italian military to defend his country in 1916, he was found unfit and denied that 
service to which he felt he was called, necessitating him to make another choice of 
vocation.24 In the same year (1916) he entered the Seminary of Brescia, though, in fact, 
he was dispensed from living in the seminary because of his poor health, and he lived and 
studied at home, to train to become a Catholic priest. As a seminarian his father involved 
him in some extra projects. Giorgio Montini scheduled Giovanni Battista’s life and 
involved him to work in his Cucine Economiche, a kind of soup kitchen for the poor 
where Giovanni Battista served people with humility, charity, friendliness, and listened to 
their problems and treated them humanely.25  
In 1917, together with Andrea Trebeschi, Giovanni Battista Montini founded a 
student magazine called La Fionda. As editor of the paper he exhibited great 
organizational abilities and skills and made numerous contributions, since he was an 
intelligent student, often at the top of the class.26 Clancy’s study of Battista Montini’s life 
shows that he followed the regular curriculum of the seminary but privately pursued his 
own agenda.  
While at the seminary he studied the usual courses in Philosophy and Theology and church history 
and Scripture, at home he continued to grow in knowledge of political and social forces shaping 
the world. . . . There was always a balance in the forces that shaped Giovanni Battista 
intellectually.27  
 
Battista Montini manifested a global and comprehensive outlook of life and the 
general human situation. This, partially, explains why he thought integrally and wrote 
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Populorum Progressio the way he did. According to Barrett “Battista Montini was in 
tune with the thinking of his time, politically and philosophically, through his active role 
in the discussion groups of Brescia . . . .”28 but from what Clancy states, it is correct to 
say that part of his knowledge, experience and standing depended on his private readings, 
interests, encounters with the friends of his family and the input of his family members. 
All these shaped him and contributed to his attainment of the goal to the priesthood and 
of his entire career. He was ordained a priest on November 21, 1920 by Bishop Gaggia.29 
B. From Brescia to Rome/Vatican 1920-1953 
 
After ordination Battista Montini’s plan was to get involved in pastoral work and 
to experience the actual life of the people. However, on November 10, 1920, because his 
bishop wanted him to pursue further studies, he entered the Lombardy Seminary and 
enrolled for courses at the Gregorian University and the University of Rome.30 He 
pursued advanced studies at these universities and at the Accademia dei Nobili 
Ecclesiastici, the Academy of the Noble Ecclesiastics, which he entered during the fall of 
the year 1922.31  
Battista Montini was soon to leave Rome for a sojourn outside Italy. “In May 
1923, Don Battista went to Warsaw, Poland, to act as secretary to the Apostolic Nuncio, 
Archbishop Lorenzo Lauri and his assistant Monsignor Carlo Chiarlo.”32 Later in 1924 he 
was appointed assistant chaplain for C.U.C.R - the Circolo Universitario Catholico 
Romano - “a club for Roman Catholic students, at the University of Rome. . . .” and 
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according to Hatch, he was made “an assistant chaplain of the University of Rome 
Branch of the Federation of Italian Catholic University students generally known as 
FUCI.”33 Eventually Pius XI appointed him to be the national moderator of FUCI 
(Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana). Although he and FUCI suffered 
humiliation from the Facists of Italy, he never abandoned the course of helping young 
Catholics as their chaplain and moderator. 
From 1932 until 1933 Battista Montini was a member of the Vatican Department 
of State, “diplomatic arm of the Holy See”, and he also conducted classes in Accademia 
dei Nobili Ecclesiastici.34 Shortly thereafter he was promoted to higher positions. In 1936 
he became Papal undersecretary of State, where he served in moments of crisis and 
turmoil as one of the central Vatican figures in the struggles against external and 
domestic forces, especially during the peak activities of the Nazis and communists and 
during the holocaust and the world wars.35  
Due to his administrative and leadership abilities Battista Montini earned 
important positions in the Vatican. In 1937 Monsignor Montini was summoned to the 
office of “Secretary of State and named Sostituto of the Secretariat of the State . . . .”36 
(Subsititute for Ordinary Affairs) and from 1944 until 1954 he acted as Secretary of State 
for Pius XII. When working in the Vatican he founded a service for prisoners of war, 
employed radio as an aggressive means to communicate, established a resettlement for 
those displaced and taken to concentration camps, showed mercy to refugees, offered 
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hope and assistance to many such people including Jews who lived in fear in the Europe 
of 1942.37  
In the post-World War II years Battistta Montini was deeply interested and 
involved in works of charity and peace. He founded and supported organizations that 
worked towards helping the poor, weak and dispossessed, and worked hard for peace and  
tried to promote a deeper understanding of the meaning of peace.38 He was entrusted with 
the responsibility of preparing for the Holy Year in 1950. He articulated a notion of 
authentic peace, which became one of the requisite conditions for integral human 
development in his encyclical Populorum Progressio, in the way he had previously 
articulated it in 1949. This claim is supported by Clancy, according to whom Battista 
Montini emphasized the notion and vitality of peace in the following words: 
The world had come to think of peace, he said, as merely a cessation of battle, a failure to resist. 
Not this, not the abandonment of principle, not the desire to enjoy life and the compromise making 
this possible, and certainly not the enforced peace of totalitarian regimes - none of these was 
peace.39  
 
Prior to Populorum Progressio, in 1963, John XXIII wrote Pacem in Terris, 
which promoted the notion of peace based on the dignity of the human person. This was 
not a surprise because Battista Montini was a contributor to the draft of Pacem in Terris. 
He is even said to be the thinking behind this encyclical of John XXIII.40 Peace is 
founded on shared human dignity and human dignity is shared because of the common 
origin of humanity. Peace can be attained if human dignity is valued, and development is 
possible only because human dignity is valued. For this reason the issue of peace was 
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crucial to Battista Montini’s agendum of integral human development in Populorum 
Progressio. This explains why Paul VI considered development and peace as synonyms, 
and called development “the new name for peace.” 41  
C. From Vatican (Rome) to Milan, 1954-1963 
 
 On November 3, 1954 Monsignor Montini was appointed Archbishop of Milan, 
consecrated on December 12 of the same year, and assumed the most challenging 
assignment in the whole of Italy.42 It was challenging because of the contextual diversity 
in which he worked. The situation was one of industrial growth, enlightenment, 
ultramontane, modern civilization, affluence, soulessness, neurosis and despair.43 The 
diverse challenges he encountered partly explain why he wrote an encyclical that made 
the notion of integral human development central, although his biographies do not make 
explicit statements to that effect. This is further manifested in his approach to conflicts. 
He did not like conflicts. He preferred persuasion, conversion and peacefully winning 
people to his side.44 He sought peace and persuaded people through the translation of 
Christian social principles into reality, maintenance of the dignity of people and labor and 
provision of hope and vision.45 The dignity of the human person and integral human 
development are at the center of the questions he attempted to articulate in Populorum 
Progressio. The fact that Battista Montini’s theme of integral human development was 
emphatically projected in his life before his pontificate is attested to by what Clancy 
recounts him saying: 
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I should like to see the workers given every assistance - social, professional, religious. I should 
like them to realize not only the wrong done them by forcing on them the materialistic view of 
life, but that our own spiritual view of life has far more respect for them as persons and recognizes 
in them the boundless treasure of a soul that thinks and prays and believes. I should like to see 
technical schools helping them to realize that there can be a vocation, a redemptive value, a 
religious dignity in human work . . . . 46 
 
Such expression of attachment to the workers explains why Battista Montini is 
sometimes called “the Archbishop of workers.”47 In his attempts to meet the needs of 
workers one can notice his holistic approach to their problems. Battista Montini looked at 
development from both material and spiritual points of view. He later developed this 
vision of true human development in Populorum Progressio, a view which Clancy 
affirms, acknowledging with Battista Montini that the two dimensions of the human 
person have to grow in a balanced manner to affirm that the person is truly developed.48  
Battista Montini’s emphasis on the religious dignity of work is related to the 
private ownership of property, which he upholds in a qualified way. According to him 
ownership of private property should be disinterested, just and enhancing to the human 
condition.49 The questions of human dignity, private ownership of property, justice and 
human rights, which eventually featured in Populorum Progressio, are here anticipated. 
Giovanni Battista Montini had genuine concern for people, caring about both 
material and spiritual dimensions of the human person. As an archbishop, Montini 
reorganized diocesan structures, revitalized social action and newspapers and magazines, 
inspired and encouraged priests to be involved in spiritual and social acts of charity and 
to guide the populace in moments of crisis. He established an archdiocesan office of 
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charity, and built inexpensive churches all over the Archdiocese of Milan to care for the 
needs of the growing population, and he established an institute for priests to study 
sociology and economics to help them explain the social doctrine besides explaining 
dogma.50 A comprehensive vision of life and undertakings for development reinforce 
Battista Montini’s advocacy for integral human development.  
In 1957 Battista Montini initiated an integral mission, one of his most powerful 
pastoral initiatives, in the Archdiocese of Milan, that aimed at reaching out to different 
categories of people in the community. The project also involved the expertise of people 
from different walks of life. It was directed to hospitals, clinics, homes of the sick and the 
elderly, women and men, and schools as a priority because education is the means of 
transforming people’s life.51 Hatch says of this mission that 
Montini’s most spectacular offensive in his battle against the forces of atheism was the Mission of 
Milan. . . . starting on November 4, 1957 and lasting for three weeks….52  
 
This mission revealed the mind and intentions of a man who wanted no person 
and no aspect of human life to be excluded in the struggle for development. This was 
Battista Montini’s outlook from an international or a global point of view. He further 
demonstrated this when, in 1957, he founded “the Overseas College especially for 
Catholic students from underdeveloped countries, and Indians, Africans, South 
Americans, Syrians and Indonesians were among those granted the opportunity for free 
education” in the College.53 Here again it is apparent that the future pope had a keen 
interest in the development of all people and this was later reflected in Populorum 
Progressio. The development he advocated was of the whole person. Here we notice a 
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man who tries to strike a balance between faith and material social action, and ensures 
that the two are integrated. For Battista Montini when social action is being promoted 
traditional Christian teaching should not be compromised or overlooked because both are 
essential for an integrated growth of the human person. Hatch confirms this when he 
states: “But for all his progressive ideas Montini was firm in preserving the deposit.”54 
On December 18, 1958 Battista Montini was named a cardinal. As cardinal he 
was enthusiastic and instrumental in the preparation for the Second Vatican Council, and 
particularly emphasized the importance of the dialogue of Christianity with the modern 
world.55 Alden Hatch says: 
Montini’s enthusiasm for the council stemmed from his ardent wish to bring the Church into 
harmony with the Kingdom of the Modern World without losing any significant traditions. . . . the 
Cardinal Archbishop of Milan was the first member of the Sacred College to publicly hail the 
Pope’s move toward the renewal of the Church.56  
 
On January 25, 1959 when Pope John XXIII announced to the College of 
Cardinals his intention to convene an Ecumenical Council, the news was not well 
received by a majority of the Cardinals, but it was good news for Montini. This partially 
explains his contributions during the Second Vatican Council, especially in drafting 
Gaudium et Spes. It also helps us to understand why and how the document influenced 
Paul VI’s thoughts in his own encyclical, Populorum Progressio. Finally, Battista 
Montini’s interest in seeing the Church placed in the modern context demonstrates the 
legacy of his contacts with personalities like his father Giorgio, Andrea Trebeschi, Paolo 
Caresana, Giulio Bevilaqua, Giovanni Maria Longinotti, Jean Guitton, Jacques Maritain, 
Fornari and Henri de Lubac who all looked forward to dialogue between the Church and 
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modernism, or at least seeing the Church placed in a context where dialogue could be 
fostered. 
 The preparation of the Second Vatican Council would also provide him with an 
opportunity to encounter people who had views similar to his. He would particularly meet 
the French Dominican priest, Louis Joseph Lebret, whose vision of life was similar to his 
own, and who eventually helped him to draft Populorum Progressio when he was pope. 
D. The Return from Milan to Vatican (Rome), 1963-1978 
 
On June 21, 1963, after John XXIII died, Battista Montini was elected to succeed 
him as pope and he returned to Rome. He took the name Paul VI, and emphasized the 
significance of dialogue between Christianity and the Modern world.57 Due to his travels 
and diverse experience, he viewed life and the world comprehensively. He was conscious 
that the world consists of “the common man in a diversity of races, beliefs, national and 
cultural backgrounds” and he was comprehensively sensitive to the diverse forces 
affecting the world of his time, thus making him a “global thinker.”58 His mind was 
already reflected in the words of the 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, of John XXIII 
whose writing he influenced. According to Clancy, Paul VI had the following to say: 
One cannot overlook the fact that even though human beings differ from one another by virtue of 
their ethnic peculiarities, they all possess certain essential common elements and are inclined by 
nature to meet each other in the world of spiritual values, whose progressive assimilation opens to 
them the possibility of perfection without limits. They have the right and duty therefore to live in 
communion with one another.59 
 
These words forecast Paul VI’s mind in Populorum Progressio where he shows 
that integral development, its necessity and possibility are based on the common origin 
and the shared human dignity of all people. Though he did not elaborate, he advanced the 
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dignity and rights of the human person as core principles and foundation stones for peace, 
justice and development. As one who lived in times of political, social and economic 
turmoil, Paul VI was sensitive to peace. Having contributed to the preparation of the 1950 
Holy Year, which had the intention of elucidating the idea of peace, and being a 
contributor to the drafting of John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris, he had already pushed 
forward some of the peace agenda he intended to perpetuate. Hatch describes Paul VI’s 
concern for peace when he says: 
The pope’s overriding preoccupation beyond, even the work of the Council was World peace, and 
in speech after speech, in allocutions and informal talks, he emphasized his intense concern.60 
 
Chronologically, since Pope John XXIII died in 1963 and Giovanni Battista 
Montini was elected pope the same year, he bridged the First Vatican Council (1870) and 
the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). He brought the Second Vatican Council to 
completion in 1965 and implemented the deliberations and the acts of the Council up to 
his death in1978. It can be suggested that what he implemented after the Second Vatican 
Council was not novelty to him because it was a doctrine to which he contributed. 
E. People who influenced Paul VI 
 
 The personality of Paul VI was a blend of personalities of some of the people of 
the society and time in which he lived, especially those with whom he interacted and who 
shaped his life from childhood to adulthood. The main concern of this part of the work is 
just to treat some of the significant people who are in this category.  
1. PARENTAL AND FAMILY INFLUENCE 
 
Paul VI was aware of the influence of his parents on his life. According to him, 
his father Giorgio’s influence was that of courage because he “did not know fear” but 
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knew how to “be a witness”; and his mother Guiditta’s influence was one of “the sense of 
recollection of the interior life, of meditation that is of prayer, of prayer that is 
meditation. . . . All her life was a gift.”61 However, the personality of Giorgio was more 
dominant in Paul VI than that of Guiditta.  
This is not to deny the influence of his mother upon him because spiritually 
Guiditta influenced him significantly. This just shows that each of the parents influenced 
him differently. Paul VI’s personality and life were, therefore, partly a reflection of a 
blend of the character and life of his parents, and partly his own making and the influence 
of other people.  
2. ANDREA TREBESCHI 
 
  There was an enduring relationship between Paul VI and Andrea Trebeschi. Paul  
VI first met Trebeschi at the age of 6 at Cesare Arici but they did not become friends 
until eleven years later.62 On November 30, 1914 he disclosed to Trebeschi his intention 
to become a priest when they met on St. Andrew’s day, and Trebeschi encouraged him to 
carry out his plan.63 Trebeschi became one of Battista’s closest friends as a youth, and 
also a source of encouragement and mutual support, especially because they shared 
similar views of life and the world. 
 The two, however, at times were separated from each other by life’s demands. 
Nonetheless, they were able to work together whenever they had the opportunity. This is 
how they founded a student newspaper.64 After the winter of 1917, when Trebeschi was 
back from Bologna after pursuit of studies in Law, the two “began to plan a student 
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magazine, called La Fionda (The Sling) which had its first issue on 15th June 1918.”65 
The magazine was launched “with the aid of other young crusaders, designed to forward 
the aims of the Society of Saints Faustina and Giovita,” founded by his father, and “to 
combat current evils and serve the cause of Christian democracy.”66 
Battista Montini and Trebeschi shared the same confessor, Caresana, who saw the 
“faith-potential of their friendship.”67 Their common relationship with Caresana 
consolidated their friendship. Even if factors of life separated them they kept 
communicating with each other in letters for “Battista knew the need of love, took the 
risk of love, was compassionate and deeply vulnerable. Friendship pulled him out of 
himself.”68 
Trebeschi was an example, comfort and encouragement to Battista in moments of 
“darkness and doubt.”69 The relationship between Trebeschi and Battista Montini 
continued even though they embraced different vocations. Trebeschi’s article in the 
magazine La Fionda, contributed to the issue of 5th Sept 1925, which articulated and 
related his Polish experience to the wider world, namely to “concepts such as people, 
nation, nationality, country (patria), state, government, patriotism” significantly impacted 
Battista Montini.70 According to Hebbelthwaite the influence of Trebeschi on Battista 
Montini is evident because 
Montini defended patriotism as a fundamental Christian virtue, the concrete expression of “love of 
one’s neighbor.” It can be corrupted or go horribly wrong, but patriotism as neighborly love is the 
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right place to start. He actually calls it “fraternal solidarity.”  Naturally he expects Polish 
patriotism to take Christian shape. . . . 71  
 
 This quotation affirms elements striking to and influential upon Paul VI. They 
were also eventually reflected in his vision of life. It also shows his wish for the 
integration of specific cultural practices with Christian values. This vision of life was 
probably facilitated by Paul VI’s short life in the Secretariat of the Nunciature in 
Warsaw, Poland, and his encounters with people of different cultural backgrounds.  
3. FRANCESCO GALLONI 
 
Francesco Galloni was a priest appointed to Concesio in August 1915. Shortly 
after his appointment he became an adopted member of the Montini family and 
influenced Battista Montini. He had many plans of which contact with the youth of the 
outlying areas was impressive to Battista Montini, but Galloni impressed Battista most 
because he “was among other things an authority in Alessandro Manzoni, the nineteenth 
century Italian novelist,” and his works, and finally he was a young priest, barely older 
than Giovanni Battista himself, and he “was zealous, cultivated and pious.”72 
Consequently, Giovanni Battista adopted Galloni as a priest-model and a senior brother. 
In May 1915 Italy was at war with Austria, all Italians were called to fight and 
there was “no clerical exemption” in the military service. Consequently, Galloni, 
Battista’s new friend, enlisted to go and fight, but before his departure Battista requested 
to have a retreat with Galloni at Camaldonese hermitage at San Genesio in the Brianza 
mountains, and they were joined by Caresana who was also the spiritual mentor of 
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Galloni.73 However, on reaching the Hermitage they got a cold reception. The two priests 
could stay with the monks, but Giovanni Battista was denied accommodation because he 
was a layman, though he was eventually given a “woodshed” to sleep in as instructed by 
the superior of the monks.74 This was a learning experience for Giovanni Battista. He 
learned to be receptive to all people, and not to alienate and discriminate against 
anybody. He has no personal and explicit statement to this effect but this can be deduced 
from his life and writings. 
Although Galloni went to the barracks and the two were separated from each 
other during the war, Battista kept communicating with him and he was in the battle- 
field with Galloni in spirit, implying that one factor that united Battista and Galloni was  
their patrioitic attitudes.75 This also explains how caring and concerned Giovanni Battista  
was and how intimate they were, not only as friends but also spiritually. 
4. GIULIO BEVILAQUA 
 
Giulio Bevilaqua was an Oratorian priest, born in Verona in the year 1881, 
appointed to work in La Pace in Brescia. He was a compulsive and unconventional 
person who “disliked learning which was not backed up by experience.”76 According to 
Bevilaqua knowledge should be founded on practical life experience and lead to a 
practical living. This explains why he was able to see the link between the Church’s 
social teaching and liturgy. 
Bevilaqua was at first Paul VI’s room-mate and later his confessor, even after 
Giovanni Battista became pope. This explains why Paul VI is said to have owed 
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Bevilaqua so much wisdom and spiritual inspiration, and why Bevilaqua was later made 
Cardinal by Paul VI when he was pope.77 Giovanni Battista was close to Bevilaqua who 
constantly extended his cultural and intellectual horizons and taught Giovanni Battista to 
look for the signs of the Holy Spirit in the Modern World.78 This eventually played into 
Giovanni Battista’s interest in other cultures and his enthusiasm for traveling to other 
lands beyond Italy. To Giovanni Battista, Bevilaqua was and remained a source of 
support, encouragement and counsel, and a “master and friend” as Paul VI (Giovanni 
Battista) himself later said when making Bevilaqua a Cardinal in 1965.79 
Bevilaqua guided Battista in his reading of some of the literature of that time but  
he left Brescia on February 5, 1917 to serve as an army chaplain, though soon thereafter 
he was taken prisoner. However, Bevilaqua had already helped Battista to become aware 
that  
reading was not a self-indulgent retreat into an aesthetic ivory tower but a way of listening to the 
contemporary world. . . . Reading was the first stage towards what would become dialogue. Later 
he would present Bevilaqua himself in the figure of “modern man,” the modern thinker, with all 
the energy, the weariness, the doubts, the struggles, the discouragements, and the hopes that the 
philosophical, scientific, religious and social crises have caused in the exhausted soul of modern 
man.80 
 
Bevilaqua taught Battista Montini to read for a purpose, not just as a hobby. In 
other words, Battista Montini’s mentor taught him to use what he read to interpret real 
life situations confronting people in the current world, and to act to change the status quo 
if this was necessary. In their relation Bevilaqua was not just a friend, he was also an 
advisor to Battista Montini.81 
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5. PAOLO CARESANA 
 
 Paolo Caresana, from Pavia province, was a calm diocesan priest who worked 
among “the oppressed rice-growers of his province, whose cause he defended, and later 
joined the Oratorians in 1912, and became the confessor and spiritual director of Battista 
Montini and remained so for life.”82 He was a confessor to both Battista and his friend 
Trebeschi, and he asked Battista Montini to help him in his various pastoral ministries. 
During the war Caresana employed Battista Montini as his unofficial and unpaid 
secretary.83 It is, however, not easy to measure fully how much influence he had on 
Battista Montini because their relationship was a spiritual and confidential one, but they 
had a long relationship.  
Battista Montini met Caresana for the first time during a retreat in 1915 through 
his friend Galloni who was also the spiritual son of Caresana.84 Caresana was Bevilaqua’s 
oratorian colleague who helped Battista Montini through 1917. He frequented the 
Montini family because he helped out in their parish church of San Giovanni. Battista 
Montini considered his fatherhood as “my seminary.”85 The relationship between 
Giovanni Battista and Caresana was motivated by the similarities in the attitudes of the 
two. Like Bevilaqua, Battista Montini was attracted to Caresana, partly because they both 
liked the cycling sports. However, their relationship went deeper than sports to real issues 
affecting life, both spiritually and materially. 
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6. JEAN GUITTON  
 
 Jean Guitton’s intellectual qualities influenced Giovanni Battista. Guitton was a 
French philosopher to whom Paul VI was partially attracted because he was French. Paul 
VI had a great admiration for and attachment to “the French Dominicans and Jesuits who 
were Montini’s masters.”86 Paul VI and Guitton first met in 1950 and Paul VI was 
probably attracted to Guitton because “Guitton, member of the Academie Francaise was 
every inch a French intellectual capable of transmitting the most banal observations by 
brilliance of his style.”87 It was Guitton’s intellectual qualities that Giovanni Battista 
wanted to and did emulate in his own life.  
The two had several intellectual exchanges. Guitton always sent Giovanni Battista 
Montini his new publications, and their enduring relationship, which started in 1950, 
involved a lot of dialogues initiated the same year.88 These dialogues ultimately proved 
useful for and exerted influence on Giovanni Battista. 
Giovanni Battista Montini’s encounter with Guitton was helpful to him in his 
analysis of situations. It was partly because he looked at life in the light of Guitton’s 
vision that he was able to recognize “the experience of modernity” 89 during his sojourn 
in Paris when the duo partially discussed the use of intellectual abilities in articulating 
issues correctly and to arrive at mutual consensus about issues. From such exercises 
Giovanni Battista Montini seemed to have learned to be more open, to learn from others, 
to be more objective, and to look at things more critically than ever before.  
                                                 
86 Ibid., 9. 
87 Ibid., 10. 
88 Clancy, 132. To understand the nature of the dialogues between Jean Guitton and Paul VI and the extent 
of the influence of Jean Guitton on Paul VI read Jean Guitton, The Pope Speaks: Dialogues of Paul VI with 
Jean Guitton Trans. Anne and Christopher Fremantle (New York: Meredith Press,1968), 5ff. 
89 Hebbelthwaite, 86, and 236-237. 
  37
7. KARL ADAM  
 
 Karl Adam was another influential person upon Giovanni Battista. He was a 
leading German Catholic theologian and a reformist Tubingen University Professor who 
“represented the best of Catholic thinking at that time.”90 Karl Adam was one of the 
people who greatly contributed to Catholic aggiornamento even if this was not 
immediately recognized and acknowledged publicly. One of Adam’s influences upon 
Battista Montini was through the latter’s reading of Adam’s book, The Essence of 
Catholicism, which imprinted an indelible influence on Giovanni Battista Montini’s 
ecclesiological thoughts. The final chapter of the work, entitled Catholicism in its 
Actuality, made a radical change from the idealistic view of Christianity and Catholicism 
to the actuality of Catholicism, which addressed practical and relevant issues like the 
place of sin in the Church, and from the “contrast between the ‘essence’ of the Church 
and its existential reality Adam deduced that the Church was in need of constant 
reform.”91 The works were attractive to Giovanni Battista Montini because he was 
interested in the transformation of the life of people when necessary. The Spirit of 
Catholicism, in particular, captured his attention because it implied a reform project, 
although this was a very controversial issue at that time.92 
 Robert Anthony Krieg says that “according to Adam, Catholicism embraces all 
that is truly human. It is an affirmation of all values wherever they may be, in heaven or 
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on earth.”93 Here Adam gives a holistic or integral view of the Church which Paul VI 
would accept with ease. The influence of Adam’s writings was significant to Battista 
Montini because he lived and worked in a confused world where he wanted to provide a 
“theology for committed lay people, giving them a sense of spiritual direction”, and “the 
Church to which he introduced students was in need of reform.”94 The ideas of Adam 
were useful to Battista Montini when the Second Vatican Council was convoked and 
there was a felt need to read and analyze the signs of the times to address the needs of the 
world of that time.95 At this juncture, it is correct to suggest that during the Second 
Vatican Council the ideas in Adam’s writings influenced Battista Montini’s (Paul VI’s) 
contributions in the drafting and deliberations of Gaudium et Spes, which addressed 
ordinary life issues and placed the Church in dialogue with the modern world. 
8. JACQUES MARITAIN  
 
 Jacques Maritain was a French philosopher. He wrote a work entitled La 
Primaute du Spirituel. Through this work and other works he had a great influence on 
Italian Catholics. This influence was partly facilitated by the translations Battista Montini 
made in 1928 and 1934.96 When studying French, Battista Montini met Maritain at the 
Institute Catholique or some other place in France, and encountered other outstanding 
Frenchmen of different backgrounds during this time.  
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 Maritain influenced Giovanni Battista Montini who eventually translated and 
introduced Maritain’s Three Reformers to Italian readers.97 These were Martin Luther, 
Rene Descartes and Jean Jacques Rousseau whose works together resulted in the French 
Revolution and a modern world. Battista Montini’s attraction to Maritain was possibly 
because in him Battista found somebody with his own type of attitude, an attitude 
positive towards reforms. It was the knowledge from the writings of Maritain and other 
people that was ultimately attractive to the young students.98 
 9. HENRI DE LUBAC 
 
 Henri de Lubac’s life and writings impacted Battista Montini. He was influenced 
by what he knew and read about Henri de Lubac and some of his writings.99 Battista 
Montini’s reading of Henri de Lubac’s Meditation on the Church had an impact on his 
vision of the church, especially “the doctrine on collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen 
Gentium.”100 Many of the ideas of Henri de Lubac in this book found their way into 
Lumen Gentium, and some of these were the ideas of the centrality of Mary in the church 
and ecclesiology, the mysterious nature of the church, and the sacramental character of 
the church, instead of viewing the church as a perfect society contesting the “infiltration 
of the modern world.”101 Such ideas were assimilated by Giovanni Battista who used 
them during the Second Vatican Council and his pontificate. The ideas found their way 
into the thoughts of Giovanni Battista Montini because he favored a dialogue between the 
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church and the modern world. This was reflected in Gaudium et Spes which influenced 
Paul VI’s writing of Populorum Progressio tremendously. 
 In conclusion, we can say that Giovanni Battista’s various encounters and 
experiences with different people were ultimately all important in various moments of his 
life. These experiences shaped his philosophy of life. His selfless love and compassion, 
deep and caring sensitivity and concern, determination, easy, diversified and on-going 
relationships with people of all colors and religions, openness to criticisms, his integral 
vision of life and approach to issues, and his well-developed talents were consequent to 
his diverse encounters and experiences.102 It was due to such diversity of experience that 
Paul VI was able to conceive of an aggiornamento, a reform of the Church, as one of the 
aims of the Second Vatican Council, and he “was able to affirm the value of the world 
without diminishing the uniqueness of the Church” or “to balance tradition and reform 
without compromising either.”103  
III. THE ENCYCLICAL, CONCILIAR AND PASTORAL TRADITION PRECEDING 
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO 
 
A. Rerum Novarum: On the Condition of Labor (1891) - Pope Leo XIII 
 
Rerum Novarum marks the foundation of modern Catholic social teaching. 
According to Donal Dorr the document was a breakthrough and major solution to the 
social question and the first Church document to initiate vigorous attempts to resolve 
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social problems - a “solid foundation on which the later encyclicals and other Church 
documents could build.”104 Barret confirms this assertion by acknowledging that Rerum  
Novarum was  
one of the world’s great social documents, a high point of Christian thinking on the condition of 
the laboring classes and on the relationship between employer and employed.105 
 
The document addressed specific questions about the changes in industry, 
physical sciences and labor, disparities between the rich and the poor, and increased self-
reliance of workers and moral degeneration which influenced the course of economic 
activities.106 The document was the brain-child of Leo XIII, the protagonist of the 
framework of modern Catholic social teaching. However, this does not mean that the 
problems addressed in Rerum Novarum were not previously addressed. In fact, Christian 
social workers and social movements created before 1891 were already dealing with 
social problems. Schafer notes that: 
The social encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1891 confirmed the beginnings of the solution to the 
‘social question’ which had taken shape within the German Catholicism of the nineteenth century 
and had been arrived at through disputes and class struggles in society and the church.107  
 
This contention is affirmed by David O’Brien and Thomas Shannon who think 
that “in Rerum Novarum, written in 1891, Leo attempted to persuade Catholics to 
concentrate less on politics and more on the “social question.”108 The place of the 
document in Catholic social thought is certain. According to Peter J. Henriot and others,  
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because of the principles which he set forth to guide in the formation of a just society, this 
document has become known as the Magna carta for a humane economic and social order.109  
 
In Rerum Novarum Leo XIII attempted to resolve a wide range of issues that 
affected human society before and at the time it was written, and even later. Leo XIII’s 
teaching about living wages was empathetic and “put the Church squarely on the side of 
the workers in the struggle for recognition of trade unions.”110 This resonates with the 
alternative English title of the document, “On the Condition of Labor” and confirms the 
view that the ‘new things’ Rerum Novarum fundamentally dealt with was the question of 
the condition of workers.111 Leo XIII articulated the recurrent contemporary socio-
economic and political problems in society, critiqued the socialist solutions to the 
problems, laid out the role of the Church in society, outlined and explicated the rights and 
duties of workers and employees, treated the question of just and legitimate ownership 
and the just use of money, the duties and the responsibilities of the state, and its limits of 
intervention for the common good, the importance of the just wage, and finally he “laid a 
solid foundation for the concept of social justice”,112 and the workers’ right of 
association. The document was a reaction to both socialism and capitalism. It dealt with 
the pitfalls of the opposed socio-economic and political systems and ideologies. The 
document’s response was relevant not only for the time and circumstances which it was 
addressing, but also for the situations that prevailed later and today. 
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In addressing major issues such as the “care for the poor, rights of workers and 
employers, return to Christian morals and the role of public authority,”113 Rerum 
Novarum placed the social question in the hands of individuals, institutions, groups and 
society. Leo XIII introduced the question of the equality of people who are distinct from 
other creatures and do not have the honor that people hold. People are the highest 
perfection of animal nature. Human persons have to live in mutual esteem and love 
because of their equality. This implies that everybody has a duty, role and responsibility 
to fulfill. This advocacy was founded on Leo XIII’s contention that all people are created 
equal, have a common destiny and have a right to a share of nature’s resources on the 
basis of sharing a common origin - God.114 The equality Leo advocated was the equality 
of human dignity.  
Another question Leo XIII addressed was that of capital and labor. He was 
particularly concerned about wages paid to people for their work and advocated that it 
should help promote their livelihood.115 Just as he made a distinction between human 
persons and the rest of creation below the human person, recognizing human dignity as 
an important characteristic of the human person, Leo XIII advocated for the rights of 
workers. He in no way advocated that capital and labor are on equal footing. They are 
both important factors of production but labor must be given precedence over capital. 
This is clear in his argument about the equality and dignity of persons. Consequently, he 
contended that the employer, who is the capital owner, may not value himself or capital 
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more than a fellow human being who constitutes labor because all people are created 
equal in dignity, and all need the basic necessities to live a dignified life. 
Leo XIII was aware that some degree of inequality among people is undeniable. 
Naturally, people may be unequal in talents even if God has endowed them with the same 
dignity.116 This is a pragmatic contention because it is indubitable that individual 
differences exist on the basis of personality, character, talents and the ability to perform. 
It is impossible to get the same achievements from all people because of their variable 
traits.  
Leo XIII spoke strongly against socialism, acknowledged the legitimacy of 
ownership of private property, which is also for the benefit of other people. He 
contended, in accordance with divine design, that other people should have a share of the 
private property of an individual. The right is presented here as a natural right. This 
contention was in line with the Early Fathers of the Church, and W.E. von Ketteler’s 
understanding of the use of natural resources that  
in the Christian view human beings have ‘only a God-given right to use the goods of the earth in 
the order that is prescribed by him, with the intent that all human beings should receive their 
necessary bodily needs from the fruit of the earth.’117  
 
The consistent argument about the ownership and the use of private resources is 
that natural resources have a universal destiny – they are for the use of all people. The 
right is conversely presented as a natural right to use the goods of nature. 
Von Ketteler was acknowledging that divine design, according to Christianity, is 
that people are entitled to use natural resources as God willed so that all people receive 
the material needs for their survival. This right is, however, limited by moments when 
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there is a dire need and the person who worked to earn ownership of the property has met 
personal basic and crucial needs. Therefore, this right is not absolute because natural 
resources are destined for the good of all people, they “all have basically the same and 
equal claim to the wealth producing resources of nature.”118 Schafers aptly summarizes 
the whole argument of von Ketteler in these words: 
Nevertheless, the right to property was not an absolute right since God created nature to nourish 
all human beings, and this purpose must be achieved. Therefore, each individual must again make 
the fruits of his property a common good in order as far as in him lies to contribute to the 
achievement of this determination. Here Christian love of neighbor is enjoined for the poor.119  
 
This is a view Paul VI later promoted in Populorum Progressio where he argued 
that in the event that an estate becomes counterproductive to the common good, public 
prosperity would demand that it be expropriated and put to a better use.120 Paul VI 
advocated that resources should be used appropriately and adequately. It is right to 
conclude that like Rerum Novarum, Populorum Progressio restrained the limit of private  
ownership by referring to the needs of other people but Paul VI was more vigorous in 
limiting the right to private ownership of property than Leo XIII. 
According to Leo XIII, society has a crucial responsibility to care for individuals 
in the society. Its purpose and duty is to allow, facilitate and promote the common good 
as its ultimate end.121 This means authority has the responsibility to serve the entire 
community. The contention suggests the significance of the principle of subsidiarity. If 
individuals and small groups are not capable of meeting their needs, the civil authorities 
have the obligation to intervene to help them to meet their needs. It also demonstrates that 
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the wealth of a nation is the fruit of the labor of its working class.122 Civil society should, 
therefore, be envisioned as owned by all its members.  
This viewpoint is what Paul VI later advanced more vigorously, and it has a 
significant implication in the way ownership of wealth or property is understood. On 
account of the fact that labor is crucial for the wealth of a nation and individuals, people 
have the right to own private property. However, private ownership must be limited 
because of the social responsibility of each member of the society. Property should also 
serve the common good and provide for other individuals’ needs.  
Leo XIII’s argument had a dual foundation. First, the workers’ right to private 
ownership of property is grounded in the fact that they have earned what they claim to be 
theirs by working. Since they have worked for what they rightly claim, they have the 
right to dispose of it as they judge fitting. Secondly, the right of other individuals to claim 
the same property is founded on the fact that nature’s resources were not specifically 
predetermined for an individual but for the good of all creation. This is the gist of his 
theological argument here. However, Leo XIII cautioned “that the just ownership of 
money is distinct from the just use of money.”123 This according to him is a significant 
teaching of the Church which has been handed down in the church’s tradition, and ought 
to observed. It is a caution that governs the use of wealth despite the right to own wealth. 
It suggests a responsible use of wealth.  
Just ownership and use of property points to the relational character of ownership 
and disposition of property. This also means that there is a social dimension of both 
personal property and the human person because people share common traits. These need 
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to be cared for by all. Similarly, the dignity of every individual and his rights need to be 
protected by all. According to Curran,  
the beginning of modern Catholic social teaching insisted on what might be called today a 
relational anthropology that avoided the opposite extremes of individualism and collectivism.124  
 
Curran’s claim is crucial for an understanding, appreciation and application of the 
notion of human dignity, human rights and the human person, and ultimately the notion 
of integral human development because development cannot be complete unless it is 
inclusive. This claim, therefore, typifies integral human development advocated by Paul 
VI. It provides a relevant foundation for Paul VI’s teaching on integral human 
development because Paul VI is concerned about the development and the good of all. It 
is here that the relational concept of a person and the phenomenon of integral human 
development challenge the disregard for a relational anthropology, and above all for a 
theological anthropology. The Aristotlean dictum that “man is a social being”, not a being 
in isolation, should be esteemed as relevant and significant in facilitating our vision of 
socio-economic and political issues too.125 The underlying reason here is that a human 
person is always part and parcel of the human family. 
In sum, the contents of Rerum Novarum were as follows: advocacy for a 
movement to develop social conscience and a demand for state intervention in the social 
question; freedom of association for workers; ownership of property; a response to 
socialism and capitalism; and the role of the Church in social questions.126 The document 
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outlined and dealt with the following significant questions and principles for human 
development: the principle of imago Dei or human dignity based on the human origin 
from God, a principle which implies human equality; the questions of common good, 
option for the poor, human rights in general and particularly the right of the workers, the 
universal destiny of the goods of nature and the right to private ownership of property, 
responsible participation and involvement, and the mutual claims and duties or 
obligations of workers and employers. Finally, the document articulated the role of 
affirmative action, understood here as aggressive government intervention to redress 
injustices against the disadvantaged, because it spelt out the role of the state or public 
authority in the enhancement of the human condition.  
B. Quadragessimo Anno: Forty Years Later, On the Reconstruction of  Social Order 
(1931) - Pius XI 
 
Pius XI’s Quadragessimo Anno, written in 1931, was an updating of Rerum 
Novarum. At the time it was written the world faced the effects of the destruction of the 
First World War, the Great Depression, socio-economic and political turmoil and 
anarchy, opposing political economies and social ideologies, systematic socialism and 
capitalism, which compounded conflicts and crises. Pius XI responded to help resolve 
some of these problems. 
 In Quadragessimo Anno Pius XI continued Leo XIII’s intervention in the social  
question and “reaffirmed the right and the duty of the Church to address social issues”.127  
According to him, the Church cannot afford to remain indifferent to the problems of 
people for whose good it was instituted. The document dealt with the recurring problems 
of the Industrial Revolution exacerbated by the great depression at the end of 1920s and 
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its impact on workers.128 Similarly, Henriot and others contend that the document was 
written at a time of “severe world wide economic depression” to address “the issue of 
social justice and” to call “for the reconstruction of social order” 129 in accordance with 
what Leo XIII taught in Rerum Novarum. These views support the idea that in 
Quadragessimo  Anno Pius XI perpetuated the doctrine of Rerum Novarum about the  
defense of workers and their rights-calling for some state intervention, the qualified right to 
private property, which also retains its social dimension, and the condemnation of the extremes of 
socialism and capitalistic individualism.130  
 
Human dignity, human rights, solidarity and social justice which Pius XI 
vigorously introduced into Catholic social teaching were the bases of his “response to the 
extremes of totalitarianism and capitalism” which affected people’s way of conceiving 
the ownership of property.131 By advocating and emphasizing that there should be “social 
responsibilities of private property and the rights of working people to a job, to a just 
wage and to organize to claim their rights,” 132 Pius XI lent his support for what Leo XIII 
taught in Rerum Novarum forty years earlier. Pius XI also reinforced the issue of a life-
supporting wage initially introduced by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum. He demanded that 
remuneration should be adequate to meet the needs of the workers, their families and 
dependents. Alegria says of a just wage that “it should be sufficient reward to cover the 
human needs of the worker and his family.”133  
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As the title of the document suggests, Pius XI contended forty years after Rerum 
Novarum that the social order needed to be reconstructed. This endeavor should include 
“the positive role of governments in promoting the economic good of all people in 
society”.134 He suggested that it was the role of both individual members of the state and 
civil authorities to contribute to the growth and well-being of the state according to their 
capacities. Pius XI called for application of the principle of subsidiarity, anticipated the 
question of ‘option for the poor’, and alluded to what was eventually called the common 
good and affirmative action.135 Some scholars are of this same view. Oliver F. Williams, 
for example, affirms that Quadragesimo Anno clearly stated that “the role of the state is 
to be in the service of society” and “its role is primarily to facilitate the cooperation and 
well-being of the “mediating structures.”136 This thought is also in line with the 
Aristotlean claim, which has an enormous support among scholars, namely, that “the very 
purpose of the state is the good life or happiness of its citizens.”137 Here the purpose, role 
and obligation of the State are clearly stated. The government has the duty to oversee the 
different activities in the state. In the judgment of Pius XI in specific social contexts, 
“economic undertakings should be governed by justice and charity as the principal laws 
of social life”.138 This is a duty the state should accomplish by employing the necessary 
apparatus.  
Pius XI condemned the prevalent unfavorable ideologies of the time. Like Leo 
XIII, Pius XI decried capitalism and communism. He condemned capitalism because of 
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its “unregulated competition” and he “condemned communism for its promotion of class 
struggle and the narrow reliance for leadership on the working class”.139 He contended 
that the evil of capitalism is that it creates a gap between the rich and the poor, and the 
problem with communism is that it kills initiatives and participation, just as it violates the 
right to private ownership of property.  
A careful reading of Pius XI suggests that justice and charity underlie his 
condemnation of the two antagonistic ideologies of communism and capitalism. 
Communism is condemned because it is against justice while capitalism is denounced 
because it is uncharitable. This makes sense because love and justice are mutually 
inclusive. Justice without love is inconsiderately harsh and love breeds justice. The 
absence of justice breeds strife and hatred. He argued for an alternative that would 
integrate the positive elements of both communism and capitalism. According to him the 
“corporatist principles as an alternative to both capitalism and socialism” 140 is the 
solution. Here Pius XI re-echoed the teaching of Leo XIII which was directed against the 
dichotomy between the individual and community, capitalism and socialism. This 
suggests why he tried to provide an alternative policy that merges the two divergent 
ideologies.  
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI furthered ideas of Rerum Novarum by proposing  
a novel alternative system, “based on corporatist principles” 141 as an alternative to 
capitalism and socialism, considered separately. This alternative has been criticized by 
some scholars. Alegria, for example, argues that creating a corporate order as a solution 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 8.Also see Dorr, 75; Walsh and Davies, 41. 
140 Curran, 10. 
141 Dorr, 94. Also see Curran, 10. 
  52
denies to people “freedom of party and association” 142 and is close to the structure of 
totalitarian regimes which practically succumbed to and bent towards capitalist interests. 
He further contends that this is the reason why the later popes and the Second Vatican 
Council remained mute about such a suggestion or this portion of Quadragessimo Anno. 
After all, the document had emphasized the right to free and autonomous association. 
This makes sense because it would be contradictory to suggest corporate order as an 
alternative solution to both capitalism and socialism as it would mean building one 
system out of two different and opposed systems. This is impossible and seems a difficult 
task because as ideologies they are two opposite extremes. 
The teaching of Quadragessimo Anno resembles that of other Catholic social 
encyclicals and pastoral doctrines because it addressed questions and advocated 
development principles present in these other documents. Quadragessimo Anno, both 
implicitly and explicitly, exposed issues, virtues and principles relevant for human 
development. These are the principles of human dignity and subsidiarity, human rights, 
charity, social justice, affirmative action, free association, the common good, and 
participation. Pius XI also treated the question of ownership of private property and its 
social orientation, and that of the option for the poor.143 Just as Pius XI demonstrated in 
his teaching in Quadragessimo Anno that the Church cares, his successor, John XXIII did 
the same in his 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra. 
C. Mater et Magistra: Christianity and Social Progress (1961) - Pope John XXIII 
 
In Mater et Magistra Pope John XXIII continued the encyclical tradition of Leo 
XIII and Pius XI. His choice of the title of the encyclical, referring to the Church as 
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mother and teacher, reechoed the opening paragraphs of Rerum Novarum and 
Quadragessimo Anno because it reaffirmed the Church’s right to teach about the meaning 
of human life and activities. Mater et Magistra affirmed that “the role of the Church is to 
encourage, stimulate, supplement and complement” the efforts of the people.144  
Mater et Magistra, however, specifically focused on and emphasized significant 
developments that occurred after the Second World War. It focused on “aid to 
underdeveloped nations.”145 John XXIII anticipated the fears in Populorum Progressio 
when Paul VI saw the need to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich and to 
achieve peace. Consequently, he “set forth a number of principles to guide both 
Christians and policy makers….” to meet this need.146 John XXIII made a significant 
contribution to Catholic social thought as previous encyclicals did: 
He called on committed Christians and “all people of good will” to work together to create local, 
national, and global institutions which would both respect human dignity and promote justice and 
peace. He emphasized that the growing interdependence among nations in a world community 
called for an effective world government which would look to the rights of the individual human 
person and promote the universal common good.147 
 
The above reading of the document shows a significant contribution from John 
XXIII. He articulated crucial principles and conditions necessary for an integral human 
development as Paul VI called it in Populorum Progressio. Besides agriculture and the 
problems related to it such as agricultural technology, health and crop insurance, price 
management and just wage for farmers, John XXIII dealt with the traditional issues and 
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conditions - human dignity, human rights, justice, peace, solidarity, subsidiarity, active 
government involvement, and the common good.148  
Though not explicitly stated, it can be inferred that when the pontiff speaks of 
“growing interdependence among nations” it is an allusion to the multiplication of social 
relations and a more effective mutual support among governments and peoples of the 
various nations, a contention augmented by the fact that John XXIII “argued for state 
intervention to ensure that property would achieve its social functions”; and the 
underpinning reason for this intervention is that “justice requires that property be used for 
the common good.”149 This means the state is an apparatus for ensuring that property is 
used to meet the needs of individuals and the society. John XXIII advocated collaboration 
at all levels, locally, nationally and internationally.150 When he speaks of effective world 
government, one concludes that the principle of subsidiarity and affirmative action151 are 
also implied here because the two are mutually inclusive. This observation is stated in 
Dorr’s reading and interpretation of the document, and the text of the document itself.152 
The two principles need to be viewed as mutually inclusive because state action is 
possible only if an institution such as a government exists, and once such an institution is 
in place the application of the principle of subsidiarity is essential. In other words, an 
establishment of a government necessitates the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and affirmative action, and an establishment of a government is necessitated 
by the need to apply the two principles. 
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In Mater et Magistra “the emphasis on socialization, an increase of network of 
relations by which individuals are connected to each other”153 compounds the 
significance of subsidiarity, association, justice and solidarity. John XXIII did not 
overlook this significant factor. Consequently, the document promoted the question of 
human development through  
its insistence on socialization: the more complex interdependence of citizens that calls for growing 
state intervention because only the state can deal with such issues.154  
 
According to John XXIII authentic development should emphasize the social 
dimension of the human person and yet be moderated by the state. This was precisely an 
advocacy for emphasis on “economic socialism” or socialization, which means “the more 
complex interdependence of citizens that calls for growing state intervention because 
only the State can deal with such all embracing issues”, and according to Curran such 
emphasis “exists in . . . tension with the older principle of subsidiarity.”155 This means 
Curran claims that socialization and subsidiarity are mutual extensions of each other. So 
John XXIII’s emphasis continues the previous affirmations of the principle of 
subsidiarity. This means that economic socialism - collective ownership - and 
socialization - an initiation of one in such a system - does not hinder the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity and affirmative action. They are mutually supportive; there is 
no opposition between subsidiarity and the emphasis on socialization.  
The right to private property and a just wage advocated by Leo XIII in Rerum 
Novarum recur in Mater et Magistra. John XXIII advocated the right to own private 
property but he also insisted on the social dimension of property and condemned the 
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inequality that exists in our world on the basis of ownership.156 Property can be a 
possession of an individual but it is also to be shared with the needy. Natural resources 
are destined for the good of all. This is one of the reasons for the document’s 
condemnation of inequality in the world. Mater et Magistra, therefore, continued the 
teaching of Rerum Novarum by stating that there is a social dimension of property as 
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI also advocated.  
Like the preceding documents, Mater et Magistra grappled with diverse questions 
and conditions relevant for the integral development of peoples. These included the 
relational character of the human person, human rights, human dignity, human freedom, 
peace, justice, subsidiarity, solidarity, participation, the social dimension of property, 
common good, affirmative action, and option for the poor.157 Some of these and similar 
problems were again expounded in John XXIII’s following encyclical, Pacem in Terris: 
Peace on Earth of 1963. 
D. Pacem in Terris: Peace on Earth (1963) - Pope John XXIII 
 
Pacem in Terris is the social encyclical that most broadly advocated and 
articulated the question of human rights in the context of natural law, at the same time 
dealing with other questions such as “the relation between authority and conscience, 
disarmament and development of the common good.”158 Although Rerum Novarum, 
Quadragessimo Anno and Mater et Magistra treated the question of human dignity and 
human rights, Pacem in Terris emphasized human rights and provided other fundamental 
conditions for integral human development. John XXIII placed Catholic social teaching 
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in an interpersonal context, especially because he clearly emphasized social, economic, 
legal and political (civil) rights of the human person.159 This explains the significance of 
mutual claims people have upon each other at all levels and in all contexts because they 
are human but have a divine origin. 
Pacem in Terris demonstrated the significance of mutual claims in a social 
context and actually compounded the importance of solidarity in its definition of human 
rights. David Hollenbach is of this view. He advocates that solidarity is a precondition for 
an adequate theory of human rights.160 The reason for this claim is that a human right is 
always restricted, especially when it conflicts with the rights of others who are “less able 
to look after themselves.”161 This means human rights should be defined and exercised in 
the social context because human beings have a common origin and share human dignity. 
This is a generally accepted truth and was confirmed especially after the “United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).”162 The United Nations implied 
natural law even if it made no explicit reference to it. This is evident in its definition of 
rights based on the assumption that all people share human dignity.  
Similarly, on the foundation of natural law John XXIII developed principles to 
govern human life. Pacem in Terris treated issues of human rights, and initiated a 
dialogue between East and West by articulating different ideologies and movements 
which deal with socio-economic issues in the two blocs of the world.163 Pacem in Terris 
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showed that human life has a dual dimension because humans are both individual and 
social. 
Pacem in Terris also dealt with the critical question of war and the arms race, and 
it underscored the importance of global peace to humankind because the arms race and 
war retard both individual and national economic progress.164 Here the question of the 
importance of peace for human development is introduced as a vital condition. This 
anticipated one of Paul VI’s final appeals in Populorum Progressio, calling development 
“the new name for peace” 165 and underscoring its significance. The development of all 
demands peace and also means peace for all. This suggests and underscores that the 
document is concerned about interpersonal relations. It deals not only with individual 
issues but also with questions that affect all people.  
The principle of common good was important to John XXIII, especially because 
of the social character of the issues with which he dealt. Consequently, he considered 
“the common good as a principle of integration” and advocated that each political 
community has a common good, called “the Universal common good”, which transcends 
the individual good but which cannot be separated from the common good of the entire 
human family.166 This notion of common good explains why questions about human 
rights, peace, participation, ownership, subsidiarity, option for the poor and affirmative 
action are closely related. The common good must be promoted by political authority 
because this is the sole purpose for which political authority is established.167 Here John 
XXIII insisted after the example of Leo XIII that political authority should intervene if 
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the interest of some portion of society should suffer some evil or injustice that it cannot 
handle. Public authority should intervene to help.168 Both Leo XIII and John XXIII 
squarely addressed the question of the role of political authority. If political authority 
does not serve the common good it is unjust. This resonates with Aristotle’s commonly 
accepted thought that the purpose of civil authority is to serve the citizens.169 
In Pacem in Terris John XXIII provided guidelines for ordering relationships 
between human beings and articulated the ways of handling the relations between 
individuals and the state. John XXIII did not mention the principles of subsidiarity and 
affirmative action explicitly in Pacem et Terris though he was explicit in Mater et 
Magistra especially regarding subsidiarity. Nonetheless, here, they are implicitly stated 
as part and parcel of the question of human development. He also treated the ways of 
ordering international relations by defining human rights in a global context.170 This is 
significant because human rights were formally defined in terms of social relations and 
meant to govern such relations whether between individuals or nations. The definition of 
human rights provides for smooth and humane social relations. This is probably why 
John XXIII treated relational issues in the world community.171 This is a significant 
contibution because integral human development cannot be achieved without good 
international and interpersonal relationships. 
In Pacem in Terris John XXIII affirmed the following important points for 
integral human development. First, human persons are social beings. Secondly, the 
understanding of human dignity and human rights should apply to all different possible 
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contexts. Thirdly, development is a relational enterprise just as peace is not an 
individually isolated pursuit. Fourthly, the important principles presented by John XXIII 
in Pacem in Terris are the principles of human dignity, human person and human rights, 
peace, justice, subsidiarity, participation, common good, affirmative action, and the 
option for the poor. Finally, all issues of human development need to be coordinated, 
interrelated and integrated in order to achieve authentic human development. 
E. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965): Two Significant Documents - GS and 
DH 
 
To understand the documents of the Second Vatican Council, it is necessary to 
grasp the situation prior to the Council and its consequences because the Council was a 
moment of transition from one era to another. An understanding of this background is 
also crucial for an understanding of the notion of authentic development, which, to a 
great extent was misrepresented in the period preceding the Council. Henriot and others 
made significant observations to elucidate this point, stating that 
In many respects, Vatican II represented the end of one era and the beginning of a new era. The 
enthusiasm and energy of the Age of Enlightenment had been spent. This philosophical movement 
of the eighteenth century, marked by a rejection of traditional social, religious, and political ideas 
and an emphasis on rationalism, had culminated in the holocaust in Europe and in a world sharply 
divided. These events had dashed hopes that secular society, based on human reason severed from 
religious faith, would lead to unending progress. Instead a misguided rationalism had unleashed 
forces which threatened to destroy the world.  
The Church had turned inward in reaction to a rationalistic age which demeaned religious belief. 
Religion, more and more defined as a “private” affair between the individual and God, was 
relegated to a marginal role in society. At the same time, the Church channeled its energies 
outwardly to evangelize the “mission lands” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.172 
 
Despite the very positive and real achievements of the Enlightenment, for instance 
its elevation of the importance of reason in facilitating a critical view of life, some people 
had misgivings about it. As Henriot and others indicate, prior to the Second Vatican 
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Council, there were errors or misconceptions of various kinds and degrees. These 
mistakes were a consequence of movements claiming to usher in changes for the better. 
Instead what happened was indeed the opposite. Secondly, there was an excessive 
emphasis on reason as the only and ultimate source of solutions to problems. Thirdly, 
despite the efforts of the Popes to teach people through the various encyclicals, the 
doctrines of the ecyclicals were not studied or never reached the majority of people. In 
other words, the church’s efforts to address social issues tended to receive inadequate 
results – her influence in the world was diminished. There was a dichotomy of world 
view, religion, society and politics, and probably the human person, especially between 
one who was a Christian and one who was not. Consequently, there was some revolution. 
The holocaust occurred in Europe and forces that threatened to destroy the Church were 
continuously making their way into the world. 
It was this and like situations to which the Second Vatican Council was 
responding through Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. The conciliar fathers, 
particularly in Gaudium et Spes, dealt with the social questions, human dignity, and the 
role of the church in shaping society.  
They affirmed that the specifically religious mission of the Church did give it a function, light, and 
an energy which can serve to structure and consolidate the human community according to the 
divine law.173  
 
Such a reaction is tantamount to acknowledging that the role of the church is 
crucial in human development and is still more relevant when considered in terms of 
integral human development, which this study advocates as the most authentic notion of 
development. The rationale for such a claim is that the church helps contribute to the 
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demands of integral human development by providing answers, insights and suggestions 
for spiritual growth besides the material growth, which constitutes only a portion of what 
is true development. 
1. GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD 
(1965) 
Gaudium et Spes, one of the sixteen conciliar documents of the Second Vatican 
Council, is important reading material for the study of Catholic social teaching in general, 
and Populorum Progressio in particular, for three main reasons. First, the two documents 
chronologically follow each other; the latter was promulgated soon after the former. 
Secondly, as Krier advances, “in Populorum Progressio Paul VI was clearly carrying out 
the vision of Vatican II, which sought to be in dialogue with the world, as church and 
society addressed current social issues.”174 This view is supported by Richard P. McBrien 
and Peter Riga, who have acknowledged that “Progressio….is simply following The 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World of Vatican II.”175 Finally, Gaudium et 
Spes is a comprehensive, dependable and authoritative document of Catholic social 
teaching on which many discourses can be based.  
In Gaudium et Spes the conciliar fathers dealt with the Catholic Church's relation 
to the secular world. The rationale in this approach is that the Church, the people of God, 
is in the world and part of the world affected by different forces of change. Theologically, 
this is the context in which believers practice their faith and non-believers express their 
solidarity with the whole of humankind. Consequently, one of the document’s main 
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concerns was the paradoxical dichotomy and relationship between faith and practical 
life.176  
Gaudium et spes “presents justice as central both to the issue of poverty and that 
of peace.”177 This means that peace and people’s level of development is determined by 
how just society is. The creation of peace and people’s development call for a critical 
study of social conditions of the people. The document was fundamentally open to the 
contemporary situation, and even emphasized that “the church can learn from this world” 
and “must help in the process of evaluating what the world has to offer” whether directly 
or indirectly.178 It addressed the question of the role of the church and challenged every 
church member to look more critically at the church’s external activity than at her 
internal concerns. It challenged people “to read the signs of the times” in the light of the 
Gospel message and to act accordingly, especially because of sociological, technological 
and other changes that affect the world.179 It advocated that the church has a duty to care 
for and protect human dignity amidst such changes.  
Gaudium et Spes called for respectful dialogue within the Catholic church, and 
with other churches and non-believers. “Respect for others” is crucial because it permits 
freedom to operate authentically.180 The council Fathers were keen to note that it is 
necessary for the church to interact with the secular world, but they also observed that 
church-state relationships should not cause the church to submit to the whims of civil 
                                                 
176 McBrien, 156. Also see Curran, 11. 
177 Dorr, 177. 
178 O’Brien and Shannon,164. 
179 Ibid. Also see Gaudium et Spes, 4-17,905-917; 21,920-922; Dorr, 168; Walsh and Davies,158. 
180 Gaudium et Spes, 92, 999-1000. Also see Dorr, 168. 
  64
authorities because the church has a prophetic role to defend the poor.181 The logic of this 
argument is that if the church identifies only with the state and civil authorities, and does 
not fulfill its prophetic role or forfeits it, there is no defense for the disadvantaged people. 
This is why the Church has always to stand apart and be the conscience of the nation, 
reminding people when things are going in the wrong direction. 
Gaudium et Spes is officially called the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World. However, the diverse nature of its contents - “personalism, the social 
nature of the human person, the relation between the Church and the world, justice, and 
development”182 - are relevant issues not just affecting Catholics or Christians, or 
believers but all people. Gaudium et Spes treated the fundamental principle for integral 
human development, namely human dignity. It placed the human person and human 
dignity in the context of “human community, human activity in the world and the role of 
the church in the modern world.”183 It was in this spirit that the Council fathers advocated 
that “social order and development should always work for the benefit of the individual, 
and they require constant improvement.”184  
The second half of Gaudium et Spes addressed intriguing issues such as marriage 
and family, culture, socio-economic life, the political community and the fostering of 
peace.185 Further issues addressed by the document were proper cultural development and 
positive intercultural relationships, cultural education, the community of nations, 
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international organizations, and international cooperation.186 These are vital elements for 
the integral human development because they either deal with institutions that promote 
development or they are components of authentic human development. 
Gaudium et Spes provided norms of cooperative and moral life. Its guidelines 
were for both the developing and developed nations. They are, namely, that developing 
nations should aim, unequivocally and expressly, at the total development of their 
citizens and they should recognize that the foundation of progress is the work, tradition or 
culture and talents of their citizens, the tapping of their local resources, and the good 
example of their most influential personalities, not just foreign aid.187 Participation and 
justice are implied here as necessary for integral development.  
Secondly, wealthier nations have a duty to support “less developed nations to 
achieve their own development.”188 This support should, however, be lent with prudence 
and mutual consideration of the needs of those to be supported and that of the supporters.  
The issue addressed here is that less-developed nations should not expect more support 
than can be provided and developed nations are not to support to the detriment of their 
own development. In Gaudium et Spes the conciliar fathers advocated that the most 
important tasks of the developed nations are “to help the developing nations to fulfill 
these commitments”, undertake within limits what is necessary “for the establishment of 
world-wide cooperation” and consider “the welfare of the weaker and poorer nations” in 
their business relations with them because the poorer nations support themselves out of 
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the revenues from such business dealings.189Here the document spells out two requisite 
conditions for integral human development: solidarity and justice.  
Thirdly, to minimize excessive inequalities between the developed and 
developing nations the document calls the international community to be the effective 
coordinator and stimulant of development without injustices or violation of the principle 
of subsidiarity, thus also calling for organizations that promote and regulate international 
commerce.190 Gaudium et Spes addressed the issue of socio-economic justice. It took a 
strong stance on the question of international socio-economic justice and cautioned, as 
Paul VI did later in Populorum Progressio, that if international justice is not pursued the 
wrath of the less-developed peoples will result in their forceful claims for what they need, 
which may be a justifiable course of action.191 The implication of this argument is that 
there is need for an international institution to regulate the global socio-economic system, 
suggesting that the principle of subsidiarity is necessary for the regulation of the 
economic system. This is what Paul VI later suggested in Populorum Progressio. 
Gaudium et Spes, therefore, identified three vital requisite factors for integral human 
development - justice, subsidiarity and solidarity in a spirit of equality.  
Fourthly, Gaudium et Spes advocates a major concern of Populorum Progressio, 
namely that although it is important to evaluate the economic and social structures, 
people must guard against whatever offers “material advantage while militating against 
man’s spiritual nature and advancement.”192 Populorum Progressio later makes central 
the issue that development is not only material but also spiritual. Gaudium et Spes states 
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that the implementation of such norms is the duty of all and again underscores the 
importance of participation for human development. It advocates that the role of the 
church and of every Christian is to support any course of action for international order 
and efforts to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich, individually, nationally and 
internationally, and any action that protects human dignity, and promotes human life 
spiritually and materially.193 This is the responsibility of the church as an institution, and 
of every individual Christians and all people including non-believers. This reinforces the 
import of the principle of participation, which affirms that authentic integral development 
involves everybody and benefits all. 
Gaudium et Spes manifests an integral character in its treatment of world 
problems and the Church in the modern world. This view suggests that the document was 
one of the immediate influences behind Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum Progressio. It 
outlines the necessary principles and requirements for a good society and for authentic 
development: the human person, human dignity, human rights, justice, peace, common 
good, universal solidarity, subsidiarity, affirmative action, option for the poor and 
equality.194 All these elements feature in Populorum Progressio. This explains the close 
relation between Gaudium et Spes and Populorum Progressio, while Dignitatis 
Humanae’s teaching is foundational for both Gaudium et Spes and Populorum 
Progressio. However, this relation is better seen in the fact that Gaudium et Spes initiated 
the discussion on the theme of development and their treatises are both critically based on 
the dignity of the human person.195  
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2. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE: DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (DECEMBER 7, 1965) 
 
Dignitatis Humanae centered on two crucial issues - human dignity and human 
freedom. The document was conspicuously an affirmation of conscientious religious 
freedom but it actually dealt with “the principle of the dignity of the human person and 
the freedom of the act of faith.”196 The Council fathers had this to say at the introduction 
of Dignitatis Humanae: 
Contemporary man is becoming increasingly conscious of the dignity of the human person; more 
and more people are demanding that men should exercise fully their own judgment and a 
responsible freedom in their actions and should not be subject to the pressure of coercion but be 
inspired by a sense of duty.197  
 
While the Council fathers recognized that the Church has a responsibility towards 
the wider, secular society, they were also cautious that there should be no disrespect for 
religious views and freedom of religious practice. This position was founded on the fact 
that all human persons have dignity and rights.198 This was a reason for their advocacy 
for religious freedom in Dignitatis Humanae. Freedom is an inherent God-given quality 
and participation in divine qualities. This suggests the gravity of the central character of 
the human person, human dignity and human rights in the document. Human dignity is 
the most imperative principle, a conditio sine qua non, for authentic development.199 The 
document, therefore, deals with one of the central and crucial elements for integral 
human development. Human dignity per se is the principle, though not emphasized 
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adequately and linked sufficiently to other development factors, that guided the 
authorship of Populorum Progressio.  
The question of the right to religious freedom was influenced by the experience of 
the American Church and the American bishops who participated in the Second Vatican 
Council, but the specific advocate and developer of the notion of religious freedom was 
the American theologian John Courtney Murray.200 The counciliar Fathers adopted the 
position advocated by Murray though they were initially apprehensive about his views on 
religious freedom. Although the original intention was to address the question of free 
practice of religion, there were other implications because attention was drawn not only 
to the rights for religious practice, but also to the realization that human rights are at the 
center of the life of a human person and interpersonal relationships, including the process 
of development. Human rights are founded on human dignity. This is why the foundation 
of the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae, namely the dignity of the human person, is the 
most fundamental basis for integral human development. The document addresses the 
religious-spiritual dimension of the human person by officially acknowledging religious 
freedom as “based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the 
revealed word of God and by reason itself” but also “based on the rights of all citizens to 
be free from external coercion to act against their conscience or preventing them from 
acting in accord with their conscience in religious matters”201 both publicly and privately.  
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Dignitatis Humanae maintains that religious freedom is important for four main 
reasons.202 It is a condition to help people achieve “a fuller measure of perfection with 
greater ease”; it is demanded by the common good of society; it safeguards the rights and 
duties of the human person in the social context and, finally, the promotion and 
protection of religious freedom is an all-embracing responsibility of individuals, social 
groups, civil authorities, the Church and other religious communities.   
Development principles presented in Dignitatis Humanae revolve around the 
human person and relationships. Though not all are explicitly spelled out in the 
document, we can infer that the following issues were addressed by the council fathers: 
the human person, human dignity and human rights, participation, common good and 
solidarity. One could summarize them as “the principle of the dignity of the human 
person in the social context.”203 This shows the document’s individual and 
communitarian character and approach to human development and the social question. 
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF LOUIS JOSEPH LEBRET IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO 
 
To understand the notion of authentic human development as presented by Paul 
VI in Populorum Progressio a grasp of Louis Joseph Lebret’s life and vision of true 
development is necessary. This section will treat only the most important aspects of 
Lebret’s life, his influence and contributions to Populorum Progressio. A significant 
foundation for this claim is the comparison of Lebret’s definition of development and that 
of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. Paul VI and Lebret define development in a similar 
way and Paul VI quotes Lebret almost verbatim in his definition. Paul VI’s views in 
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Populorum Progressio many times replicated the thoughts of Lebret.204 It is significant to 
study his life in relation to that of Paul VI because the study facilitates our vision of why 
they looked at life in a similar way. This claim was supported by Paul VI himself, in 
Populorum Progressio, John Paul II, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, and Denis Goulet.205  
A. Louis Joseph Lebret and Paul VI 
 
  Lebret was a French planner, priest and philosopher and a contemporary of Paul 
VI. He was “born in 1897 to a family of fishermen: his birth place was the hamlet of 
Minihicsur Rance near Saint-Malo, a major port of Brittany” and at the age of 18 years 
Lebret joined the French naval academy and served his country in that capacity.206 He 
served in Belgium, Holland and in the Middle East during the First World War, and in 
1922 he was made an instructor in the Naval academy. At the age of 26 he changed his 
career. He joined the Dominican Order and was later ordained a priest. After ordination 
he was appointed a chaplain to a convent in Sain-Malo so that he could recover from his 
poor health, but he soon abandoned the responsibility, got involved in the social struggles 
of the fishermen of Britanny, and eventually developed an interest in development and 
social action because he strongly believed that exploitation and misery at that time were 
consequences of structural malpractices.207  
Goulet describes Lebret as a man who respected nature, and had immense 
“curiosity for lands and cultures other than his own, unshakable common sense in the 
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face of life’s tragedies, and a person with ever-fresh willingness to take new risks”, and 
one who traveled widely.208 He observed the circumstances in which people lived, their 
economic activities, and concluded that structural evils could not just be eliminated 
through individual efforts alone but must be fought by concerted efforts. In the words of 
Goulet, Lebret believed that: 
chronic structural evils cannot be corrected by subjective goodwill, but only by concerted 
transformation of structures, a task which presupposes a rigorous and detailed understanding of 
how structures work. Lebret refused to accept the simplistic choice: either efficiency or 
humanization. He understood that efficiency was indispensable; but he also knew that it had to be 
redefined so as to serve human values.209 
 
Lebret advocated a development in solidarity because it takes teamwork to effect 
development. He contended that planning for development should involve both “decision  
makers at the summit and communities at the grassroots.”210 Both Lebret and Paul VI 
strongly invoked participation because the latter concurred with Lebret in Populorum 
Progressio where he advocated that every member of society must contribute to the full 
development of the society.211 The principle of participation was strongly invoked here. 
This involvement, however, demands that the social, economic, political and cultural 
circumstances are properly understood. This is why according to Goulet Lebret thinks 
that 
progress or development takes place when freedoms can find their expression in institutions, 
norms of exchange, patterns of social organizations, educational efforts, relations of production 
and political choices which enhance the human potential. What is ultimately sought are basic 
conditions under which all persons may fulfill themselves as individuals and as members of 
multiple communities.212  
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A careful reading of Goulet suggests the value he attaches to the concern for the 
common good, freedom, education, social relations, mutual respect and viable political 
systems. This calls for an analysis and understanding of how the socio-economic and 
political systems operate. He places the human person at the center of the question of 
development, and makes human dignity and human rights important. Efficient work 
toward development must take this into account, and should be judged in terms of how it 
promotes the dignity and rights of the human person, both individually and communally. 
There are similarities in the life, and ultimately the experiences and vision of  
Louis Joseph Lebret and Paul VI. Other than being contemporaries they were both from 
families of moderate background, though Paul VI was from a richer family background 
than Lebret; they lived during the First World War and were both interested in defending 
their countries by fighting during the war, though Paul VI was incapacitated by his poor 
health.213 Just as Lebret saw the plight of the fishermen and the third world and had poor 
health at one moment, Paul VI experienced the same; they were interested in cultures 
other than their own; and they both traveled to many countries in the world, which 
definitely affected their outlook on life.214 This explains their interest in the problems 
affecting the poor and the Third World nations. Their common interest in socio-economic 
and political issues is probably best explained by these facts too. It was not a surprise that 
both Paul VI and Lebret would view true development in the same way.  
Lebret and Paul VI met during the Second Vatican Council. Paul VI (then 
Giovanni Battista Montini) was one of the principal figures in the drafting of Gaudium et 
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Spes, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, and Lebret himself 
was one of those who played an important role in drafting the constitution.215 This, too, 
accounts for how Paul VI and Lebret knew each other and why Paul VI enlisted the help 
of Lebret in drafting Populorum Progressio.216 Three other reasons possibly account for 
their relationship. First, both men were writers and interested in the development of poor 
people. Secondly, Paul VI lived in France, learned the language and the culture, which he 
liked. Thirdly, they influenced each other through their writings and if Paul VI had to 
enlist the help of Lebret in drafting Populorum Progressio, it was because he already 
knew Lebret to be an expert in the field of development. These evidences strongly 
suggest that Lebret exerted influence on Paul VI, especially in his encyclical, Populorum 
Progressio. This view is further supported by Goulet who affirms that  
one explicit and detailed formulation of the requirements of authentic development has been made 
by the French planner and philosopher, Lebret. Lebret is that rare development expert cited by 
name in the 1967 encyclical, the text that is commemorated and amplified in the 1987 papal 
document, On Social Concern.217 
 
This is an affirmation of the influence of Lebret on the contents of Populorum 
Progressio and Paul VI’s trend of thought in the document. Goulet is explicit and 
confirms that “Lebret served as the major expert advisor to Paul VI in drafting On the 
Development of Peoples.” 218 
Lebret used his experiences to meet the development needs of his time and world.  
He founded the Institute for Research and Training in Development (IRFED) in 1958, to  
try to resolve some of the socio-economic problems of his time. The institute was 
founded “to prepare future leaders of the Third World for the difficult tasks of 
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development.” 219 Lebret died in 1966, just one year before the encyclical Populorum 
Progressio which he helped to draft, was published.  
B. Development and The Last Revolution, 1960/ 1965 
 
The Last Revolution, one of Lebret’s major, influential and challenging works was 
written and first published in 1960 and reprinted in 1965, two years before the 
promulgation of Populorum Progressio. According to George G. Higgins, who wrote the 
preface of the 1965 edition of The Last Revolution, Lebret’s main concern was  
the essential causes and remedies for economic, social and cultural misery which plagues the so 
called underdeveloped countries and poses such ominous threat to the security and peace of all 
mankind.220  
 
In the work Lebret impartially critiques what Higgins calls the “established but 
fallacious values” of the East and the West or more specifically, of the Soviet Union and 
the United States.221 Higgins further affirmed that he was tougher on the United States 
than on the Soviet Union because he expected a higher standard of performance from a 
nation which claims to be an example of democracy, than from any other nation. 
According to Lebret, the economic system which the West created made them rich but it 
dissociated the West from “the confidence and the friendship of the underdeveloped 
peoples of the world.”222 Lebret was affirming that the West had created not just a gap 
but a rift between the rich and the poor together with its own dangers. This vision was 
eventually made explicit in Paul VI’s advocacy for integral human development in 
Populorum Progressio.  
Lebret decried the oppressive market system of the West in their dealings with the  
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underdeveloped nations simply because he contended that the West’s desire to become 
even wealthier has blinded them from recognizing, respecting and protecting the rights of 
other people, especially their rights to the basic essentials of life.223 He further argued that 
because there is “greed and immoderate love of possession, there is reluctance of more 
advanced and consequently richer peoples to take an objective view of the world 
situation”.224 Here Lebret raised the question of social and distributive justice. The 
argument of Lebret was that more advanced and rich nations often make decisions to 
favor their own interests, while the poor continue to suffer and their situation deteriorates. 
As lack of due good poverty is evil though in itself it is not immoral but this kind of 
injustice is an offense against those who are in dire need. Lebret affirms this by saying 
that “the greatest evil in the world is not the poverty of those who are deprived but the 
lack of concern on the part of those who are well off.”225 In other words, the immoral 
thing is refusing to do something to alleviate poverty.  
According to Higgin’s reading of Lebret, “money has become a yardstick of 
everything” and consequently, education, media, art and culture are weighed against 
human persons, especially children, in terms of money, not the value of persons.226 
Higgins’ interpretation of Lebret raises a question about the understanding of the dignity 
and rights of the human person in the Western context. It suggests the conclusion that 
according to the Western scale of values human persons other than one’s self and one’s 
properties rank last and close to a slave. He aptly demonstrates this contention in his 
claim that the West’s “persistent greed has divorced them from the higher values of 
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human living.”227 In other words, human persons are reduced to “things” and deprived of 
their dignity and rights when such a yardstick is used. Here Lebret touches the basic 
moral or ethical principle for integral human development, namely the dignity of the 
human person.  
According to Lebret tampering with such a fundamental principle has a serious 
negative implication, namely a revolution, which can erupt spontaneously because of 
people’s constant growth in the awareness of the world situation, and their own 
dignity.228 This awareness may cause discontent and revolution, but the latter can be 
avoided by prudent and patient handling of the socio-economic and political questions. 
The West or developed nations should, therefore, be cautious to avoid revolution by 
resolving the problem of the gap between the developed nations and underdeveloped 
nations or by alleviating the difficulties that confront the poor. He succinctly warned in 
the following words: 
It is, therefore, clear that if the West resists the change which is being imposed on it, this rejection 
is suicidal . . . The West can protect itself only by abandoning its introspective attitude.229 
 
Lebret was in fact stating that the obliging change, not self-chosen by the West 
but necessitated by the status quo, is the improvement of the condition of the poor, which 
is a guarantee to avoid their violent reaction. This anticipated what Paul VI later ardently 
reaffirmed and advanced in strong terms in Populorum Progressio to the developed 
nations in different parts of the document, after observing a gap between the developed 
nations and the underdeveloped nations.230 Both Lebret and Paul VI were very conscious 
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and cautious about the danger of violent reaction from the less fortunate people. 
One of the central and critical views of Lebret, which is also reflected in 
Populorum Progressio, is the measurement and the concept of authentic development. In 
The Last Revolution he argued that the notion of development can be deceptive. True 
development needs to be judged by a comprehensive and careful assessment because 
something apparent can be claimed to be true development. According to him  
Growth expressed in terms of increased national income per inhabitant can disguise an increase in 
the incomes of the rich and a corresponding impoverishment and regression in the incomes of the 
poor. In this case no development has taken place. Genuine development presupposes, in effect, an 
increase in the standard of living and in human standards which affects the huge, deprived mass of 
the population. It involves a generalized development of the whole human order, in every man and 
in all men.231  
 
In Populorum Progressio Paul VI articulated the notion of integral human 
development which Lebret called genuine development. Both Lebret and Paul VI 
advocated the development of all people. Lebret advanced one of the significant 
arguments about authentic development when he observed that the greatest need is the 
development of the entire world, and what is crucial is the advancement of all people 
“from a less human form of existence to a more human one” as fast as possible, in 
solidarity and in the least costly possible way.232 A careful reading of Populorum 
Progressio shows that this exhortation is present in the document. Dorr even testifies that 
Paul VI borrowed the concept of development from Lebret, and like Lebret, he 
emphasized “being more rather than having more.”233 It is evident that the document 
bears the influence of Lebret because it emphasizes “person-centered development” and 
argues for the complete development of all people.  
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Populorum Progressio and The Last Revolution both emphasize the human 
person, human dignity, human rights, equality, justice, option for the poor and solidarity 
as necessary development factors. Lebret advocates a global development in solidarity 
when he argues that the survival of the West is possible only if it relates liberally without 
frontiers.234 The underlying reason here is that the West is not self-sufficient in terms of 
resources. It depends on the underdeveloped nations for some of the raw materials for its 
industry. The West also averts the anger of the less developed countries by supporting 
them. Consequently, the West cannot afford to, absolutely, discard the less developed 
nations in its economic or material endeavors. 
One of the components of authentic human development, according to Paul VI, is 
cultural development.235 This was not absolutely a novelty in the teaching about human 
development. Lebret advocated the importance of culture as a component of 
development. This is evident in his indiscriminate love for cultures. He confirms this 
when he says: 
Each group has its roots in a certain part of the earth and must find its own formula for collective 
progress. If it uses Western values as its yardstick, the underdeveloped parts of the world can only 
lose their zeal for life and lapse into despair.236  
 
The term culture is implied in the term “values”. Culture is the sum total of a 
people’s way of living which is in turn determined by their thought patterns and the 
values they hold. Western cultures are different from the cultures of underdeveloped 
peoples because they hold different values. Development should occur in the context of a 
particular culture. It is difficult to attain development out of proper cultural context. 
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Lebret was advocating that people should treasure their own cultures and make them an 
integral part of the development process, and yet at the same time respect other people’s 
cultures because they are valuable too.  
For Lebret, authentic development involves all people. He advocated participation 
as a necessary principle for integral development. This is why he contended that integral 
development is a difficult task even for the wisest person because it calls for “a collective 
will” and understanding.237 Paul VI expressed this idea in Populorum Progressio where 
he indicated that “every person and all peoples are entitled to be shapers of their own 
destiny,” 238 everybody is an agent of human development on a personal, local, national 
and international level.  
Finally, Lebret advocated “a generous welcome to others” and hospitality to 
emigrant workers.239 This was a call for openness to foreigners, a call for solidarity and 
freedom of movement. This call reflects his warning against an introspective attitude if 
the condition of the underdeveloped people is to be changed, and revolution is to be 
avoided. This exhortation is also evident in Populorum Progressio and expressed in 
almost the same way The Last Revolution presents it.240  
Lebret’s notion of genuine human development, the value of culture in 
development and the importance of participation and the requisite conditions for 
authentic human development are reflected in Populorum Progressio. These are some of 
the significant indicators of the influence of Lebret’s thoughts in the document. The 
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significance and influence of Lebret on Populorum Progressio is further ascertained by 
the various evidences in the next section. 
C. The Influence of Louis Joseph Lebret on Populorum Progressio 
 
Lebret was one of the major influences behind Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum  
Progressio. Lebret contributed a great deal to shape the draft of the document. Paul VI’s 
idea of integral human development is critical like that of Lebret who  
opted for a model of development that promotes community, spiritual fulfillment, and 
enhancement of creative freedom over mere material abundance, technological prowess, or 
functionally efficient institutions.241 
 
Paul VI himself confirms this in Populorum Progressio where he quotes Lebret 
and speaks of him as being an eminent specialist, thus actually invoking the authority of 
Lebret’s work to support his own arguments and authoritatively confirming that Lebret 
influenced his notion of authentic development. He states: 
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be 
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of 
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we 
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart 
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each 
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.242  
 
Like Lebret, Paul VI “insists that what is in question is the development of each 
person and of every person”- integral development - which is the theme that runs 
throughout Populorum Progressio and what Paul VI attempts to articulate throughout the 
document.243 This explains Dorr’s claims that Lebret had great influence on Populorum 
                                                 
241 Goulet, “The Search for Authentic Development”, 129. Here Goulet is quoting L.J.Lebret, Montee 
Humaine (Paris; Ouvrieres, 1958); Erich Fromm, To Have or To Be? (New York: Harper and Row, 1976. 
Also see Dorr, 160. 
242 Populorum Progressio, On the Development of Peoples, (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic 
Conference, 1967), 14, 7. The eminent source and specialist Paul VI is quoting here is L. J. Lebret, O.P, 
Dynamique concrete du developpement, Paris: Economie et Humanisme, Les editions Ouvrieres, 1961, 
p.28. 
243 Dorr, 181. Also see Goulet, “The Search for Authentic Development”, 133; Populorum Progressio, 
14,7; 17,8; 18,9 and 19,9. 
  82
Progressio, and in his treatise on the notion of development Paul VI quoted from Lebret 
and followed the approach of Lebret. Dorr contends that “the inspiration of Lebret 
pervades Populorum Progressio and some of the statements in the encyclical are taken 
almost word for word from Lebret’s writings. He clarifies his point by stating: 
At the heart of Populorum Progressio lies a notion of integrated development, which Paul VI took 
from Pere Lebret, the Dominican scholar and activist who died some time before the encyclical 
appeared.244 
 
Marvin L. Mich Krier affirms this contention when he explains the competing 
schools and views of development in the 1960s in relation to Paul VI’s view of 
development in Populorum Progressio. According to Krier one of the schools at that time 
was the French school that advocated integral development. Making reference to the 
French influence on Paul VI, he says: 
Because he was something of a Francophile already, it wasn’t hard for Pope Paul VI to side with 
the French school. So he asked the French Dominican economist Louis Lebret, O.P., to be the 
primary editor. Lebret served admirably in that capacity until his untimely death in 1966. Msgr 
Paul Poupard, another Frenchman picked up the reins and brought the process to its conclusion.245  
 
Paul VI was influenced by the French culture which he experienced and admired, 
and so it was not a surprise that he would enlist the help of French men like Lebret and 
Poupard in the writing of Populorum Progressio. Lebret’s thoughts also affected John 
Paul II’s thoughts in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On the Social Concerns. Goulet recognizes 
and acknowledges the influence of Lebret’s thoughts in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, which 
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was written to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Populorum Progressio and he 
expressly contends that 
Lebret is that rare development expert cited by name in the 1967 encyclical “On the Development 
of Peoples, the text that is commemorated and amplified in the 1987 papal document “On Social 
Concern”.246  
 
Lebret discussed five essential attributes of true development. The first attribute is 
that development must be “finalized”, meaning that development “must serve the basic 
ends - that is, build a human economy and satisfy all human needs in an equitable order 
of urgency and importance.”247 True development meets human needs according to a 
properly arranged scale of values. Secondly, development must be “coherent”, meaning 
that it has to address “all problem sectors in a coordinated fashion” without sacrificing 
one for the sake of another. Authentic development therefore should not be fragmented or 
segmented. This also features in Populorum Progressio.248 Thirdly, authentic 
development is “homogeneous.” Here Lebret means that development should not be 
imposed. It should respect and include people’s cultural aspirations, their abilities and 
their history. Populorum Progressio reechoes this view.249 Fourthly, according to 
Goulet’s reading of Lebret, authentic development is “self-propelling.” This means true 
development capacitates or empowers people, provides for their autonomy and minimizes 
their “dependence, parasitism, passivity and innertia.” This recurs in Paul VI’s 
Populorum Progressio.250 Finally, true development is “indivisible.” This means 
development should benefit all people, facilitate the attainment of the common good, and 
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bridge gaps between rural and urban populations. Lebret’s claim that authentic 
development is indivisible resonates with Paul VI’s core statement in Populorum 
Progressio about authentic human development and other similar statements spread 
throughout the document.251  
A careful reading of Populorum Progressio reveals a widespread presence of the 
attributes of authentic human development advocated by Lebret.252 Chronologically, 
Populorum Progressio was written after Lebret’s death. When Paul VI speaks of 
development for each and all, and as the transition from less human conditions to more 
human conditions, he does so under the influence of the inspirations of Lebret. This 
distinction was initially made by Lebret as Goulet states. 
The normative expressions “more human” and “less human” need to be understood in the light of 
a distinction Lebret considered vital: the difference between plus avoir (“to have more”) and plus 
etre (“to be more”). A society, Lebret contends, is more human or more developed not when men 
and women “have more,” but when all citizens are enabled “to be more.” The main criterion of 
value is not the production or possession of goods, but the totality of qualitative human 
enrichment. Some material growth and quantitative increases are doubtless needed for genuine 
development, but not any kind growth or increase at any price.253  
 
Authentic development is enhancement of the quality of the life of all people, not 
necessarily an increase in the quantity of goods. These are interpretations of the thoughts 
of Lebret but they typically anticipate Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum Progressio. The 
Last Revolution and Goulet’s interpretations of the writings and thoughts of Lebret evince 
the relation and similarity between the thoughts of Lebret and Paul VI about the notion of 
true human development. 
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V. SIGNIFICANT PONTIFICAL DOCUMENTS DURING  PAUL VI’S PONTIFICATE 
 
A. Humanae Vitae: On the Regulation of Birth (1968)  
 
Humanae Vitae, the last and most controversial papal encyclical of Paul VI, was 
written in 1968. The central issue the document dealt with was the regulation of birth. 
One reason for reading Humanae Vitae in the light of Populorum Progressio is to throw 
some light in understanding the issue of integral human development. Humanae Vitae is 
treated here because it dealt with life, which grounds the fundamental right to life, and 
human development is all about the necessities for and the quality of human life.  
The relationship between Humanae Vitae and Populorum Progressio is explicit in 
the question of population and human dignity where Paul VI argues that the problem of 
rapid demographic growth should be addressed in such a way that human dignity remains 
unharmed.254 As part of the treatise on integral human development Humanae Vitae is 
supported by authors like David M. McCarthy who reads the document in the light of 
Populorum Progressio and advocates that it says a lot about authentic human 
development. 
The framework of Humane Vitae is at once social and theological, since it begins with a statement 
about our cooperation with God and repeatedly turns to concerns about human community.255  
 
McCarthy contends that Humanae Vitae relates human life to God, the origin and 
destiny of life, and relates individual human life to other individuals, and to the entire 
human society. In society, lives mutually interact and are affected by God. McCarthy 
further argues that in Humanae Vitae  
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Paul VI proposes that we cannot make the world a better place by denying the procreative 
character of human sexuality. In HV, he relates the issue of contraception to contemporary social 
problems, to which contraception is considered by many to be a solution but, in fact, holds out 
only hollow promises for the goods of life. Contraceptive practices promise relief in a culture 
where child rearing is an economic liability and a risk to one’s personal life style, but Paul VI 
warns that we will undercut the basic structure of social life if we abdicate our common calling to 
bear and raise children. Modern development strategies promote advancement by means of 
eliminating the social and economic drag of having children. Paul VI, in contrast, is convinced 
that true development necessarily includes the basic human activities of child rearing. HV fits with 
his wider proposals for authentic human development. True human community cannot be attained 
at the cost of its own generative character and true development is known through the flourishing 
of creation of which this generative character is a part.256 
 
The first fundamental issue addressed here is that of the procreative character of 
the human sexuality and the sexual act itself. On the grounds that the sexual act is 
procreative in character, the proximate argument is that the procreative element is 
progressive because it has the potential of generating new life. This is the fundamental 
element of development within the sexual act. It is from this quality that the unfolding of 
hidden potentials, properly called development, starts. If this is obstructed, the human 
species and the divine design are at stake.  
Paul VI views procreation and child-rearing as constituent elements of true 
development. According to McCarthy this shows how Humane Vitae is in line with Paul 
VI’s comprehensive proposal for authentic human development. Contraceptive practices 
militate against integral development because they impede the growth, enhancement and 
natural unfolding of life. Paul VI actually made a compelling assertion that procreation is 
“fundamental to God’s design, and as such, the procreative character of sexual acts is not 
optional.”257 The main problem Paul VI addressed was that of the inherent intended 
‘procreative character’ of sexual acts. Whether sexual acts, initially, have such a 
character or not is beyond human control. This suggests why Paul VI used strong terms, 
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though not without exceptions. The gravity of the problem is confirmed by Hatch, 
according to whose reading of Paul VI, “the question of birth control represents the most 
serious present-day confrontation between Science and the Church” because 
contraceptive practices contradict the original divine plan for human persons.258 This 
claim is founded on the divine command to “be fruitful, multiply and conquer the 
earth.”259 The assertion offers a theological foundation for arguing for human 
development, and raises its social implications for development because of the shared 
nature and origin of humanity. McCarthy argues that  
questions about our nature are always social because they refer to claims about human solidarity, 
and these claims are eschatological: true human community is precisely the meaning and mission 
of the Church. . . . By abiding in continuity with our supernatural end, we will see creation coming 
to fulfillment which is the very possibility of authentic human community. Humane Vitae says 
nothing less.260  
 
McCarthy’s argument suggests that the ultimate human community is the 
eschatological community, the heavenly kingdom of God, and all earthly expressions of 
solidarity in social life anticipate this ultimate community and solidarity. This is the most 
authentic and integral human development in the language of Populorum Progressio.261  
McCarthy argues that like Populorum Progressio, Humanae Vitae features the 
invitation to participate in the divine activity of creation. For him Populorum 
Progressio’s call for participation of all in the process of development is reasonable. His 
claim is that 
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The character of our nature as ordered creation underlies every point and sets the claims of HV 
within the framework of our participation in God’s gracious activity and the fulfillment of our 
human nature through a supernatural end.262 
 
Creation was initially intended to be orderly - a cosmos not chaos. This order was 
initiated by divine action but cooperative human action is to participate in promoting it. 
This is why all should participate in the maintenance of this order. Participation presented 
in Populorum  Progressio is echoed here as necessary for integral human development.263 
If divine intention and human collaboration are separated the intended end of creation is 
in jeopardy. It is, therefore, important that the rest of Humane Vitae be interpreted with 
this link between God’s activity and human involvement, and the supernatural end of 
humanity in mind. Collaboration and participation in divine activity is one of the 
theological reasons for integral human development whose climax is union with and 
participation in the life of God.  
Paul VI was concerned about rapid population growth in Southern American and 
Asian countries, as his experiences during international trips revealed to him.264 This 
concern is relevant because population growth has significant implications for integral 
human development and procreation. McCarthy acknowledges that “the transmission of 
human life is a most serious role (munus) in which married people collaborate freely and 
responsibly with the Creator.”265 Procreation is a vital responsibility of married people 
because through it they collaborate in integral development intended by God.  
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Population growth has significant social implications because it is “intimately 
connected with the life and happiness of human beings”266 Life has a social dimension 
because the life of a person affects that of others and vice versa. Humanae Vitae 
advocated that the transmission of life is the most serious duty of married people because 
human life is always intimately related to other peoples’ lives. Whatever undermines 
human life undermines human society, and vice versa, because of this intimate 
relationship. 
Paul VI observed that population growth raises a number of concerns. The first 
problem is that the rapid population increase leads to distress in families and developing 
countries. Consequently, civil authorities could take radical measures to curb population 
growth that out-paces the requisite resources for decent life, a problem further aggravated 
by “modern economic conditions, which put an increasing burden on housing and raising 
large families.”267 Such concerns are real but they need to be addressed appropriately. 
Paul VI did not consider state-enforced population control an appropriate solution. An 
appropriate resolution to the problem of rapid demographic growth is the enforcement of 
economic justice, resolving problems of urbanization and the First World consumption, 
living in human solidarity, and as John Paul II suggests, taking the question of the 
inviolability of human life and dignity seriously because “life is always a good.”268 These 
resolutions help promote human dignity because they provide conducive situations for 
human life to thrive. 
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Secondly, population growth results in concern about the person and dignity of 
women, and their place in society. If human progress is to be integral the concern about 
women’s place is in the context of “conjugal love in marriage” and the “conjugal acts in 
relation to that love”269 This is crucial, especially in the context of contemporary views 
about women’s dignity where “reproductive rights (to abortion as well as contraception) 
have been hailed as grantors of women’s equality, autonomy, and bodily 
integrity.”270According to Paul VI contraception is not true progress because its 
repercussions on the dignity of women are negative. These repercussions include 
encouragement to disregard the dignity of women, placement of private conjugal life at 
the mercy of public authority, lowering of morality, loss of respect, disruption ofwomen’s 
psycho-physical equilibrium and reduction of women to instruments or objects of selfish 
desires.271 All these consequences are dehumanizing, not enhancing the life and dignity 
of women. McCarthy summarizes Paul VI’s concern as follows: 
Contraception fosters a lack of reverence for women in so far as it frees up the arbitrary will of 
men and violates the limits of control set within creation. In Octogesima Adveniens, Paul VI 
rejects “that false equality (for women) which would deny the distinctions laid down by the 
Creator himself and which would be in contradiction with women’s proper role, which is of such 
capital importance, at the heart of family as well as society. (OA13). Contraceptive practices, Paul, 
claims, diminish the dignity of women and the integrity of their bodies.272  
 
The principal concern here is women’s dignity. Contraception dishonors women’s 
dignity and integrity. This vision is relevant because it affirms the respect for the very 
basic development principle - human dignity.  
Aggressive advocacy for liberation of women and promotion of contraception has 
been partially prompted by the modern economic system, demanding equality of women 
                                                 
269 Humanae Vitae,  2,1. 
270 McCarthy, 706. 
271 Humanae Vitae, 17,11-12. Also see McCarthy, 706. 
272 McCarthy, 706. 
  91
and men. Liberal advocates call for freedom for women from the burden of child-rearing 
so that they may also contribute socially and economically to society. The problem with 
such advocacy is that children are considered liabilities to economic freedom and 
growth.273 The objection is compounded if economic freedom is preferred to child-
rearing because human life and dignity are valued less than economic progress. What 
emerges here is the issue of human dignity in relation to authentic development. 
However, here the threat is only potential, not real, because the issue here is the attempt 
to prevent the phenomenon of conception.  
Human dignity is the epicenter of true development and defines it. If human 
dignity is disregarded in the process of economic progress, the result is not integral and 
authentic development. The strength of Humane Vitae precisely lies in its advocacy for 
respecting human life because life has dignity. 
The last area of concern addressed in Humane Vitae is the human tendency to 
claim dominion over self. The issue here is that “humans are attaining control over the 
body, the mind, social life and even over laws that regulate the transmission of life, a 
concern also expressed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith nineteen years 
later.”274 Reproductive and other technologies come with temptations to manipulate 
human life in the name of progress. Paul VI affirms this position in two of his documents. 
McCarthy states: 
Paul VI challenges this logic of contraception by objecting to its underlying assumptions about 
productivity and progress. In Populorum Progressio and Octogesima Adveniens, he argues that 
development and progress are false when defined primarily in economic terms. Such progress 
actually frustrates growth on both personal and social levels.275  
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What Paul advocates here, according to McCarthy, is that contraception excludes 
the value of life and economic development may not be considered the only development. 
Secondly, human life, the human person and human dignity are the reasons for any kind 
of development. Finally, exclusive economic growth falls short of Paul VI’s 
understanding of development. The human person is more than material possessions, and  
what a person owns does not define the person. Persons are defined by the totality of 
what affects their life and destiny. Consequently, true human development transcends 
economic progress and embraces all people. This suggests why according to McCarthy 
Populorum Progressio teaches that “true progress, then, embraces the whole of human 
community, and it is directed to our eschatological (rather than merely temporal) 
solidarity.”276 The climax and ultimate realization of integral human development is 
eternal life-salvation of body and spirit. This affirmation resonates with Paul VI’s 
thoughts about holistic salvation, the ultimate integral human development, in Populorum 
Progressio.277  
Paul VI’s consistent argument against contraception is that it does not have a 
holistic view of the human person as an individual and as a part of the human 
community. This point of view explains McCarthy’s concluding statement about the 
human tendency to claim dominion over self and develop independently. He says:  
If self-development and the procreative character of human life are disregarded, then progress and 
human mastery are out of control. The abundance that comes in this reductionist term is 
inauthentic, self-serving and unjust.278 
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If technology and human culture are defined independently of human persons, 
problems develop with regard to human life; “technology is inherently disordered, and 
contraceptive technology is likely to be a symptom of social problems rather than a real 
solution.”279 The human claims of dominion over self and one’s needs ought to take into 
account the social context of the individual persons as well as the entire community.  
Paul VI argued that marital love is not limited to the loving interchange between 
husband and wife. It must go beyond this to bring new life into being thus meeting the 
development of natural potentialities and human social needs.280 Paul VI is emphasizing 
that marriage has a social dimension because it is for the promotion of human society. In 
support of this view McCarthy contends that 
Contraception is certainly a question about the beginning of life, but primarily it is an issue of 
human solidarity, in accord with the end of creation and our human community with God.281  
 
If community is to survive it is the duty of everybody including married couples. 
This demands that contraception must be treated in the context and application of the 
principle of solidarity, according to which we need others ‘to be’ and ‘to become.’ 
Without this in view married couples disregard their relation to the rest of human 
community and the common good. This argument resonates with James P. Hanigan, who 
argues that the human person and human actions must be viewed in relation to other 
people. Explaining the moral agent within community context he says: 
To recognize the social nature of the human person is to recognize that human beings need one 
another in order to be what they are-human. Human life is not possible in isolation. . . . Human 
development cannot take place apart from a human community. . . . To ignore the social 
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dimension of human life, to turn our backs on society, to contemn the social order, is to ignore, 
turn away from and contemn ourselves.282  
 
Hanigan supports the idea of solidarity and its significance in human life. Here 
two observations are in order in relation to the notion of integral human development 
advocated by Paul VI. First, human development that excludes the rest of society falls 
short of being integral. It is incomplete. Secondly, excluding society is evil - a lack of due 
good - because development is not a negation. It is a promotion of potentialities that lie 
deep within individuals and communities. 
It is appropriate to conclude that Humanae Vitae re-echoes some of the doctrine 
of Populorum Progressio which advocated that technology, increased productivity and 
economic growth by themselves are not the whole of development. They are just a quasi-
development according to Paul VI. They do not fully make the earth a more suitable 
living place for human beings. Human fulfillment must be realized within the context of 
solidarity with humans and in solidarity with God.283 In true development the human 
person works together with God and other people. This is the authentic progress because 
it is not opposed to the divine design.  
B. Octogesima Adveniens: A Call to Action (On the Eightieth Anniversary of Rerum 
Novarum - 1971) 
 
Octogesima Adveniens was written in 1971 to commemorate the eightieth 
anniversary of Rerum Novarun and the tenth anniversary of Mater et Magistra. It is an 
apostolic letter written by Paul VI “to Cardinal Maurice Roy, president of the Council of 
the Laity and of the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission”.284 The document was 
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written typically in the spirit of Gaudium et Spes. It was a response provoked by the 
Medellin Conference of the Latin American bishops in 1968, which was itself triggered  
by the Second Vatican Council, especially the discussion of Gaudium et Spes.285  
Gaudium et Spes treated justice in relation to poverty and peace, and Medellin 
carried forward the same theme by advocating the option for the poor as an act of justice, 
and the need for liberation. The conference made a shift from merely discussing 
economic issues to making the economic question a part of political discussion. Although 
the document was directly addressed to Catholics its impact goes beyond the Catholic 
community because the community interacts with the world beyond itself. This 
contention is supported by what O’Brien and Shannon claim. 
Octogesima Adveniens emphasized that action for justice was a personal responsibility of every 
Christian, that this responsibility rested on Christian organizations and institutions, but that it 
involved both the effort to bear witness to the principles of justice in personal and community life 
and acting to give those principles life in society.286  
 
According to Henriot and others “Paul VI acknowledged the difficulties inherent 
in establishing a just social order and pointed to the crucial role of the local Christian 
communities in meeting this responsibility.”287 The innate difficulty here is the one of 
using the same principles, norms, and directives of the Catholic social thought because 
the circumstances in which people live are not always exactly the same. Involvement of 
people at the grass roots was considered crucial for building a just society. Similarly, 
Curran affirms that in this letter Paul VI urged “Christians to participate and contribute to 
solving the many problems facing individual countries and the world.”288 Participation 
and cooperation or collaboration are necessary prerequisites to resolve the problem of 
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injustice. Christian communities are, in particular, urged to be involved in critical 
examination of the contexts in which they live. This is necessary because of the existing 
variable contexts in the different countries.289 It was precisely for this reason that Paul VI 
stated that 
It is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to 
their own country, to shed on it the light of the Gospel’s unalterable words and to draw principles 
for reflection, norms of judgment and directives of action from the social teaching of the 
Church.290  
 
The exhortation was written in the spirit of Populorum Progressio’s teaching 
about integral human development where Paul VI articulates the issue in terms of the 
various individual countries and the world community. This reiterates the argument about 
individual and social dimensions of authentic human development, which is actually a 
development in solidarity. Paul VI proposes critical analysis of situations in which 
Christians find themselves as one of the crucial responses to the problem.291 Here the 
emphasis is that people have responsibility to shape their own situations. Like one of its 
successor documents, Evangelii Nuntiandi, Octogesima Adveniens called people to a 
critical observation, examination and evaluation of circumstances in which they live, to 
hear the word of God, and to act on it according to the practical situations of their daily 
life. Precisely, their future is determined by them because it is in their own hands.  
Paul VI suggests that such a process occurs in three stages or moments: 
“evaluation and analysis of their contemporary situation”, “prayer, discernment, and 
reflection” on the situation in the light and teachings of the Gospels and the Church, and 
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“pastoral action which fights injustices” 292 and positively transforms society. This means 
action should be taken to exercise and defend the course of justice. However, effecting 
change in the world is the duty of all. This duty ought to be enlightened by and based on 
the Gospel. 
Paul VI made a leap in addressing the social question in Octogesima Adveniens 
because development tended to be limited only to the economic sphere. Paul VI decided 
to emphasize liberation because the political question is part of the economic agenda, and 
this suggestion was a shift of emphasis from economics to politics.293 He made this move 
because he was convinced that political action should check the power of multinational 
corporations that create economic difficulties due to their magnitude and power, 
outpacing small corporations and private enterprises. There was need for a body that 
moderates socio-economic relations. Paul VI “acknowledged the significance of the 
political dimension” 294 but also knew and acknowledged that politics is not an end in 
itself, it is a means to help achieve human development in different forms.  
In Octogesima Adveniens Paul VI also dealt with other issues affecting modern 
society. These included urbanization and its contingent consequences. For Paul VI 
urbanization and industrialization are not necessarily indicators of human development; 
they are occasions for exploitation and need to be carefully weighed because they 
sometimes create problems rather than solving them.295 This viewpoint reechoes Paul 
VI’s notion of authentic development in Populorum Progressio.  
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Octogesima Adveniens also addressed issues of equality and participation. Curran 
notes:  
This document emphasizes the human aspirations to equality and participation; recognizes some 
legitimate aspects in Marxism, especially as a tool of sociological analysis, condemns liberal 
ideology, discusses urbanization and mentions environment for the first time.296  
 
Since these aspirations affect human life they need to be addressed squarely. Here 
Paul VI addressed various issues in the document and did not favor just one political or 
ideological system. Much as he opposed Marxism, he shows that there is also something 
good in the Marxist ideology. He also demonstrates that liberal ideology has its own 
pitfalls. The integral character of his approach is manifested in his ecological concerns 
and in the diverse nature of themes the document dealt with.  
Octogesima Adveniens dealt with various issues. These include justice in personal 
and community life, participation which expresses personal responsibility in 
development, solidarity, equality of human persons, common good, charity, global 
ecology, and the principal ideologies behind many political programs, all of which were 
treated as significant and necessary for human development.297 By concentrating on the 
question of justice Octogesima Adveniens has close ties with Justitia in Mundo, which 
was published the same year. 
C. Justitia in Mundo: Justice in the World (Synod of Bishops, Rome, 1971) 
 
Justitia in Mundo: Justice in the World is one of the most important documents 
issued by Rome on the issue of justice in the history of Catholic social thought.298 It was 
published in 1971 after the Synod of Bishops convoked by Paul VI as part of the follow-
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up of the Second Vatican Council, and intended to implement the acts of the Council, 
especially to make the Church more active and vigilant in pastoral activities and the 
question of “world justice and peace.”299 Justitia in Mundo is like the two documents that 
preceded it - the Medellin Conference document and Octogesima Adveniens because of 
its contextual approach to social issues and its theme of social justice.300 According to the 
Synod of Bishops the church has a duty to bring about change in society when that is 
called for. Consequently, the Synod fathers advocated that the transformation of 
institutions through involvement in social and political issues is a “constitutive dimension 
of the preaching of the gospel.”301  
Justitia in Mundo centered on the question of justice in the world to be effected 
through pastoral action. It specifically addressed structural injustice as its core agendum 
because, according to the bishops, social structures obstruct conversion, structural 
injustices affect international economic relations, and people need to be liberated from 
such situations.302 Development is suggested here as a means to liberation but it ought to 
be noted that liberation itself is actually a process of development. Justice is emphasized 
as a constituent element of evangelization and catechesis. The Synod fathers made this 
clear when they said that: 
action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as 
a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel or, in other words, of the Church’s 
mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation.303  
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Awareness about justice is necessary to help people realize the need to exercise 
justice in society. They can learn to practice justice if they are taught. Therefore, people 
need to be reminded of unjust situations where they exist. The Synod fathers clearly 
stated that “the Church must stand with the poor and the oppressed if it is to be faithful to 
the gospel mandate.”304 Here Justitia in Mundo used the language of the Second Vatican 
Council, the Medellin conference and Octogesima Adveniens which all admited that 
differences in local contexts must be taken seriously when addressing social questions.305 
Consequently, the Synod fathers further advocate that pastoral agents who are in touch 
with the actual life situations of the people have the duty to discover this and integrate it 
into their pastoral actions, including evangelization. This suggests that their preaching 
must be down to earth, and it should touch the real issues affecting the people they 
minister to. This call also challenges the church as an institution that ministers to society. 
Walsh and Davies affirm this when they state that “the Bishops admit that the church has 
itself not always been the very best example of that justice which it now preaches.”306 
The church ought to reflect on its functions and relation to the people. It is clear that the 
document is hinting that the church is also an employer and needs to examine herself 
about how she treats people she employs. The church should be the protagonist and a 
living justice as she is also the advocate for justice. Curran’s arguments show that this is 
evident in the bishops’ statement in Justitia in Mundo.  
The bishops call for significant structural change in our world, based on justice and universal 
solidarity. The document underscores the need for ecclesial witness to justice in the church’s own 
practical life if the church’s teaching is to be credible in the world.307 
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The call for changes in social structures was prompted by the fact that 
development comes with some negative consequences such as rapid demographic 
changes or growth, rural stagnation, lack of land reform, massive rural-urban migration 
and the consequent urbanization, and unemployment caused by technological 
advancement, from all of which people have to be liberated.308 These are not precisely 
measures for authentic development because they are not liberating, they are oppressive, 
dehumanizing and do not solve problems. The victims of injustice that come out of such 
situations are migrants, refugees, those persecuted for their faith, those whose rights are 
restricted, political prisoners, orphans and nations or regions that are not given 
opportunities to grow.309 These are typical indicators of underdevelopment and ought to 
be overcome. 
According to Henriot and others, during the Bishops' Synod in Rome in 1971, the 
bishops clearly made their mind known in Justitia in Mundo. The document shows that 
the Bishops linked together the dynamism of the Gospel and the hopes of people for a 
better world today and in the future.310 What is implied here is that a dynamic 
interpretation of the Gospel in accordance with every context is mandatory in the face of 
people's desperation about what the future holds for them. In other words, people's 
understanding of justice, and their hope to experience it, and a good life are determined 
by the way the Gospel is preached in our contemporary world. What the document 
advocates is that injustice must be fought by all people in different ways. The document 
concentrates on and emphasizes the role of the Church and calls for the Church to 
                                                 
308 Dorr, Option for the Poor, 230-231. 
309 Justitia in Mundo, 20-26, 38-40. Also see Walsh and Davies, 273-274 and Dorr, Option for the Poor, 
234. 
310 Walsh and Davies, 270. Also see Henriot et al, 62 and Justitia in Mundo, 5, 33. 
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actually witness to justice by example.311 This is evident in its emphasis on integrating 
justice and evangelization, yet it puts less emphasis on the role of civil institutions and 
individuals. It can be noticed here that the document addresses the problem one-sidedly. 
Development or eradication of evil in society involves all people. This is true and 
necessary because the principle of responsible participation is vital for joint development 
efforts. Populorum Progressio is clear about this but the Synod fathers did not emphasize 
this adequately. 
Like other preceding documents, including Populorum Progressio, Justitia in 
Mundo outlined some basic principles and necessary conditions for integral human 
development. These are justice, participation, solidarity and, indirectly, human rights. 
The document also alludes to the option for the poor and the relational or social character  
of the human person as a necessary consideration.312  
D. Evangelii Nuntiandi: Evangelization in the Modern World (1975-Paul VI) 
 
In 1975, ten years after the Second Vatican Council and eight years after 
Populorum Progressio, Paul VI wrote his apostolic exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi: 
Evangelization in the Modern World. The document was “not primarily a statement of 
Catholic social teaching” but is important for the Church’s involvement in socio-
economic and political issues because it emphasized that  
salvation ‘is liberation from everything that opposes man’(EN9), thus decisively linking the 
proclamation of the gospel to the concern about the sort of life people have to live in this world.313  
 
Salvation and liberation are used as synonyms here. Paul VI cautioned, however, 
that evangelization should not be mistaken for human liberation in a political sense, and 
                                                 
311 Curran, 12. 
312 O’Brien and Shannon, 287. 
313 Walsh and Davies, 284. 
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the church should not be identified with any political system of liberation. The church 
advocates a holistic liberation but political liberation falls short of a holistic one. As a 
mark of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the closing of the Second Vatican 
Council, Evangelii Nuntiandi “affirms the council’s teaching on the active role that the 
institutional church and individual Christians must play in promoting justice in the 
world.”314 The specific aspect of liberation addressed in this case is the liberation from 
situations of injustice. This is to be achieved through preaching and living the word of 
God. This lends support to the claim that Evangelii Nuntiandi is in continuity with the 
teaching of the Second Vatican Council, especially Gaudium et Spes which treated justice 
as one of its central themes, and Justitia in Mundo. 
Other issues addressed by Evangelii Nuntiandi are human rights, solidarity, peace, 
the human person, development and liberation in the dual sense - spiritual and material 
liberation. Henriot and others suggest in Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret 
that in this apostolic exhortation Paul VI was not just advancing Catholic social tradition, 
but was advancing some of the agenda of Populorum Progressio, including his idea of 
integral human development.315  
Evangelii Nuntiandi emphasized the cultural dimension of liberation.316 This 
means besides economic, political and structural change, it called for change in people’s 
thought patterns and way of life. The theme of liberation and salvation in Evangelii 
Nuntiandi is a resurgence of the same theme of the Medellin Conference and in Justitia in 
Mundo. This shows how Evangelii Nuntiandi is in continuity with the issues treated by 
                                                 
314 Henriot et al, 66. 
315 Ibid., 67. 
316 Dorr, Option for the Poor, 242-247 and 258.  
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the two documents which preceded it. 
Evangelii Nuntiandi and Populorum Progressio are related through Gaudium et 
Spes which influenced Paul VI's understanding of authentic human development. 
Evangelii Nuntiandi shares with Gaudium et Spes, especially where it dealt with issues 
like family life and life in society, besides other issues such as peace, justice and 
development. All that Evangelii Nuntiandi did was to advocate that the various 
dimensions of life be changed by the Gospel message. The document has conspicuously 
manifested notion of integral human development - the growth of the entire person, a 
holistic salvation and liberation.  
In Evangelii Nuntiandi Paul VI confirmed the profound link between 
“evangelization and human advancement”, “development and liberation.”317 
Evangelization has an integral character because it is about human liberation and 
development. It teaches about human rights, duties, family life, peace, justice, 
development and liberation, and shows that human liberation and solidarity depend on 
the proclamation of the Gospel message – evangelization - because it creates conversion 
and collaborative conscience and ultimately transforms people’s actual life.318 On the 
bases of such interlocking relationships and the authorship of the documents it is right to 
suggest that the documents are related in their contents. Henriot and others also affirm 
this in the following statement: 
Here he emphasized that preaching the Gospel would be incomplete if it did not  take into account 
human rights and the themes of family life, life in society, peace, justice and development. 
Liberation - in both its spiritual and its temporal senses - must be proclaimed. The plan of the 
redemption includes combating injustice.319  
 
                                                 
317 Evangeli Nuntiandi, 31,18. Also see Walsh and Davies, 284. 
318 O’Brien and Shannon, 301. 
319 Henriot et al, 12. 
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Even if Evangelii Nuntiandi does not explicitly deal with integral human 
development, the tone of the document supports such a conclusion because it is also 
related to other Catholic social doctrines. For instance, like Gaudium et Spes, Evangelii 
Nuntiandi states that the laity have the role and duty to influence the life, thoughts and 
actions of people in their work places or environments of life.320 Similarly, as it explicitly 
deals with the question of evangelization, Evangelii Nuntiandi is closely related to 
Justitia in Mundo because of its emphasis that “working for social justice is an essential 
part of the meaning of the Gospel.”321 This is a significant argument because justice is a 
virtue upon which the Gospel teachings are centered. However, the gospel message is 
more than justice alone.  
Evangelization involves an explicit message, adapted to the different situations constantly being 
realized, about the rights and duties of every human being, about family life without which 
personal growth and development is hardly possible, about life in society, about international life, 
peace, justice and development - a message especially energetic today about liberation.322  
 
The issues with which Evangelii Nuntiandi dealt show how Paul VI continued to 
emphasize some of the issues he dealt with earlier in Populorum Progressio. These issues 
are social in nature but directed to liberation of all at all levels, and this coheres with the 
Christian message of liberation as universal salvation. Evangeli Nuntiandi needs to be 
read in the light of the preceding documents. 
The following remarks are in order about Evangelii Nuntiandi: First, the 
document consistently insisted on the social context of people as vital for evangelization. 
Secondly, it dealt with questions like justice, human rights, solidarity, peace, the human 
person and human dignity. Thirdly, all the questions articulated were centered on the 
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human person and human dignity because this is the object of evangelization, liberation 
and total salvation. Fourthly, like other documents of Catholic social teaching, Evangelii 
Nuntiandi attempted to address practical life problems. Fifthly, the contextual emphasis 
of the document on issues is significant socially, politically, economically and spiritually. 
Sixthly, the document and other documents preceding it point to one significant 
theological fact: namely, that theology, religion and belief have to be and must be ractical 
if they are to achieve their real goals. Finally, they can be practical only if they address 
real issues that lead to true or integral liberation or salvation because theology is an 
integral enterprise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter dealt with the biography of Paul VI, forces that influenced his trend 
of thought, and the development of the Catholic social encyclical and pastoral tradition 
since Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum in 1891. The study suggests that Paul VI was a 
multifaceted person and a pastor whose life was carefully modeled on the personalities of 
people he encountered, interacted with from within and without his family. The study 
suggests why Paul VI made the choice to write the encyclical, Populorum Progressio: On 
the Development of the Peoples, with an emphasis on the integral character of authentic 
development. 
The treatise of the encyclical and pastoral tradition from Rerum Novarum (1891) 
to Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975), apart from Populorum Progressio, leads to some 
significant observations. First, Catholic social teachings prior to and after Populorum 
Progressio had progressive influences and relationships. The documents prior to 
Populorum Progressio influenced and shaped Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum 
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Progressio and those that succeeded it were in a like manner influenced by it. Secondly, 
the arguments that feature in the Catholic social and pastoral tradition gravitate around 
the dignity of the human person, whether they treat human life, human rights, justice and 
peace, equity, common good, subsidiarity, charity, participation and involvement, option 
for the poor, affirmative action, solidarity or ownership of property. This suggests that 
human dignity is the fundamental principle of Catholic social teaching about 
development. It is the imperative moral principle governing authentic human 
development. All other conditions for authentic human development gravitate to and 
circulate around human dignity. Thirdly, the historical development of the teaching of the 
Catholic social encyclical and pastoral tradition shows that the various questions 
mentioned above, which are related to the dignity of the human person, are recurrent. 
Fourthly, there have been other social errors in the history of humankind and they seem 
to continue to recur. Fifthly, the church, the state and every individual has a responsibility 
and role to rectify such errors by way of correction or active intervention. Sixthly, in 
order to achieve this, certain principles and guidelines are necessary, and should be 
properly articulated, grasped and applied. Seventhly, considering the historically 
prevalent circumstances, change or renewal is necessary. This is evident in the study 
which shows that Catholic social teaching on human development has been progressive 
because each document was either innovative or it clarified the doctrine of the preceding 
documents. Finally, such a vision of the Catholic social tradition suggests that resolutions 
reached in the past have either been inadequate or inadequately comprehended, applied 
and followed. This inevitably suggests that there is some unfinished business, a business 
that will be treated in the successive chapters of this work. The next chapter, in particular, 
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will present principles, conditions and guidelines for authentic human development as 
presented in Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio. The foundation laid by this chapter is, 
therefore, necessary for an appropriate understanding of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF POPULORUM PROGRESSIO  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter one was intended to give a background for understanding Paul VI’s 
doctrine in Populorum Progressio on the central theme of integral human development. 
The overarching concern of this chapter is the notion of development and the requisite 
principles, virtues and conditions for authentic human development. It will focus on Paul 
VI’s concern in Populorum Progressio about four distinct issues: he wanted to articulate 
the problem of development, outline the significance of a programmatic development for 
poor countries, denounce injustice and emphasize the relation between development and 
peace.1  
The encyclical has been called the Magna Carta of Catholic teaching on human 
development.2   It is the the fundamental document of the Catholic Church’s teaching 
about human development because the document “represents a remarkable advance on 
the previous Church teaching about human development.”3 It is a foundation for the 
subsequent teachings on human development. Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII (1891), 
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI (1931), Mater et Magistra of John XXIII (1961), Pacem 
                                                 
1 Marvin L. Mich Krier, Catholic Social Teaching and Movements, (Mystic, Connecticut: Twenty-Third 
Publications, 1998), 155.  
2 Mary Synder Hembrow, “Development” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, ed. Judith A. 
Dwyer, (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1994), 280. Also see Peter J. Riga, The Church of the 
Poor: A Commentary on Paul VI’s Encyclical On The Development of Peoples, (Techny, Illinois: Divine 
Word Publications, 1968), vii. 
3 Donal Dorr, “Solidarity and Integral Human Development” in The Logic of Solidarity: Commentaries on 
John Paul II’s Encyclical On Social Concern, ed. Gregory Baum and Robert Ellsberg (Maryknoll, New 
York: Orbis Books, 1989), 144. Also see Peter J. Henriot, “Who Cares about Africa? Development 
Guidelines from the Church’s Social Teaching” in Catholic Social Thought and the New World Order: 
Building on One Hundred Years, ed. Oliver Williams and John H. Houck, (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1993), 210. 
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in Terris of John XXIII (1963), and Gaudium et Spes of Vatican Council II (1965) had 
treated some of the issues discussed but they were treated in less depth than in 
Populorum Progressio. Unlike the previous documents “written from a predominantly 
European perspective, Populorum had international overtones.”4 With the additional 
influence of Gaudium et Spes it went beyond the influence of the previous documents.  
“The understanding of human development worked out by Paul VI in Populorum 
Progressio was a major contribution, relevant” not only for the time he wrote “but also to 
the world of 1980s”5 and for our times. This is demonstrated in Paul VI’s understanding 
and definition of human development and social justice and his treatment of diverse 
issues related to the question of human development. He defined development more 
deeply and broadly than ever before in any document of Catholic social teaching on 
development, and treated justice from a global, not only national, point of view.6  This is 
further evidenced in the statement by the United States Bishops’ Conference that 
Populorum Progressio specifically  
. . . proposes a Christian vision of the authentic development of people . . . emphasizes the 
universal destination of created goods and condemns liberal capitalism . . . . reinforces the idea of 
the duty of prosperous nations to help developing nations . . . highlights the widening gap between 
the rich and poor, and emphasizes that “development” is the new name for “peace.” 7 
 
The problematic issues in development are as old as human history and involve 
both sad and happy memories - suffering and enjoyment, joy and sadness, sufficiency and 
                                                 
4 Julian Filochowski, “Looking Out to the World’s Poor: Teachings of Paul VI”, in The New Politics: 
Catholic Social Teaching for the Twenty-First Century (eds), Paul Valley, (London: SCM Press, 1998), 61. 
Also see Krier, 155. 
5Dorr, 143. Also see John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On Social Concern (Boston: Pauline Books and 
Media, 1987), 41, 77. 
6 Judith A. Merkle, From the Heart of the Church: The Catholic Social Tradition, (Collegeville, Minnesota: 
Liturgical Press, 2004), 122. Also see Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic 
Social Teaching (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 180. 
7 Robert J. Vitillo and Donna Toliver Grimes, ed. , Principles, Prophecy, and a Pastoral Response: An 
Overview of Modern Catholic Social Teaching, Catholic Campaign for Human Development, Revised 
edition, (Washington, D C: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2001), 38. 
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insufficiency - involving individuals, nations and the international community and 
covering different facets of human life - “political, economic, social, educational, 
medical, technical and similar fields.”8 Albert T. Dalfovo further asserts that the question 
of development involves both answers or solutions and questions or problems, and “it is 
better to reverse the issue and to recognize that development is a question before being an 
answer, it is a problem before being a solution.”9  
The assertion of Dalfovo is credible because problems precede development. 
Development simply comes in as solution. Without problems there would be no need for 
solutions and development. Development offers solutions but begins with problems, 
which provoke human thinking and search for solutions to problems. Paul VI’s treatise on 
the question of development gives this picture. His recognition of the prevalent problems 
provoked him to redefine and articulate the subject of human development more 
comprehensively than even before Lebret defined it.  
This chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with the actual 
problems Paul VI was addressing. Part two treats Paul VI’s general response to the 
problems and their consequences. Part three deals with ways to attempt to alleviate the 
situation or resolve the outstanding problems in the attainment of integral human 
development. The requisite principles, virtues and conditions necessary for integral 
human development are also discussed in the third part. 
II. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM: THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 
 
In Populorum Progressio Paul VI addressed a number of urgent problems ranging 
                                                 
8 Albert T. Dalfovo, “The Rise and Fall of Development: A Challenge to Culture” in African Philosophy, 
vol.12, no.1, (Massachussets, Cambridge: SAPINA and ISAP, 1999), 38.   
9 Ibid. 
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from “the gap between rich and poor to the differences and tensions between wealthy and 
impoverished countries.”10 This view suggests that the document treated international 
development issues. The principal concern of Paul VI was the magnitude of the critical 
problem of poverty evident in the ever increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and 
its effects on human dignity. His initial statement succinctly summarizes this fact: 
The development of peoples who are making very great efforts to free themselves from the 
hardship of hunger, poverty, endemic diseases, and ignorance, who are seeking a more bountiful 
share in the benefits flowing from civilization demanding that greater value be in fact set upon 
their qualities as human beings, and who are constantly giving their attention to great growth is 
gladly and encouragingly viewed by the Catholic Church.11 
 
 Hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance directly affected less-developed countries. 
According to Paul VI the developed nations had contributed to part of the problems. He 
stated the core issue regarding integral human development in the following words: 
While today we see that men are seeking to find a more secure food supply, cure for diseases, 
steady employment, increasing personal responsibility with security from oppression and freedom 
from degradation endangering the dignity of man, better education, in a word while men seek to be 
more active and consequently to enhance their value, we see at the same time that great numbers 
are living in conditions which frustrate their just desires. . . .12  
 
Paul VI was comprehensive in his attempt to address factors that affect true 
development. The crucial issues related to authentic development are the questions of 
meeting the basic needs of life, human dignity, human rights, responsibility and 
participation, education and the ultimate satisfaction of the needs of individuals. Peter 
Riga’s observations about the document are helpful for an understanding of the issues 
raised by Paul VI. He notes:  
                                                 
10 Richard P. McBrien et al. (eds)., “Populorum Progressio” in Harper Collins Encyclopedia of 
Catholicism, (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1989), 1033. Also see Riga, 15-16 and 18, 
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 (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 2002), 65. 
11 Paul VI (Pope), Populorum Progressio: On the Development of Peoples, (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Catholic Conference, 1967), 1,1-2. 
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The social encyclical of Paul VI, Populorum Progressio - “On the Development of Peoples” - is 
the culmination of the voice of the modern popes on the problems and agonies of the men of our 
day. A note of urgency is one of the letter’s outstanding characteristics; Pope Paul obviously 
considers the problem of poverty and underdevelopment the most pressing and dangerous issue of 
our day. On the resolution of this issue will hang the balance of peace and, indeed the future of 
human race.13 
 
 The crux of the problem raised by Paul VI was that the human dignity was in 
jeopardy. Paul VI was explicit in pointing this out even if he was not consistent in doing 
so throughout the document. Human dignity is threatened by the prevalence of misery. 
This threat may be aggravated by the apparent absence of peace. Paul VI “addressed in 
Populorum Progresio what was clearly the social problem of the age – the division 
between the rich and the poor nations.” 14 It must be added that he did so with foresight 
and a very close attention to the attendant or related problems. These problems were 
practical socio-economic and political issues manifested in the prevalent poverty, 
ignorance, hunger and diseases. They were further evident in avarice, inequality, 
selfishness, cultural degradation, nationalism, racism, and the adversely affected 
epicenter of human development, namely human dignity. All of these were indicative of 
the “growing gap between rich and poor nations,”15 and particularly in their 
understanding of the human person or their failure to take the true notion of the human 
person seriously. 
It should be emphasized that these problems and threats to human dignity were 
consequences of selfishness, which Paul VI called greed and egoism, besides the problem 
of a misconstrued notion of human development, which was partially the cause of the 
other problems mentioned above. It must also be emphasized that all of these issues were 
                                                 
13 Riga, viii. 
14 Filochowski, 61. 
15 Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 1891-Present: A Historical, Theological and Ethical 
Analysi,s (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 11. 
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related to the human person, and particularly human dignity. Riga reminds us that Paul 
VI’s presentation in Populorum Progressio shows that “what must remain as the crux of 
social thought is man - every man and all men.”16 Precisely, human dignity stands at the 
center of the question, and is crucial to development.  
Populorum Progressio focused on human community and individuals, their 
relationships and circumstances of life. The encyclical was concerned with major areas 
affecting people. These included not only human dignity, but also human aspirations, 
structural injustice, the role of the Church in human development, a new vision of 
humanism, common good, international socio-economic and political relations, and 
peace.17 Here it is relevant to suggest that Populorum Progressio exhibits the spirit of 
Gaudium et Spes, which intended to offer joy and hope to people in desperate situations 
as the title of the document states.  
A. Socio-economic and Political Conditions    
 
The socio-economic and political problems addressed by Paul VI were world-
wide. They were rampant that time and being addressed by other religious leaders too. 
For instance, in many ways Paul VI grappled with socio-economic and political situations 
similar to those confronted by Martin Luther King Jr., although one’s was national (that 
of King) and the other’s international (that of Paul VI). Nonetheless, practically, the 
issues addressed were intimately related as Hanigan indicates for King. 
Concretely for King social evil meant segregation, the second rate status afforded America’s black 
citizens, and economic injustice, the simple disparity between the rich and the poor, the fact that 
some men had more than enough while others went hungry or homeless. In a formal sense social 
                                                 
16 Riga, 29. 
17 Peter J. Henriot et al, ed. Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis 
Books, 1988), 52. 
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evil comprehended those institutional elements which put restrictions upon or distorted the 
development of the human personality.18  
 
These are the same evils Paul VI was addressing in Populorum Progressio. There 
is little wonder that there is such a vivid similarity. The two addressed real problems of 
the world of the 1960s. They both addressed the question of social injustices, the gap 
between the rich and poor, racism and the question of human development. King 
advocated the development of all the citizens of the USA in the same manner, and in 
different areas of life. The difference between the two is apparently the level at which 
they addressed the issues and the methodology they used. 
Populorum Progressio opened with a statement on the prevalent phenomenon of 
inhuman material or economic conditions of people who are attempting to overcome their 
desperation. Paul VI did not limit this problem to just a national level. Instead, he 
emphasized the international character of the social question but specifically underscored 
the development needs of the developing nations.19 This phenomenon of desperation, 
according to Paul VI, is evident in the prevalent hardship caused by hunger, poverty, 
diseases and ignorance of people who are struggling to liberate themselves from their 
conditions in order to experience greater human values than what they currently 
experience.20 The international problem was, therefore, not only caused by desperation in 
the underdeveloped countries. It also included the relationship between developed and 
underdeveloped countries and the dangers of apathy on the side of the rich nations.21  
                                                 
18 James P. Hanigan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Foundations of Nonviolence (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, Inc.1984), 156. 
19 Curran, 11. 
20 Populorum Progressio, 1, 1-2. Also see Henriot, 53. 
21 Richard W. Rousseau, Human Dignity and the Common Good: The Great Papal Social Encyclicals from 
Leo XIII to John Paul II (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002), 263. Also see Populorum 
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1. POVERTY AND AVARICE 
 
Paul VI observed that avarice was one of the causes of the problems. This 
explains why he addressed the question of ownership of property. However, a caution is 
necessary according to Paul VI, because property is not possessed for the sake of 
increasing one’s power, but for enhancing the dignity of the human person. Avarice must, 
therefore, be avoided or averted by all. The underlying reason for this global call was that 
avarice, whether of individuals or families or nations, equally affects both the rich and the 
poor, and “can drive both to materialism which stifles their souls.”22 The ultimate end of 
productive work is not avarice or accumulation of material resources, because they are 
not an end in themselves but are means to an end. Here Paul VI was addressing an 
enduring problem. The gravity of the problems caused by avarice or greed was expressed 
thirty-two years later when the international community was attempting to address and 
resolve the population and development problem.23 
Paul VI was prompted to such advocacy because of his personal observations of 
the ordeal of the poor and the conditions of the rich nations. He alluded to his pre-
pontifical and pontifical trips to various places - South America (1960), Africa (1962), 
Palestine and India, where he had first-hand observation of the pathetic economic 
situations there. He stated that such and similar observations were what prompted the 
                                                 
22 Populorum Progressio, 18, 8-9. 
23 The Rome Statement on the International Conference on Population and Development,  ICPD (Religion 
Counts, January 1999), 4. 
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Church to request the United Nations to intervene to help the poor.24 The difficult 
economic conditions of the less-developed countries were another immediate major cause 
of concern for Paul VI.  
Paul VI’s reference and appeal to the UN was an indirect suggestion of the 
significance of affirmative action, namely aggressive government intervention on behalf 
of the desperate poor, on the international or global level, and the significance of the 
principle of subsidiarity and option for the poor, even if not directly stated by Paul VI. He 
was suggesting that a bigger, more powerful and capable body that could respectfully but 
firmly and forcefully intervene on behalf of the poor, especially when they could not 
handle their own problems, was necessary. Such a body should continue to function and 
never be obsolete at any moment if world affairs are to progress.25 The significance of 
such a body would be to regulate the distribution of resources and curb avarice at a global 
level when necessary. 
2. INEQUALITY AND INJUSTICE 
 
According to Paul VI the inequalities and injustice consequent to technological 
advancement were problems that needed to be addressed too.26 Although technology 
helped to improve the situation of colonial subjects, technological advancements cause 
rapid inequalities unless their use is well-checked to avoid such disparities. However, 
inequalities are increasing because some nations produce more than they need while 
others are constantly in need of more or produce less than they need or they are uncertain 
                                                 
24 Populorum Progressio, 4, 2-3. 
25 Michael Walsh and Brian Davies (eds), Proclaiming Justice and Peace: Papal Documents from Rerum 
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of meeting their aspirations of sales of their produce.27 Paul VI was addressing the 
problem of what I would call development fixation in underdeveloped countries and the 
opposite in the developed countries. This affirmation confirms the gravity of the growing 
gap between the rich and the poor. It also confirms the inadequate support for the less-
developed nations and their deteriorating situation. There was an imbalance between the 
steady and rapid growth in developing countries and the stagnation of underdeveloped 
countries.28 While underdeveloped nations were not advancing, developed nations 
continued to advance further and so to increase economic and political differences.  
Inequalities were also experiences of regions dependent on agriculture and 
farmers were aware of their wretched situations in comparision to the industrialists and 
the prevaling inequalities among them as farmers.29 These inequalities include possession 
of goods and the exercise of power. This means that while the minority lived a decent and 
dignified life, the majority lived in dehumanizing conditions, where freedom is curtailed 
by those who tended to control most of the resources. Paul VI was addressing the 
problem of the growing gap between the minority rich and the majority poor, who were 
totally incapacitated to live humane lives and to work under decent and healthy 
circumstances. He described the situation as follows: 
For it happens in certain regions that while a small and select number enjoys a most refined 
culture, the needy meanwhile and the scattered inhabitants, “lack almost every possibility of acting 
on their own initiative and responsibility, spending their lives in living and working conditions 
unworthy of human beings.”30 
 
                                                 
27 Populorum Progressio, 8,4. Also see Hennelly, 764. 
28 Rousseau , 265. Also see Hennelly, 764. 
29 Rousseau, 265. Also see Populorum Progressio, 9, 4 -5. 
30 Populorum Progressio, 9, 5. Here Paul VI is quoting Vatican Council II Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral 
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Paul VI was addressing the theological problem that a growing gap between rich 
and poor nations inhibits God’s intention from being realized.31 He specifically referred 
to the universal destiny of natural resources. Here it is noteworthy that the issue of 
inequality between the rich and the poor is a global reality, even if Paul VI’s focus in 
Populorum Progressio was on the problems in the less developed countries. 
3. CULTURE 
 
Conflict of cultural interests or values was another problem Paul VI identified. 
The encounter between traditional cultures and industrial civilization forges conflicting 
social structures and creates conflicts between adults and young people because the two 
categories of people hold divergent cultural values.32 Paul VI was clear about this 
problem. 
Then since the traditional civilization is in conflict with recently introduced industrial civilization, 
it happens without fail that social structures not corresponding to modern needs are almost 
shattered. Consequently, while adults think that the life either of individuals or families is to be 
centered as it were in the framework, often times narrow, of this civilization and believe that it is 
not to be abandoned; the young at the same time consider it a kind of meaningless barrier which 
keeps them from eagerly advancing to new ways of life in society.33 
 
While adults cling to traditional values, youth look at them as obstacles to modern 
advancement, which they consider as development. According to Paul VI this tension 
needs to be eased or eradicated. People constantly deliberate whether to retain traditional 
cultural institutions and values and forego progress, or to discard the culturally rich 
traditions in favor of modern technology and novel cultural values. Oftentimes traditional 
moral, spiritual and religious values, convictions and institutions are discarded and do not 
have a place in new values and institutions. The principal problem here is the radical 
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break from tradition and the intimate attachment to an inadequately comprehended 
culture. According to Richard Rousseau, this is a real “breakdown of traditional customs 
and attitudes.”34 This, according to Paul VI, is where development falls short of its 
authentic character. This is a plausible assertion because abandoning one culture in favor 
of another is absorption rather than integrated development, which is open to relevant 
values. Development is not a matter of discarding old or traditional practices and taking 
up new ones. Rather it is an integration of new and old valuable cultural heritage, a 
continuity of the old in the new. It ought to be noted here that cultural integration is 
sometimes difficult to achieve but its possibility is what Paul VI’s arguments suggest in 
this case. 
The difficulty of uncritical choice of cultural values was the problem that Paul VI 
thought needed to be addressed. He cautioned developing nations against the attraction to 
values of wealthy nations whose cultural and technical civilizations and example of hard 
work and industry which produced their prosperity to a high degree.35 Though good in 
itself, Paul VI contended that temporal prosperity and cultural values of wealthy nations 
do not meet all human needs, especially spiritual needs. Cultures should be critically 
examined and only “excellent and useful” values should be sought and developed 
together with those of the “less wealthy”36 nations. Paul VI was actually advocating that 
poor nations should not take up the cultures of the technologically developed and wealthy 
nations and abandon their own because of an apparently better and superior nature of the 
cultural values of the wealthy nations compared to that of the less-developed nations. 
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Here he affirmed that development is not measured in terms of technology and industry 
alone because they do not define the superiority or inferiority of a particular culture. The 
significance of a culture is defined by how human it is. As long as cultures of less-
developed nations esteem the human person and promote human dignity, they are worthy 
of retention. This is why, according to Rousseau, Paul VI warned that “developing 
countries must be careful of simply accepting the values and examples of wealthy 
nations.” 37  
The problem of cultural conflict is sometimes aggravated by those who leave their 
native countries to study in foreign countries, especially developed or industrialized 
nations. Paul VI cautioned youth who study in developed countries and eventually loose 
esteem for their own traditional and cultural values.38 The problem with such students is 
that they often attain an excellent education in the developed nations, a knowledge that 
would be beneficial for their home countries if well integrated with their own culture, but 
oftentimes they overlook and disregard the invaluable cultural and spiritual values of 
their own nations.39 Besides this they sometimes abandon their own countries and decide 
to live in the developed nations. Here Paul VI addressed the significant issue of loss of 
skilled labor by less-developed nations to the more developed ones. When people from 
the former category of countries refuse to return to their patria, they contribute to the 
slow progress at home but a faster progress in the more developed nations because 
instead of being the brains for development and using their skills at their home countries 
they add their skills and brains to what the more developed countries already have. This 
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behavior of expatriate students also partly contributes to the widening gap between the 
less-developed nations and the developed nations. 
4. POPULATION EXPLOSION 
 
Paul VI was concerned about demographic issues in the less-developed countries 
because of inadequate resources for a decent life. He observed that rapid population 
growth exceeding “available resources adds its own problems to development.”40 In his 
judgment population growth was disproportionate to the supportive productivity of 
developing or less- developed nations. This was threatening decent living conditions. In 
such cases resources “badly needed for industrialization and capital investment” 41are 
diverted to meet the fundamental or primary needs. According to Paul VI, this does not 
promote other aspects of development. This is why he says: 
It is not to be denied that accelerated demographic increases too frequently add difficulties to 
plans for development because the population is increased more rapidly than available resources 
so that all solutions seem to end in a blind alley.42  
 
If population growth outpaces the development or the availability of requisite 
resources for humane living, it is hard to satisfy the material needs of the people. 
Alternatively, human needs may not be addressed in morally desirable ways. Paul VI’s 
principal concern was that population explosion was creating difficulties in the 
development of the Third World countries.43 He feared that the temptation would be the 
attempt by the legitimate authorities to radically or drastically limit population growth by 
use of unethical or immoral methods. He wanted demographic problems to be resolved 
without tampering with human dignity. This is where, according to Paul VI, explosive 
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demographic growth becomes problematic to true human development. This problem was 
also later recognized and acknowledged by John Paul II in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis as an 
obstacle to development. 44   
5. NATIONALISM AND RACISM  
 
Paul VI observed that nationalism and racism are not supportive of integral 
human development. According to him nationalism was often misunderstood and given a 
negative connotation as expressed in its practice in some countries. It was precisely 
understood to mean chauvinism, which is “blind patriotism.”45 This understanding of 
nationalism differs from the positive understanding of it as patriotism or love for and 
defense of one’s own country. Paul VI was concerned that nationalism as practiced at that 
time tended to be a reaction to colonialism and had discriminating overtones which did 
not allow for solidarity beyond one’s own country. This would not promote integral 
development. Rousseau’s reading of Populorum Progressio shows that the primary 
reason for the inconsonance of nationalism and racism with true development is that they 
are opposed to the spirit of solidarity, and ultimately contrary to the spirit of integral 
human development.46 Nationalism and racism, and let it also be affirmed in African and 
similar contexts that tribalism,caste system and all sorts of favoritism, are factors that 
impede integral human development. Initially, nationalism was mainly a problem of 
newly independent former colonies because these newly independent states wanted to 
assert themselves as separate entities, but in the course of self-assertion they were 
                                                 
44 Peter J. Henriot, “Who Cares About Africa? Development Guidelines from the Church’s Social 
Teaching.” in Catholic Social Thought and the New World Order, eds., Oliver F. Williams and John W. 
Houck (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 230. Also see John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis: On Social Concern (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1987), 25, 41-42. 
45 Gove Babcock,Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of English Language, Unabridged 
,(Springfield, Massachusetts, U.S.A.: Meriam Webster Inc. Publishers, 1986), 380. 
46 Rousseau, 272. 
  124
isolating themselves from other nations. According to Paul VI, just as it was before 
colonial withdrawal, equality based on human dignity and solidarity remains problematic 
today because of nationalism and racism.47 Here Paul VI pointed out that nationalism and 
racism are enduring problems in the way of development. Nationalism is problematic and 
an obstacle to integral human development because it  
is divisive and stands in the way of people’s genuine advantages, but it causes the most serious 
harm particularly in those areas where the needs of national economy demand on the contrary the 
pooling of efforts, or of knowledge, or of financial resources to carry out the plans for economic 
development and to increase and strengthen commercial and cultural ties.48 
 
The problem with nationalism is that it is opposed to the essential conditions or 
principles necessary for integral human development. These include solidarity, common 
good, participation, involvement, universal charity, peace and justice. For Paul VI 
nationalism and racism were similar. According to him racism is an international 
phenomenon. It existed in newly independent states where there was a diversity of people 
of various backgrounds. The similarity between nationalism and racism, and even 
tribalism, is that they fragment human community. They are opposed to the spirit of 
global solidarity and they promote limits, division, and they are detrimental to national 
and international community respectively. 
Where there is human diversity, tribal wrangles, separatist political affiliations 
and factions also develop. Paul VI observed that racism was detrimental to justice, it 
endangers civil peace and welfare, it obstructs mutual and profitable understanding, and 
provokes conflicts based on prevalent injustice. All of these are serious threats to integral 
human development because they are, by nature, opposed to the spirit of mutual 
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integration and growth. Racism and tribalism have similar effects on human development 
as nationalism. Paul VI was categorical that racism is  
an obstacle to collaboration among poverty-stricken people and sows the seeds of discord and 
enmity within countries as often as either individuals or families see themselves deprived of basic 
rights of the rest of the citizens on account of race or color with contempt for man’s inalienable 
rights.49 
 
Paul VI did not explicitly mention tribalism as a problem, but by inference 
tribalism rightly falls in the category of problems or obstacles to development because 
like nationalism and racism, tribalism absolutely does not support solidarity in a wide or 
universal sense. All three recognize the value of solidarity, common good, participation, 
involvement, personal responsibility, charity, peace and justice but to a very limited 
extent. They do not go beyond the borders of nation, race and tribe.  
B. A Misconstrued Notion of Development 
 
Paul VI decided to redefine human development because he recognized and 
acknowledged a serious problem with the notion of development. He noted that what 
many people and governments claimed to be development was in fact a quasi-
development. The prevalent notion of development at that time was exclusively an 
economic one. This was one of the problems that people needed to confront and find an 
answer to. Paul VI was of the view hat if authentic development is not properly 
understood it is still harder to achieve.  
Paul VI acknowledged that development is misconstrued if viewed solely from a 
material point of view, which is devoid of social and spiritual dimensions of a human 
person. Consequently, he cautioned against two issues regarding development. First, 
individuals and nations should not consider the growth in supply of possessions their 
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ultimate goal, and neither is it the ultimate goal of true development. Considering the 
growth in quantity of possessions as development is a mistaken notion of development. 
The definition of true development is broad.50 Secondly, Paul VI acknowledged that 
development has a twofold effect: positively, it contributes to the progressive growth of 
the human person, and negatively, development imprisons a person if it is considered 
“the highest good beyond which one is not to look.”51 The second effect of material 
growth falls short of integral development because it excludes the ultimate end and 
meaning of true human development. Material growth is not liberating; authentic 
development has a liberating dimension. 
The problem here is the temptation to think that economic growth alone is 
complete development, and ultimately to make a clear distinction between true 
development and inauthentic development. Paul VI incessantly and consistently disputed 
the idea that economic development is the whole of development. According to him 
giving priority to material possessions, while neglecting real needs of people because of 
greed or avarice was not true development because it is adversely consequential to the 
human person. He described the consequence as follows: 
Consequently, the exclusive quest for economic possessions not only impedes man’s development 
as a human being but also opposes his true greatness. For both nations and men who are infested 
with the vice of avarice give clearest evidence of moral underdevelopment.52 
 
  Paul VI’s emphasis here does not deny the value of material or economic 
development which constitutes only a fraction of true development. His principal concern 
was human dignity. He contended that as people progress economically or materially, and 
otherwise, they should also grow morally. Material or economic development should not 
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retard or curtail moral development or overlook human dignity. Though not explicated 
this way, Paul VI's contention is tantamount to stating that economic development and 
moral development should have a direct proportionality, not an inverse one. This makes 
sense especially when conceived in the context of Paul VI's notion of integral human 
development. Authentic development is all-dimensional and does not retard the growth of 
people materially and spiritually, economically and morally. 
C. Causes of the Problems 
 
Paul VI attributed misconstrued notion of development to three main factors 
which he thought played a great role in creating the prevalent situations which moved 
him to write Populorum Progressio. These were colonialism, neocolonialism with 
subsequent imbalance of power and wealth, and imbalance in trade relations and 
economic power in general, between the rich and the poor nations.53  
1. THE EVIL LEGACY OF COLONIALISM 
 
 The first cause of poverty, according to Paul VI, is the negative legacy of 
colonialism.54 Colonialism left enduring negative effects on the economy of many  
countries that were left dependent on single export crops subject to sudden and 
considerable price fluctuations.55 Although colonizing powers brought to the colonies 
quality achievements through science and technology and left beneficial results of their 
presence - diminished ignorance, diminished sickness, benefits of communication and 
improved standard of living - in many underprivileged regions, they often perpetuated 
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their own interests, power, domination and glory, and their departure left precarious 
economies in the former colonies.56 Though Paul VI appreciated the work of the 
colonialists, he also questioned how disinterested they were in their endeavors and 
suggested that the lacuna in their endeavors was lack of authentic charity and justice. 
 The product of colonialism, according to Paul VI, was inadequate to face the hard 
realities of modern economics. The colonialists widened levels in the world’s standard of 
living, rich people enjoyed rapid growth while the poor developed slowly, and some 
people produced a surplus while others produced less and were incapable of exporting.57 
Paul VI observed that there was an economic, social and political power imbalance. 
There was inequality in the exercise of power, a limited group of people enjoyed refined 
civilization and the majority of people were poor, deprived of nearly all possibility of 
personal initiative and responsibility, and lived under conditions unworthy of human 
beings.58  
Paul VI was opposed, though not absolutely, to capitalism or liberal trade. He 
called into question the fundamental principle of economic liberalism which was 
responsible for the socio-economic and political power imbalance, and requested a 
moderation in free trade.59 In the context of the doctrine of the document it is plausible to 
affirm here that Paul VI took such a stance because property, and subsequently profit are 
not evil in themselves if they are used to promote human dignity. Promotion and priority 
of property is bad only when it serves selfish ends, compounds exploitation and 
disregards human dignity. 
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Paul VI contended here that poverty is not merely self-made or caused by natural 
factors, it is a human creation. Filochowski affirms this assertion. According to him, Paul 
VI thinks “clearly it is not to be assumed that poverty and underdevelopment result from 
natural causes or laziness.”60 To affirm that the poor are the cause of their poverty or to 
blame for their poverty is to presume that poverty cannot be a consequence of other 
people’s attitude or behavior. It is naïve to understand it that way. An integral and critical 
consideration of the causes of poverty is called for here. I would suggest that people 
should see beyond the context of prevalent poverty to its causes and solutions to alleviate 
it. The concession that laziness is one of the factors that thwarts development is true and 
ought to be added to any list of obstacles to development. Work enhances human dignity 
and contributes to material human growth. 
2. THE CURRENT NEO-COLONIALISM  
 
For Paul VI, the prevalent neo-colonialism was a significant cause of 
development problems.61 The problem with neo-colonialism is that it perpetuates political 
pressure and economic domination aimed at acquiring wealth and maintaining political 
control by/for a few. It aims at dominance which contradicts the principle of respect for 
human dignity.62 According to Paul VI, nationally, neo-colonialism promotes economic 
domination and internationally it encourages both economic and political domination of 
poor countries by rich countries. Here Paul VI again raised the issue John XXIII had 
raised in Pacem in Terris when he emphasized that “there can no longer exist a world 
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divided into nations that rule and nations that are subject to others.”63 Paul VI was 
suggesting that colonialism is obsolete. This position was based on the equality of the 
dignity of people. Although Paul VI apparently thought neo-colonialism was a suspicion 
and a possibility rather than a reality, he never took it for granted and he addressed 
problems related to it.64 It is important to note that neo-colonialism was and still exists. 
Paul VI questioned the motives behind grants and suggested that they should not be given 
to subdue or curtail the freedom of the recipients; instead they should promote their 
dignity. 
 Paul VI contended that bilateral and multilateral agreements create dependence 
and bitterness. They should be replaced by systems that substitute dependence and 
feelings of enhancement, left by colonialism, for systems that build a happier relationship 
of friendships based on constitutional and political equality.65 If, under the cover of 
financial assistance and technical aid, there is political pressure and economic motive 
aimed at complete domination then there is something unjust with the arrangement. This 
frustrates efforts to assist developing nations, financially and technically, and deteriorates 
to an illusion because benefits accruing from such endeavors would be, at least partially, 
nullified.66 
3. TRADE AND POWER IMBALANCE 
 
 Paul VI noted with concern that imbalance in power led to injustice in trade 
relations and contributed to the poor state of development in the Third World nations 
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which were just beginning to grow or had not yet started growing.67 He challenged the 
status quo of international trade relationships and underscored that these relations are 
arranged to help the rich nations to become richer while poor ones become poorer.68 
Development cannot be integral if trade relationships promote growth in some nations 
and undermine development in others. This is one of the causes of poverty and 
underdevelopment in disadvantaged nations. It is also externally determined by the 
attitude of international trade partners. 
Paul VI was concerned about the system of trade between rich and poor nations 
because it was characterized by an unchanging course to the detriment of poor countries. 
This was again partly a negative consequence of colonialism. Industrialized nations 
primarily export manufactured goods which have constantly increasing prices, while 
developing countries export raw materials whose prices constantly fluctuated.69 This is 
why developing nations find it difficult to balance their economy or trade.Consequently, 
they remain poor.  
Human persons, human dignity and rights are often threatened by malfunctioning 
socio-economic, religious and political systems. An understanding of true development, 
healthy trade relationships, the exercise of Christian and human virtues, just political 
arrangements and just social structures are also significant for the esteem and protection 
of the human person and the human dignity. From these observations it is realistic to 
conclude that, although Populorum Progressio dealt with issues such as authentic human 
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development, materialism, a new humanism, technocracy, mutual solidarity, social 
justice, universal charity, nationalism, racism, and collaboration, the underpinning 
question it was addressing was that of the defense or protection of human dignity.70 
In addressing problems prevalent in the global community Paul VI was making a 
moral judgment about socio-economic and political relations between peoples and 
nations. His ultimate concern was their effect on human dignity, the raison d’etre - the 
fundamental and ultimate end or reason, of true human development.71 It would seem 
right to suggest that every problem he declared immoral was because he judged it to be 
consequent to an actus humanus. That is, he judged each event according to whether it 
was a human act done freely and after deliberate choice preceded by knowledge. The 
fundamental cause of the problems is self-concern or self-absorption of individuals and 
nations. When nations or individuals make choices only in their favor they deny that 
other individuals or nations are worthy of the same or similar choices. This idea points to 
the question of the dignity of other individuals. It prompts the suggestion that structures 
and systems are necessary for the promotion and protection of the dignity and human 
rights of individuals and nations regardless of which person or nation. It also suggests 
that sometimes nations and individuals are responsible to some degree at least according 
to moral principles, if no impediments such as ignorance, passion, fear and coercion stand 
in the way of their decisions and actions.72 
III. PAUL VI’S RESPONSE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Paul VI’s approach to the problem of poverty and underdevelopment was 
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deliberate. He did not approach the problem by beginning with a provision of solutions to 
the problems at the international or national level without a careful and thorough analysis 
of the world situation, and the causes of poverty and underdevelopment, and neither did 
he start from the “. . . current conception of economic development.”73 He did just the 
opposite and started with a statement of the historical concern and involvement of the 
Church, an analysis of the world situation and problems, and later attempted to resolve 
these problems. Donal Dorr affirms Paul VI’s deliberate approach. He thinks that Paul VI 
did not use the current conception of economic development as a starting point and then 
modify it. Dorr suggests that this explains why Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio 
represents a notable advance on earlier Catholic social documents on the question of 
human development.74 
 According to Paul VI, “the present situation of the world demands concerted 
action based on a clear vision of all economic, social, cultural and spiritual aspects” of 
human life and society.75 Here he was hinting at the importance of solidarity, 
participation or involvement and respect for socio-economic and political differences. His 
ultimate economic response was that rich nations should aid poor nations and 
international trade should be regulated by social justice. 
A. Historical Church Involvement and Contribution  
 
Social justice has always been a concern of the Church, and the Church has often 
attempted to resolve some of the social problems including problems of people struggling 
                                                 
73 Filochowski, 62. Also see Donal Dorr, “Solidarity and Integral Development” in The Logic of Solidarity : 
Commentaries on John Paul II’s Encyclical On Social Concern ( Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1989), 145. 
74 Dorr, Option for the Poor, 181. 
75 Christine E. Gudorf, Catholic Social Teaching on Liberation Themes (Washington, D.C.: University of 
America, 1981), 21. Here Gudorf is quoting Populorum Progressio, 13, AAS, p.59 (1967); 264; translation 
Renewing the Earth, p.317. 
  134
to come out of situations of hunger, misery, disease and ignorance.76 Paul VI affirmed 
that problems are a fact in human life and the Church recurrently confronts them. They 
are true, difficult and undeniable aspects of the human situation to resolve. Problems defy 
changes in society. The nature of social problems changes but as problems per se they 
always exist. The church is always aware of this. The Second Vatican Council 
recommended the importance of the social question in all its ramifications and called for 
the necessary urgent cooperation of all people.77 This was an invocation of the principle 
of participation and the principle of solidarity, both of which are significant for true 
human development. The historic and future role of the Church in promoting integral 
development cannot, and should not be underestimated.78  
Paul VI stated that historically the Church has pursued integral human 
development and must continue to facilitate it both individually and in solidarity. After 
the example of her founder, the Catholic Church has never ceased to promote the 
development of people. For example, missionaries built infirmaries, hospitals, schools 
and universities. They taught the natives to tap their resources and to benefit from the 
resources, they also guarded the natives against the greed of foreigners, though at times 
they acted imperfectly and contrary to Christian doctrine.79 Paul VI acknowledged that 
missionaries cherished institutions of the indigenous people and developed them further. 
Paul VI insisted that the Church must always be attentive to current phenomena, 
reading and interpreting the signs of the times. His call and advocacy for the Church’s 
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historical involvement is that it must be alert and critical, especially in situations of mal-
development. This is a duty the Church must continue to cherish within its own ability 
and jurisdictions so as to establish “on earth the kingdom of heaven”80 through presenting 
a view of the human person and human affairs totally. 
Currently this project is undertaken by both groups and individuals, but it 
demands the concerted effort and action of all who have a clear understanding of the 
different facets of political, economic, social, spiritual and cultural matters. Paul VI 
mainly focused on and pointed to ecclesiastics and academics or professional people. At 
this juncture he introduced the topic of authentic human development by outlining the 
areas from which efforts need to be pooled together in order to bring about true human 
progress. He made it clear that the political dimension is an important aspect of human 
development.  
B. Development in Solidarity 
 
 Here Paul VI used the word solidarity to accentuate the idea that people need one 
another to be and to become, to live and to grow. For development to be true or integral, 
it must occur in solidarity even if individual members of society are responsible for their 
own individual development.81 This means development in solidarity demands individual 
responsibility. The reason for this call is that everybody is a part of a particular society 
and the community of the entire human family. Solidarity is an important principle 
because people need mutual support to grow and to enhance their human dignity, to be 
what they were originally intended by God. It provides opportunities for mutual exchange 
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of talents and resources necessary for integral development. John S. Mbiti clearly states 
the expression of solidarity in an African context which typifies solidarity. He says that 
the African is convinced of the saying that “I am, because we are; since we are, therefore 
I am.”82 Among the Lugbara of Uganda proverbs emphasize the importance of solidarity 
for development or any achievement. The proverb: “Aluri pa (k)uu ku”, translated as “the 
foot of a single person does not sound” means:  
The footsteps of an individual can hardly be heard when walking. There have to be several people 
walking or dancing for the sound of their feet to be heard clear and far. The inference is that the 
person who is alone in society or in family cannot accomplish much; his activities have no 
repercussion. Instead many people together attain far-reaching results.”83  
 
 According to Dalfovo the proverb encourages people to co-operate, to work 
together to be effective in their undertaking. What is precisely encouraged by the proverb 
is the spirit of solidarity toward meeting individual and community needs. This solidarity 
extends from the family to people outside the family.84 
Solidarity is central to integral human development. Paul VI exhorted all people 
to join together to strive for the complete development of every individual and all people. 
Paul VI invoked the principles of solidarity, participation, social justice, and global 
involvement, peace and common good. These are principles which the Pontifical 
Commission for Justice and Peace was established to promote. Paul VI further advocated 
this view when he stated:  
Wherefore, we earnestly exhort all men today to strive by united planning and joint action for the 
full development of each individual and the common progress of all Mankind.85  
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This view was forcefully re-emphasized by John Paul II about twenty years later 
in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. One of Paul VI’s initial responses to the question of human 
development was that development should necessarily occur in solidarity involving 
dialogue leading to global plans, if human development is to be integral.86  
The Church’s practical action for the cause of human development was the effort 
to implement the resolution of the Second Vatican Council through the establishment of 
the Pontifical Commission for Peace and Justice. The purpose of this Commission is to 
conscientize the people of God about the functions entrusted to it in order to promote 
human development of the poor, to foster international social justice, to aid the less 
developed countries, and to facilitate their personal and independent development.87 In 
1983 the German Bishops emphasized the significance of world peace by advocating 
both just and sustainable promotion of development in the developing countries in order 
to create the peace which Paul VI himself equated to development.88  
The Church’s ceaseless call to solidarity, which is a “call to relationship with 
others reflects the church’s awareness of the integral equality of dignity enjoyed by every 
human being.”89 Paul VI’s concern was to foster the dignity of the human person when he 
advocated development in solidarity. Development in solidarity is vital, according to him, 
because “there can be no progress toward a complete human development of a person 
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without the simultaneous development of all humanity in the spirit of solidarity.”90 True 
development is not a solitary process. The development of an individual is related to the 
development of other individuals and groups. True development involves mutual support 
among individuals and groups.  
Paul VI contended that true development is not just an individual affair and not 
just the development of an individual. True development is mutual and demands mutual 
support. According to him “the complete development of the individual must be joined 
with that of the human race and must be accomplished by mutual effort.”91 This is why, 
according to Paul VI, authentic development is both inclusive and exclusive. It is 
inclusive because no one is outside the claim and it is exclusive because at the same time 
it means the whole development of an individual. Whether development is of a whole 
individual or of the whole of human kind, it calls for mutual support. It is not just a 
product of an isolated individual effort but of all. This is what explains development in 
solidarity, collaboration and unity, which is a development that embraces participation or 
involvement. Such development, according to Paul VI, is not only relevant nationally but 
internationally. Authentic human development embraces the whole of humankind, 
including the past, present and future generations motivated by the spirit of mutual 
collaboration, unity, good will, harmony of minds and friendship among individuals and 
nations.92 The affirmation here is that in all generations true development is progressive 
and dynamic, not retrogressive or static. 
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The realization of integral human development necessitates duties on the part of 
development agents. Authentic development is possible, according to Paul VI, on the 
basis of three-faceted natural and supernatural obligations. The first aspect is the “duty of 
mutual relationship, that is the duty on the part of the rich nations to give assistance to 
nations still developing.”93 Paul VI was asserting that, if rich nations can assist the poor 
ones, the latter can be helped to move to the development level of the former. Paul VI 
advocated the importance of solidarity on international level but the same principle is 
relevant for social relationships within nations, between individuals and groups or 
institutions smaller than nations. 
Secondly, there is “the duty of social justice which consists in improving trade 
relations between the more prosperous and weaker nations.”94 Here Paul VI explicitly 
advocated fair conditions for both prosperous and poor countries. He meant that the 
bargaining powers of developed countries and that of less developed countries must be on 
par. Both parties should be able to deal with each other without one imposing on the 
other conditions that do not favor mutual exchange and progress.  
Thirdly, according to Paul VI, there is 
finally, the duty of charity to all men by which human relationship for all is promoted in which all 
must give and receive, in which the progress of some should not impede the development of 
others.95  
 
Paul VI suggested the need to love indiscriminately because it promotes social 
relationships and leads to solidarity. Authentic development demands mutual efforts, 
support and charity expressed in mutual sharing. Paul VI gave precedence to charity 
because according to him integral human development depends on charity. He 
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emphasized genuine love, a selfless love. He introduced love as a virtue, not only 
fundamental to integral human development but the greatest of virtues upon which “the 
future of civilization depends.”96  
Paul VI’s emphasis on solidarity, love and justice as crucial factors for true 
development suggests that development is a kind of democracy achieved by a democratic 
process. If it is to be called authentic development it is the development of all, by all and 
for all. Development of all is integral and a development in solidarity. Development by 
all is one that involves participation of all in a spirit of solidarity, and hence, democratic. 
Development for all is one, which takes seriously the spirit of love, solidarity, social 
justice and common good and the good of the individual as fundamental elements of 
development.  
Paul VI advocated a selfless human solidarity. He argued that human solidarity is 
possible only when “mutual suspicions of nations and selfishness” are overcome by “a 
stronger desire for collaboration and a more profound awareness of human solidarity.”97 
Here Paul VI suggested a committed desire for collaboration and deep-seated 
acknowledgement of the importance of human solidarity and unity in both thought and 
action. 
According to Paul VI selfless solidarity also demands “common plans of action”, 
coordinated investments, proportionate distribution of  “means of production”, and 
organized “sale of products”, and assistance to “the more needy nations” to liberate 
themselves from obstacles to their progress, “and to find, without detriment to their own 
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native character, the means of human and social development.”98 He advocated mutual 
support on the basis of human solidarity, but he also demanded that this be altruistic. 
True solidarity is expressed in selfless service, it is essentially for the sake of human 
dignity.  
Development ought to be the special concern of the wealthy nations. This is not 
just an option for them but an obligation, and confers on them a triple duty.99 First, they 
have a duty to human solidarity, which calls for aid to the poor nations. Secondly, they 
have a duty to observe social justice, which demands equitable trade relationships. 
Finally, they have a duty to universal charity and collaboration, which demands that the 
world be made more conducive for living human life, for all peoples. Paul VI’s emphasis 
on this statement suggests how much he thought that the future of the civilization of the 
whole world depends on the fulfillment of these duties. 
1. AID TO THE WEAK  
 
 In addressing the issue of aid to the weak Paul VI was addressing no problem 
other than the question of respect for human dignity. According to him wealth per se is a 
divinely ordained good and a real gift of God to people but it is, above all, an opportunity 
for Christians to grow toward their ultimate destiny. Peter J. Riga suggests that, following 
the Gospel injunction to faithfully serve the cause of the poor Paul VI devoted the whole 
of Populorum Progressio to “one great appeal for the poor throughout the world.” 100 
Riga further observes that according to Paul VI 
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a preoccupation with material things has blinded the spirit of many men, particularly in the rich 
nations. Others must realize that although material goods are absolutely necessary for human 
dignity, they are not the end of human life but exist only to promote it.101 
 
Throughout Populorum Progressio Paul VI addressed the issue of poverty that 
affected human dignity. He spelled out two distinct categories of people living under 
different conditions - the weak people who live in less human conditions and the rich 
who live in more human conditions. According to Paul VI people who live in less human 
conditions are those weighed down by material and moral poverty. They include the 
materially poor and hungry, the less educated, those culturally marginalized, and those 
oppressed by bad social structures created by abuse of power and wealth, exploitation of 
workers and unjust business arrangements and deals.102 They are destitutes of different 
sorts who need to be aided. Paul VI consistently and ceaselessly urged that such 
categories of people and nations should be helped by the rich nations and peoples.103  
Those who live in more human conditions are people living where there is respect 
for human dignity, people are oriented to spiritual poverty, there are materially selfless 
people, and there is cooperation for the common good and a will for peace. According to 
Paul VI, they are people capable of aiding the disadvantaged people. This is why, in the 
Gospel spirit, Paul VI made a strong appeal on behalf of the anawim, the poor, of the 
world who were in dire need of the support of the wealthy, and referred to their situation 
as being “scandalous and intolerable.”104 Consequently, Paul VI enjoined the world 
community, especially the communities that are blessed with resources to aid the poor 
nations. He bluntly suggested that the rich nations should fulfill a threefold duty - “the 
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duty of human solidarity” which suggests mutual consideration and aid which the rich 
nations ought to give to the less-developed nations, “the duty of social justice” which 
calls for the ratification of inequitable trade relations between powerful nations and weak 
nations, and “the duty of universal charity”105 which demands efforts to make a world 
which is more human to all people, and all can mutually share their resources without one 
group progressing at the expense of others. He stated the threefold duty in the document 
as follows:  
first a duty of mutual relationship, that is a duty on the part of richer nations to give assistance to 
nations still developing; then the duty of social justice which consists in improving trade relations 
between the more prosperous and weaker nations; finally the duty of charity to all men by which 
more human relationship for all is promoted in which all must give and receive, and in which the 
progress of some should not impede the development of others.106  
 
The triple duty Paul VI suggested touches three significant factors for authentic 
development. According to Peter J. Riga’s critical and challenging reading of Paul VI, the 
latter’s theology at this juncture is that if people cannot discover Christ in the numerous 
suffering people in the world they cannot find Christ anywhere.107 People’s response to 
critical situations of need depends on how seriously they take solidarity, justice and love.  
Paul VI commended aid provided by Food and Agricultural Organization, Caritas 
International, and other groups, but stated that elimination of hunger and poverty is not an 
adequate means to integral development. True development demands “building a world 
where everybody, regardless of race, religion and nationality, lives a fully human life.”108 
This is the integral development he advocated in Populorum Progressio. According to 
Paul VI this kind of development calls for generosity, a spirit of sacrifice, readiness to 
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give out of pocket for poor countries and from the fruits of natural resources and the 
existing technology.  
Paul VI further advanced this as a challenge to both individuals and nations, 
especially the advanced nations who should devote part of their resources for production 
to meet the needs of the less fortunate. He cautioned against a possible danger of a dual 
character - spiritual and physical characters - if the poor are neglected. First, spiritually a 
failure to help the needy will result in divine judgment and punishment, and secondly, 
such a failure will arouse the wrath of the weak or poor people against the rich with 
unpredictable consequences.109 Succinctly, Paul VI suggested that divine anger and 
human violence could be consequences of neglect of the needs of the poor. In his 
judgement the solution to such eminent dangers is to aid the weak or the poor, and to 
promote the development of all people. The greatest threat to peace, according to Riga’s 
interpretation of Paul VI, is poverty and efforts to address differences between people 
through development of all people promotes peace. This explains why Paul VI eventually 
considered development as the new name for peace.110 
2. EQUITY IN TRADE RELATIONS  
 
  Paul VI was conscious of the need to have a balance of power, 
economically and politically, nationally and internationally. According to him imbalance 
of power was the negative legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism, and he was opposed 
to the rule of an exaggerated liberal trade system - free trade. In liberal trade 
arrangements the ground is not level for all trading partners.111 Consequently, he called 
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for structural change and an economic and political balance of power. However, Paul VI 
was not in an absolute opposition to liberal capitalism as Dorr rightly contends. In 
paragraph 26 of Populorum Progressio Paul VI is clear, that he did not suggest a 
complete elimination of liberal competition or capitalism. This is also evident in 
Populorum Progressio where Paul VI only calls for a creation of equal opportunities for 
trading partners.112 In other words, capitalism ought to be modified. The significant and 
unstated, but underpinning, reason here is the dignity of the human person - labor - and 
work that deserve recognition but are not as much recognized as profits. Paul VI was 
aware like other authors, that “profit while morally legitimate requires the virtues of 
generosity and magnanimity.”113 Paul VI was not teaching a new doctrine. The 
foundation of this teaching goes back to the Sacred Scriptures, and was more vividly 
explicated by the Fathers of the Church including Basil the Great (330-379 A.D), an 
“ecclesiastical statesman, reformer of liturgy and social activist.”114 According to Samuel 
Gregg he was critical of the rich because of their lack of social consciousness and insists 
upon sharing as an essential obligation of social justice. His argument was that the 
resources of nature are meant for all people. Social justice demands that no one be 
deprived of these resources. Consequently, he advocated equal opportunities, recognition 
of the dignity of labor, the human person, and the social purpose of natural resources.  
The issues Paul VI addressed under this theme were: the North-South economic 
relationships, long-term progress toward development, and “the international system of 
trade between the rich and poor” nations, characterized by “an unchanging course to the 
                                                 
112 Populorum Progressio, 61, 25. Also see Dorr, Option for the Poor, 187.  
113 Gregg, 130. 
114 Gen 1: 27-29. Also see Gregg, 131. 
  146
detriment of the poor countries.”115 He also emphasized in light of the foreign aid 
received by less developed countries that all aid to developing nations is meaningless and 
ineffective if these nations lose much more than the aid they receive because trade 
relations and arrangements are unfavorable to them. Free international trade is good and 
advantageous only when the trading partners are equal.116 It is unjust if there are 
disparities between trade partners. If conditions of trade partners are unequal, trade 
agreements are void. Consequently, Paul VI consistently insisted that free trade between 
unequal trade partners must be governed by laws of justice.117 Discussions and 
negotiations are necessary for equality of opportunity. It must be added that nationalism, 
racism and tribalism, which obstruct justice, have to be eliminated in economic 
dealings.118 The rationale here is that norms are essential for establishing more equal and 
just relations between trading partners. Consequently, Paul VI proposed international 
agreements with a broad spectrum. According to him international agreements should 
establish norms for regulating prices, guaranteeing specified types of production and 
supporting specific industries. Such regulations promote justice in business relations 
among peoples and offer positive assistance with immediate and enduring effects.  
3. UNIVERSAL CHARITY  
Paul VI describes the world as being sick because there is lack of concern among 
people. This world sickness consists less in the unproductive monopolization of resources 
of nature by a small number of people than in the lack of brotherhood and sisterhood 
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among individual peoples and nations.119 There are many areas that have not been 
touched by charity. These areas ought to be reached by true charity which is 
indiscriminate, all- embracing, inclusive and open, even globally. This is the authentic 
love Paul VI advocated as a crucial virtue for human development. Paul VI understood 
charity in a broad sense, and Monika K. Hellwig’s understanding of charity helps to 
clarify what Paul VI meant by universal charity because both view charity in a similar 
way. According to Hellwig,  
Charity is considered in Christian tradition either as the whole of authentic human communion 
with God and others, or more narrowly as one of the three theological virtues. In either case it is 
distinguished from a love of natural attraction, a love of needy desires, a love that simply clings to 
and aligns itself with the familiar, and from such responses as the instinctive care and protection of 
offspring. In contrast to all of these, charity is seen as a gift of grace empowering human beings to 
transcend their nature to share in the creativity and self-gift of God. It is an enhancement of human 
will to act, as it were, divinely.120  
 
The first sense of charity is in line with Paul VI’s understanding of true charity as 
a virtue necessary for integral development. Authentic charity expresses the relationship 
between God and the loving agent, and between the latter and fellow human beings who 
are both objects and subjects of love. This does not exclude the sense of charity presented 
by Hellwig, namely charity as one of the three theological virtues, because theological 
virtues, which “relate directly to God”121 have necessarily to be reflected in a person’s 
relationship with others. This implies that because of the link between charity and the 
divine will, authentic charity is prompted by an innate sense of human dignity because of 
the divine origin of human dignity. It affirms that true charity, which is disinterested, is a 
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fundamental virtue for integral human development. This was affirmed by St. Augustine, 
according to Hellwig who states that: 
He demonstrates that where each seeks his or her own without regard for others, there will always 
be conflict, disaster, fear, and suffering. Only when the saving power of divine love transforms 
human goals and desires, can human society hope for harmony and integration of all its parts.122  
 
The above statement suggests how central the virtue of charity is in human life. It 
is essential for solidarity, participation, association and common good. Charity is the 
foundation on which justice and peace are founded, human community is built, and from 
which protection for human dignity, and ultimately respect for human rights comes. It is 
precisely for this reason that charity is central and has a social dimension, and “it affects 
all human relationships and all structures of human society from the local to the 
global.”123 Whether in small or large communities, charity is the propelling force for 
solidarity, common good, option for the poor, unity among people and integral growth.  
Paul VI specified ways of showing love and made recommendations for a 
universal charity.124 First, there is the duty and obligation of hospitality to strangers, an 
obligation rooted in human solidarity and Christian charity. Secondly, there should be 
concern and care for the youth and students, especially those who have left their countries 
in order to achieve skills that would eventually be helpful for the progress of their own 
people. Thirdly, people should welcome immigrant workers who want to earn resources 
for helping and updating the conditions of their families. Finally, financial and 
educational assistance are crucial, and business people in developing nations should be 
initiators of social progress and human advancement, helping other people to develop 
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knowledge and skills that would make them responsible and productive. According to 
Paul VI all these and similar efforts call for sincere dialogue both internationally and 
nationally. They also demand that Christians, people of good will, government authorities 
and educated people commit themselves to this cause.  
C. The Invaluable Significance of Culture 
 
Paul VI respected cultures and cultural differences, and he saw in institutions that 
promoted cultures the solutions to the problem of cultural conflicts. He claimed that 
besides professional organizations, institutions that promote culture played a significant 
role in human development. Consequently, he argued that both rich and poor countries 
have cultures that foster human life and dignity, and these cultures have been handed 
down from generation to generation through arts, education and religion. Paul VI asserted 
that it is a grave mistake to disregard the culture of the poor nations, in favor of that of 
the rich nations, because the cultures of poor nations also “contain genuine human 
values.”125 Paul VI was addressing this problem when he stated: 
Developing nations, therefore, are to make the correct choice among the things held out to them; 
let them criticize and reject false values by which the ideal of human life is lowered, but let them 
accept the excellent and useful and strive to develop them together with their own excellent 
qualities in accord with their natural abilities.126  
 
Paul VI’s argument about the value of cultures was deliberate and succinct. If 
cultures of poor nations are life enhancing they must be maintained and should not be 
radically discarded. By affirming the significance of culture Paul VI recognized the 
original meaning of the word culture which originated from the “latin cultura agri and 
later cultura animi” which referred initially to the improvement and refinement of the 
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person, mainly through education.”127 From the root of the word culture one realizes the 
importance and value of each culture in the progress of its people, especially 
educationally. Dorr, similarly, supports the idea that culture is important - it must be duly 
respected - and he argues that the notion of “development proposed in Populorum 
Progressio  and understanding of international solidarity” 128 as presented in Sollicitudo 
Rei Socialis offer a strong challenge to any opposition to the culture of one group of 
people by another.  
Paul VI raised a significant issue for the less developed nations, especially where 
they indiscriminately think that development means discarding one’s own culture and 
taking up a new and different one which seems appealing and progressive and yet does 
not have regard for the value of the human person, dignity, rights, life and the human 
community as such, but instead curtails the enhancement of authentic and genuine human 
values and needs.129 Paul VI cautioned developing nations against temptations coming 
from wealthier nations, lest they lose the best of their patrimony.130 The significant issue 
he raised here was that culture and cultural values must be part and parcel of the process 
of authentic human development. Cultures should be brought to confront one another but 
be mutually enriching if they are to be part of authentic development. Development 
outside concrete cultural contexts is utopian because it is out of context of the people 
being promoted. It remains foreign, and it does not affect the real life of the people and 
hence is not authentic development. 
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Cultural imperialism was one of the issues Paul VI addressed in relation to 
development. He was firm that civilizations which shaped the life, character, talents and 
skills of experts should never “be considered the only one, nor must it look with disdain 
on other countries.”131 Paul VI cautioned foreign experts about the danger of cultural 
imperialism. He called them to a critical study and knowledge of the culture of the people 
they served so that they would introduce elements of their own culture in foreign 
countries only when it is appropriate and necessary, but even then ensure that they were 
properly adapted to the culture of the people they served. This approach to cultural 
interaction provides for reciprocal or mutual cultural enrichment. The enduring 
significance of this assertion is evident in emphasis of the Rome Statement on the 
importance of culture during the International Conference for Population and 
Development (ICDP) as necessary for the harmonious coexistence of people.132 It was for 
a similar reason that Paul VI cautioned people adapting to foreign cultures in the 
following words: 
Therefore those who undertake a mission of this kind must see to it that they carefully investigate 
the history, the special characteristics, the store of knowledge of the country in which they live as 
guests. From this will follow a contact of one culture with the other by which both will be 
enriched.133  
 
Innovation of development projects must start with a thorough study, 
understanding and acceptance of people’s culture. Cultural interaction is not only 
beneficial because of mutual enrichment but because it leads to mutual understanding and 
knowledge, especially when the interaction involves sincere and genuine dialogue 
between the principal elements of the interacting cultures. Paul VI made this clear when 
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he stated that 
When genuine dialogue between different national cultures is established as in the case between 
individual men, a fraternal meeting of minds readily has its beginnings. Programs initiated for 
human development to be implemented by common effort bring nations together if all the chief 
government officials and the lowest artisan, are enkindled with brotherly love and ardently desire 
establishment of a civilization of world solidarity. Then a dialogue will begin based on man but 
not on the produce of land or products of technology.134  
 
Paul VI suggested that a genuine cultural dialogue is a trust-building process 
which leads to mutual understanding and love. This suggestion is realistic because 
without mutual exchange of knowledge and trust, love is difficult if not impossible. 
Mutual dialogue and understanding of cultures is significant not only for human dialogue 
but also for appropriate action of the parties involved. Paul VI’s argument is logical and 
simple - mutual cultural knowledge leads to mutual acceptance and love. However, in 
real life mutual cultural exchange and knowledge does not always necessarily lead to 
mutual acceptance and love.  
Nonetheless mutual acceptance and love lead to solidarity. Solidarity becomes 
meaningful with dialogue centered on the human person, not on capital because people 
realize that the human person is central in the dynamics of dialogue, relationship and 
solidarity. This is possible only if there is a cultural exchange, which brings to realization 
the singular but universally equal human dignity of people. This is again theoretically a 
plausible assertion but practically there are often difficulties brought forth by individual 
dispositions of people to the real vision of the human person and the significance of 
mutual cultural exchange. 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Ibid.  
  153
D. The Primary Significance of Education 
 
The educational background of Paul VI as stated in Chapter One, and the 
educational background of many of his family members and friends would suggest that 
Paul VI would attach great importance to education. It is, therefore, no surprise that he 
advocated that for development to occur, education of people is an imperative. Education 
is a significant factor for integral human development and constitutes one of the 
fundamentals for any attempts to develop human community. For Paul VI, “economic 
growth” is founded on “social progress towards which it strives and that primary 
education” which introduces literacy is the “prime objective of those planning 
development.”135 Education is often insufficiently stressed as a crucial factor for human 
development, yet it is actually one of the most basic factors in addition to human dignity 
and rights, necessary to be grasped, acknowledged and implemented, for authentic human 
development. Education is important because it creates literacy and knowledge of 
phenomena and reality. It is a fundamental ingredient for human social knowledge, 
integration and consolidation of personal and communal achievements. The ICPD, many 
years later, underscored the importance of education for human development when it 
stated that education and good health services are “prerequisites for full participation in 
human societies,” 136 meaning that they facilitate personal involvement and contribution 
to human development.   
Education is a factor for human development because it is a significant social 
process and a starting point for development. All other human achievements are preceded 
by education, whatever their form may be. In Populorum Progressio, Paul VI suggested 
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that education is “a prime objective of those planning development” besides asserting that 
“economic growth is above all based on social progress toward which it strives.”137 This 
assertion is plausible because any social project and progress starts with education about 
its meaning, prerequisites, value and relevance, the necessities for social growth, what the 
development process involves, and how it can be achieved. Paul VI demonstrated the 
importance of education by emphasizing that  
. . . primary education which teaches the elements of reading and writing is the prime objective of 
those planning development. The lack of education is no less troublesome than lack of food, for an 
illiterate is, as it were, a person suffering from starvation of the spirit; but when one knows how to 
read and write, when he is prepared to perform a task or properly to carry out a function he regains 
self-confidence and realizes that he can make progress along with others.138  
 
Paul VI underscored the significance of education for integral development. 
However, he emphasized the importance of the formative effect of education rather than 
literacy because education contributes to development only by transforming human 
persons and behaviour. Paul VI was right to state that the value of education as a 
stepping-stone for social progress and economic growth is crucial but his distinction 
between education and social progress is unnecessary because education is an intimate 
aspect - constituent facet - of social progress. It is also more plausible to suggest that 
education is a prime factor in planning and implementation of development rather than 
the prime objective of planners. The prime objective of planners is development not 
education. 
 Education is important because it has a purposeful and liberating effect. It 
liberates people from ignorance, fear and incapacity for action and responsibility. 
Education helps one to get involved and participate in solidarity with others. Paul VI did 
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not directly state the liberating effect of education in Populorum Progressio but this can 
be deduced from an interpretation of the text. In this case, Paul VI contended that 
education is a relevant action for development and necessary for the functioning of the 
principles of solidarity, common good, participation and freedom as a human right. It 
makes the dynamics of these principles possible. This also suggests that it facilitates the 
possibility and functioning of the virtue of charity. Even if Dorr seems to suggest that 
Paul VI did not emphasize the role of education in making people responsible in society 
Paul VI recognized that education helps people to take up tasks along with others.139 He 
advocated for both literacy and education for responsibility. This was alluded to when he 
called for students from the Third World to study in the developed nations and return to 
develop their home countries.  
Paul VI affirmed the importance of education in his reference to his message to 
the members of the UNESCO conference held in Teheran, where the priority he gave to 
education was clearer than his prior affirmations. He says:  
As we stated . . . “literacy is a basic and primary factor not only for man’s social integration but 
also for his personal enrichment, and for society a most excellent aid to effect growth and 
development.”140  
 
Paul VI intimated here that literacy promotes human integrity, and individual and 
societal growth. He praised the initiative of public authorities and international 
organizations as significant for the promotion of human progress because they equip 
people to achieve development on their own. This recognition, acknowledgement and 
praise suggests that Paul VI considered education to be the prerogative of all individuals 
and all national and international institutions, governments and organizations in pursuit of  
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development. 
Paul VI argued that professional educational organizations are important because 
they facilitate “the principal and primary way of life in the family circle.”141 Here he 
conceded that educational institutions are important supplementary organs to the family 
since development is also founded and dependent on the moral fiber of the family. This 
shows the significance of participation of all, from individuals to the global community, 
in the development process. For Paul VI the role of organizations is crucial to 
development but it demands proper planning.  
If these have been established to serve the convenience and interests of their members, their duty 
is great in regard to their educational function which they can and must carry out. For these 
organizations, since they instruct and train men, do much to imbue them with an understanding of 
the common good and obligations which it imposes.142  
 
Paul VI suggested here that educational institutions are not established for selfish 
group or institutional interests but for public interests and must fulfill their duties to that 
effect. Education is futile and detrimental if it does not meet its goal, namely the growth 
of individuals, groups and society. Education is important, according to Paul VI, because 
it helps in the instruction, training and facilitating of people’s understanding of the 
common good and its demands in the development process.  
Paul VI was of the view that the value and purpose of education is not limited to 
just a few people. It is for the good of all people. If education is oriented to personal and 
selfish goals, it is rendered useless as a starting point for integral human development. In 
fact selfish education is one reason for lack of integral human development, according to 
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Paul VI. Education should and ought to change people and their lives integrally and be 
used integrally.  
Paul VI’s affirmation about the necessity of education in the development process 
is significant. Education, which many commentators on Populorum Progressio and 
documents of Catholic social teaching have not explicitly stated as a crucial practice, or 
loosely, a ‘principle for human development’ in the sense that it is a starting point of 
development, should be emphasized and stated as such. The importance of education lies 
in the fact that, if properly imparted and used, it is both a curative and preventive action 
for human development. It enlightens people, makes them aware of the dangers of 
poverty and its causes, and offers solutions to avoid the tragedy that follows in the wake 
of poverty. 
E. A Credible Notion of Human Development 
 
 Etymologically, the word development originated from the Latin word volere 
which means to roll, and from the root-word veloper meaning wrap, eventually came the 
old French word developer and the later or modern French developper or develop which 
means unwrap, open out or to unfold possibilities of something.143 Most sources agree 
that the word means to unfold possibilities of something, to open, to unwrap, and to 
evolve to a higher stage in function or stature. What is evident here is that to develop or 
development is not limited to a particular form of growth. 
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 The notion of human development up to 1960s when Paul VI wrote Populorum 
Progressio was predominantly economic. Paul VI believed that the true meaning of 
human development needed to be redeemed. This is evident in his deliberate choice to 
use the term “development” instead of “economic growth.”144 Paul VI thought a right 
notion of development was important, and he attempted to offer in Populorum Progressio 
a novel and credible notion of human development. This fact is attested to by authors like 
Dorr who says that Paul VI offered a “fresh approach to the understanding of 
development” in the sense that it was inclusive and avoided violence.145 Most authors 
affirm the view that the encyclical “maintains that development is the new name for 
peace and insists on personal and social development in the context of a transcendental 
humanism.”146 Development is envisioned as not being only economic and of individuals 
in isolation, but as the growth of every individual who is part of the community. This was 
the idea Paul VI took from Louis Joseph Lebret’s notion of true human development, 
which Paul VI called integral human development. This is evident in the core statement 
of Populorum Progressio:  
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be 
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of 
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we 
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart 
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each 
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.147  
 
This is the central notion of development which runs through the document and 
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provides the greatest impetus in Populorum Progressio.148 This vision of development, 
which encompasses all dimensions of the human person and of all people, can transform 
the thoughts, attitudes and practical life of individuals, groups and human society. Paul 
VI emphasized that this kind of development calls for cooperative promotion of the 
common good.149  
 Another characteristic of the document was Paul VI’s analytical approach in 
defining human development. Dorr states: 
Populorum Progressio represents a remarkable advance on previous Church teaching about 
human development. The advance was a conceptual one. By this I mean what is radically new is 
the framework of understanding  rather than specific details.150   
 
Paul VI provided a framework for understanding but not the specifics for practical 
implementation or action. This is where his notion of human development is more 
theoretical than pragmatic. Paul VI’s approach to and notion of development was also 
sharply different from that in the previous Catholic social teaching documents.151 
Reflecting what Lebret had emphasized in his development ethics, Richard McBrien and 
others affirm that Paul VI “is forceful in his insistence that development is spiritual and 
cultural as well as economic” and he urges a “complete humanism” that accentuates “the 
freely rounded development of the whole and of all men.”152 The difference was basically 
in his definition of development because according to him authentic development is 
integral, it is not just economic. Integral development is a development in solidarity, and 
a development which covers all dimensions of human life, social, economic, political, 
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cultural, psychological and spiritual.  
Paul VI’s introduction of the term “integral” in the definition of human 
development is what made a radical break from the previous definitions of development, 
apart from that of Louis Joseph Lebret on which he heavily relied. This is what makes the 
difference between authentic development and quasi development. Dorr aptly 
summarizes Paul VI’s understanding of authentic development in Populorum Progressio: 
It does not give a privileged place to the economic dimension of human development, any more 
than to cultural, psychological, political, ecological, or religious dimension, rather it challenges 
Christians to take full account of the non-economic elements - to recognize, for instance, that the 
protection of the right to free speech may be at least as valuable a part of development as an 
increase in disposable income.153  
 
The document neither gave privilege to economic development nor took the 
prevalent concept of economic development as its starting point. It outlined basic 
standards for rendering social changes as authentic human development. It provided a 
framework and a model of authentic human development. It emphasized the social, 
political, ethical and cultural character of problems related to development, and the 
legitimacy and necessity of the Church’s intervention in this field.154   
 As opposed to what was erroneously claimed to be development up to mid-1960s, 
Paul VI described what he called ‘integral’, and sometimes referred to as ‘complete’ or 
‘authentic’ human development in key paragraphs of Populorum Progressio. Many 
authors, including Peter Henriot concur that a true definition of human development must 
be inclusive and centered on the human person, not economics.155  
 Authentic development is integral, meaning it is inclusive of all dimensions of 
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human life. True development provides for the progress of each individual, the whole 
person and the whole human family.156 It is the holistic advancement of individuals and 
community. Relying on Lebret’s work, which was intensely used for drafting Populorum 
Progressio, Riga and others affirm this notion by stating that the human person must 
develop spiritually, morally, socially, economically, politically and culturally, and it 
should be added, psychologically and mentally.157 If some of the above aspects of human 
life are not developed authentic development has not occurred.  
 This notion of authentic development is to some extent idealistic or utopian 
because there are variable factors that affect development. For instance, talents, 
geographical locations, available basic resources, mental capacities, social possibilities 
and physical abilities affect the rate and level of development of individuals and nations. 
What Paul VI promoted is a notion which assumes that there are no such variable factors. 
This is as theoretical as what John Rawls proposes in A Theory of Justice and calls the 
veil of ignorance in the original position where all parties are equal in terms of 
knowledge of relevant requisite principles for justice.158 This theory presumes that 
everybody has or lacks the requisite qualities and resources for the exercise of justice, 
which is a difficult condition to attain in real life.  
True and integral human development ought to be advocated for the sake of, 
among other reasons, human dignity. According to Paul VI all people have human 
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dignity, and the perfection of “human potentialities is not left to man’s good pleasure”159 
because of the origin of the human person, which determines human action. True 
development is, therefore, the enhancement of human dignity rather than the possession 
of an abundance of material things.  
Efforts and activities towards authentic development are rationally guided. It is 
not a laissez faire project - absolutely freely chosen and done - because rational creatures 
are obliged to direct their lives and their wills to God, who is “the first truth and highest 
good.”160 Human life is destined for a higher dignity, a life in union with God and a life 
which transcends human nature. This is the ultimate goal of human life and activity, and 
the aim of true development. Development activity ought to be guided by this fact.  
For Paul VI true and integral human development is a progressive process in 
which all are involved. Using Lebret’s vision of authentic development Paul VI argued 
that true development “consists in each and everyone’s passing from less human to more 
human living conditions.”161 He advocated the development of the potentialities that are 
within the individual, but this demands an atmosphere where there is love, friendship, 
prayer and contemplation, all of which indicate that the human person is in a progressive 
process. 
There are indicators of less human conditions of life and more human conditions 
of life. A less human condition of living is indicated by lack of “the minimum subsistence 
necessary for life,” self-imposed moral deficiencies due to excessive self-love, oppression 
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by social structures with consequent abuse of power or ownership, exploitation of 
workers and unjust transactions.162 Conversely, more human living conditions are 
characterized by the absence of destitution, possession of basic supplies for life, 
successful struggle against social ills, broader knowledge, acquisition of culture, 
increased esteem for human dignity, orientation to the spirit of poverty, cooperation for 
the common good, the will for peace, recognition and acknowledgement of God as the 
highest good, author and ultimate end of all things. For Paul VI God’s gift of faith and 
unity in Christian love is also a sign of a more human condition of living. 
Development is authentic if all productive activities are directed to the service of 
the human person, and if they lessen inequalities, remove discrimination, free people 
from the bonds of servitude and enable them to improve their conditions in the temporal 
order, achieve moral development, and perfect their spiritual endowments or simply 
protect the dignity of the human person as consistently taught by the subsequent 
encyclical and pastoral traditions.163 These assertions show the gravity of Paul VI’s 
vision of development as “liberation” and his introduction of the term in the question of 
human development, though he did not use it liberally because it would fall short of 
integral human development which looks “to the absolute God.”164  
True development is not merely growth in the national domestic product or 
technological advancement. True development consists in social progress and economic 
growth, an increase in the capacity of an economy proportionate to its people, and 
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equitable distribution of socio-economic and political wealth. This helps to promote more 
human social situations of meaningful human life and dignity. This is what Paul VI 
meant when he stated that: 
When we speak of development care must be given both to social progress and economic growth. 
The increase of national wealth is not sufficient for its equitable distribution; the progress of 
technology is not enough to make the earth a more suitable place to live in as if it had been made 
more humane. . . . The predominance of technologists, or technocracy, as it is called, if it gains the 
upper hand in the next generation will be able to bring on evils . . . . Economics and technology 
lack meaning if they are not turned to the goal of man whom they must serve.165  
 
True development goes beyond meeting people’s physical or material needs to 
meeting their spiritual needs. Complete and authentic humanism consists in provision for 
the development of whole persons without limits to material provisions to the exclusion 
of God and spiritual values. 
There is no genuine humanism except that which reaches out to God as the absolute, while the 
duty to which we are called is acknowledged and by which true meaning is given to human life. 
By no means therefore, is man his own final measure, he only becomes what he must be if he 
transcends himself.166  
 
Full growth is realized in self-transcendence, namely in being in and with God. 
True human development is not independent of God. Paul VI introduced the ultimate 
meaning of human development by giving development a theological meaning besides its 
material dimension. The true and ultimate realization of the human person is to be found 
in God, the originator of the human person. This suggests that the climax of the process 
of the unfolding of human potentialities and self-realization is in the beatific vision and 
union with God. This is where socio-economic and political activities and processes 
should ultimately lead people.  
Paul VI advocated that development is not merely resolving prevailing problems 
of people. Consequently, he stated that appeals to aid organizations, groups and persons 
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for provision of funds, both privately and publicly, and gifts and loans are inadequate for 
development to be called authentic just as eradication of hunger and poverty, and 
combating destitution are insufficient.167 He declared that private and communal 
handouts for eliminating hunger, poverty and any kind of destitution do not constitute 
development. This is a sound claim because development is the unfolding of the potential 
of individuals and groups. Handouts do not promote this unfolding. Instead they hamper 
the spontaneous unfolding of potentials or talents. To a great extent they thwart 
development because they create reluctance to work, which is a dignified activity. Paul 
VI was realistic to state that donations and gifts are not development because they do not 
involve any personal initiatives, involvement or participation. Important in true 
development is the 
establishment of a human society in which everyone, regardless of race, religion or nationality, 
can live a truly human life free from bondage imposed by men and the forces of nature not 
sufficiently mastered, a society in which freedom is not an empty word and where Lazarus the 
poor man can sit at the same table as the rich man.168  
 
 True development is human advancement where discrimination and segregation 
are absent, there is no injustice, human rights are respected, there is a radical preferential 
option for the poor and charity is shown to all people. In quoting Lk.16: 19-31, Paul VI 
implied that everyone who can uplift others should do so. The rich man is unnamed and 
simply refers to anybody capable of elevating the needy from less human to a more 
human level, even to a level better than one’s own. To emphasize the gravity of this issue 
Paul VI stated that true development demands generosity, self-sacrifice and ceaseless 
efforts on the part of materially blessed people and critical self-examination of all people. 
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Integral development demands that every person capable of support should do something 
for those who have nothing and are incapable of self-support. 
Paul VI indefatigably advocated that true development embraces every body and 
nation, it is multi-faceted, and depends on various factors. True development consists in 
socio-economic, political, spiritual and moral progress of all people. He argued that  
when we combat misery, and struggle against injustice we are providing not only for man’s 
prosperity but also for his spiritual and moral development and are therefore promoting the 
welfare of the whole human race.169  
 
According to Paul VI authentic development is not accumulation of wealth for 
private benefit, neither is it wealth sought for its own sake. Positively, development is 
economic growth “adjusted to the welfare of the human person and in daily sustenance 
provided for all the resource as it were, of fraternal charity and clear sign of the help of 
Divine Providence.”170 True development involves sharing acquired resources with the 
needy. This sharing of the gifts of God is rooted in love and generosity. 
Populorum Progressio suggests the following conclusions regarding Paul VI’s 
notion of development. First, complete development is integral in character. This means 
development of the whole person because each person has dignity, right and obligation to 
attain self-fulfillment. Secondly, authentic development is not a self-centered or 
fragmented phenomenon - it has a social dimension. Every individual is part of a 
community and civilization with its own relational history. All people are bound in 
solidarity. Each person has to care for the wellbeing of others in human community, 
including generations yet to come. Thirdly, authentic human development is not only 
economic, it includes cultural, psychological, ecological, political and religious or 
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spiritual dimensions of the human person and of all people. Fourthly, Populorum 
Progressio offered a novel description of the term “development.” Paul VI linked and 
equated development to peace. He asserted that “development is the new name for 
peace”.171 This view suggests that development makes peace, and there is a mutual 
exchange between development and peace. Development of all people creates a peaceful 
atmosphere because each member’s dignity is respected, protected and cared for. When 
an atmosphere of peace prevails it is conducive for development. The relationship 
between the two is, therefore, an intimate one, and they are mutually indispensable. The 
document not only linked development to charity and peace, but linked peace to justice. 
Peace is the consequence of charity and justice, just as integral human development is the 
consequence of charity and justice exercised in solidarity. 
 Paul VI looked at development in a radically different way from most 
development experts. The economic, political, psycho-social and spiritual overtones in 
the document underscore the fundamentals of Paul VI’s notion of integral human 
development, and differentiate his vision of development from others.  
F. Means and Models of Change: Violent Revolution or Passive Resistance 
 
Paul VI suggested ways of responding to socially unjust situations. He did not 
explicitly propose them, but his arguments for a response to evil in society suggest two 
models of change - confrontational and consensus models of change. Each of these 
models has both positive and negative consequences. 
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1. MEANS OF CHANGE: FIVE PRINCIPAL SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Paul VI suggested five means of change in Populorum Progressio. These are: 
world relief fund, foreign aid, limited competition, concerted effort and effective world 
government.172 First, Paul VI advocated that there should be a world fund to relieve 
destitute people. This was a relevant practical expression of love. It suggests the 
importance of solidarity, charity, justice, option for the poor, the common good, 
affirmative action and the principle of subsidiarity. He suggested that nations should 
work in mutual collaboration to raise such funds. It is from out of the funds that the needs 
of the poor can be met. The efforts of different people and nations should be well 
coordinated so that personal interests are checked. Individual nations should also increase 
their production in order to help their citizens live a dignified life and help improve the 
conditions of the human race. They are entitled to use the fruits of their labor but they 
should not keep their wealth exclusively for their own use.173  
Secondly, he suggested massive foreign aid in the form of money, goods, skilled 
labor, especially financial expertise, and agrarian reform.174 This is a questionable 
suggestion in the context of the whole document because it encourages dependence and 
discourages initiative and creativity. It fulfills the demands of solidarity, charity and 
common good but it is against the principle of participation. It is good only at the 
initiation of the development process. The suggestion supplements the theme of relief to 
destitute people and concerted effort, but it needs to be implemented cautiously, because 
too much foreign aid also stifles initiatives and creativity. It does not contribute to true 
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development which demands involvement and participation of all people capable of 
work. Paul VI himself was aware of this because he warned that development is not just 
elimination of hunger and poverty or situations of destitution, as treated in the preceding 
section of this chapter.175 It goes beyond that to a change of attitude toward the material 
and moral empowerment of people.  
Thirdly, he proposed limits of international competitive trading so as to restore 
equality between the trading partners.”176 Paul VI was never totally opposed to 
capitalism. He understood that as long as profits accruing from it are used for the 
enhancement of human life and dignity, they served the right purpose for which resources 
of nature were made. However, he called for an end to exaggerated liberal capitalism and 
instead advocated moderation.  
Fourthly, Paul VI suggested a concerted economic effort for the promotion of 
development.177 Nations have to work together in an organized fashion in order to 
promote the development of peoples. It was for such reason that Paul VI encouraged the 
nations that are more blessed with resouces to help those that are less fortunate. He 
advocated that this was a way of implementing the doctrine of Second Vatican 
Council.178  
Finally, Paul VI thought that a move towards the establishment of an effective 
world authority would be instrumental for integral development.179 He encouraged and 
praised the work of the UN and FAO for this reason. This was a meaningful suggestion 
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for an organ regulating the international community’s socio-economic and political 
activities. However, the problem is always management of large organizations or 
governments, a problem which the UN experiences currently as its efforts and strength 
are disputable, and sometimes defied by individual nations.  
2. MODELS OF CHANGE: CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATIONAL MODELS 
 
Paul VI opposed violence as a way of effecting change. Instead, in his 
affirmations about response to social evil he implied the possibility of two models of 
change – the confrontational model and consensus model of which Paul VI preferred the 
consensus model.180 His choice was necessitated by the gravity of consequences of the 
chosen model. 
a. The Consensus Model 
This is the top-down model of change where change is not initiated from the grass 
roots but from the top. According to Julian Filochowski, the consensus model demands 
that “changes should be brought about by those at the top - they must agree and then 
mold others.”181 This approach is questionable because if the bureaucratic structure 
consists of a corrupt body of people, any change initiated is corrupt and the possibility of 
oppression and domination is great. The advantage of this model is that the possibility of 
violent revolution is minimized.  
In the consensus model, change is envisaged as coming from a willing agreement 
based on reason, emotional appeal and moral pressure from the various parties involved 
in the dialogue. This model presupposes that all parties have sufficient goodwill and 
commitment to justice, which can move them to make concessions. It also presupposes 
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that they are ready to sacrifice self interest to bring about harmony and promote the 
welfare of all. These presuppositions do not guarantee that positive change is imminent. 
Considering the requisite dispositions for initiating a consensus model of change, one is 
also right to differ from Filochowski’s description that it is only a top-down model of 
change. If all are well disposed it could as well be initiated from the grassroots, hence a 
top-down model of change. 
b. The Confrontational Model 
Paul VI never intended to recommend the confrontational method, but his vision 
of the urgency of the need for change suggests this kind of model which could provide 
those in dire need of change an alternative model.182 This contention seems to be a 
conjecture. The overall tone of Populorum Progressio suggests peaceful means of change 
- not a confrontational approach. The confrontational model suggests that the principal 
means of change is pressure or threat. It presupposes that those who have power and 
wealth eventually yield reluctantly, but when there is pressure they cannot ignore it.183  
This is a people-power model which demands more “emphasis on the political 
and critical awareness that could come from education and literacy.”184 For this method 
to work without serious problems, education is necessary so that people know their role 
and the consequences of their behavior. This is grass roots-top movement of initiative for 
change which implies that power is in the hands of the masses. It suggests a democratic 
process which is ideal for true development. This would be the most effective and easiest 
model of change because more people would be part of the process than if initiated by the 
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bureaucracy.  
The problem with this approach is that any socio-economic and political change is 
still superficial because it is consequent to coercion and the change may not be genuinely 
an act of responsibility. The best way to pressurize would be the education of the people 
which empowers them to confront the prevalent problem. The eminent danger of the use 
of this model is violent revolution, which is possible even when the community is 
educated. The model is contrary to the intention of Paul VI because he warned about the 
poor venting anger which would perhaps have undesirable consequences.  
This approach supports Martin Luther King Jr.’s advocacy for militant non-
violence, which was intended to appeal to the conscience of the people who perpetuated 
sinful structures.185 King opted for a militant nonviolent response for two reasons. First, it 
was a lesser evil and, secondly, it was effective. Paul VI was warning the rich about 
situations and reactions similar to what King was confronting. When poor, deprived, 
marginalized and oppressed people cannot tolerate their ordeal any more, they resort to 
any way to achieve results and to save them from their situation with minimum of losses. 
However, a difference must be acknowledged. While King deliberately chose militant 
nonviolence as a way of expressing his spirituality, Paul VI was not warning about the 
danger of the poor expressing a form of spirituality.186 He was cautioning about the 
danger of persistent injustice to the poor. Though Paul VI and King affirmed that evil 
situations should be resolved, their approaches were similar only insofar as they appealed 
to peoples’ consciences and different in that King was actively involved. 
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There are different views about the value of the confrontational model. Dorr 
argues that the confrontational model is sometimes necessary and inevitable for social 
change. Some people think the poor and oppressed should be encouraged “to demand 
their rights – and organize themselves in such a way that this demand must be heard.” 187 
These views tend to suggest that Paul VI was leaning towards the idea of organized 
violence but such a point of view is conspicuously absent in Populorum Progressio.  
The two models of change are not necessarily beneficial for all parties involved in 
the development process, and neither are they absolutely incompatible.188 The problem 
with both models of change is that disadvantaged people are always at the mercy of the 
rich and powerful because the development and shaping of each model depends on the 
determinants of the situation. These include those who have social, economic and 
political decision-making powers.  
A significant question here is whether Paul VI suggested either of these models in 
Populorum Progressio. The document makes no explicit suggestion of a model. 
However, Paul VI implied the preferable model to be change through consensus. This 
conclusion is arrived at only from the indications in the document.189 The consensus 
model reflects Paul VI’s commitment to dialogue, which shows in his conviction that “a 
more deeply felt need for collaboration and a heightened sense of unity will finally 
triumph over misunderstandings and selfishness”.190 Though Paul VI warns the rich about 
the dangers of obstinately remaining complacent, there is no clear indication that he 
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favors the confrontational approach in the effort to overcome injustice, oppression and 
poverty or underdevelopment in general.191  
The consensus model appears better than the confrontational model because it is 
less likely to breed more injustice, but it seems better to suggest that both models need to 
be integrated or used simultaneously. One without the other may be inadequate or 
ineffective. Both models can be engaged at the same time but their application should be 
intensified according to the nature of the situation being addressed. According to Julian 
Filochowski, Paul VI suggested in Populorum Progressio that education must always 
precede this integration and application process.192A realistic choice of model demands a 
positive education process which includes emphasis on the dangers and benefits of each 
type of model, and any use of a model must be motivated by concern for human 
dignity.193  
Paul VI detested the idea of enforcing change or development through violent 
action. Except when “basic human rights of the human person” and “serious harm to the 
common good” are at extreme risk, insurrection and rebellion are morally wrong because 
they “beget new injustices, inflict new inequalities and goad men to new destruction.”194 
He objected to resolving injustice and social suffering through active resistance or 
violence. Paul VI’s objection to violence is explained by the fact that violence contradicts 
development, which he calls the new name for peace. It would be a self-defeating effort 
to attempt to enforce development by promoting active force or violent resistance. To 
affirm that Paul VI was justifying revolution of a violent nature as Peter Riga suggests is 
                                                 
191 Ibid. , 197. 
192 Filochowski, 66. 
193 Dorr, Option for the Poor, 200. 
194 Populorum Progressio, 31, 14. 
  175
incorrect and detestable.195 Violence would defeat Paul VI’s statement and suggest that 
the means justifies the end, which was not his position. He argued for the protection of 
the human person and dignity; therefore, violence would be contradictory, and his call for 
universal charity would be contradicted too. Violence is not recommended because it is 
an emotional, irrational and irresponsible response to problems. 
Paul VI was adamant that injustice and suffering ought to be confronted with 
courage, and not be ignored. Injustices should be analyzed, people should be taught about 
confronting injustice with courage and overcome them. He stated that “development 
demands a bold approach to changes by which things will be thoroughly renovated.”196 
Paul VI’s suggestion was relevant because passive observation of social injustices 
is morally wrong. It is a sin of omission from a Christian perspective. Action ought to be 
taken to preserve human dignity and to make situations of suffering noble, but only 
dignified action is morally justifiable. Immediate action is needed and all people should 
participate. However, those who hold special responsibility and influence “by reason of 
their education, position and power” are exhorted to participate extraordinarily.197 The 
significance of Paul VI’s advocacy for vigorous confrontation of injustice is explained by 
the rationale that for development to occur, obstacles to it must be removed.  
One may conclude that Paul VI, like Martin Luther King Jr., called for active 
resistance but not a violent one – he called for a militant non-violence as described by 
Hanigan.198 King did not advocate physical confrontation but stimulated consciences 
towards dialogue. This constitutes an active response to unjust situations without violence 
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and is morally justified. Similarly, Paul VI thought participation of all people was 
important. Though Paul VI was aware that he could not enforce international order, he 
was also aware that other people could be instrumental in the pursuit of this cause. 
Statesmen and women, scholars, people of good will, especially Catholic Christians and 
other believers can bring about change in the mentality and structures for change.199  
 For Paul VI a favorable response to the problem of poverty is beneficial to both 
the poor and the rich. There is a threefold threat in failure to respond to needs of the poor. 
Rich people jeopardize “their own highest values by yielding to greed,” they invite the 
“judgment of God” upon themselves, and finally, they call upon themselves the wrath of 
the poor - “a clear warning to the rich that the oppressed may take into their own hands 
the challenge to bring about change through a violent action” suggesting that it is “in 
everybody’s interest not to allow such a desperate and risky situation to develop.”200 Paul 
VI’s concern was the risk consequent to the apathy of those who are instrumental in 
creating the prevalent situation. Julian Filochowski underscores this risk when he states 
of Paul VI that “he offers no further teaching on violent reaction from the oppressed. He 
simply warns of the risk” and quotes Paul VI himself as saying: 
Lacking the bare necessities of life, whole nations are under the thumb of others: they cannot act 
on their own initiative; they cannot exercise personal responsibility; they cannot work towards a 
higher degree of cultural refinement or a greater participation in social and public life. They are 
sorely tempted to redress these insults to their human nature by violent means.201  
 
 It is risky to create such a situation, because a revolutionary uprising causes new 
injustices, imbalances and disasters, and produces greater misery. The evil of violent 
revolution must always be in view. However, this does not mean that evil in society is to 
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be endured passively. What is important is that the situation has to be changed - injustices 
have to be redressed and overcome. Paul VI is opposed to violent revolution as a way of 
bringing about radical change because it is ineffective; change introduced in this way is 
destructive and short lived.202  
Paul VI was not encouraging revolution though some authors disagree with this 
assertion.  In the context of the whole document and in the context of Evangelii 
Nuntiandi Paul VI clearly denounced violent revolution as he stated:  
We exhort you not to place your trust in violence and revolution: that is contrary to the Christian 
spirit, and it can also delay instead of advancing that social uplifting to which you lawfully 
aspire.203  
 
Additionally, his advocacy for universal charity as a fundamental virtue for 
integral human development defies the assertion that he was encouraging violence. 
Finally, Paul VI would not have called development the new name for peace if he 
encouraged violence. Paul VI even rejected the use of the term “liberation” as a synonym 
for "development" for fear it would cause people to rise against unjust regimes.204 If he 
considered peace as crucial to development, he would not advocate violence as a means 
or model for change to achieve development. 
In Populorum Progressio Paul VI carefully and skillfully advanced three 
important points about violent reaction to situations of injustice.205 First, he considered 
the possibility of a violent revolution, but found it is a futile way of overcoming injustice 
because it tends to breed the very evils that it wants to overcome. Therefore, it is wrong 
to argue that Paul VI advocated for a justified revolution. Secondly, the document 
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specifies the circumstances under which a revolution could occur - flagrant and long 
standing violation of human rights and great injury to the common good of the State. It is 
too exaggerated to read this as Paul VI endorsing the idea of violent revolution. His 
emphasis on universal love as a fundamental principle of development speaks to this 
point. Finally, while acknowledging the possibility of a justifiable revolution, the Pope 
very carefully refrained from stating that it would be justifiable or justified under certain 
conditions. This clarifies the preceding assertions that Paul VI would not advocate violent 
revolution. Even on the basis of his experience of war and the suffering it causes, as 
presented in chapter one of this work, he would object to violent revolution. The fact that 
he notes that there is a possibility of a justifiable revolution does not necessarily mean 
that he advocated it. He was merely being speculative and foresighted. 
 This is a view often misrepresented as advocacy for violence. To understand it 
one should not lose sight of his statement that development is the new name for peace.206 
What Paul VI suggests is that violent revolution is an inevitable consequence of 
omission, negligence and irresponsible behavior, a consequence of lack of development. 
He argued that “excessive social, economic, and cultural inequalities among nations stir 
up strife and contention and frequently imperil the peace.”207 Those who respond to such 
situations with violence are culpable. But due to the negligent people who provoke 
violence, their degree of culpability is diminished because they are coerced by the 
prevalent situations and have to fight for their personal dignity. If the bonds of 
relationship between people are close they contribute to peace-making and preservation, 
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and promotion of progress.208 
G. Agents of Change 
 
Paul VI appealed to three categories of people - Catholics, Christians and people 
of good will - but generally he appealed to all people who value human dignity to effect 
change.209 He called for immediate participatory action in solidarity when and where 
innocent lives are at stake, the burden of poverty amidst inhumane living conditions is 
great, and world peace and “the very survival of civilization”210 are at stake. The 
involvement of all people and nations in these issues is urgent and of grave significance. 
All people should assume responsibility to make positive change wherever and whenever 
necessary. Every person and all peoples are to be architects of their own destiny because 
development is something people do for and by themselves. 
Paul VI spelled out some categories of development agents and what is expected 
of them. These are the Catholic hierachy - that has the duty of teaching - and the laity, the 
entire Christian community and all people of good will.211 Re-echoing Gaudium et Spes 
and anticipating Octogesima Adveniens and Evangelii Nuntiandi, Paul VI advocated that 
the laity improve the temporal order by free initiative, by planning and creativity. As 
much as possible they must “permeate not only men’s customs and mentality, but also the 
laws and structures of the civil community with the Christian sense of life.”212 The laity 
have the responsibility to change things according to Gospel teaching and moral 
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principles. “Without passively waiting for directives they have the role of infusing”213 
Christian spirit in the mentality, customs, laws and structures of the communities in 
which they live and they also have the duty to bring about basic indispensable requisite 
reforms. The Catholic laity, especially in developed nations, should offer “their skill and 
active cooperation to organizations, public or private, civil or religions, which are striving 
to overcome the difficulties of developing nations,” and they have the role to disseminate 
“an international morality based on justice and equity.”214 The laity should be involved in 
the activities of charitable and humanitarian organizations. Their involvement in 
development is an application of the principles of participation, solidarity, justice, charity 
and common good. 
 Secondly, the Church has a role in transforming the structures of society that need 
to be transformed.215 Paul VI asserted that the Church has always been involved in the 
struggle to transform unjust social structures. In such situations the role of the Church is 
to offer a global vision of the human person and human relationships as situations require 
concerted action on a global scale. The entire Christian community is an agent of change. 
All Christians have the duty to enforce change by helping people to refrain from 
selfishness and resolve problems such as “egoism and arrogance, disputes and rivalries, 
and ambitions and injustice” through which, according to Paul VI, the attainment of “a 
more human life” where everybody is loved and assisted is possible.216 The challenge 
Paul VI posits here is a reflection of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council’s 
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Gaudium et Spes, Justitia in Mundo and Evangelii Nuntiandi which, recommended 
reading of the signs of the times in addressing issues affecting people. 
Paul VI invoked the participation of all people of good will to create meaningful 
and humane living conditions through deep study and love.217 The difficulty with this 
injunction is that not everybody may participate or be capable of involvement in a 
development project. It takes interest, awareness of needs and commitment to the 
development process to be involved. This is an obstacle to progress toward what Paul VI 
calls integral human development. Consequently, the description of true development has 
to be qualified as integral human development according to possibilities such as natural 
capacities and resources. 
According to Paul VI people of good will may be “delegates to international 
organizations, government officials, journalists and publishers, educators and 
teachers.”218 He further contended that in accordance with their capacities and 
professions such experts are agents in resolving difficulties in the human situation and in 
building a new world.  
 Finally, heads of state and ambassadors are significant agents of change and 
development. Internationally, the role of “the rich countries and their leaders” and of 
international agencies such as FAO and the UN is vital.219 Paul VI emphasized the role of 
statesmen and women, journalists and the elite in wealthy states. The role of heads of 
state is to create unity between their countries and other people, persuasion for 
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contribution towards “the development of peoples and to preserve peace.”220 In poor 
countries an important category of agents responsible for change and development are the 
“experts and development workers, from the rich countries, who work in the poor 
countries.”221  
 Paul VI affirmed that all “people of good will who are aware that peace cannot be 
attained except through the development of civilization and increased resources” 222 are 
also agents of human development. Paul VI appealed to the will of individuals to act in 
the face of injustice and to work for development which brings about peace. For him 
ambassadors to international organizations have to work for “a policy of mutual, 
international cooperation, which is friendly, peace-seeking and interested to replace 
hostile and senseless confrontations of force and arms” 223 among all people. This means 
delegates to international organizations or institutions have the duty to make policies that 
are altruistic and provide for peace and unity rather than unrest. This is how integral and 
harmonious human development can be promoted. According to Paul VI the more 
important agents of change are those who have power, wealth and influence. The 
problem with such a suggestion is that such people contribute positively only if they have 
the right attitude to human needs, otherwise they can be obstacles to development.  
IV. PAUL VI’S RESPONSE TO THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS 
 
A. The Right to Private Ownership of Property 
 
Paul VI treated private ownership of property in the light of integral development. 
According to him ownership must foster the good of the whole person and of every 
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person.224 However, Paul VI’s understanding of private ownership of property was not 
novel, but related to teachings of the Early Fathers, who had two emphatic doctrines 
about private ownership of property.  
First, the Early Fathers considered property as a means to what they called 
autarkeia or self- sufficiency which means “property is a means to the relative end of 
self-sufficiency and self-reliance which keeps one from being a perpetual burden to 
others.” 225 It is a means to self- determination, self-assuarance, moral independence and 
freedom to serve others. The Fathers advocated that ownership of property must be 
subordinated to its use. Property is not to be owned for the sake of holding or keeping and 
showing off.  The real value of property is realized only when it is used, otherwise there 
is no way of determining its worth. This assertion does not deny that property has 
potential worth. It only means that it is difficult to determine the value of property apart 
from its use. 
The Fathers taught that property’s second goal was koinonia. Property is to serve 
in building fellowship between those who have and those who do not have, meaning that 
it is a means of communion between people, especially the rich and the poor.226 Property 
is an instrument for consolidating solidarity. It ought to serve all people in need. The 
Fathers were clear that property is not an end in itself. It is a means to genuine service to 
human values and needs.227  
Paul VI did not break radically from Leo XIII or John XXIII regarding private 
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property. All three popes and the Second Vatican Council affirmed the natural right to 
private property.228 However, in Populorum Progressio Paul VI treated the right to 
private property in a social context. Consequently, he called for restraint in the exercise 
of this right.  
Paul VI’s claim about private ownership as a principle for integral human 
development is based on a theology of creation, namely that “God intends the earth and 
its goods for use by everyone.”229 Paul VI cited the book of Genesis: “Fill the earth and 
subdue it”, and using this as a basis he argued for the right to own property with 
restraint.230 He asserted that the text teaches that: 
. . . all things of the world have been created for man, and that this task has been entrusted to him 
to enhance their value by the resources of his intellect and by his toil to complete and perfect them 
for his own use. Now if the earth has been created for the purpose of furnishing individuals either 
with the necessities of a livelihood or the means for progress, it follows that each man has the right 
to get from it what is necessary for him.231  
 
Paul VI affirmed the universal destiny of natural resources. Some Ugandan 
societies acknowledge this contention, namely that creation is God’s gift to all people, 
not the monopoly of a few people. This is well stated in the Lugbara proverb: “Nyakuni 
ba piri ma andri ni,” literally translated as “the earth is the mother of all,” and meaning 
that the earth can feed everybody by its produce, like a common mother.”232 There is the 
need to work, which in Catholic social teaching is the means of ownership, to guarantee 
this motherhood of the earth.  
Paul VI acknowledged that people are participants in creation and do so by adding 
value to the original creation of God. People participate in and continue God’s creative 
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activity in the world by working. This makes work blessed, dignified and noble before 
God. The dignity of work, individual participation and use of natural resources are 
emphasized as crucial for development.  
Paul VI affirmed the right to tap resources of the earth through working on the 
earth. Every person who works can claim the fruits of his/her labor as private property, 
but not absolutely, because of “the destiny of the goods of creation to serve the needs of 
all.”233 The universal destiny of natural resources is possible if things are ordered 
according to the principles of justice and charity. Paul VI affirmed that people have the 
right to what is necessary, not what is unnecessary. He stated: 
All other rights, whatever they are, including property rights and the right of free trade must be 
subordinated to this norm; they must not hinder it, but must rather expedite its application. It must 
be considered an urgent social obligation to refer these rights to their original purpose.234   
 
The right to private ownership ought to remain open to arising needs. The needs 
of the less fortunate oblige those who are affluent, out of love and justice, to share their 
resources with the needy. “The rights of all to the goods of the earth supersede not only 
property rights, but also the right of free commerce.”235 The obligation to leave the claim 
over property open is based on love; Paul VI also referred to the Early Fathers, 
particularly St. Ambrose, who argued that the basis for sharing with the poor is the 
universal destiny of natural resources.236  
According to Ambrose and Augustine, the affluent do not give from their own 
resources, they return what belongs to the poor. The universal destiny of resources to 
meet human needs is the more compelling argument. “No one is allowed to set aside 
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solely for his own advantage possessions which exceed his needs when others lack the 
necessities of life.”237 This affirmation corroborates the relationships between the right of 
private ownership, charity and the common good. It is here that Paul VI “adopts a 
traditional concept of private property in this encyclical but gives it a different stress”, 
particularly the emphasis on “the social function of private property.”238  
According to Riga, for Paul VI “property is always a social responsibility.”239 He 
agrees with Augustine according to whom “the phenomenon of property must be situated 
in the context of humanity’s solidarity.”240 Paul VI affirmed that sometimes for the sake 
of the common good, private property can be interfered with, especially when it affects 
society negatively:  
The common good therefore, at times demands the expropriation of an estate if it happens that 
some estates impede the common property either on account of their vast size or because of their 
small or negligible cultivation, or cause extreme poverty to the population or bring serious harm to 
the country.241  
 
In the same spirit as the Second Vatican Council, Populorum Progressio was 
clear that revenues derived from natural resources should not be disposed of at the 
pleasure of an individual, and excessive profits should not be used for individual benefits. 
Transfer of excess profits to foreign countries is unjust because the resources of nature 
are for the benefit of all people.242 This suggests that human labor is for the good of the 
human community too. Human labor is good because it is participation in God’s creative 
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activity, and so personal industry and creativity are significant contributions to human 
development.243  
Paul VI’s assertions reflected the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas, who affirmed the 
right of private ownership but gave ownership a different meaning. According to him 
ownership “is merely an extension of the freedom of the person - a necessary extension 
for successful navigation through life”, but essentially property is for the promotion of 
the common good.244 Ownership helps in the cultivation of virtue through the practice of 
stewardship, generosity and work. Aquinas affirmed the value of work and regarded the 
benefits accruing from labor as being for the individual as well as others, and labor was, 
in a way, a custodian of natural resources. 
This explains why Paul VI was, to a significant degree, opposed to exaggerated 
free-market capitalism and insisted that the economy must serve the people.245 He 
observed that the principal purpose of economic development is not promotion of profits, 
competition is not “the supreme law of economics,” “private ownership of the means of 
production” is not “an absolute right which recognizes neither limits nor concomitant 
social duty” and such abusive economic mentalities ought to be rejected because 
economic progress is for the good of people.246 Diez-Alegria concedes this claim of Paul 
VI and succinctly states that what Paul VI “condemns on moral grounds, is private, 
individualistic profit taken as an absolute itself, to which everything else must be 
subordinated: the idea that maximizing return on capital is the supreme value.”247 Paul VI 
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rejected the idea of liberal capitalism, though not entirely. He condemned the 
maximization of profits and their selfish use. When profits are used selflessly to meet 
needs of people, divine intent is respected. It was for this reason that Paul VI consistently 
denounced liberal capitalism as the dominant principle for international economic 
systems.248 
Paul VI viewed the right to own property in relation to labor and its contribution 
to development. He argued that “justice demands that we admit that not only the 
organization of labor but also industrial process made a necessary contribution to 
promote development.”249 The right to private ownership of property is advocated on the 
basis of the traditional argument since Rerum Novarum, that property is earned through 
labor. Since work dignifies and it is the causality of production, ownership of what one 
has worked for is realistic. This is a motivation to work and a positive contribution to 
development. 
Paul VI further argued that what a nation has by virtue of divine providence and 
its input in the form of labor should first be enjoyed by that nation, but no nation should 
appropriate natural resources exclusively for its own use.250 Economic systems and 
relationships should respect the right to private property. They ought not to turn human 
beings into objects without dignity just for the sake of acquisition of property. 
Consequently, Paul VI condemned the use of labor as a commodity to be sold for profits, 
denounced the separation of labor and capital, and considered the exaggerated profit 
motive of capitalism, which neglects human dignity, as the crux of the problem in current 
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development programs.251 The problem with the profit motive of capitalism is that it turns 
values upside down. Profit becomes the end and human persons become the means. Paul 
VI denounced private ownership as an absolute right and suggested that the only absolute 
principle is human dignity.252  
Samuel Gregg observes that many authors have vehemently defended the right to 
private property.253 Some of the reasons for this defense are: private property is a 
guarantee and security for people who have worked to earn property; private property 
promotes self-reliance and autonomy, it helps people to actualize virtues such as 
liberality, and magnanimity; and “private ownership is actualized when persons mix their 
labor with raw materials.”254 Paul VI was aware of these credible reasons, but his concern 
was that this right was exaggerated and abused. Consequently, he argued for “the 
common use principle” which advocates that natural resources are destined for common 
use, not for unrestrained private use.255 Paul VI acknowledged that  
. . . inequality of wealth is not necessarily unfair. Christianity has always affirmed that many 
factors must be taken into account when thinking about what constitutes justice in the material 
realm. These include factors such as need, merit, willingness to take risks and the function 
performed by a person.256  
 
Paul VI’s call for the proper exercise of the right to private property was 
necessitated by the demand of integral human development, the recognition and 
acknowledgment that “the goods of the earth are for all people.”257 Paul VI upheld the 
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right to private property but insisted that it is superseded by the right to use the resources 
of nature.  
B. Two Consequential Virtues: Charity and Justice with Peace as Consequence 
 
The relationship between charity, justice and peace is an intimate one. In Catholic 
social teaching prior to and after Populorum Progressio the three are consistently linked 
together. “Justice is an indispensable part of charity,” and “justice is a prerequisite for 
true peace.”258 Charity, justice and peace are related not only as Christian virtues, but also 
as social virtues. Peace is a consequence of love and justice, and comes after the two 
virtues. Paul VI was not the first person to recognize the value of peace for the human 
community and its growth. All he taught affirmed Thomas Aquinas who considered 
peace a significant factor for the well being of human community.259                                      
1. CHARITY 
 
For Paul VI the social dimension of the human person affects all human relations. 
The Church calls all people motivated by love to heed the call of those who live under 
evil social, political, cultural and economic conditions.260 Paul VI invoked the virtues of 
Christian charity and solidarity as basic principles of liberation and true human 
development. Charity should be viewed in the context of human solidarity and be given 
priority in social relationships. Consequently, Paul VI encouraged the practice of 
fraternity, and charitable organizations such as Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and Caritas Internationalis that attempt to meet the demands of charity and the material 
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needs of desperate people.261 According to him such organizations are necessary and 
visible expressions of charity because the depraved condition of humanity is caused more 
by lack of charity than by a monopoly of the resources of nature.  
Paul VI considered charity a fundamental principle for integral human 
development. His assertion is justifiable because where there is universal and 
indiscriminate love among individuals and nations, the possibility of integral 
development is heightened. It facilitates the process of mutual support among peoples 
and nations, and ultimately integral development. He affirmed extension of “a generous 
welcome to others” as “a duty of human solidarity and Christian charity” in “households 
and also cultural institutions of host countries.”262 This suggests that solidarity and 
charity are foundational for hospitality. By recognizing their mutual bonds people love 
each other. Paul VI’s concern was young people who tend to be vulnerable to situations, 
ideologies and worldviews and need moral and spiritual guidance. In this case hospitality 
involves not only love and accommodation, but also moral support and directing the 
youth. 
Paul VI advocated that “emigrant workers too must be welcomed” 263 and be 
offered decent working conditions as opposed to the fact that they are often left to fate 
despite their need to support their poverty-stricken family members. The dignity of 
immigrant workers ought to be respected. Hospitality to aliens was emphasized as an 
expression of universal charity. It was later reaffirmed as a guiding principle for the 
international community. The Rome Statement of 1999 advised the members of the 
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International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) to incorporate 
hospitality to aliens as a vital principle for human development.264  
Paul VI used the term “charity” as a specific form of Christian love, not a 
philanthropic act.265 Charity is not an emotional response to circumstances but a rational, 
deliberate and responsible response. He proposed that expatriate experts should be 
motivated by charity in what they do in foreign countries. Regardless of personal 
concerns, love must be extended to people in honor of their dignity. 
Technical skill should not be valued independently of love. “If then technical skill 
is necessary the signs and proofs too of genuine love must be joined with it.”266 Paul VI 
affirmed that technical skill per se is not sufficiently valuable. Its value is determined by 
how and why it is used to serve others and expressed in a loving way or not.267 In 
emphasizing the significance of universal charity, Paul VI stated that  
Programs initiated for human development to be implemented by common effort bring nations 
together if all, the chief government officials and the lowest artisan, are enkindled with brotherly 
love and ardently desire the establishment of a civilization of world solidarity. Then a dialogue will 
begin based on man but not on the produce of the land or products of technology.268  
 
For Paul VI love is the origin of dialogue between nations and collaborative action 
because it is people-centered. Love breeds solidarity, and solidarity is the beginning of 
authentic dialogue. According to Paul VI with true solidarity, dialogue centers on people, 
not products or technical skills. He made the human person central in the pursuit of 
development, arguing that education leads to self-embetterment, and economic and 
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spiritual progress.269  
Genuine love contributes to integral human development because one “who is 
animated by genuine love is the one who in particular applies his mental acumen to 
discourage the cause of misery and find ways to combat them and boldly overcome 
them.”270 Love is what moves one to devote personal talents, intelligence, wisdom, 
energy and abilities to ensure that suffering is abated and development of all is achieved. 
This suggests that authentic development of the human race demands a daring love, a 
charity that reaches out to others unconditionally. Paul VI suggested this when he said: 
Now this striving for a more human way of life does indeed demand effort and entails 
inconvenience but these very sufferings endured out of love for our brothers and for their benefit 
can be most conducive to the development of the human race.271  
 
Authentic development demands commitment to self-sacrificial charity and, a love 
that is indiscriminate, unconditional and never hesitates to act. This kind of charity is a 
biblical demand of discipleship and a social demand of human community.272 A loving 
community can help the disadvantaged to rise to a higher standard, befitting human 
beings. Though charity is supreme, it must be linked to justice because “it both motivates 
and completes justice.”273 People are moved to act justly because they love and love 
makes justice real and moral.  
2. JUSTICE 
 
Paul VI made the notion of justice more expansive than encyclicals before 
Populorum Progressio. He extended the notion of social justice from a national level to 
                                                 
269Riga, 140. Also see Populorum Progressio, 73, 30. 
270Ibid. , 75, 31. 
271Ibid., 79, 33. 
272 Cfr. Mt. 5: 38-48. 
273Gudorf, 3. Gurdorf quoting Evangelii Praecones, June, 1951, AAS 43 (1951): 518, para.71; 
Quadragesimo Anno, May 15, 1931, AAS 23 (1931): 223-224, para.137; Pacem in Terris, April, 11, 1963, 
AAS 55 (1963): 302-303, para.167. 
  194
an international one, and advocated that international social justice is essentially based on 
human solidarity because human community constitutes a family.274 Fair treatment 
among peoples is influenced by their relationships and the inevitable need for each other. 
Paul VI recognized the significance of the regulation of economic relations between 
nations so that no party would be exploited. He advocated commutative justice. He dealt 
with a situation of exchange involving legal contracts, which stipulate, directly or 
indirectly, the requisite conditions of the agreements or contracts entered into. This is 
typical of commutative justice, a justice exercised in exchange of commodities or 
services.275 
Paul VI envisioned that protective agreements were necessary. Consequently, he 
suggested that bilateral and multilateral agreements must be honored because of the 
social relations they create on the basis of political and juridical equalities. He further 
thought that these agreements need to be governed by justice which is a fruit of sincere 
collaboration and respect for human rights and dignity.276 The implication of this view is 
that justice must protect the human person, rights and dignity. The view is credible 
because all principles for integral human development are founded on the most 
fundamental principle of the human dignity. If human dignity is understood, recognized 
and acknowledged, respect for human rights and the human person, solidarity, and 
ultimately the exercise of justice is more easily achievable.  
From Paul VI on, the requirement of justice for human development has been 
consistently emphasized and supported. For example, justice was one of the principal 
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developmental elements underscored during the ICPD. The Rome Statement affirmed 
that justice is an important and protective component against poverty and disparities of 
wealth and societal unity.277 Similarly, Paul VI had earlier argued that solidarity is easily 
undermined by injustice. When nations attempt to work in collaboration and mutual 
agreement, they should ensure that there are no variable trade relations, which exist 
between richer and poorer countries because steady relationships provide hope and 
confidence for poor nations. 278 Otherwise, their fears that aiding nations can take back 
their aid any time may be aggravated.  
Paul VI affirmed “the need for social justice to govern world trade.”279 Less-
developed countries depend on exportation of raw materials which are less valuable than 
the products of developed nations, and “subject to very great and sudden price changes 
and are consequently far outclassed by the increasing value of industrial products.” 280 
This variation contributes to the gap between developed and underdeveloped nations. The 
phenomenon incapacitates less-developed countries competing with industrialized 
countries. Costs of goods from industrialized countries claim more money from the 
unindustrialized countries than their income. Paul VI concluded rightly that “for this 
reason nations struggling against poverty become still poorer, but those endowed with all 
resources are enriched with even greater wealth.”281 Injustice in international trade 
relations persists in relationships of unequal bargaining powers, capacities and 
possibilities.  
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According to Paul VI, international trade relations are good and just only if “the 
parties involved do not differ too much in resources” and it is unjust if “very unequal 
situations obtain between countries”, and it was for the same reason, according to Paul 
VI, that “the fundamental principle of liberalism as the norm of commercial transaction is 
called into question.”282 Paul VI did not condemn economic liberalism or capitalism, 
absolutely. He simply called for moderation in the system. As long as the profits of a 
capitalist serve the needs of human dignity, and are not used for needless selfish interests, 
he had no problem. The aspect essentially questioned is that capitalism gives rise to 
economic inequalities. Inequalities at the same time provide opportunities for free trade 
because the poor cannot favorably compete with the rich. To allow people to make 
economic transactions without agreements that favor both trading partners is unjust and 
faulty because the more powerful can manipulate situations for selfish ends, thus 
disregarding the common good. 
Paul VI raised many challenging issues. First, he questioned the sense of a 
claimed or supposed solidarity. When nations or individuals get into trade relationships 
they express their need for each other, but true solidarity is not selfish or exploitative. 
True solidarity benefits all parties involved. Where there is authentic solidarity there is 
justice. Secondly, there is no justice in relationships when one party suffers or is 
exploited. Thirdly, though it could happen in any economic system, liberalism is 
inconsonant with justice and solidarity, or at least makes them difficult to achieve. The 
terms of a just agreement may not be honored, or mutual needs are disregarded or 
become selfish. Partners fail to see their need for one another and this makes the principle 
                                                 
282 Ibid. 
  197
of economic liberalism questionable. Finally, Paul VI suggested the principle of 
subsidiarity and an option for the poor to regulate economic justice. According to him, 
regulation of trade relations demands an authority that intervenes when smaller groups 
are unable to resolve their problems.  
Paul VI argued for the exercise of justice, freedom and equity. He observed that 
free competition is beneficial only to those who have stronger bargaining power. It is 
unjust that the weaker or poorer parties are compelled to succumb to stronger ones 
because they have no alternative. This would be an act of commutative injustice, a 
violation of human freedom and immoral because it is coercion. Paul VI suggested that 
there should be objective rationality in economic relations. Human reason endowed with 
divine assistance should discern what needs to be done. Economic relations should be 
governed by ethical principles. If not, the so-called collaborative relation or solidarity is 
not authentic or relevant and integral human development is impossible. 
 Paul VI advocated justice on the basis of Christian understanding of the social 
character of people. He asserted that justice must be based on “responsibility to others,” 
restrained inviolability of private property, and “the universal destination of material 
goods” or “the common use principle,” and that “completely equal standards are 
necessary” 283 for just economic competition or trade. Paul VI outlined conditions 
necessary for justice to flourish: people need to be responsible for each other, take the 
common good seriously, be selfless in the use of property and deal on even economic 
grounds.  
Paul VI praised the work of large industrial groups operating in foreign countries. 
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He advocated and urged “industrialists, merchants, the leaders and representatives of 
these large organizations” to deal with the less-developed countries disinterestedly; their 
principal motive should be “social development and human progress.” 284 Justice should 
govern employer-employee relations. “No one should unjustly be subjected to the 
arbitrariness of others.” 285 They should help nationals to participate in shaping 
development in their countries, and do this by training and involving them in the 
leadership and general business of their organizations. Paul VI suggested that joint 
participation of specialists and nationals of countries they serve is necessary because 
different skills supplement each other and meet the needs of integral development. This 
means solidarity is a necessary partner of justice because it expresses how much people 
need each other and treat each other according to their genuine needs. 
For Paul VI justice makes two important demands.286 First, it demands that 
experts who work in nations other than their own do not dominate but serve. Paul VI 
advocated just action on the part of those whose skills benefit those who lack requisite 
skills for development. Secondly, justice demands that experts are free from exaggerated 
patriotism - an inordinate love of their country - and unjust discrimination. Their 
patriotism should not jeopardize the life, dignity and culture of the people in the nations 
they serve. They should refrain from giving pre-eminence to their own culture, 
knowledge and experience, and their countries of origin. 
Several authors agree that in his treatise of social justice in Populorum Progressio 
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Paul VI moved the focus from a national to an international level.287 Prior to the 
document “justice was primarily a matter of ensuring the proper distribution of existing 
wealth and resources”; the novelty of the document is that “it could be seen in terms of 
the production of increased resources which would be used to overcome poverty and to 
ensure that those who have little could catch up with those who have more.”288 This 
means justice, like option for the poor, affirmative action and subsidiarity, consists in 
improving the conditions of those who are poor and incapable. The document affirmed 
the worldwide dimension of justice in human development, and the role of solidarity 
between the rich and the poor.  
In Populorum Progressio Paul treated the three types of justice - social justice, 
commutative justice and distributive justice. Social justice is more explicit in his vision of 
human solidarity and mutual relationship. The commutative dimension is clear in his 
treatise on the balance in trade relations. The distributive dimension is treated in his 
attempt to address the plight of nations marred with poverty, ignorance, disease and other 
maladies. However, his advocacy for distributive justice should be read in light of the 
right to private ownership of property and the promotion of the dignity of the human 
person because the use of property also reflects justice. This suggests that general justice 
as understood by Thomas Aquinas, namely as justice whose direct object is “the welfare 
of entire community - the common good”, 289 and what Christine E. Gudorf calls social 
justice as justice of the status quo or the social order is present in Paul VI’s vision of 
justice. 
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3. PEACE 
 
 At the end of Populorum Progressio Paul VI equated his overarching theme of 
human development to peace. This shows how significant a condition peace is for 
development. Both the Church and state should always pursue peace. Its pursuit should 
be directed to the defense of human dignity - the principal focus in the struggle for peace 
as Paul VI had stated in 1965 in his address to the United Nations assembly.290 Peace is 
also a product of the practice of justice, and since love and justice are necessarily linked, 
then peace is also a product of love. It can rightly be called the fruit or consequence of 
charity and justice.  
Paul VI’s doctrine of peace promoted the teaching of his predecessors. For 
example, Pius XI, in Quadragesimo Anno and John XXIII, in Pacem in Terris, had 
clearly affirmed that peace is an important and a unique condition to be established. It is 
crucial to integral development of peoples, but delicate because it can be disrupted easily 
by “excessive social, economic, and cultural inequalities among nations.”291 For Paul VI 
the consequence of inequalities among nations and even individuals is often controversy 
and fighting, but “peace is not simply to be reduced to the elimination of all war, as if it 
consisted in a precarious balance of power.” 292 True peace is not just the absence of war.  
Peace is an earned harmonious life, tranquility in relationship, consequent to unity 
of mind and a deeply heart-rooted reconciliation. Justice and charity are crucial for 
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authentic human development but “a more perfect form of justice” 293 is a prerequisite for 
peace. True peace is tranquility of heart and mind, a real transformation and an absence 
of fears and concerns. A balance of socio-economic and political power is not a guarantee 
for enduring peace. True peace is a consequence of satisfactory living circumstances for 
all. 
The French bishops argued that true peace is created by a rational influence on 
people’s political wills and intentions. Peace is not forced through threats or intimidation. 
Consequently, they preferred the French word dissuasion for deterrence which has the 
English equivalence of dissuasion and the German word abschreckung, which is derived 
from the German verb abschreken, meaning to deter, put off, plunge in cold water, all of 
which give a sense of force or conditioning.294 This German term does not exactly depict 
the sense of the English word dissuasion. Instead it conveys the sense of deterrence just 
as the United States Bishops’ English equivalent of deterrence, which gives the sense of 
intimidation and fear, even though the latter can influence people’s wills.295 The French 
rendering of deterrence is preferred because it does not convey the sense of intimidation, 
and it is “the deterrence of the strong by the weak.”296 This notion of deterrence is 
plausible because it resonates with the original sense of peace as derived from the 
Hebrew word shalom. Both OT and NT shalom had an integral meaning of general 
welfare. The word meant health or peace, and a comprehensive welfare which St. 
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Augustine referred to as “the tranquility of order”- meaning a true harmony with self and 
environment.297 
For Paul VI authentic peace is not given and taken without labor, it is earned. 
Peace is something to work for ceaselessly and progressively in accordance with the 
original harmony divinely instituted. Paul VI’s vision of true peace is a product of the 
harmony of mind and heart, within oneself and with people in a communal environment. 
For this reason peace is rightly called “a quality of relationship between persons and 
nations.”298 It is a fruit of authentic love and justice. Consequently, Paul VI “argued for 
economic justice as the surest way to peace.”299  
This is a credible argument because people disagree and fight on the basis of 
whether they are justly treated or not. Social, economic, political, religious, cultural, and 
educational injustices are fundamental causes of disharmony. They directly affect human 
rights and human dignity, which is the overriding principle for the integral development 
of the human person and communities. 
If true development is the new name for peace as Paul VI claimed, then peace is 
the work not only of an individual person or a single nation, but of all.300 It involves 
action in solidarity. Contributions of nations and people towards peace are significant but 
they needed to be corroborated and coordinated. This is what Paul VI meant when he 
said: 
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Since nations are each the architects of their own development they assume a task and 
responsibility of such magnitude that they will never be able to accomplish it if they live in 
isolation.301  
 
True development is not the achievement of one nation, and it is the achievement 
of peace which Paul VI equated to development. The achievements of peace and 
development are hard tasks in isolation. Peace and solidarity are necessarily related. For 
this reason Paul VI stated that 
. . . agreements between poorer nations of the same region on mutual assistance, common 
programs of broader scope to help them, likewise other agreements of greater importance made to 
coordinate plans of action with other nations are, so to speak, so many milestones of this road 
which leads to peace while it promote progress.302 
 
Paul VI asserted that personal or individual efforts need to be supplemented with 
coordinated external efforts and support to attain true peace and true human development. 
The road to true peace and development is hard, involving and demanding individuals 
and nations to pool their efforts, talents and resources. Similarly, the French bishops later 
affirmed in 1983 that to build peace requires courage, effort and willingness on the part 
of all parties involved in the peace building process, and what needs to be understood and 
attended to are the ideologies and intentions of people in conflict.303 This is a credible 
affirmation because true peace can only be built when worldviews and the intentions of 
conflicting parties are reconciled. Above all, the peace-building process involves critical 
analysis of situations, mutual understanding and sincere dialogue. 
For Paul VI there is no distinction between the fruit of peace and the event of 
human development because “development is synonymous with peace,” a view 
                                                 
301 Populorum Progressio, 77, 32.  
302 Ibid. 
303 Winning the Peace, 17, 109. 
  204
commonly affirmed by many interpreters of Populorum Progressio.304 The credibility of 
this assertion is based on the vision that when and where there is development there is 
peace and when there is peace the possibility of development is eminent. This was why 
Paul VI called development the new name for peace.  
Henriot supplements Paul VI’s assertion by stating that there is a twofold 
connection between development and peace, which flows from the text of the document. 
First “a world filled with poor and oppressed people will not be a peaceful world” and, 
secondly, “a world preparing for war or actually waging war will not be a world where 
people move from less human to more human conditions.”305 This statement realistically 
explains the equation of peace to development. Henriot suggests here that development is 
the cause of true peace. If development is not authentic, peace is a dream or falsely 
claimed. Secondly, war contributes nothing to the development of people. 
Development and peace are necessarily mutually supportive. Peace-loving 
peoples, regions and nations develop. Truly developed peoples, regions and nations are 
peaceful, not only because they are developed but also because they understand that the 
disruption of peace retards human progress, diminishes human dignity, and creates more 
problems for society and individuals.  
Paul VI’s introduction of development as a synonym for peace shows a break 
from previous papal teachings regarding the relationship between social justice and the 
status quo, and consequently called for a careful understanding of justice.306 Paul VI 
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stated that civilization is partially manifested in charity and justice, which are antecedents 
to peace. The inseparable relation between love and peace confirms the relation between 
peace and solidarity. John Paul II later succinctly stated that the achievement of peace 
requires “the practice of the virtues that favor togetherness and which teach us to live in 
unity, so as to build unity by giving and receiving a new society and better world.”307 
This summarizes the requirements of true peace, and some of the requirements of true 
development. 
C. Three Contextual Principles: Subsidiarity, Option for the Poor and Affirmative 
Action 
 
1. SUBSIDIARITY  
 
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into Catholic social teaching by Pius 
XI in his encyclical Quadragessimo Anno, where he stated that the principle is the 
important guiding norm for the restoration of social order.308 According to Pius XI 
subsidiarity is “that most weighty principle which cannot be set aside or changed, it 
remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy,” and states that: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own 
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a 
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser 
and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish 
help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.309  
 
Pius XI suggested that if smaller bodies or groups or individuals can meet their 
needs larger bodies like the state should not interfere. Conversely smaller bodies should 
not transfer to the larger bodies like the state what they are able to do for themselves. It 
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would constitute mutual injustice if smaller bodies shunned their responsibilities and 
bigger bodies usurped responsibilities of smaller bodies, and vice versa. The explanation 
is that the principle of participation demands that all people contribute to the common 
good according to their abilities. The teaching about subsidiarity was continued by John 
XXIII in Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris.310  
Paul VI advocated for a mediating body to resolve conflicts when individuals or 
groups are incapable of supporting themselves. In case of  
conflict between acquired private rights and the primary needs of the community it pertains to the 
public authorities to seek a solution to these functions with the active participation of individuals 
and social groups.311 
 
Paul VI suggested that the common good, affirmative action, participation and an 
option for the poor are related to the principle of subsidiary.  
When small or weak communities make efforts but cannot handle conflicts or 
support themselves, then stronger or larger bodies such as public authorities should 
intervene. Affirmative action is implied here because subsidiarity advocates necessary 
intervention of stronger or larger bodies on behalf of the poor or the weak. It boosts the 
participation or involvement of all people. Paul VI emphasized the significance of the 
principle of subsidiarity.  
It is the function of public authorities to establish and enjoin the objectives to be attained, the 
plans to be followed and the means to achieve them; also to stimulate the energies of all involved 
in this common activity. But they must be careful to associate the projects of individuals and 
intermediary agencies with this kind of work. 312 
 
According to Paul VI intervention by superior bodies must be limited - they 
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should not take away what individuals and smaller groups are capable of doing. To do so 
would usurp rights of these bodies to function freely and to attain self-fulfillment. 
Respect between the smaller bodies and the superior ones is an imperative. The limits of 
each are defined by what the small bodies are capable of doing. Encroaching on the 
freedom or rights of individuals or smaller groups kills initiative and participation, 
ultimately encouraging dependence. It also denies the dignity of an individual’s work and 
personal dignity. However, the principle is fraught with, at least a flaw, because it is not 
easy to determine what smaller bodies can or cannot do for themselves. 
Paul VI thought that projects of “individuals and intermediary agencies” should 
not be associated with public authorities because this leads to collectivization and 
arbitrary economic management, which deprives individuals and groups of people of 
their freedom and exercise of basic human rights.313 The second part of the principle of 
subsidiarity is that when individuals and intermediary groups are capable, the 
intervention of public authority is unnecessary. This part of the principle protects capable 
individuals or intermediary bodies and limits the intervention of public authorities to 
necessary moments only. 
Paul VI did not explicitly use the term subsidiarity but it is apparent in his 
assertion in Populorum Progressio that  
This international cooperation which embraces the whole world demands institutions which 
prepare the way for it, coordinate, and direct it until a new judicial order is established which all 
recognize as fixed and firm.314 
 
Paul VI was suggesting that it is necessary to have an international structure or 
authority to govern activities within the international community and organizations with 
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international orientations and overtones. He reiterated “the need of international authority 
to coordinate the establishment of just political and economic spheres.”315 Such a body is 
necessary when nations need support, though they should act on their own. Institutions 
act as mediators or coordinators for different groups, but they should unite people and 
nations, and create effective international judicial and political systems.316 In other words, 
an international government or body should have effective guidelines for directing and 
developing the world community.  
Paul VI emphasized the importance of the United Nations Organization, which 
was already established. The principle of subsidiarity was intended to restore social order 
in relations between smaller groups and larger ones, to restore autonomy of groups, and 
to state the right relations between associations and and the larger society.317 This was 
important because integral human development depends on mutual relations and dealings 
among individuals, groups, communities and nations.   
2. PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR 
 
As alluded to in Chapter One, Paul VI’s trips to different continents influenced his 
vision of the world and shaped his writing of Populorum Progressio. Riga says that “it is 
evident that the Pope’s travels put him into direct contact with the poor and that he was 
shocked to see the extent of human degradation throughout the globe.”318 It is no surprise 
that Paul VI’s concern for the poor was emphatic and empathetic.  
The condition and dignity of the poor was the crux of the problem Paul VI 
addressed in Populorum Progressio; it was inevitable that he should suggest a principle 
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directly related to the problem. Consequently, he proposed the principle of an option for 
the poor as a way of resolving these problems. The principle invokes the spirit of 
sacrifice directed toward resolving the problem of poverty in society. This is a dominant 
demand of Populorum Progressio.319 Option for the poor is an invitation to give priority 
to care for and to protect the human dignity of disadvantaged people. This is a call to all 
to act in solidarity for the empowerment of the weak in society.  
Paul VI declared that “the more needy nations” should be helped to liberate 
themselves from what retards their progress, “and to find, without detriment to their own 
native character, the means of human and social development.”320 Here he advocated a 
preferential but not exclusive action which favors the disadvantaged people. Their needs 
are not specified in the document, but it can be inferred from previous doctrine that they 
are socio-economic, political and spiritual because he emphasized integral human 
development. For Paul VI, opting for the poor demands their liberation from obstacles to 
progress, namely poverty, disease, ignorance and injustice. He cautioned that this should 
not be done at the expense of their cultural values. 
Paul VI urged nations to emulate the examples of nations that have replaced 
military service with social service directed to the poor and needy, after the example of 
Christ’s preaching.321 He suggested that money allocated for destructive military 
equipment should be constructively used for promoting the dignity and meeting the needs 
of people. People who are stricken by poverty and ignorance should not be ignored; those 
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who possess resources have responsibility to show compassion to them.322 Prompt action 
is imperative where suffering is evident. 
According to Paul VI, opting for the poor is not optional for the rich. Riga 
suggests that, according to Paul VI this means that for the rich it constitutes a duty, “not 
an ‘act of charity’ out of their superfluity (par.44).”323 To say that it is a duty for the rich 
to give to the poor needs to be well defined. If they have not met all their basic needs they 
are not bound by the obligation to help the poor. This is the advocacy Paul VI made. 
Those who have are obliged to give to the poor when they (the poor) are unable to 
procure resources by their own strength. If they are capable but simply lazy, their lack of 
resources does not constitute an obligation on the side of the rich. There is an optional 
dimension of gift to the poor if circumstances surrounding the gift are critically 
scrutinized. Justice would at least speak to this effect. To say that opting for the poor is 
not an act of charity is contestable. It would suggest that Paul VI used the term charity 
liberally while he actually used it in the strict sense of Christian charity or gift motivated 
by true or selfless love which demands sacrifice. When one person gives to another that 
person does so out of love. 
Paul VI advocated that the Church as an institution should defend the poor. She 
has the responsibility to teach and to remind the rich of their obligation to support the 
weak.324 This too is not an optional responsibility for the Church and must necessarily 
constitute part of her responsibilities as later advocated by Evangelii Nuntiandi and 
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Justitia in Mundo. A further implication of this call is that, as a protagonist of the 
principle of option for the poor, the Church must also physically do something to 
alleviate the condition of the weak in society. Paul VI never overlooked the Church’s 
historical involvement in the struggle for the improvement of human conditions. He 
encouraged the Church’s continued involvement to support the weak in society.  
3. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
The term affirmative action was not part of the vocabulary of Paul VI’s teaching, 
neither was it explicitly coined and used that time or earlier, but his teaching in 
Populorum Progressio speaks to that effect because it addressed the need for deliberate 
action to address the helpless condition of the disadvantaged people of society. The term 
is used here to mean assertive government intervention on behalf of the weak and 
disadvantaged people. This is not different from affirmative action which is a “legislated, 
judicial and administrative mechanism” used for addressing problems caused by social 
structures so as to offer hope for minorities to participate, contribute and improve their 
conditions.325 Affirmative action captures the thought of Paul VI about integral human 
development because it is “a program to diminish the present effects of past 
discrimination and to prevent its future occurrence.”326 Similarly, Paul VI was addressing 
the problem and the causes of differences in socio-economic and political status of 
people. 
Paul VI contended that individual initiatives and competitions are not a guarantee 
for successful development because they can exacerbate the problem of the widening gap 
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between the rich and the poor. Instead of improving living situations “the resources and 
power of the rich become even greater and the distress of the needy increased and the 
enslavement of the oppressed aggravated.”327 In case of two conflicting parties, a third 
party is inevitably necessary to resolve the conflicts. Here government intervention 
becomes necessary. 
Paul VI addressed questions of social justice, common good, option for the poor 
and human dignity. These are problems that individuals may not be able to handle on 
their own. It was for this reason that he advocated some sort of world authority and 
approved the organization of the United Nations, as a force to help when smaller 
communities are incapable of handling their development needs. This is why he stated 
that “programs therefore are necessary to encourage, stimulate, coordinate, supplement 
and supply the deficiencies of the activity of individuals and intermediary agencies.”328 
The affirmation here is that a government should rectify situations of disadvantaged 
people.  
An unjustifiable discrimination or arbitrary differentiation on the basis of race, 
sex, tribe or age contradicts integral human development just as it is counter to 
affirmative action because it renders its victims alien, forgotten, dispensable and 
insignificant objects in decision-making as well as the allocation of resources.329 This is a 
problem Paul VI addressed in Populorum Progressio, and why he emphasized the 
importance of related principles such as solidarity, common good, option for the poor and 
subsidiarity and affirmative action. Although Paul VI never used the term ‘affirmative 
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action’ he applied it in his teaching in Populorum Progressio. 
D. Two Significant Social Principles: Common Good and Solidarity  
 
1. COMMON GOOD  
 
Paul VI advocated that the common good is crucial to human development and it 
imposes obligation on all people.330 The common good is a reflection of the social 
character of human persons. The notion of the common good is closely related to 
Aristotlean anthropology and the Thomistic vision of the goal of law. Thomas Massaro 
spells out this assertion in the statement that 
Aristotle’s anthropology begins with the claim that the human person is by nature a social animal, 
a being of the polis. Every person is a part of the polis and the end of the polis is the common 
good. The purpose of law, therefore, is to govern the relation of a person to his or her true good, or 
genuine happiness. Aquinas borrows this notion when in his “Treatise on Law” he asserts that 
“everyone is ordained to the common good.”331 
 
The idea of common good is at once relational, moral and legal. It is relational 
because human persons are naturally social beings, they have the affinity to relate with 
one another and must be protected by the political community. It is also relational 
because the common good is “the end of the social whole.”332 It is moral because it 
provides some norm for ordering people’s life; “it implies and requires recognition of the 
fundamental rights of persons.”333 It is legal because the common good is sometimes 
promoted through enforcement of laws or norms directed to create conditions for people 
to live gratifying or self-fulfilling lives. 
It is because of its social nature that the common good is related to social justice, 
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solidarity, human rights such as the right to private ownership of property, option for the 
poor, affirmative action, peace, participation and other virtues, conditions and principles 
for integral development. In this regard, other than human dignity, the common good is 
the most inclusive of the principles for integral human development. This is suggested by 
Jacque Maritain’s observation which aptly describes it. 
Thus, that which constitutes the common good of the political society is not only: the collection of 
public commodities and services – roads, ports, schools, etc, which the organization of common 
life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the state and its military power; the body of just laws, 
good customs and wise institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its 
great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural 
treasures.The common good includes all of these and something much more besides – something 
more profound, more concrete and more human. For it includes also, above all, the whole sum 
itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units. . . . It 
includes the sum of sociological integration of all civic conscience, political virtues and sense of 
right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously 
operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism 
in the individual lives of its members. For these things all are, in a certain measure, communicable 
and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his life and liberty of person. They all 
constitute the good human life of the multitude.334 
 
Maritain advocates a consolidation and integration of conditions that contribute to 
human growth and perfection. All of these are some of the “values which combine 
overlapping and sometimes competing concerns for both individuals and communities” 
and make the common good “an umbrella term for describing patterns of human agency 
which allow for the protection of such values.”335As a condition for integral growth the 
common good is defined as “the sum total of conditions of social living, whereby persons 
are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection.”336 The common good 
is not just the sum total of individual interests or goods. It is a condition or circumstance 
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that allows total growth of people of the community in question. Jacques Maritain 
succinctly states this: 
The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good 
of a whole which, . . . relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good 
human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in  good living. It is 
therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, 
must benefit from it.337 
 
According to Paul VI, at times for the sake of the common good, ownership of 
property can be interfered with especially when it affects the wider human society 
negatively. He encouraged people’s cooperation for the common good because it 
facilitates people’s lives.338 Paul VI linked private ownership of property to the common 
good and the original divine intention about natural resources. Revenues derived from 
natural resources should not be disposed of at the pleasure of an individual, nor should 
excessive profits be used for one’s benefit only. The resources of nature are for the 
benefit of all people. Through such assertions Paul VI implied that resources of nature 
must be used for creating possibilities for people to realize their self-perfection. They are 
good only for human participation in God’s creative activity through personal industry 
and creativity which are significant contributions to human development. 
Paul VI stated that the common good is related to the right of ownership. The 
explanation for this assertion is that the life and dignity of people, and the common good 
itself are jeopardized if the wealthy and powerful withhold resources meant for the good 
of all.339 This explains why, according to Paul VI, the common good is the public good 
and a necessity for a decent life. His notion of the common good was close to that of John 
XXIII in Mater et Magistra where he says of the common good: “This embraces the sum 
                                                 
337 Maritain, 50-51. 
338 Populorum Progressio, 21, 9-10; 23, 10-11. 
339 Krier, 73. 
  216
total of those conditions of living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily 
to achieve their own perfection.”340 This means the common good is an aggregate of 
requisite conditions for individuals to realize their self-fulfillment to the most perfect 
possible degree. Natural resources constitute part of the conditions necessary for a decent 
human life. According to Paul VI natural resources must be used for the promotion of 
human community, and if they are not the community can claim them.341 For this reason 
Paul VI argued that  
The common good, therefore, at times demands the expropriation of an estate if it happens that 
some estates impede the common prosperity either on account of their vast size, or because their 
small or negligible cultivation, or cause extreme poverty to the population or bring serious harm to 
the country.342  
 
The common good compels an individual to abdicate personal rights of ownership 
for the sake of community. This is especially necessary if what an individual owns 
obstructs development of community or does not contribute to the growth of society. The 
attainment of the common good involves dynamic exchange between an individual and 
community or among members of the community. 
From the foregoing arguments it is right to concur with Jacques Maritain that the 
common good goes beyond the individual and beyond community. He says that “the 
common good of the city implies an intrinsic ordination to something which transcends 
it.”343 The common good is a condition that is not a monopoly of an individual, neither is 
it a monopoly of community but it is promoted by both and it promotes both. The 
common good goes beyond individuals constituting community yet it is achieved in and 
by the individuals constituting community. 
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2. SOLIDARITY 
 
Paul VI emphasized universal human solidarity for integral human development 
as he stressed the necessity of universal charity. It was because of the significance of 
solidarity that his emphasis on “universal human solidarity and fraternity” 344dominated 
Populorum Progressio more than any of the previous encyclicals. However, Paul VI was 
not the first person to raise the significance of solidarity in human life. His advocacy for 
solidarity in Populorum Progressio is in line with Thomas Aquinas, John Chrysostom, 
Pius XI, John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council fathers, especially in Gaudium et 
Spes, that emphasized the necessity of solidarity for human life.345 Paul VI advanced the 
teaching on solidarity by emphasizing its importance for true human development. 
Solidarity is the guiding principle for integral human development, according to 
Paul VI.346 Paul VI also thought that one must first understand the human person to 
understand human solidarity. The human person, according to him, must be defined in 
relation to other humans because the person is a social being and belongs to society, and 
family in particular, which defines a person initially. Paul VI was of the view that people 
should also define themselves independently. Citing the social structure in the developing 
nations he advocated that “ancient social institutions, however characteristic of 
developing regions are still necessary for a time, but their excessive force must gradually 
be diminished.”347 However, he never disregarded the family ties that define initial 
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human identity. Families forge unity and mutual assistance, leading to acquisition of 
wisdom and harmony in personal rights, which “with other social requirements 
constitutes the foundation of society.”348  
The origin of solidarity is in the family because solidarity within the family is 
what is extended beyond it. Solidarity leads to harmony and a better understanding of the 
human person, rights and relationships both within and outside the family. This 
affirmation facilitates the understanding and appreciation of the equality of human 
dignity. Consequently, the universal value of the human person and human rights can be 
recognized. This recognition promotes mutual acceptance, respect, unity and enhanced 
solidarity. Equality of human dignity is the basis for the claim that solidarity should be 
infinite both temporally and spatially.349 
Solidarity is fundamental for Paul VI because without solidarity progress towards 
development is deceptive. There must be a “simultaneous development of all humanity in 
the spirit of solidarity.”350 Solidarity is not only to be exercised among individuals. It 
should also be expressed locally, nationally and internationally. For this reason developed 
nations and peoples have a duty to help less fortunate nations.351 The principle of 
solidarity is a compelling reason for rich countries to help the poor ones. People need one 
another to be and to become better. Consequently, developed nations have the obligation 
to support the less-developed nations.  
More-developed and less-developed nations need to live in solidarity, but this 
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demands a spirit of dialogue. For Paul VI dialogue creates understanding and a smooth 
working relationship among nations. It is a burning necessity because it provides well- 
articulated conditions for functioning, and it encourages and facilitates mutual support. 
Loans can be more properly used, their repayment is less problematic, capital is loaned 
without ulterior motives, and poor nations receiving loans can maintain their 
independence and integrity and avoid interference from the aiding and developed nations. 
This ensures that there is no mutual violation socially, economically or politically. Paul 
VI advocated solidarity with freedom when he stated that 
Since sovereign states are involved, it is their exclusive right to conduct their own affairs, to 
determine their policy, and to choose the form of government they prefer. This, then, is 
indispensable that nations collaborate with each other without constraint and with equal dignity, 
that they at the same time work at creating a civil society truly worthy of man.352  
 
For Paul VI collaborative action is important and should be performed 
ceaselessly. He stated that “this common task without doubt demands constant, prompt, 
concerted action.”353 Action in solidarity ought to keep pace with needs and all efforts to 
meet needs should be pooled together. It is ceaseless in the sense that even when external 
assistance has long stopped, solidarity between the collaborating nations should 
continue.354  
Paul VI thought that solidarity is the fruit of joint national and international 
efforts of government officials and the grassroot-individuals. This demands participation, 
a spirit of understanding, collaboration, love for the common good and an attitude of 
selflessness which are crucial for integral human development.355 Consequently, he 
advocated that “individuals, social groups, and whole nations” should devote all their 
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“wisdom enthusiasm and charity” to help the disadvantaged to progress.356 This suggests 
that the fruit of solidarity animated by charity is the preferential option for the poor, care 
for the common good and affirmative action. It indicates the significance of solidarity for 
integral human development, and evinces that it is related to option for the poor, the 
common good and affirmative action. 
According to Paul VI human solidarity is possible only when “mutual suspicions 
of nations and selfishness” are overcome by “a stronger desire for collaboration and a 
more profound awareness of human solidarity.”357 This demands “common plans of 
action”, coordinated investments, proportionate distribution of means of production, 
organized sale of products, and it requires that “the more needy nations” should be helped 
to liberate themselves from what retards their progress, and “find without detriment to 
their own native character, the means of human and social development.”358  
The vision of solidarity presented by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio was 
expanded and re-emphasized by John Paul II in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. The latter called 
solidarity a virtue with eight requisite conditions. Solidarity demands interdependence, 
trust, collaboration, an enduring commitment to serve common good, a spirit of self-
sacrifice, transformation of interpersonal relationships to a point where the wealthy take 
responsibility for the weak, participation by the weak and mutual respect of interests.359 
According to him, solidarity demands that there be no domination, oppression or 
exploitation of one nation by another; and nations must resist hegemony and 
                                                 
356 Populorum Progressio, 75, 31. 
357Ibid. , 64, 27. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Lamb, 909. 
  221
imperialism.360  
John Paul II asserted that solidarity demands and leads to radical change in 
society because it empowers people “to oppose diametrically the desire for profit and the 
thirst for power, and the sinful structures arising out of choice of profit and power” 361 at 
any cost. It calls people to live responsibly in harmony with their environment. He 
cautioned about ignoring solidarity. Individuals and nations that exploit others instead of 
respecting them may grow rich, but they are not truly developed because they ignore the 
crucial moral dimension of human development in solidarity with others.362  
The principle of solidarity demands collaboration, participation and responsibility 
for others. It fits well in the treatise of integral human development. Paul VI thought that 
solidarity should yield efficacious results, as later re-emphasized by John Paul II. 
Consequently, solidarity dominated the teaching of Populorum Progressio.363 The 
importance of solidarity for integral human development lies in the fact that it facilitates 
selfless joint movement toward growth. 
E. Necessary Conditions: Association and Participation  
 
Association and participation are akin to the principle of solidarity, according to 
Paul VI, although documents issued after Populorum Progressio are more emphatic 
about their positions as prerequisites for integral human development than he suggested 
in the encyclical. Nonetheless, Populorum Progressio never neglected the significance 
of association and participation in integral human development. 
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1. ASSOCIATION  
 
Solidarity is the reason for association and it embraces participation, which 
promotes it. People associate to build organizations because they need to uphold, 
preserve, protect and promote each others’ dignity. Paul VI was clear about this in his 
encouragement of organizations such as UN and FAO. However, he was discriminate in 
his choice and suggestion of associations. Social actions that rest on the philosophy of 
materialism and atheism are detestable from a Christian point of view, especially, if they 
have “no regard either for the religious outlook directing life to its eternal and final goal, 
or for freedom, or for human dignity”364 because social organizations are established to 
serve people and to liberate them from desperate circumstances of life. Any association 
that falls short of this goal does not contribute to true human development. Social 
organizations and associations have as their objective the promotion of the human person 
and human dignity. Integral human development is possible “through dialogue and 
cooperation with others.”365  
Paul VI reiterated his support of associations by recognizing and acknowledging 
charitable organizations such as FAO, Caritas Internationalis and other groups operating 
everywhere to help meet the needs of desperate people.366 These and similar 
organizations are to be emulated because they promote people. 
2. PARTICIPATION/INVOLVEMENT 
 
The emphasis on participation as a principle for integral development was not 
Paul VI’s own idea. He was promoting the doctrine of Quadragesimo Anno of Pius XI 
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who advocated that “humanization of production demands the participation of all 
involved.”367 Paul VI encouraged participation by advocating that every person and all 
peoples are entitled to be shapers of their own destiny.368 He made this appeal in many 
parts of Populorum Progressio. According to a significant number of authors including 
Dorr, participation is one of the document’s most important contributions because 
“development is something people have to do for themselves.”369  
Circumstances demand that individuals change their lives and the society in 
which they live. The significance of participation is in promotion of authenthic 
development is evidenced in self-fulfillment people experience when they do things for 
themselves and their community. They realize their worth, the significance of their 
initiative and creativity. What people realize is an unfolding of their talents, which is 
development.  
For Paul VI, human persons created imago Dei, are called to cooperate with God 
in creation, and to perpetuate the creative activity to perfection. This is possible because 
of the intellectual power and sensitivity with which God has endowed people. Anyone 
who engages in work cooperates with God and participates in God’s work of creation and 
“leaves imprint of himself upon them while at the same time refining his persistency, 
skill and power to think.”370 This suggests that work is also a means to participate and to 
be united. 
Participation in solidarity or unity demands mutual respect for human rights and 
collaboration. In other words, where there is true solidarity and unity there is freedom 
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too. According to Paul VI world unity “must allow all peoples . . . to be the architects of 
their own fortune.”371 Unity and solidarity are significant for complete development but 
they should not diminish personal involvement. Instead they ought to promote 
participation. People need not entrust their future entirely in the hands of other people. 
Paul VI urged that international relations, interpreted broadly, should consider seriously 
that regard and friendship; they should “be expressed in assistance with mutual respect 
and collaboration” with “individual nations accepting with full conviction their obligation 
and duty to promote the improvement of all.”372 This assertion is significant because it 
points out that participation is not only a duty, it is also a right.373  
Participation is also seen in the work of expatriate experts involved in developing 
countries. Their presence in these nations should be one of helping and collaborating with 
the people to bring about development.374 Paul VI advocated the value of participation of 
the people who need to develop. He also suggested that a facilitating leadership is 
necessary for the involvement of the people. This means participation demands which 
stimulates people’s thoughts and activity. 
Participation is important for authentic development because it is the 
responsibility of the entire human race to heal and prevent miseries due to disease, 
poverty, ignorance and other social moral evils. Everyone must be devoted with “firm 
determination to combat underdevelopment to the extent of his strength and 
resources.”375 Such a demand to participate whole-heartedly calls for a selfless attitude 
                                                 
371 Ibid. , 65, 27. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Robert J. Vitillo and Donna Toliver Grimes, 9. 
374 Populorum Progressio, 71, 29. 
375 Ibid. , 75, 31. 
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that goes beyond an individual and extends to the needy. It also demands maximum 
participation according to one’s capacity. 
Participation is demonstrated in joint action to enforce change. According to Paul 
VI immediate participatory action of all people, capable of contributing in solidarity, is 
called for in situations and moments where innocent lives are at stake, the burden of 
poverty amidst inhumane living conditions is great, and world peace and “the very 
survival of civilization”376 are all at stake. In other words, the involvement of all people 
and nations in such moments is an urgent need and of grave significance. All people 
should assume the responsibility to make positive change. Paul VI was also attentive and 
focused on the importance of the value and role of the lowest artisan. True development 
calls for recognition, acknowledgement and involvement of, even, the least as long as 
they have the abilities to perform, and are capable of contributing to the enhancement of 
human life, person, rights and dignity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The treatise in this chapter leads to the following conclusions: First, Paul VI’s 
vision of development in Populorum Progressio is paradigmatic in the sense that he 
provides an archetype notion of development which reduces other notions of 
development to just a portion of what he called integral human development. Though 
Paul VI’s conception of development appears paradoxical because it seems challenging 
and practical, and at the same time idealistic or practically difficult, meaningless, 
contradictory, and sometimes utopian, it has truth and presents an enduring challenge of 
Catholic doctrine on human development. This is evinced in the fact that all Catholic 
                                                 
376 Ibid. , 80,30; 81, 33-34. 
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social doctrine before Populorum Progressio gravitated toward the document and those 
after it emanated from the document or re-echoed it. The theme running through all of 
them is concern for the human person, which constitutes the center of all development 
and development problems. 
Secondly, Populorum Progressio is pragmatic because it treated issues that still 
affect people. Paul VI placed the social issue, particularly, that of human development, in 
a global context, offered an interpretation of the causes of unrest, and presented charity 
and justice as the sources of true peace and development. Paul VI rejected the basic laws 
of capitalism, especially its laissez faire principles for liberal pursuit of ownership of 
property, its profit-oriented tendency, its inclination to absolute reliance on free trade in 
the world economy. However, he was not opposed to the entire practice of capitalism. 
According to him, if profit promotes human dignity it is in accordance with divine 
design. 
 Thirdly, Paul VI emphasized justice, the right of the poor nations to aid from the 
wealthier nations, and argued that in situations of extreme need the poor have the right to 
claim the property of the rich. They may also be justified to use non-violent pressure or 
force to seek solutions to their problems. Precisely, it emphasized social justice and the 
social dimension of property. 
Fourthly, in Populorum Progressio Paul VI offered a vision of development 
which takes place on an individual level as well as communal level, an integral human 
development. This notion of development includes all dimensions of human life, namely 
the economic, cultural, political, social, psychological, educational and spiritual aspects 
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of life. It is based on the recognition of supreme values of human dignity and the destiny 
of the person and the acceptance of faith, which opens individuals to union with God.  
Fifthly, Populorum Progressio underscored the importance of development, 
which Paul VI equated to and called the new name for peace, one of the principal 
prerequisites for development. The document suggests that requisite principles for 
integral human development are of diverse nature but all of them are interrelated. None 
of them is dispensable for authentic human development because each plays a unique role 
and contributes to the support of other principles, and ultimately integral human 
development. Their basic relationship is founded on the principle of human dignity. All 
the principles, virtues and requisite conditions govern and direct human activity to the 
protection and care for the dignity of the human person.  
Finally, human dignity per se is the indisputably contending principle and reason 
for the existence of other principles, conditions and virtues. This point will be 
emphasized in the next chapter which will explain the centrality of the human person, 
human dignity and human rights. The chapter will advocate the significance of a relevant 
anthropology, and explore the relationship between different development principles, 
virtues and requisite conditions 
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CHAPTER THREE 
  
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO AND AN ANTHROPOLOGY FOR INTEGRAL 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
I.INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal concern of this chapter is to show that a relevant anthropology is 
necessary for integral human development, which Paul VI suggested in Populorum 
Progressio, because true development is the enhancement of all people through respect 
for the human person, human dignity, and human rights. Chapter Two treated Paul VI’s 
doctrine in Populorum Progressio, the meaning of integral human development, and the 
problems and causes of lack of integral human development. It revealed Paul VI’s 
concern for both the individual and community, which are significant terms in both 
Chapter Two and this chapter. They are the reasons for Paul VI’s introduction of the term 
integral human development in redefining development. The chapter also outlined Paul 
VI’s suggestions for attaining integral development. He attempted to resolve people-
related or people-centered problems. The problems not only affected people, they were 
also caused by people, and the suggestions to resolve them were virtues, conditions, and 
principles related to people. This suggests that the problems originated from conflicting 
anthropologies.  
Paul VI’s major concern was the human person but his goal was not a treatise of 
theological, philosophical and social anthropology. This chapter focuses on the notion of 
the human person, human rights and human dignity, all of which are necessary for 
authentic human development. It treats an anthropology for Populorum Progressio. 
Critical readers of Paul VI question the adequacy of the application of Christian or 
theological anthropology in Populorum Progressio. Robert Royal, for example, notes that 
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If there was a step backward, it was not his adherence to Catholic principles, but his failure to 
bring the church’s views of the human person fully to bear on the current developmentalist 
orthodoxies. This failure resulted in contradictory messages in his text.1  
 
Royal suggests that Paul VI needed to critically apply Catholic or Christian 
anthropology to facilitate the question of integral human development and the application 
of principles, virtues and conditions necessary for it in the current contexts. It was not 
Paul VI’s intention to do an anthropological treatise as such. However, Royal’s 
observation shows a failure in the application of Christian anthropology in Populorum 
Progressio. This chapter attempts to construct an anthropology relevant for integral 
human development, but Paul VI should be credited for his vision of the human person in 
terms of development, because throughout Populorum Progressio he made references to 
anthropological notions such as person, dignity and rights. This chapter will attempt to 
emphasize these anthropological elements and show their significance in the application 
of the doctrine of Populorum Progressio.  
It is necessary to treat and understand the human person, dignity and rights 
because of the pluralistic nature of human community, both locally and globally. Above 
all it is an imperative to construct a relevant anthropology because “the ultimate 
determining factor” and litmus test or measure of true development “is the human 
person.”2 An anthropology is necessary in the study of Populorum Progressio because 
the document addressed problems affecting human dignity and involved people of 
                                                 
1 Robert Royal, “Populorum Progressio (1967)” A Century of Catholic Social Thought: Essays on Rerum 
Novarum and Nine Other Key Documents, Ed. George Wiegel and Robert Royal, (Washington D.C: Ethics 
and Public Policy Center, 1991), 117. 
2 Matthew Habiger, “Papal Tradition on the Distribution of Ownership” in Curing World Poverty: The New 
Role of Property, Ed. John H. Miller (Social Justice Review: Saint Louis, Missouri, 1994), 3. Here 
Matthew Habinger, verbatim, quotes the Statement of Archbishop Renato R. Martino, Apostolic Nuncio, 
Head of the Holy See delagation to the United Nation Conference on Enviroment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, June 4, 1992. 
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diverse socio-cultural, economic and political backgrounds. There are racial, tribal, ethnic 
and class differences, yet all people have equal dignity. This is the central critique Paul 
VI suggested in Populorum Progressio. In light of this statement it is realistic to concur 
with John Mary K. Kabyanga that  
. . . the problem of the theology of development as a starting point is no longer merely that of the 
split between the body versus the soul, the temporal versus the spiritual and the kingdom versus 
eschatology. The problem is man himself.3  
 
The problem here is anthropological. Kabyanga argues that true development 
starts with a right understanding of the human person. It is from the understanding of the 
human person that the temporal and spiritual, the kingdom and eschatology can be 
integrated well. This is a credible vision because, theologically, ultimate integral human 
development is realized at the end times when all people are united with God and with 
each other. This assertion suggests why Kabyanga advocates people’s individual and 
collective striving. Chapter Three is significant because it attempts to explain the human 
person; it shows whether the concept of the human person is the same for all people, and 
how different visions of the human person can be explained and reconciled.  
The chapter is divided into six main parts. The first part deals with contending 
notions of the human person. It treats the development of the African communitarian 
notion and the Euro-American notion of the human person. The second part deals with 
the notion of human dignity, its meaning and origin, the universality and equality of 
human dignity, and the significance of the universality and equality of human dignity. 
The third section treats human rights from the liberal and communitarian points of view, 
and attempts to establish the universality of human rights. The fourth part is an 
                                                 
3 John Mary K. Kabyanga, Towards Integral Human Development: To Be More Rather Than to Have 
More, The Contributions of Fr. Louis Joseph Lebret, O.P. (Wisconsin, Sparata: Prell Books, 2004), 30. 
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anthropology for Populorum Progressio. It attempts to demonstrate how Paul VI viewed 
the human person, human dignity and human rights. The fifth section is an attempt to 
reconcile liberal and communitarian notions. It shows difficulties in reconciliation of 
these notions and how the difficulties can be overcome. The last part attempts to establish 
an ultimate principle for integral human development and how it is a link between other 
principles for integral human development. 
II. CONTENDING NOTIONS OF THE HUMAN PERSON 
 
 The two contending notions of the human person are the individualist or liberal 
notion and the communitarian notion. David Bohr states that people’s search for self-
understanding is “the basic quest for life, and the question Who am I?, has been 
intensified due to “cultural pluralism.”4 This question suggests why it is necessary to 
understand the human person from different perspectives, and to attempt to judge 
whether it is right to prefer only one vision of the human person.  
Cultures affect people’s thought patterns and their vision of reality. Consequently, 
cultural differences explain differences in the vision of the human person. From a 
Catholic, and generally a Christian believers’ point of view, “the human person is central, 
the clearest reflection of God among us.”5 The Scriptures ground an understanding of the 
human person. Catholic social doctrine suggests that “the book of Genesis provides us 
with certain foundations for Christian anthropology” such as the “inalienable dignity of 
                                                 
4 David Bohr, A Catholic Moral Tradition: In Christ, A New Creation, (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday 
Visitor Publishing Division, 1990), 66. 
5 Robert J. Vitillo and Donna Toliver Grimes, (Ed.) Principles, Prophecy, and a Pastoral Response: An 
Overview of Modern Catholic Social Teaching, Catholic Campaign for Human Development, Revised 
Edition (Washington D C: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2001), 5. 
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the human person” 6, the principle of imago Dei, human freedom and the social nature of 
human person and the meaning of human activity in the world.  
A. Development of the Notion of the Human Person 
 
The notion of the human person developed over time. Classically, Boethius (ca 
480 - ca 524) defined the human person as rationalis naturae individua substantia, 
meaning that the human person is “an individual substance of rational nature.”7 The 
principal elements of this definition of the human person are rationality and individuality. 
The human person is an individual with the ability to think or reason. This defines the 
human person inadequately because the human person is defined independently of other 
people and the prevalent environment. It denies the notion that the human person is a 
social being. However, rationality distinguishes the human person from other creatures 
but identifies one person with other people and “only humans are honored with the term 
person.”8 No other individual being is called person, except what has naturally been 
endowed with rationality. 
Later, the human person was defined on the basis of “relationship, 
incommunicability, self-consciousness, freedom, duties, inalienable rights, and dignity.”9 
The notion of human person is so lofty that it cannot be easily captured but there are 
certain traits specific to a human being. The human person is an individual but also a 
social being, aware of his/her existence and activities as an individual. A human person is 
endowed with the ability to choose, to make inevitably obliging claims on other human 
                                                 
6 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church (Washington D C: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2005), 17. 
7 Gerald O’Collins and Edward G. Farugia, A Concise Dictionary of Theology, Revised and Expanded 
Edition (New York: Paulist Press, 2000), 199. 
8 James B. Reichmann, Philosophy of the Human Person (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), 208. 
9 O'Collins and Farugia, 199. 
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persons, to act responsibly and to be accountable for his/her actions. The human person 
has worth which other human individuals have, but which other creatures do not have. 
This notion of the human person is more balanced than the preceding one because it 
includes individuality and communality.  
Like Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure considered a person as “a distinct substance 
possessing dignity.”10 This notion of person emphasizes individuality and dignity. This 
dignity of a person provides gravity for the claim that the human person, human dignity 
and human rights are at the center of integral human development. Later, Immanuel Kant 
(1724 -1804) viewed the human person as “an absolute that may never be used as a 
means but must always be respected as a moral end-in-itself.”11 The Kantian vision of the 
human person, like the biblical notion, places the human person at the peak of creation. It 
reflects the singular identity of the human person. The human person is never a ‘thing’. 
After God, in rank, the human person is the master of creatures other than human beings, 
can make responsible use of them for his/her own good, but cannot be equated to the 
things (s)he uses to meet his/her needs. The rest of creation is a means to help the human 
person realize fulfillment. The Kantian notion of the human person suggests a vision of 
the human person who is more an absolute individual than a social being. Jacques 
Maritain developed Kant's vision of the human person in relation to or based on the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic visions. Maritain stressed the idea of the individuality of 
human person in relation to personality but distinguished the two. According to him 
                                                 
10 Thomas D. Williams, Who is My Neighbor?: Personalism and the Foundations of Human Rights 
(Washington D C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 155. Williams is quoting St. 
Bonaventure In I sent., dist.23, art.I. q.I, Resp. 
11 O'Collins and Farugia, 199. 
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Outside of the mind, only individual realities exist. Only they are capable of exercising the act of 
existing. Individuality is opposed to the state of universality which things have in mind. It 
designates the concrete state of unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which 
every actually existing or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from 
other beings.12  
 
Maritain emphasizes that the human person is a distinct individual. Individuality 
is the principle which explains the identity or distinction of a person from the rest of the 
community. However, this is not a sufficient definition of the human person according to 
Maritain. He thinks that “personality is the subsistence of the spiritual soul 
communicated to the human composite” and it “signifies interiority to self” and yet “of 
its essence requires a dialogue in which souls really communicate, especially to God, “the 
absolute source of sufficiency.” 13 In defining individuality and personality Maritain 
asserts that individuality is a reality of the human person to be asserted and respected as 
such, but human affinity to relate or communicate, especially as an expression of his/her 
spiritual and personal nature may not be ignored without denying the human person a 
truly human characteristic of being communal or social. He affirms that individuality and 
personality are distinct from each other but inseparable when predicated of the human 
person: “our whole being is an individual by reason of what is in us which derives from 
matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from Spirit.”14 Personality 
pertains to the spiritual reality and the concrete individual pertains to material reality. 
The contemporary definition of the human person has relational overtones, even if 
it takes the individuality of a person seriously. This is probably because at one moment 
there was an overemphasis on the individuality of persons and liberal expression of 
                                                 
12 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, Trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 34 . 
13 Ibid., 41-42. 
14 Ibid., 43. 
  235
freedom and claims for personal rights. The contemporary theological notion of the 
human person resonates with the philosophical assertion that “every human person is 
distinct from every other, yet at the same time all are truly human.”15 In both Theology 
and Philosophy the individual and social dimensions of the person are significant for 
understanding the human person. They provide an integrated and balanced vision of the 
human person. Gerald O'Collins and Edward G. Farrugia note that 
Today, to overcome the notion of persons as autonomous selves, some stress the way persons are 
always persons-in-relationship, constituted through relations with other persons and the 
environment.16  
 
The contemporary notion of the human person is a summation of notions of the 
human person developed over time. It is relational, not only to fellow human beings but 
also to the rest of creation. It tends to combine the individualist or liberal and the social or 
communitarian visions of the human person in order to give a better notion of the human 
person. Paul VI's vision of the human person in Populorum Progressio is suggestively in 
the category of the contemporary notion. This is, at least, implicit in his advocacy for 
integral human development. The contemporary notion of the human person is preferable 
because it takes seriously the individuality and the social nature of the human person.  
The human person may be defined from different points of view by different 
people, depending on what emphasis they prefer or think is fundamental for the definition 
of the human person. Louise Marcil-Lacoste is aware of this and observes five 
perspectives from which a person could be defined. First, logically, “a person is an entity 
                                                 
15 Reichmann, 252. Also cfr. Karol Wojtyla, Cardinal (John Paul II). The Acting Person. Trans. Andrezej 
Potocki. (Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 293. 
16 O'Collins and Farugia, 199. 
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distinct from a mere thing.”17 The dignity of a person is what makes distinction between a 
person and other creatures. Theologically, this claim is explained in terms of the principle 
of imago Dei. The dignity of the human person is directly endowed by God in whose 
image and likeness the human person is created. Since the human person is created in the 
image and likeness of God the human person has an “inherent dignity that must not be 
violated.”18 
Secondly, from a moral point of view people are entitled to special treatment on 
account of their inherent and inviolable dignity as beings created in the image of God. 
This means, in Kant’s famous phrase, that persons are “ends-in-themselves and sources 
of value in their own right.”19 The dignity of the human person is again the ground for 
such claims. The unique treatment of a person differentiates the person from things and 
limits the relationship between the person and God who is an end, the absolute being. The 
relationship of the human person to God is one of creature to creator.  
As God’s image the human person lives constitutively in relation to God. This means every 
dimension of his existence and finitude, his creaturely needs and his mortality.20  
 
The relationship between the human person and God is one of dependence where 
the human person owes existence and functionality to God. Human activity is due to God, 
the ultimate principle of activity. 
Thirdly, from a legal point of view, “a person is a being who has legal rights and 
duties. In this context, one would insist that persons alone are responsible and that 
                                                 
17 Louise Marcil-Lacoste, “Women as Persons” in The Human Person, Vol. LIII, Ed. George F. McLean, 
(Washington D C: The American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1979), 78.  
18 Russel W. Davenport, The Dignity of Man, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), 231. 
19 Marcil-Lacoste, 78. 
20 Eberhard Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World, 
Trans. Brian McNeil (Washington, D C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 229. 
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rationality is a precondition for responsible action.”21 Here the qualifications of a person 
are stated. A person is one who can make claims on other people and is at the same time 
responsible in relating to others because of the endowment with reason. A person has 
duties or obligations toward other people because of this endowment with reason.  
Fourthly, from a metaphysical point of view “persons ought to be defined 
primarily by reference to self- consciousness.”22 Persons are aware of themselves as 
existing individual entities. This does not suffice to define a person because relationship 
with others and environment is also crucial. Metaphysically, there is relationship to 
oneself and this constitutes the individuality and the totality of the human individual in a 
social relationship. The individuality of a person is a significant element of the definition 
of a human person. It is also important to note that “the relationship of a human person to 
his own self” is not “a conscious relationship of the intellect to itself, but is a total unity 
of human life embracing body and soul.”23 This means the human person exists as an 
individual entity, a totality, distinct from other things but there is a relational dimension 
of the individual because of the spiritual dimension of the human person. The identity 
and distinction of an individual from others involves the totality of a person as a 
conscious individual agent who is aware of this consciousness. Here there is also an 
emphasis on the rational aspect of the human person. 
Finally, since the human person has a unique role in relation to the rest of 
creation, the “definition of the concept of person is based on the concept of role.”24 The 
                                                 
21 Marcil-Lacoste, 78. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Schockenhoff, 232-233.  
24 Marcil-Lacoste, 78. 
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human person has “a God-given mission to preside (Gen. 1:26) over all created things.”25 
The human person is also related to these creatures in terms of responsibility. The human 
person is the crown of God’s creation, commissioned and entrusted with a task “to serve 
his Creator in the representative function of establishing God’s peaceful sovereignty over 
Creation.”26 This alone does not suffice to define the human person adequately. The 
dominion of the human person over creation must be a responsible one. This means the 
human person is a steward and a co-operator27 with God in the enhancement of creation.  
Since a human person is viewed differently, depending on the point of view from 
which the human person is defined, the claim that “such variations in meaning are 
important sources of ambiguities when talking of persons” 28 is compelling and 
intriguing. Therefore, if the concept of the human person varies, integral human 
development is problematic because human dignity and human rights are not conceived 
in a uniform way. 
Attributes often associated with the human person are spirit, soul, image of God, 
human dignity, body, intelligence, ability to love, and moral responsibility.29 Here, it is 
significant to note that human dignity is founded on these attributes of the human person, 
and for the same reason the human person has inherent and inviolable dignity. Paul VI’s 
Populorum Progressio advocates that a totality of these attributes should be protected and 
                                                 
25 International Theological Commission, Proposition on the Dignity and Rights of the Human Person 
(Washington D C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1986), 6. Also see Pontifical Council for Justice and 
Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 52. 
26 Schockenhoff, 234.  
27 I prefer the term co-operator with God in creation to the term co-creator, which John Paul II has often 
used. It is a term many secular sciences would prefer to use today. I am of the opinion that creation is ex-
nihilo, it is from nothing, except for the creative power of word which is God’s prerogative. 
28 Marcil-Lacoste, 78. 
29 O’Connell, Timothy E. Principles for Catholic Morality (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978), 58-59. 
Also see Michael Novak, “Human Dignity, Human Rights” in First Things, No.97 (New York: Institute on 
Religion and Public Life, November 1999), 41. 
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enhanced. Consequently, a right vision of these attributes is necessary for integral human 
development. 
The human person, as the image of God, is a relational being in four ways: human 
relation to God, other human beings, self and creation. As Thomas D. Williams suggests, 
according to his reading of Augustine, “the human person is, therefore, an intermediate 
end in himself and also a being for God, his ultimate end,” meaning that the human 
person is  
. . . a true and inviolable end in himself and must be treated as an end; on the other hand; one 
person cannot constitute the final end for another, or for himself, since man is made to find his 
total fulfillment in union with God.30  
 
This assertion suggests that the human person is ultimately subject only to God. 
Other human beings may not, therefore, do as they please with fellow human beings 
because they are all (intermediate, not ultimate) ends in themselves. God is the ultimate 
reference for defining the human person, even when the human person is defined in 
relation to other human beings. Consequently, the Catholic Church has consistently and 
emphatically stated that 
The human person may never be thought of only as an absolute individual being built up by 
himself, as if his characteristic traits depended on no one else but himself. Nor can the person be 
thought of as a mere cell of an organism that is inclined at most to grant it recognition in its 
functional role within the overall system. Reductionist conceptions of the full truth of men and 
women have already been the object of the Church’s social concern many times . . . .31  
 
The unity and totality of the individual person are significant. That “man was 
created by God in unity of body and soul” 32 is the consistent teaching in the Catholic 
Church. The notion of the unity of the human person is significant for Paul VI’s advocacy 
                                                 
30 Williams, 163. 
31 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 56. 
32 Ibid. The consistent series of quotations the Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice made in this regard 
suggests emphasis on integral character of a human person, expressed in the unity of the physical and 
spiritual dimensions of the human person. 
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for integral human development which is not only the development of all people but also 
the development of the whole individual. Here the anthropology implicit in Paul VI’s 
teaching in Populorum Progressio is affirmed to be relevant for integral human 
development. According to “Aristotelian - Thomistic ontology, the human person, unlike 
non-personal existents, is a totality in which the fullness of creaturely reality is present in 
a unique manner.”33 The human person is a climax and summary of divine creation. In a 
way, the contention is that creation subsists in the human person. However, the 
superiority and distinctiveness of the human person over the rest of creatures is what is 
stated in this claim. It is also important to note that while the human person is not like 
other creatures - not a thing - persons are still both objects and subjects because they can 
initiate action directed to other beings and actions can also be directed to them. Thomas 
D. Williams has clarified this by asserting that persons are “rational subjects of action” 
but also “rational objects of action.”34 The assertion is plausible because human beings 
can rationally initiate activity and also rationally direct activity towards other human 
persons or receive rationally initiated activity from other human beings. I think this is 
partially why human persons are responsible for what they do and how moral culpability 
may be judged. 
The human person is social and this fulfills God’s plan of love, which is 
theologically, based on “the mystery of God as a Trinitarian love.”35 The relationship 
between the three persons, a relation of love, is the ultimate fulfillment and reflection of 
the social nature of the human person. No relationship goes beyond this in perfection. 
                                                 
33 Schockenhoff, 230.  
34 Williams, 125. Also see O'Connell, 60. 
35 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 16. 
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Every loving human relation is a reflection of the Trinitarian love to some degree. This 
element of interpersonal relationship is a significant aspect of the definition of human 
person because it grounds human rights, which are mutual claims.  
Relationship to other human beings, namely shared humanity and the fact of two 
genders, suggests the universality of human personhood, human dignity and human 
rights. The vertical relationality of human existence with God is extended in the 
horizontal relation with other human beings. Here there is a relationship of “the 
dependence of the human person on a human ‘thou.’ ”36  According to Eberhard 
Schockenhoff this horizontal relationship of dependence is captured by Gen. 1:27 where 
both male and female are created in God’s image. This is where the equality of 
personhood must be sought. This is further affirmed in Gen. 2:8-14 which shows only 
humans are equal and other animals do not meet the standard of personhood and both 
genders are complimentary though different. That “they complement each other’s shared 
humanity in a comprehensive manner which includes mutual understanding and 
dialogue”37 is, according to Eberhard, a significant and realistic statement. It spells out 
that man and woman are distinct only in gender but not in human personhood. This 
distinction or differentiation of gender does not affect equality of human personhood. 
This assertion facilitates the understanding of the equality of the dignity of the human 
person.  
 The vision of the human person has varied over time, and from one person to 
another. Noticeable in historical development of the notion of the human person are two 
outstanding positions. First, the human person is defined as an individual entity distinct 
                                                 
36 Schockenhoff, 230. 
37 Ibid. , 231. 
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from and independent of other human persons or an individual in relation to other people. 
The definitions emphasized the individual dimension of the human person or the social 
dimension of the human person. Secondly, the human person is defined in terms of 
rationality as opposed to the rest of creation. It is in the light of such visions that the 
distinction between the communitarian notion of the human person and the individualist 
notion should be viewed. 
B. The Communitarian View of Person 
 
 The communitarian defines a human person in a social context, not in isolation 
from other persons and the rest of creation. A typical communitarian vision of the human 
person is what Placide Tempels offers in his study of the Bantu of the present Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which Bujo correctly suggests is applicable even to “modern Black 
Africa.”38 Tempels describes the human person as a personal living force who 
participates in the force and being of God, the supreme, complete and perfect force; and 
the human person is “the dominant force among all created visible forces.”39 However, 
the emphasis in the communitarian vision of the human person is on community rather 
than the individual, although this does not mean that the individual is negligible. The 
individual has a personal conscience and is responsible or accountable for his/her actions 
which is primarily based in the heart according to most African societies and ethical 
thought.40 Much of the communitarian vision of the human person is summarized in what  
David Fergusson states: 
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Trans. Brian McNiel, (NewYork: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001), 113. 
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The communitarian . . . is more impressed by the essentially social nature of the human being. 
Then self is formed by its roles, attachments, and relationships with other people, institutions, 
communities, and traditions. Concepts of what is right and how society should be organized 
always presuppose some vision of the common good.41 
 
The human person is an individual affected by the actual context of life. The 
individual lives in and interacts with the environment. The individual is partly externally 
determined, not absolutely self-determined. As Stanley M. Harrison states, “persons are 
irreducibly social beings, where this is taken to mean that being-with others is necessary 
in order to be a person.”42 Harrison’s assertion is correct because people’s personalities or 
characters are molded by and in the community in which they live and with which they 
interact. This explains why a right vision of the human person is that the human person is 
social, has an individual identity, and yet is in a growth process which is a consequence 
of interaction with other people and the environment in which the person lives. This idea 
is also expressed by the African scholar, John S. Mbiti, whose view is consonant with 
that of Harrison. He states that according to an African “the individual can only say: ‘I 
am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’.”43 The significance of the 
community for an individual and the individual for the community is also underscored in 
this statement. This is appropriately equated by Uzukwu to Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
statement in one of his speeches for advocacy for equality of people and human rights. 
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According to Uzukwu, the idea of relatedness underlies or is consonant with with Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s dream speech for a free non-racial America in 1961 when the latter 
stated: “Strangely, enough, I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you 
ought to be. You can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be.”44 
A person is a creature made in the image and likeness of God, and endowed with 
freedom of thought and action, responsibility to respond and enter into dialogic 
relationship with God, the absolute "I".45 The human person has the ability to think freely 
and responsibly, take initiative to communicate and relate with others. The climax of this 
communication and relationship is the one with God. This thrusts into the communitarian 
vision of the human person that the human person, whether extravert or introvert, is 
actually relational. Joseph Fichtner agrees with this vision. According to him it is only 
when a person transcends whatever is selfish and enters into fellowship with God that the 
person is complete and fulfilled. The climax of the communitarian element of the human 
person is expressed in the communion with the divine community. In fact the human 
person is considered the image of God because (s)he becomes person through  
. . . relationship to the whole of the world, through openness and accountability to the world, to its 
end, and to the Thou in community. This is in fact a relationship with God and this proposal stands 
in contrast to definitions of person that focus primarily on conscious spiritual individuality.46  
 
 The emphasis in the quotation again is on the social nature of the human person. 
Human personality develops and is shaped by the environment through the interaction of 
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the person with others or the environment and the interaction with the Creator. This 
vision of the human person is opposed to the individualist vision, which emphasizes the 
individuality, freedom and autonomy of the human person. The communitarian theology 
of the human person, therefore, consistently views a person as  
. . . a being in solidarity with the cosmos and with God. Corporeally he gathers up the world 
within himself but spiritually he transcends it, raises it to the level of his own existence, and in 
turn is open and accessible to his creator.47  
 
The human person is viewed here as a being shaped in and by society but (s)he is 
an individual who exists as a distinct entity and even transcends society in as far as (s)he 
relates to God. Therefore, the human person is not only social by nature, but also a sacred 
being because of the relationship with God. This communitarian view of the human 
person is reaffirmed by Philip Hefner whose understanding of Tillich suggests that 
. . . being a person is constituted both by a cognitive process of perceiving and understanding 
oneself in one's world, and also by a moral process of responding in relationship to the world. 
Formally, then, the person is defined in relationship.48  
 
Communitarians define the human person relationally, not independently or as an 
isolated individual. Even in the contemporary African context a person is defined in 
terms of clan or blood relationship as well as relationship beyond blood or clan because, 
as Alexis Kagame suggests, according to Bujo, “fellowship based on blood extends to 
include non-blood relationship.”49 This means relationship is also just based on the fact of 
being human. The life of an individual is affected by others, and (s)he affects the lives of 
others too. This assertion supports the commonly accepted Aristotelian view that the 
human person is a political animal and social being. It suggests why communitarians 
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think that “we realize our dignity and rights in relations with others in community.”50 The 
human person ought always to be defined relationally. This is a valid foundation for 
mutual respect for human rights and human dignity. The communitarian vision of the 
human person is fundamentally based on the idea that “individuals actualize their full 
potential through the virtually unlimited enhancements that community life offers . . . 
persons can develop most successfully by drawing on the talents and accomplishments of 
others.”51 According to Andrew N. Woznicki the  
. . . feeling of deep esteem for each and every human person is the corner stone of building any 
community life of all men, which Cardinal Wojtyla described as participation in terms of a relation 
of man to man.52  
 
Human community is founded on every human being. The respect for the dignity 
of every person is the foundation for a social or community life, and acknowledgment of 
a participatory or shared dignity. Unless universality of human dignity is acknowledged 
community life is not possible or authentic. 
C. The Individualist/Liberal View of the Human Person 
 
 The liberal notion of the human person seems diametrically opposed to the 
communitarian notion. It begins with the idea of self-consciousness or subjectivity as a 
fundamental basis of humanity. The human person is depicted as being aware of his/her 
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existence as a person. Ray S. Anderson expresses the foundation of the liberal notion of 
the human person in the following words: 
I experience my own humanity as a subjective reality. I am a center of feelings, reactions, hopes, 
fears, opinions, motivations, and desires. Other persons exist for me. That is, they are within range 
of my own perception of reality, either as other subjects whose feelings, motivations and desires 
interest or threaten me, or as objects along with other phenomena in the objective world.53  
 
 This vision of the human person is centered on the individual and defies 
relationship with other individuals. At its social best other human persons affect one’s life 
positively to a minimum possible degree. Otherwise, they affect the individual 
negatively. This, however still suggests that other people are not absolutely excluded 
from an individual’s life although the vision does not seem to acknowledge the basic 
relationship between persons. It shows an individual as an absolutely independent and 
distinct entity from other people. The underlying principle emphasized in this notion of 
the human person is the principle of individuation and unrestrained freedom and use of 
reason. 
However, some scholars think that the liberal notion of the human person does not 
necessarily neglect the communal elements in the human person though its emphasis is 
on the individual. This raises the question whether it is necessary to categorize the vision 
of the human person into the communitarian vision and the individualist vision. In 
response to such a question Andrew N. Woznicki argues that 
In view of the mutual relation between men, participation in humanity is based on mutual primacy 
of “I” in regard to each other, as being regarded as person, constituting ties which are always 
secondary to the personal one. In other words, the mutual participation of “I” in the other person is 
by the same token indicative of the primacy of personal subjects over the community.54  
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While it is right to acknowledge that the difference in the understanding of the 
human person by both communitarians and individualists is a question of the emphasis on 
one dimension of human person to the neglect of the other, it should also be 
acknowledged that the individual always comes before community. This is the argument 
Woznicki attempts to raise when he refers to the “I” as the primary element of 
relationship between people. The mutual relation of people is the interaction of the 
various “I”s and these various “I”s are constituents of the community. The individual 
should not get lost in the community; instead the individual should be emphasized so that 
a community makes sense and the human person can be called a social being. 
In terms of human rights the inevitable tendency is to view the human person as a 
liberal bearer of rights. As Fergusson states, “liberalism asserts the right of each person to 
free and equal treatment” 55 and views human rights as entitlements of individuals. This is 
a Kantian vision of the human person supported by scholars like Karol Wojtyla (John 
Paul II), who was strongly of the view that the human person is a being endowed with 
dignity which is “an excellence that calls for special regard” ; a person is “a thinking and 
willing subject, capable of making decisions,” a subject not to be subordinated by other 
subjects, “never to be used merely as a means to an end for another person” and by 
natural right a person “deserves to be treated as an end-in-himself”56 According to 
Thomas D. Williams, Wojtyla thinks that the person must remain inviolate by fellow 
human beings and even God the Creator.57 
Though credible from a practical point of view, this idea is subject to challenge 
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because of the social nature of the human person and the significance of interdependence 
in human life. Even from the very fact of differences in people’s talents and abilities such 
an argument falls short of practical needs. The principles of participation, solidarity, 
association or involvement, common good and subsidiarity would be rendered useless if 
the social aspect of the human person was ignored because these principles recognize and 
affirm the significance of using one’s talents for the good of others. From this point of 
view the human person can still be considered also a means for other people to thrive. 
However, what is clarified and ought to be noted here is that human dignity may not be 
tampered with in such a process, an assertion Kant affirmed by stating that “we should 
not only ever use each other partially as means.”58 Human dignity is an-end-in-itself and 
so the human person may not be treated merely and only as a means. This is the 
categorical imperative of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals that suggestively offers a 
significant argument for the respect of the individual, human rights and human dignity. 
The foregoing study shows two contending notions of the human person and two 
extreme emphases in the notion of the human person. The first emphasis is on the social 
dimension of the human person, which represents the communitarian vision of person. 
The second emphasis is on the individual dimension of the human person, which depicts 
the vision of the liberals or individualists. In both cases the opposite dimension is not 
excluded absolutely. Consequently, the following conclusions are in order: First, the 
social and individual dimensions of the human person are both significant in a total 
definition of a human person. Secondly, each of the notions of the human person suggests 
the possibility or potential for reconciling the communitarian and liberal visions of the 
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human person and human rights. Thirdly, there is also a paradoxical dimension of the 
definition of the human person as Thomas Massaro says: 
Maritain holds out a paradox for investigation: humans are beings of inestimable and inviolable 
value, transcending any temporal or political order, yet they find themselves and realize their 
dignity only by participating in (and in so doing, subordinating themselves to) the community. The 
human person simultaneously transcends and is subordinate to the common good.59  
 
Here the paradox is that the human person is both a social being and an 
autonomous individual who acts freely, a person is communal and individual. One is an 
individual by reserving sovereignty to self, and social because the human person remains 
open to other people and open to God, interacts with God and “reserves ultimate 
sovereignty to God alone.”60 Maritain views the human person as having both immanent 
and transcendent dimensions but the aspirations for transcendence are immanent. These 
two opposite traits inhere in the same person. This suggests some uniting element in the 
human person in the vision of the communitarian and the liberal. This connecting element 
also explains why some liberals have rightly conceded that “the self cannot be understood 
apart from the social roles and attachments. Any fulfilled life is one in which the self is 
committed to goods that are essentially social.”61 The ultimate suggestion of the 
preceding arguments is that radical separation of the communitarian and individualist 
notions of the human person is unnecessary. As Linda Zagrzebski suggests, it suffices to 
view a person as a rational individual substance, self-conscious or aware of his/her 
existence as an entity with a capacity to act deliberately and responsibly to attain an end, 
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and may do so not only for his/her own sake but also for the sake of others.62 
III. HUMAN DIGNITY           
 
A. Meaning and Origin 
 
 The meaning and origin of human dignity can be viewed both philosophically and 
theologically. The operative notion of human dignity depends on who defines it. The 
notion of human dignity articulated here rejects an understanding of dignity that 
disregards the qualities of universality, durability and invariability. This means human 
dignity is lasting and does not change according to circumstances. A notion of human 
dignity which excludes the idea of associating human dignity with only certain capacities 
and conditions of life is more preferable than its opposite because human dignity never 
depends on the individual person’s characteristics and circumstances of living. Patrick 
Verspieren observes that a concept of dignity defined in terms of capacities and 
conditions of life denotes that human dignity is “the capacity to decide and act for 
oneself, what may be called autonomy and independence, and the quality of the image of 
oneself that one offers to others.” 63 A definition of human dignity that considers dignity 
as autonomy and a liberal expression of personal freedom as opposed to the classical 
vision of freedom as “the inalienable value of the person” 64 demanding respect because 
of the enduring character of human dignity regardless of prevailing temporal or social 
circumstances, is out of question. 
 According to Williams, Aquinas considered the origin of human dignity to be 
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“personhood” defined in terms of the rational character of the human person, and he 
defined human dignity as “the distinguishing characteristic of personhood.”65 
Bonaventure concurred with Aquinas in his definition of human dignity. In the definition 
of both Aquinas and Bonaventure human dignity marks the difference between a human 
person and other creatures. This definition of human dignity also establishes the intimate 
link between human personhood, human dignity and human rights. The trio are 
inseparable and necessary for defining each other. The human person comes first but 
there is concurrence or simultaneity in their occurrence. 
“One classic definition of the enlightenment philosophy is that dignity is that 
which has no price, which cannot be bought or sold,” a definition derived from Kant’s 
vision of “the human being as an end in itself and a prohibition against total 
instrumentalization which follows from that.”66 Kant clarified the definition of dignity by 
distinguishing between price and dignity which he called “innern werth, an intrinsic 
value.”67 Kant affirmed that dignity was different from price because price measures the 
value of a thing and equates it to another thing of the same value but human dignity 
cannot be equated to the value of any other thing. This invaluable worth inheres in all 
people. The notion suggests the singular and invaluable character of human dignity as a 
necessary principle for real development because it does not exclude anybody from 
possession of dignity. Human dignity is a transcendental human quality. Kant attributed 
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the foundation of the dignity of human nature to “autonomy”, a view which is disputed 
because autonomy, value and moral norms are founded in God, not just human nature, 
even if it participates in divine nature.68 It seems right to concur with those who dispute 
Kant’s view that the origin of the dignity of the human person is merely autonomy 
because freedom or autonomy does not ultimately originate from an individual. 
Individual freedom or autonomy is a participation in divine nature and confined within 
divine freedom which is ultimate. 
 While Philosophy does not state that human dignity originates from a definite 
being other than human person and nature, Theology explicitly affirms that human 
dignity has its foundation in God. Human dignity originates from without the human 
person. It is a gift and a participation in the nature of a greater being than the human 
person. 
Theological foundations of human dignity and rights include creation in the image of God (Gen.1: 
26-27), the Trinitarian concept of God, redemption by Jesus Christ, and the call to a transcendent 
destiny.69  
 
This idea is succinctly stated by Gaudium et Spes which affirms that “an 
outstanding cause of human dignity lies in man’s call to communion with God. From the 
very circumstance of his origin, man is already invited to converse with God.”70 This 
conversation leads a person into a communion with God. This is an essential statement 
about human dignity and human rights. All other explanations of human dignity and 
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human rights revolve around this idea. The grounding of the notion of human dignity on 
the idea of creation in the image of God is, however, often questioned from a secular 
point of view. It is considered a religious view of human dignity in the same way human 
rights are some times branded. According to Michael J. Perry, people argue that the 
notion of human dignity and human rights are religious because “there is . . . no 
intelligible . . . secular version of the conviction that every human being is sacred. The 
only intelligible versions are religious.”71 Such objections are refutable, according to 
Regina Ammicht-Quinn, on the basis of the assertion that  
On the human level the dictum about human beings as the image of God has two shades: 
representation and affinity. . . . representation means that human beings are not alone. They are 
wholly themselves, but not just themselves. If one looks at them they are transparent to another 
reality. Affinity means that human beings are not alone. They are wholly themselves, but not just 
themselves. If they look at themselves, at the same time they see the other.72 
 
As individual entities, human beings are representations of God. As complete 
individuals they tend towards union with God, and reflect God and fellow human beings. 
This observation seems to concur with Perry’s view that the concept of human rights, 
based on human dignity which is an attribute of human personality or human beings, is 
“inescapably religious”73 because it is an idea that reconciles beliefs about interpersonal 
relationships and how people are bound to each other and to the Ultimate Reality or God. 
This is theologically correct. The question here is who defines or interprets human rights 
and human dignity, and from what perspective the person is doing this – a believer or a 
non believer. There is, therefore, a religious notion of human dignity and there is also a 
secular notion. The notion is not necessarily religious but the notion is just better 
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articulated in religious or theological terms. Nonetheless, this does not make a difference 
in human dignity as such because it does not depend on religion or any other 
circumstances and status. To claim it makes a difference in itself is to deny the 
universality of human dignity. It would seem that Perry has stated that the notion is 
inescapably religious because any notion of human dignity other than the religious notion 
is already contained in the religious notion. 
Human dignity is worthiness, not value, but it is the basis of value and what 
makes human beings different from things and animals, although human dignity and 
human worth are rather recent vocabulary of the 20th century.74 Human persons have 
something that resembles God. It is for this reason that the idea that “God created us in 
His image . . . is the basis of human dignity.”75 Theological anthropology often advances 
three basic reasons for the claim that human persons are created in God’s image. First, 
they are rational. Secondly, they are created free and have ability to make choices. 
Thirdly, they are capable of interpersonal relationships. This last characteristic captures 
the idea of human persons created in the image of God because God is a community of 
relationships between Father, Son and the Holy Spirit which David Bohr calls “a Trinity 
of personal relationships or Tri-Unity.”76 This Trinitarian element of the definition and 
origin of human dignity is also significant for understanding the human person and 
human rights as being relational too. It ought to be reflected in the treatise of the human 
person, human dignity and human rights. 
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Machan Tibor defines human dignity in terms of the capacity for moral 
responsibility for actions rationally evaluated, and consciously and freely chosen. 
Human dignity is the capacity of individuals to be morally responsible. Moral responsibility, in 
turn arises because human beings are capable of free choice and rational thought, rational 
consciousness and the ability to make choices make an individual a moral agent since his 
decisions can be made in accordance with a rational standard in which some actions are right 
while others are wrong. 77 
 
Freedom and the ability to choose constitute significant defining elements of 
human dignity. Since rationality and freedom are traits of the human person, it is 
reasonable to say that human dignity is an individual’s moral capacity to act responsibly. 
It is also the ability to make choices which accounts for human responsibility for 
deliberate behavior. Consequently, it is right to say that when people’s ability to choose is 
impeded, their human dignity is denied because human dignity is a moral capacity for 
responsible action.  
From a social point of view human dignity is also based on self-respect and the 
respect for others. This idea is well expressed in the traditional religion of the Lugbara. 
The word ru or ruta, which means respect or honor or fear, explains some unique quality 
in every human person, and  it is the reason for respecting or honoring every person.78 
This means there is something shared or mutual about human dignity and human persons. 
A further reason for such a respect consists in what John Paul II often referred to as a 
sincere feeling and great esteem for the human person as stated by Macan Tibor. 
  
The most vital social condition for any person is the honoring of his or her dignity. If someone’s 
dignity is destroyed, all other benefits that person reaps from others amount to very little and 
certainly serve as no compensation. Trading one‘s dignity is akin to selling one’s soul; it takes 
away one’s essential identity as the human being one is.79  
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 The honor and respect for human dignity is a foundation for understanding human 
rights. Its significance is in the idea that human dignity is the core of the being of the 
human person and accounts for becoming the human person. The human person is 
defined by human dignity, on which human rights are based. The very attributes which 
define human dignity, namely intellect or rationality, freedom, and the capacity for 
responsible action or choice, and the capacity for interpersonal relationship are the 
reasons for people to claim certain rights. 
In human dignity there is singularity and universality. The feeling of the presence 
of human dignity in other people is something unique in the human person and in all 
people. Ammchidt-Quinn, citing John Baptist Metz, suggests that “radical vulnerability is 
a negative formulation of dignity”, necessary for understanding human dignity meaning 
that the “human dignity is unassailable.”80 Human dignity cannot be tampered with 
without an opposing reaction in response. This claim is credible because human dignity is 
the most sensitive element of the human person in the sense that it is easily tampered with 
by others and yet nobody wants it to be tampered with. This is probably an argument that 
defies the claim that the notion of human dignity is essentially or “inescapably religious” 
because every human being is sacred, as Michael Perry suggests.81 Human dignity is the 
reason for the claim of the inviolability of human integrity. It is the worth that every 
person has which demands  
. . . that the human being must not be treated as a mere means to some other end (such as, for 
example, the state), but must be regarded as an end in himself. His self-fulfillment is an 
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indispensable goal of human life, and the society is backward, unjust, even evil, that does not 
promote it.82  
 
 This vision of the importance of human dignity clearly shows that an institution, 
religious or civic, that does not respect and promote human dignity ought not to claim to 
be developed. The view also affirms the recognition of the universality of human dignity 
which will be treated in depth in the next section. The same view was, at least indirectly, 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where the drafters of the 
document never linked human rights to religion and never thought that one had to adhere 
to a particular religion in order to accept the existence of human rights.83 The 
International Theological Commission, using Kantian categories of thought, emphasized 
the gravity of the recognition and respect for human dignity in the following words: 
. . . man appears not as an object and instrument to be used but as an intermediate end in himself, 
whose welfare both personal and ultimately as a being for God must be our aim. Man enjoys a 
spiritual, soul, reason, freedom, conscience, responsibility, an active role in society.84  
 
The constitutive elements of human dignity were stated by the commission as 
important. These elements make the human person valuable and different from other 
beings. It was for this reason that the commission advocated that “all personal 
relationships between people must be conducted in such a way that this fundamental 
human dignity be given full honor, and the needs of self be fulfilled to the best of our 
ability.”85 The commission suggested that the virtues of justice and love are crucial for 
the enhancement of human dignity. Likewise, Paul VI advocated in his theory of integral 
human development that this dignity should be enhanced in all people. The basic reason 
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in both cases is that human dignity is equal in all because all are created in the divine 
image and likeness. The equality and common origin of human dignity from God also 
explains why the dignity of each person is realized in community, should be recognized 
by the community or other individuals, and is protected by the community or other 
individual persons. This shows the social and the universal dimensions of human dignity. 
It is for this reason that Catholic social doctrine emphasizes “community as a necessary 
locus” 86 for the awareness and promotion of human dignity.  
Three concluding statements prompted by the above treatise are: First, the origin 
of the idea of human dignity is the idea that all people are created in the image and 
likeness of God, or at least a being that human persons recognize and acknowledge to be 
greater than every human person. Secondly, because of their common origin all people 
share in divine qualities such as rational faculty, and the ability to make free decisions or 
choices though to a limited extent as compared to their creator. Thirdly, secularists 
consider these assertions to be religious. Consequently, human dignity is variously 
defined but the ideas principally expressed are tantamount to calling human dignity a 
connatural value, inherent value, inborn worth or “an innate worth.”87 It is an  
immeasurable value, an invaluable worth, in monetary or equivalent terms. It is also an 
invariable worth under every circumstance of time and place. It is an ontological value. 
The idea is not necessarily religious because even those who are not religious recognize 
human dignity. 
B. Universality and Equality of Human Dignity 
 
The main issue treated here is whether human dignity is spatially and temporally  
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universal and equal in all people of all. The focus of the arguments will be the assertion 
that everybody has human dignity regardless of disabilities.88 The explanation of the 
universality and equality of human dignity is traced to the origin of human dignity.  
Each person is created as an imago Dei; collectively we are deemed by our Creator to be good. 
Even the power of sin, original or actual, in no way cancels this bestowal of dignity. Our status as 
children of God sets humans apart from the rest of the created order . . . . 89 
 
Human dignity is the participation of all rational beings endowed with the ability 
for free choice, in the intelligence of God or divine qualities. The arguments advanced by 
Thomas D. Williams about the universality and equality of human dignity are 
compelling. He argues from the very nature of the human person, which according to 
him, is the same in all people. It is in this nature that human dignity should be located. 
Consequently, he states that 
If this dignity inheres in man’s nature as a free and intelligent being, it can be predicated equally 
of all members of the human race. In order to be universal, personal dignity could not be a 
function of intelligence, abilities, accomplishments, moral worth, or baptism, for these factors vary 
from person to person. It must rather be a function of the human being simply by virtue of his 
humanity, of his personhood, a natural quality that cannot be acquired or lost. The very expression 
“human dignity” implies that dignity resides in human nature itself and thus ensures a fundamental 
ontological equality among all people.90 
 
The universality and equality of human dignity, according to Williams, is its 
inherence in human nature. Human dignity is beyond human ability or creativity. It 
defeats conditions created by individual human persons and communities. The vision of 
the universality and equality of dignity of all people has not only been the idea of the 
Catholic Church or any other religious group. The inherence, inviolability, universality 
and equality of dignity and rights “of all members of the human family” were affirmed by 
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“the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations on 10 
December 1948.”91 The assertion is also reechoed in the assertion of John Paul II who 
contended that “the dignity of the human person is a transcendent value, always 
recognized as such by those who sincerely search for the truth.”92 The general consensus 
is that all human beings have dignity. Human dignity is beyond any human conditions or 
making because it does not derive from the will of the human person. The preceding 
arguments support the assertion that the universality and equality of human dignity is 
explained by the idea that  
. . . every person is created by God, loved and saved in Jesus Christ and fulfills himself by creating 
a network of multiple relationships of love, justice and solidarity with other persons while he goes 
about his various activities in the world.93 
 
 That all people were created by God and in the image and likeness of God 
explains why human dignity is universal and equal. However, this claim can be contested 
on the basis that it is only a religious claim and may not be held as such by non-believers. 
Nonetheless, the problem is whether non-believers can adequately account for the origin 
of human dignity, which transcends individual persons and embraces all people. If the 
common origin of dignity is denied, then universality may have to be denied and the very 
idea of human dignity or humanity makes no sense at all. Hence, human dignity and its 
universality should be affirmed. 
That the dignity of the human person is inviolable and “the whole of the Church’s 
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social doctrine” 94 develops from this assertion or principle is generally an accepted 
assertion because the social doctrine is all about the promotion of the human person. The 
idea of the universality and equality of dignity applies to all human sexes or genders. The 
two human sexes,  
“Male” and “Female” differentiate two individuals of equal dignity, which does not however 
reflect a static equality, because the specificity of the female is different from the specificity of the 
male, and this difference in equality is enriching and indispensable for the harmony of life in 
society. . . . 95 
  
The firm assertion of the Catholic social doctrine is that man and woman are 
complementary physically, sociologically and ontologically. This complementarity does 
not, however, mean that either of the two has greater dignity. The meaning of human 
dignity and human person would change if there was any differentiation in the dignity of 
men and women. 
Man and woman have the same dignity and are of equal value, not only because they are both, in 
their differences, created in the image of God, but even more profoundly because the dynamic of 
reciprocity that gives life to the “we” in the human couple, is an image of God.96  
 
Significant to note is that equality of dignity is not affected by differentiation in 
sex or gender, stature, socio-economic or political standing. What is stated here is that 
human beings complement each other in many different ways because they are social. 
The idea that both men and women are social also demonstrates individual inadequacy 
and the need for others on account of their talents and abilities or capacities. This 
affirmation does not disqualify the assertion that all people are created in the image and 
likeness of God. Difference in dignity are only in what Williams calls moral dignity but 
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not what he calls ontological dignity. This means the root of the offence against the 
equality of human dignity is sin, in both its “personal and social” 97 dimensions because 
division, which also explains claimed differences in human dignity, has both personal and 
social aspects. Any sin is an abuse of freedom with the consequences of alienation from 
God, alienation from others and alienation from self as the Pontifical Commission for 
Justice and Peace advocates. According to the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 
the affirmation of the equality of the dignity of human persons is also theologically 
founded on the idea that God loves and cares for everybody and “shows no partiality.”98 
According to Thomas D. Williams scholars like Fortin disapprove of the idea of 
the universality of human dignity on the grounds that it is approved only in a limited way 
by Christian anthropology.99 Williams argues that Fortin can be refuted on the basis of 
the distinction between “ontological dignity, common to all human beings by reason of 
their nature, and a moral dignity, which reflects the consistency with which a person lives 
according to moral truth”, meaning that while “moral dignity can be acquired and also 
forfeited, ontological dignity remains constant, since the rational nature on which it rests 
endures independent of moral choices.”100 Williams’ argument is based on the nature of 
the human person which is a quality shared by all human beings. On this basis the 
universality of human dignity can be affirmed, whether by Christian anthropology or any 
category of people who take human nature seriously. According to the argument of 
Williams the actual universality of human dignity is explained in the ontological 
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dimension of dignity, not the moral dimension. The argument of Williams is more 
credible than that of Fortin. To argue that the universality of human dignity is approved 
only in a limited way by Christian anthropology is to deny the very idea of the 
universality of human dignity. Secondly, it would suggest that the idea of human dignity 
is necessarily religious or Christian, which is not true. The fact that human dignity is not 
necessarily a religious notion suggests the affirmation of the universality of human 
dignity. 
Williams plausibly argues that ontological dignity is a quality per se while moral 
dignity is a quality attached to an action, not independent of any action. In other words, 
human dignity is not contingent or dependent on any factor.101 The credibility of this 
argument is affirmed by the idea that if human dignity were contingent on prevalent 
circumstances, one would only sensibly talk of degrees of human dignity or human 
dignity varying from person to person. It would make less sense to talk of human dignity 
generally. Instead it would even be better to talk of human dignities. Consequently, it is 
plausible to state that since moral dignity is just a quality attached to an action, it defies 
the idea of universality. Universality of human dignity can only be predicated of the 
ontological dignity. 
Since human dignity is inherent in the human nature the affirmation of the 
universality of human dignity is credible. Hence, Williams’ distinction between 
ontological dignity and moral dignity is intelligible and plausible. It facilitates the 
distinction of a contingent dignity and a universal, invaluable, inviolable and durable or 
enduring dignity, which is typically a human dignity. Further reflection on the source of 
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morality Williams suggests points to a transcendent and universal source, which is an 
ontological source. Consequently, one can conceive an ontological dignity, which is 
universal. The universality of human dignity ultimately implies an ontological human 
dignity, of which what Williams calls moral dignity is part because the ultimate source of 
morality is God who is the Ultimate Being and also the source of human dignity. 
C. Importance of the Vision of Universality and Equality of Human Dignity 
 
Paul VI’s principal concern in Populorum Progressio was the integral 
development of peoples. The vision of universality and equality of human dignity is 
important for Paul VI’s vision of integral human development for a number of reasons. 
First, the “conditions of equality and parity are prerequisites for the authentic progress of 
the international community.”102 If all are to develop or be helped to develop, they must 
be seen as having equal worth because they are creatures of God and in the likeness of 
God. This way they can be treated in the same way or at least with the same 
consideration. The recognition of human dignity and human rights which are based on 
human dignity is necessary for the integral promotion of the progress of peoples.103 
Recognition of the dignity of all people is an impetus for a struggle for the promotion of 
all peoples. The gravity of this assertion can be seen in light of Karol Wojtyla's statement 
that humanness is “concretized in every man just as much as it is in myself” and this 
humanness “unites human beings.”104 When people recognize in others what they know 
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they have and treasure they can be moved to act selflessly. This offers possibilities for 
integral human development. 
Secondly, the awareness and recognition of the universality and equality of the 
dignity of every person helps “safeguard and promote human dignity only if it is done as 
a community, by the whole community.”105 This suggests that the awareness and 
recognition of human dignity is everybody’s responsibility if integral human 
development is to be achieved. This recognition can be promoted through the 
applications of Paul VI’s integral human development principles of solidarity, 
association, common good and participation. Since all people are created in the image 
and likeness of God, and participate in some way in divine dignity, human dignity can be 
affirmed as equal in every person. Promotion of freedom, justice and peace in the world 
and in any society demands the recognition of the inherent worth, also expressed in 
human rights, of every human being.106 
Thirdly, the human person is defined by attributes such as body, soul, spirit, 
intelligence, conscience, freedom and sense of responsibility. All these attributes 
contribute to the foundation of human dignity. Since these attributes are under normal 
circumstances shared by all people, “all human beings, since they are God’s creation and 
endowed with the same fundamental characteristics deserve the highest consideration.”107 
It should also be added that the universality of human dignity demands that all people be 
responsible. That all human beings have dignity is the principal thesis in human dignity 
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talk. The emphasis of the International Theological Commission is that there is no 
exception in treating people respectfully because all share the same attributes originating 
from the same source. This assertion reaffirms that human dignity is an objective reality. 
For these reasons it seems right to concur with Williams that  
. . . to say that persons are to be treated in a certain way, then, is not an expression of a 
philanthropic sentiment to which others may or may not subscribe, it is a statement about the true 
nature of things. Human dignity is a quality which demands a certain response from us.108 
 
Fourthly, the respect for human dignity, which facilitates the development of all, 
demands an application of “the principle of reciprocity” or Jesus’ golden rule “Do to 
others what you would like done to you . . . be merciful as your heavenly father is 
merciful.”109 This principle of reciprocity is founded on the notion that the human dignity 
is a shared quality or value and should always be recognized as such. As Michael Perry 
suggests, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was proclaimed by the 
United Nations suggests this universality in its recognition, in the preamble of the 
document, of “ ‘the inherent dignity…of all members of the human family and of the 
dignity and worth of the human person’ ”110 thus recognizing and acknowledging the 
universality of human dignity. The affirmation suggests that human beings should treat 
each other in a dignified manner. 
Finally, the universality of human dignity brings to our awareness that human 
dignity is an ontological reality inherent in human nature. As an ontological reality it is 
not contingent on any person or factor. Nobody can give another person human dignity. 
Human dignity is (it exists) in human beings. Although it can be abused, violated and 
                                                 
108 Williams, 153. 
109 International Theological Commission, 5. 
110 Perry, 12. 
  268
denied, it cannot be taken away. It ought to be protected, defended and promoted or 
enhanced. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INDIVIDUALIST AND COMMUNITARIAN NOTIONS 
 
 A number of observations are necessary before delving into the question of 
human rights. First, the concept of human rights is polyvalent and it developed over time. 
Most human rights studies trace the origin of human rights to the Ancient Greek 
foundation of Stoicism at the time of Zeno who initially suggested the universality of 
rights on the basis of the universal law of nature.111 Secondly, this section is a treatise of 
two, supposedly, different and hardly reconcilable, concepts of human rights - the Euro-
American individualist and the African communitarian concepts of rights. The goal of 
this section is to examine the two concepts of human rights, and to attempt to establish 
the universality of human rights. Some definitions of human rights will be interjected to 
help support the positions of the two philosophies of human rights. It suffices here to note 
that  
Human rights address situations where power is being exercised in such a manner as to control 
human beings by manipulation or coercion so that they are unable to affirm their dignity and 
humanity fully.112 
 
This means human rights are immunities or protections against forces that 
interfere with the exercise of human freedom, and consequently abuse of human dignity. 
It suggests that the claims of one person are limited by claims of other people.  
Thirdly, it is significant to note, as the magisterial teaching presents, that human 
“dignity forms the basis of rights.”113 Hence, a correct notion of human rights depends on 
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the right understanding of human dignity. The preceding section is therefore crucial to 
this section. Finally, I will attempt a synthesized definition of human rights using ideas of 
other authors, which, I consider to be inclusive of both Euro-American individualist and 
African communitarian notions of human rights, especially with consideration of the 
reconciling Roman Catholic notion of rights. 
Michael Perry’s vision of human rights points to two major perspectives on 
human rights - the individualist and communitarian notions. He states that the idea of 
human rights suggests that “each and every person is sacred - each and every human 
being is inviolable; has an inherent dignity and worth; is an end in himself; or the like.”114 
This aspect of the idea of human rights emphasizes the individuality of a person as a 
distinct entity. The vision gravitates to the liberal notion of the human person and human 
rights. The second part of the idea of human rights is that  
. . . because every human being has inherent dignity, certain choices should be made and other 
choices should be rejected; in particular certain things ought not to be done to any human being 
and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.115 
  
This dimension of the idea of human rights points directly to the relational 
character of rights, and so it has communitarian overtones because claims one makes on 
other people are reciprocally applicable. There is mutual obligation in claiming and 
exercising rights. Rights are related to individuals as well as community. 
A. Individualist Notion of Rights: The Euro-American Model  
 
 The Western liberal concept of human rights, like any other vision of rights, is a 
consequence of political, social and economic power or authority. Contextually, Donnelly 
thinks that the Western concept of human rights is characterized by “a perpetual and . . . 
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obsessive concern with individual dignity, personal autonomy and property.”116 Human 
rights are viewed as protections or immunities from external aggressions against 
individual freedom. This contention suggests that  
. . . the liberal tradition interprets a right as an immunity from coercion; a right in this sense is 
understood as a circle of protection within which the person is guaranteed a sphere of freedom 
from intervention by the state or other organized forces in the society.117  
 
  This seems to be the reason why Western philosophical anthropology views 
individuals or persons as dominantly motivated by self-interest when making claims upon 
others or for themselves.118 However, it would seem that, according to Donnelley, the 
individual character of human rights is reasonable in the absence of alternative protection 
of the dignity of the individual person. If an individual’s dignity, which defines or 
determines freedom, is to be protected and the individual is incapable of doing this, some 
other external and capable force has to protect it. This very concern gravitates toward the 
possibility of thinking that the dichotomy between an individualist and a communitarian 
view of the human person is unnecessary in the human rights dialogue because their 
mutual complementarity is suggested here. An individual’s claim to be protected as a 
being that has dignity is inevitably valid and necessary because human dignity is the 
basic human principle. Society has a duty to support and protect the individual. This 
means the individual also needs society. To be society individuals should also exist 
because society is constituted by individuals. 
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The Western concept of human rights was much impacted by Lockean thought.119 
Bryan J. Hehir states that according to John Locke the concept of human rights has 
nothing to do with the notion of shared responsibilities; “the person enters civil society 
with rights but not bound by social responsibilities” and the individual is presented as 
being a “self-sufficient” entity in need of society because “protection of life, liberty and 
property is too arduous outside some kind of social setting”, meaning that “a person is 
social by necessity.”120 This suggests that according to Locke people are merely 
conditioned to be social because they, individually, are incapacitated to meet some of 
their needs. Even here one can still notice that the individual cannot, absolutely, stand 
independently of society. Whether it is out of necessity or not, individuals need society or 
community because society is built on the basis of values commonly shared by its 
members. Two of the commonly-shared qualities are natural equality of dignity and 
freedom. These are the foundations or reasons for the unity of all people, they are not 
qualities of differentiation.  
The USA Virginia Bill of Rights had Lockean tones in some aspects. The June, 
1776 document had the following to say in its first clause: 
. . . all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, 
when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their 
posterity: namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property and pursuing and obtaining happiness.121 
 
 Four important observations are significant at this point. First, the main emphasis 
of the above statement is that individuals precede society and determine it. This is an area 
of fundamental difference between Western individualist and African communitarian 
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concepts of a human person in relation to society, because the notion of human rights is 
comprehended in terms of the individual in the Western context while it is centered on 
community in the African communitarian view. Generally it is observed that “liberalism 
asserts the right of each person to free and equal treatment.”122 For the African 
communitarian the individual and the community are inseparable. It is true that the 
individual and community are in mutual need but in the order of phenomenon there is a 
flaw because the individual is not given precedence over community. However, this does 
not mean that African communitarianism entertains unequal treatment. Consequently, 
like the individualist vision the freedom or individuality of a person is still significant. 
Secondly, the foundation of natural equality is not specified in the document. Rights are 
only said to be inherent. The source of inherence is unstated in the clause. If it is on the 
ground that human nature is the same, the sameness of this nature has yet to be accounted 
for. However, in the mind of the founding fathers expressed in various ways - the 
American motto, In God We Trust, the pledge of allegiance and the National anthem - 
this clause does not exclude the idea that the equality of nature is grounded in God. This 
fact is also evident in the July 1776 Declaration of American Independence. Thirdly, 
although the clause is refined in the Declaration of American Independence of July, 1776 
which states that “all are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights . . . .”123 both statements still manifest the individual and liberal 
character of human rights in the Euro-American concept. Finally, such a view of rights 
tends to create a dichotomy between the individual and the society or community – the 
Western view and the African one.  
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According to David Hollenbach,  
In the neo-scholastic documents it is ‘reason’ which gives persons the power to make history, to 
understand their social relationnships, to be self-determining and to be obedient to God’s law 
without loss of personhood and freedom. 124  
 
Reason commands human action and life. It explains the demand for 
responsibility for one’s actions. This is why it defines the human person, and specifically, 
human dignity. Reason impacted the Western concept of human rights in the sense that it 
helped define rights as responsible freedom. If freedom is a natural quality of all people, 
then rights may not be considered absolute prerogatives of an individual or few 
individuals. In the Western context because every person is by nature free, everybody has 
rights. The corollary implication is that it suggests that one person’s rights are restrained 
by another person’s rights. This is why in every context rights have always to be 
interpreted as mutual claims. In this sense there are never absolute rights in any context. 
According to Bujo this idea is similarly deepened by Kant’s emphasis on the autonomy of 
a person on the basis of the faculty of rationality or the general law (the categorical 
imperative), making autonomy the chief characteristic of the Western concept of human 
rights.125 Bujo suggested that this autonomy was not just a laissez faire freedom but 
autonomy for self-realization. This autonomy again belongs to everybody, but in relation 
to the autonomy of other people.  
The preceding contentions suggest that the emphasis on the autonomy of the 
individual or personal freedom is, historically, a constant contention in the Western 
tradition of human rights. Hollenbach’s claim that the Western concept of human rights 
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emphasizes the right of the individual and, consequently, his assertion that all rights are 
commonly founded on “the freedom of the individual person”126 is a testimony to this 
contention. The emphasis of freedom as foundation for rights supports individual liberty 
but in relation to the liberty of other individuals or groups because all people are naturally 
endowed with freedom. On account of this fact the social dimension of the individual’s 
life is not secondary, as it seems in practical life. Benezet Bujo’s view is not different 
either. He suggests that in the Western school of thought based on Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals, there is one original right, and quoting Kant, Bujo says:  
Freedom (independence of another person’s constraining arbitrariness) is the sole, original right, to 
which every human being is entitled on the basis of humanity itself, as long as this freedom can 
exist together with every other freedom in accordance with a general law.127  
 
Even if freedom is the sole original right, it seems right to infer from this 
quotation that freedom, and consequently human rights, are not absolute. Rights call for 
duties or obligations - rights and duties or obligationa are correlative. One person’s 
freedom is limited by other people’s freedom, implied in the general law or the 
categorical imperative, which proposes that other people have similar freedoms or rights. 
A laissez faire interpretation of freedom, hence, is irrelevant. This suggests that, just like 
human dignity, an adequate concept of human rights gravitates around a commonly-
shared element in human persons.  
Bujo contends that according to the Euro-American vision of rights 
. . . at the core is the concept of the the dignity of the individual: being human justifies the claim to 
certain rights. The emphasis falls upon the individual, not upon society; the single person should 
be respected as such and not on account of ‘the relationship to others.’128  
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The autonomous respect of an individual is based on the dignity of the individual, 
which is universal at the same time. Human dignity and human rights are, in turn, based 
on and defined in terms of natural freedom. This view promotes Hollenbach’s assertion 
that human rights are “ramifications and extrapolations of individual freedom” - human 
rights are consequences and expressions, projections and expansions of human freedom - 
hence rooted in the fundamental rights to liberty as H. L.A. Harts affirms.129 He further 
advances that people capable of choice have the right of liberty or freedom from coercion 
or restraint, and they have the liberty to do any action that is never coercing or restraining 
or injurious to any other person.130  
Harts’ vision of rights, according to Hollenbach, is that rights are negative in the 
sense that they are defenses of liberty. This seems an extremely liberal notion of rights. 
However, the second part of Harts’ definition points to an element of rationality and 
responsibility, implied in the ability to choose. A right is freedom to do what is morally 
right and necessary but it should not obligate others nor may it thwart the liberty of others 
by restraining them. Its expression should not hurt any other human person. This Western 
vision suggests why Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff think that many people have 
rightly argued that “the very concept of liberal democracy implies restraint” - in other 
words “the ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy incorporates its restriction because 
the concept of liberal democracy implies this restriction.”131 Such an understanding of 
human rights does not seem to give an absolute character to human rights. It is within 
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limits of charity, justice, peace, common good, subsidiarity, solidarity, option for the 
poor, and respect for human dignity. If rights are absolute, for example, the right to 
private ownership of property, then we must also deny the social nature of human person 
because it would mean the human person is independent or does not need other persons 
for whatsoever reason. As long as there is no absolute freedom, there are no absolute 
rights for one’s rights are restricted by another person’s rights. 
The emphasis on the individual is valid, but it ought to be affirmed with emphasis 
on community. If humanness and human dignity are shared by all, a conscious individual 
always fights to promote and protect the duo. This protection, however, is the 
responsibility of the individual and community or society. It is the duty of both the 
individual and society because society facilitates individual efforts and the individual 
contributes to the efforts of the community. Consequently, society or communituy and 
the individual cannot determine or facilitate human rights independently of each other.  
Although Bujo does not deny that there are communitarian elements in the Euro-
American liberal notion of human rights, he says: “. . . they are always concerned with 
the individual’s self-realization.”132 This may not be read negatively only. It positively 
affirms individual freedom. However, to some degree, this is where the Western 
individualist concept of rights and the African communitarian concept conflict with each 
other. The problem here is that of mutual exaggeration of individuality or communality at 
the expense of the other and of an individual’s relation to community or vice versa. The 
conflict of rights remains unresolved if such emphasis is not moderated.  
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Western philosophy of human rights manifests that rights emanate from the needs 
and the good of the individual. They are based on the command of reason and human 
freedom, and they are legally determined through mutual agreements. Rights are liberal 
exercises of freedom. They are freedom from external “interference of the exercise of 
one’s rights.”133 In this sense rights are negative or “they are immunities from 
interference by others.”134 This suggests that rights always have communal orientation. 
This is evident, especially where an individual’s claims conflict with or obstruct the 
rights of another individual.135 Since one person’s rights are limited by the rights of 
another person or other people, rights are not absolute at all. This notion of rights does 
not deviate from the Roman Catholic vision. A testimony to this assertion is that 
In the nineteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church clearly rejected the liberal concept of 
human rights on the grounds that the individual was being elevated to such a position that social 
cohesion and the common good were being undermined.136  
 
 A liberal notion of rights would be characterized by absoluteness but the idea of 
absolute rights has been refuted in the western world too. The basic reason for this 
refutation is the mutual relationship between people. Mary Ann Glendon affirms that an 
absolute human right is an illusion, and a harmful vision of rights. When one claims an 
absolute or mandatory right one hurts other people too. Such claims are irrational and do 
not deserve the name human rights. Glendon’s claim suggests that  
When we assert our rights to life, liberty, and property, we are expressing the reasonable hope that 
such things can be made more secure by law and politics. When we assert the rights in an absolute 
form however we are expressing infinite and impossible desires - to be completely free, to possess 
things totally, to be masters of our fate and captain of our souls. 137 
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The argument of Glendon has gravity and serious implications. It draws attention 
to the idea that we are limited and our rights are limited. It suggests that to claim absolute 
rights is to initiate a conflict of rights. The exercise of rights demands mutual respect and 
some compromise. The significance of the argument lies in the thought that rights are 
protections or immunities and claims demanding responsible action from the side of both 
the right bearer and those upon whom claims are laid or from whom the respect of rights 
is demanded. To deny this, according to Glendon, is to shun one’s responsibilities and 
“the implication is that no one else is affected by the exercise of the individual right in 
question.” 138 This is not possible because rights are exercised in social contexts and have 
social implications too. It is important to note, as Hollenbach suggests in relation to social 
justice, that in the Western context, “human rights have a social as well as individual 
foundation.”139 People make individual claims and do so with the awareness that there are 
other individuals who constitute society and make similar claims.  
B. Communitarian Notion of Rights: The African and the Third World Model 
 
The foundation of the African concept of human rights is the African 
understanding of the human individual. As stated earlier, according to John S. Mbiti, an 
African thinks that “the individual can only say: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are, 
therefore I am.’”140 This African saying emphasizes the value of the individual within the 
community, not an individual dissociated from community. The importance of 
community is emphasized not only in a secondary sense but also in a primary sense 
without disregarding the individual. Both community and the individual are placed on 
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par. This idea is suggested by Mbiti’s affirmation that “the individual does not and cannot 
exist alone except corporately.”141 For Mbiti, and many who interpret him, the individual 
constitutes just a portion of the entire community because “only in terms of other people 
does the individual become conscious of his own being, his duties, his privileges and 
responsibilities toward himself and towards other people.”142 The African individual and 
community are complementary and actually mutually inclusive.  
 However, this notion of the individual does not exclude individual identity. This 
means individual identity is not lost in the community. While the individual is identified 
with community, he/she is at the same time distinct from it. This is what Placide Tempels 
affirms of a person when he asserts that 
The Bantu cannot be a lone being. It is not a good enough synonym for that to say that he is a 
social being. No; he feels and knows himself to be a vital force, at this very time to be in intimate 
and personal relationship with other forces acting above him and below him in the hierarchy of 
forces. He knows himself to be a vital force, even now influencing some forces and being 
influenced by others.143  
 
The individuality and independence or freedom of a person is evident, according 
to Tempels, but the conscious individual person is also aware of the influence, on him or 
her, of other people and the environment in which one lives. Some African authors 
support this contention. For example, Deusdedit R.K. Nkurunziza is in line with Tempels 
and thinks that man is an active constituent part of society involved in the promotion of 
the well-being of other members of society.144 The individual is not lost in society. In a 
response to the question: “Does individuality get lost in the African communitarian view 
of a person?” Bujo explicitly says that “the statement that in Africa the community alone 
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matters and not the individual is hardly right.”145 He argues that the individual is singular, 
inexchangeable and responsibly related to the community by solidarity while at the same 
time retaining his/her identity. The argument that the individual does not get lost in the 
community in the African communitarian view of person is consistent. It is also 
supported by the fact that in the African context each person is responsible for his/her 
actions and punishments are administered according to responsibility for actions. 
 The second factor that individuates the African person is name. Authors like 
Tempels and Bujo argue to this effect. Temples argues that besides the physical 
appearance of an individual, the name is an outstanding factor of individuation, “the 
name is not just a simple external courtesy, it is the very reality of the individual” 
because “the name expresses the individual character of the being.”146 According to Bujo 
the concept of names is what typically points toward the difference between the Western 
and African notions of an individual. He argues that in African context  
There are no family names, in the Western sense, which are transmitted from father to son. Every 
child has its own name, depending on the circumstances of birth. The name of the individual 
characterizes him/her as a historical being, in its uniqueness.147  
 
Bujo’s contention suggests that there is an individuation of the human person in 
African society. A person is different from the community. Bujo’s contention also 
amounts to the idea that there is something communitarian in the Western world, 
expressed here in terms of names, because if one name is passed from parents to children, 
there must be something that binds their lineage too. The issue at stake is that the 
communitarian element in the Western world is emphasized in the concept of names but 
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not as much in their concept of rights of the individual in relation to society. This is the 
paradox of theory and practice which is outside the scope of this work but requires 
further investigation.  
The foregoing paragraphs suggest the following conclusions as affirmed by 
Uzukwu and Bujo: First, in African social and theological anthropology, individual 
freedom is recognized as such; an individual remains free within society. According to 
Uzukwu E. Elochukwu  
The autonomy and right of the individual subject are enjoyed in relationship in communion. 
Indeed the “freedom” of the individual is “for” the construction of a better community. . . . It is not 
principally understood in terms of “freedom from” an oppressive society.148  
 
The positive element in Uzukwu’s assertion is that freedom is considered as a 
virtue in the sense that it is a disposition of the human person to do good for 
herself/himself and for others. The common good is in view in the exercise of freedom. 
This suggests that African societies advocate responsible freedom. 
Secondly, the African concept of human rights is based on the African 
understanding of the individual in the context of society. This is because relationship is 
“not simply a way of living in which the subject must realize itself” but “it is the essential 
element of personhood. One is human because of others, with others, and for others.”149 
This is what earns the African notion of human rights the description communitarian 
concept of rights. The African sees individuals’ rights in a relation of mutual interaction. 
They can at most be mandated or confirmed in a community context. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to describe the African notion of human rights as the African social concept 
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of human rights. This assertion is explained by the authentic communitarian vision that 
rights are never absolute individual claims. This vision supports the assertion that in a 
communitarian vision of the human person “the conception of what is right and how 
society should be organized always presuppose some vision of the common good. In this 
respect, the good presupposes the right.”150 This suggests that the common good makes 
the individual impose claims on others but it also obliges the person claiming rights to 
accept similar or the same claims from others for their own good. 
Thirdly, human rights are founded in the community without disregarding the 
individual, although the emphasis seems to be more on community than the individual 
interests or claims. Bujo affirms this view by claiming that “human rights here do not 
emanate from the individual but are extended from community to the individual.”151 
Bujo’s argument is grounded on the idea that in the African context “only within the 
lineage, that is the kinship, can one be a human being,” without forgetting human dignity 
and right, because “to be human is something that has to be learned right from childhood 
together with others.”152 This assertion suggests why the African notion of human rights 
seems not to allow deviation, heroism and the individual’s overwhelming influence on 
society.153 The problem with such a vision of rights is the limitation of individual 
freedom. It is the crux of the African understanding of human rights and a point where it 
seems to deviate radically from the Western notion of human rights.  
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C. The Universality and Equality of Rights 
 
The primary concern of this section is to attempt to show that human rights are 
universal and relative. It is generally acknowledged that human rights are claims persons 
have on other people on account of being human. This acknowledgment shows the 
mutual character of rights and points to the idea of the universality of human rights and it 
suggests that human rights are not absolute. 
 The universality of human rights is affirmed on the basis of the common origin, 
nature and dignity of people. The affirmation of the universality of human dignity also 
suggests the universality of human rights. The basic argument for the universality of 
human rights is that God created people in his image and likeness as is explicit in Genesis 
1:27-28. Many scholars hold this position. Joseph Massaro expresses the idea as follows: 
. . . every human being is a person; that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. 
Indeed, precisely because he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and 
simultaneously from his very nature. And as these rights and obligations are universal and 
inviolable, so they cannot in any way be surrendered.154 
 
On the basis that people have the same nature originating from the same source, 
every human being has rights prompted by this universal nature, and these rights are the 
same every -  where. This argument does not, however, suggest that people have the same 
rights everywhere but it suggests that certain rights (human rights) are commonly shared 
and so are universal. The assertion also suggests that rights are sometimes relatively 
absolute as long as they are founded on human nature. For instance, the right to life of an 
innocent person is always to be respected, everywhere and by all people. I would like to 
suggest here that the right to life is a relative-absolute right. As long as one maintains 
innocence the right to life is absolute but in the event that innocence ceases the right to 
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life ceases to be absolute - it becomes a relative right. The quality of inviolability or 
inalienability of human dignity makes the right to life relatively absolute. Thompson 
speaks to this point by affirming that human rights are claims made on the basis of human 
nature and so are equal, universal and cannot be taken away from people or be 
surrendered by people. 
. . . human rights are rights that one has simply because one is human. Such rights are held equally 
by all humans, and they are inalienable. Human rights are rooted, then, in a theory of human 
nature.155  
 
The idea of the equality and universality of human rights is, however, 
controversial. People like McIntyre reject the idea of the universality of human rights, 
and even the idea of human rights per se. Such contention or denial suggests a vision of 
rights as a laissez faire exercise of human freedom. Williams states that according to 
McIntyre 
To speak of “rights of man” is to speak of a presumably universal phenomenon. Yet whereas 
needs and wants are universally experienced and thus universally intelligible, rights claims 
presuppose social and ethical structures that are not universal.156 
 
The principal claim of McIntyre seems to be that human rights depend on local 
social structures and institutions. It is true that some rights depend on established local 
social institutions and structures. Some civil rights, for instance, fall into this category. A 
distinction ought to be made between human rights and civil rights. Civil rights are 
entitlements of a person by virtue of being a citizen. These would vary because of 
differences in institutional and legal structures, and not necessarily be universal. Human 
rights are claims people have on other people by virtue of being human. These are rooted 
in human nature and so are universal. The denial of universality of human rights is a 
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denial of the universality of human nature. This does not, however, exclude the existence 
of universal human rights, for example, the innocent person’s right to life. Whether by 
religious people or unbelievers, civilized or uncivilized people, the right to life and other 
related rights such as the right to food and decent living are often treasured.  
The universality of human rights was affirmed by John XXIII because human 
dignity is universal and all people are created by God in the divine image, and they 
deserve the reverence that is due to God because “human nature” is a partial reflection of 
“divine nature.”157 This assertion grounds the universality of rights because human rights 
are based on human dignity, which originates from God. If human dignity and human 
nature and their universality are affirmed, the same affirmation should be granted to the 
possibility of the affirmation of at least some human rights. Conversely, the denial of the 
reality and universality of human nature, dignity and rights should be predicated of 
human nature, human dignity and human rights. 
 The study of human rights in this section is typified by Williams’ vision of rights. 
Williams outlines characteristics of human rights as follows: First, “a right is something 
one has” in the sense that it is the power to make claims on others, meaning that it is 
distinct from its bearer but “within his ownership or jurisdiction . . . . ”158 Secondly, a 
right is “a transitive term: always a right to something.”159 This means a right is a claim 
to do or to have something or a demand for protection against something or action. 
Thirdly, a right is not a tangible thing, it is “a moral power or capacity or in more 
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classical language, a faculty”160, and as such it is a stable quality to do or to claim or have 
something. Fourthly, Williams suggests that as a moral quality a right is important 
because it determines the quality or type of claims one lays upon others. In other words, 
rights are not needless burdens laid upon other people or unrealistic demands from others. 
The importance of this understanding of rights is evident in the pragmatic characteristics 
of human rights. Finally, human rights “describe a reciprocal relationship,” meaning that 
“an assertion of right is other-directed and therefore passes from the sphere of personal 
morality to the juridical sphere.”161 Any claim on others invokes the reciprocal 
acceptance of the same claim from others. It invokes corresponding duties, obligations 
and responsibilities on the part of the rights’ claimant. This shows how rights are 
necessary for ordering people’s relationships in society. 
V. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POPULORUM PROGRESSIO 
 
The principal concern of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio was the human 
person, particularly the development of the human person. This too is the central concern 
of the Catholic social doctrines. Since the promotion and the good of the human person is 
the center of attention in both cases, it is relevant to suggest that a Christian anthropology 
is necessary for the promotion of the human person, and in particular for Paul VI’s 
advocacy for integral human development. Paul VI never explicitly defined the human 
person or undertook a categorical anthropological study for this purpose. However, in 
many ways he mentioned, implied, and dealt with traits that define the human person. 
The intention of this section is to explicate areas of the anthropology of Populorum 
Progressio necessary for integral human development. 
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A. The Human Person 
 
Paul VI touched upon issues like human freedom and the creation of the human 
person in the divine image. The freedom of a human person, which can also be properly 
called a right, is what partly determines a person as an individual. It also constitutes a 
defining element of the dignity of a person in terms of valuing the nature of the human 
individual as free and divinely endowed. Paul VI made the important assertion that: 
. . . man is a man only in so far as being the master of his own actions and the judge of their 
importance, he himself is the architect of his progress and this must be in keeping with his nature 
which the Creator gave him and the possibilities and demands of which he freely assumes. 162 
 
Autonomy or freedom, the ability to judge and to act responsibly defines the 
human person. Paul VI did not veer from the views of other theological anthropologists 
who define the human person in terms of intellect and responsibility. A responsible action 
is first an intellectual activity because it involves judgment. Neither was Paul VI different 
from Kant who emphasized autonomy as a defining characteristic of a human being. He 
was in line with traditional Catholic creation theology founded on Gen.1: 26-28, which 
grants the human person dominion over the rest of creation.  
The free nature of the human person facilitates people’s ability to interact with 
their environment, particularly fellow human beings. Consequently the human person is, 
in part, defined in terms of other humans because the person is a social being and belongs 
to society and family, which defines an individual. Paul VI advocated that persons should 
be defined and define themselves individually because an exclusively social definition of 
the human person, typical of “ancient social institutions” of the “developing regions” 163, 
impairs the basic human rights. He mentioned the individual’s right to marry and to 
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procreate. Paul VI suggested that the individual person should be recognized as a distinct 
entity, and always as such even if he/she lives in and is a part of society. He cited social 
structures such as the institution of the family in the developing nations as an example.164 
Such rights as to form family should be protected. Paul VI advocated that old social and 
institutional definitions and arrangements are necessary only temporarily.  
According to Paul VI “excessive force” from ancient social institutions in 
developing regions “must gradually be diminished.”165 Though Paul VI was not explicit, 
his contention suggests that he was opposed to an exaggerated community ethos which 
would cause the individual to disappear or be a negligible component of human society. 
He advocated that the exercise of individual freedom must be permitted. This means that 
the identity of the individual must be intact, yet the individual should be seen as part of 
the human family, dependent on it for personal fulfillment. He advocated for family ties 
that define initial human identity and forge unity, mutual assistance leading to acquisition 
of wisdom and harmony in personal rights. However, he further argued that social family 
values are instrumental for humane living. Family is fundamental and the first enriching 
school, and together “with other social requirements constitutes the foundation of 
society.”166 True solidarity starts in the family. This implies that solidarity based on 
family relations has positive effects. It leads to harmony and a better understanding of the 
human person, rights and relationships, and builds a solid community. This assertion is 
realistic for four reasons. First, it suggests that human dignity is universal and equal in all 
people. Secondly, as a consequence of the assertion, the human person and human rights 
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can be recognized as having universal value. Thirdly, it facilitates unity and mutual 
respect for human dignity and human rights. Finally, it suggests a typically 
communitarian element of the notion of the human person, dignity and rights.  
 The above discussions also suggest the following conclusions: First, Paul VI's 
vision of the human person incorporates both the communitarian and liberal notions of 
the human person. This assertion is confirmed by his vision of human rights, especially 
the right to private ownership of property. He affirmed that the individual has the right to 
own private property, but this is not an absolute right in the face of ardent need. When 
there are people or individuals in dire need, one should relinquish the right to private 
ownership in order to save or promote the right to life. The individual’s right to private 
ownership of property is subordinate to the demands of the common good or the needs of 
the community or its members, especially in moments of ardent need. Secondly, Paul VI 
defined the human person as an individual endowed with qualities such as intellect and 
freedom or autonomy, which are exercised within the context of fellow humans and the 
rest of creation. Finally, like other philosophical and theological anthropologists, he 
asserted that a human person is not a thing, and is different from the rest of creation, 
which is meant to serve human needs. 
B. Human Dignity in Populorum Progressio  
 
The persisting principal concern of Catholic social teaching is the human person 
and the promotion of the dignity of the person.167 Similarly, the epicenter of the teaching 
of Populorum Progressio is the dignity of the human person, based on the fundamental 
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principle of imago Dei, meaning that all people are created in the image of God. Imago 
Dei is the principle on which human dignity and human rights, and all other principles of 
humane living and relationship are grounded. It is also the principle of universality and 
equality. All human beings are made in God’s image. They have a value different from 
that of other creatures by virtue of their unique relationship with God, and they cooperate 
with God and participate in God’s governing and creative activity in the world.168  
Paul VI did not categorically state that human dignity is the foundational principle 
for authentic development but it was the reason for his advocacy for integral human 
development. He was motivated to take a stance for integral human development because 
there is “an integral equality of dignity enjoyed by every human being.”169 However, Paul 
VI presumed that the centrality of human dignity and human rights were already 
acknowledged as such and emphasized enough. His approach to the issue of integral 
human development suggests that the dignity and rights of the human person were 
already understood by all as basic for human development. Consequently, he tended to 
weaken the stance that human dignity is fundamental because all human beings are 
created in the image of God and participate in divine qualities and dignity. This principle 
runs throughout the entire Catholic social teaching because it is the reason for the 
institution of the Church.170   
The Church has a duty to defend and protect this dignity and is always concerned 
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about the dignity of all people who constitute society. The evidence of the centrality of 
human dignity in modern Catholic social teaching is Gaudium et Spes, which provides 
the core of the thesis, that human dignity is the foundational principle for true 
development. According to Peter Henriot, the document confirms this in its statement that 
“the human person is the source, the center and the purpose of all socio-economic life.”171 
All development efforts are motivated by this fact, and they are directed to the human 
person. When they fall short they are not efforts towards authentic development. 
Human dignity and human rights are at the center of the human person, and this is 
why human dignity is the overriding principle for integral human development.172 All 
development initiatives should attempt to address the problem of degradation and abuse 
of the human person, human dignity and human rights. It should be stated here that 
human dignity is also central to the question of integral human development because it is 
an invariable principle. It is immutable not just because it is equal in all people by virtue 
of being imago Dei, but also because it does not depend on any variable factors such as 
economic status, political status, social status, religion or age.173 Human dignity is not 
determined or defined by any of these variable factors. The whole of paragraph six of 
Populorum Progressio is devoted to the question of the dignity of the human person, 
which should be recognized in endeavors towards development.174   
Like many other proponents of the central position of the human person and 
dignity in development issues, for Paul VI human aspiration must first try to protect 
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human dignity.175 This is why people seek and do what they advocate. The quest for food, 
cure for diseases, the search for employment, personal responsibility, security and 
protection from oppression, desire for education, private ownership, socio-economic 
progress worthy of humans and enhancement of human values, and freedom from any 
threat to human dignity; all of these contribute to protection or defense or enhancement of 
human dignity. They are genuine human aspirations, which people desire to achieve by 
their own power through the available resources. The problem is that many people live in 
conditions that frustrate these natural, human and genuine desires.176 In Populorum 
Progressio, Paul VI expressed his deepest concerns for human dignity, and demonstrated 
the invaluable character of human dignity. 
When newly independent or less-developed nations overcome frustrating 
conditions and gain their legitimate human enhancement, they can become part of the 
international struggle for true human development. Here Paul VI emphasized human 
dignity, the human person and human rights. They are strongly invoked and advocated as 
reasons for every effort favorable to development.  
Since human dignity is at the center of the human person, it is unjust to deprive a 
person of any opportunities that enhance human dignity. Human dignity is enhanced by 
work because work is dignified. Work has dignity because it is a divine design, mandated 
by God’s command to our first parents to fill the earth and subdue it. The Pontifical 
Commission for Justice and Peace affirms that “even though these words do not refer 
directly and explicitly to work, beyond doubt they indicate it as activity for man to carry 
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out in the world.”177 Work is a duty of all who are capable of work. When people capable 
of work are deprived of this duty or shun this duty, their dignity is depraved/corrupted, 
and this is an injustice. Often times this injustice is detestable because it affects the very 
being of people.  
Paul VI was aware of the invaluable significance of human dignity when he said: 
For when entire populations, deprived of necessities of life, are so subjected to the domination of 
others that they are denied any self initiated activity, responsibility, attainment of higher culture, 
and participation in social and public life, men are easily tempted to remove by force the injustice 
done to human dignity.178  
 
When the core dimension of a person is attacked, there is the inevitable reaction 
in self-assertion by fighting back in self-defense. Here Paul VI addressed the question of 
the significance of people’s self-determination expressed in self-fulfillment. Individual 
and social self-determination and assertion or private and public self-determination and 
assertion of a person is an indication of the need to protect and enhance human dignity. 
One way of asserting oneself is work. Paul VI meant that human dignity is enhanced by 
human involvement and participation in work. He was also suggesting, like other 
theological anthropologists, that the human person should also be defined in terms of 
responsibility expressed through dominion over the rest of creation other than human 
persons and God. Denying a person such an opportunity means tampering with a very 
basic principle and reason for efforts toward human development. Human dignity which 
is (exists) because the human person is created imago Dei is attacked. This assertion is 
credible because if the human person is created in God’s image and does not contribute to 
and participate in work (s)he does not cooperate with God in God’s creative activities. 
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This deprivation is an injustice because the human person is emptied of the core of 
human existence, and human dignity is devoid of its meaning and credibility. It is 
because of such offenses against human dignity that forceful uprisings are often 
inevitable.  
Paul VI was concerned that the population explosion could adversely affect 
human dignity because  
. . . accelerated demographic increases too frequently add difficulties to plan for development 
because population is increased more rapidly than available resources so that all solutions seem to 
end in a blind alley.179  
 
If population growth outpaces the development of available resources, it is either 
too hard to meet the material needs of people, or their needs may be addressed 
inadequately. This militates against human dignity and its consequence is the temptation 
to attempt to address the shortage of material supply by drastically limiting population 
growth using methods that disregard human dignity and the value of the human person. 
This would mean the possibility of violation of human dignity and human rights. It 
explains why, according to Paul VI, wild demographic growth is problematic to authentic 
development.  
Social actions that rest on the philosophy of materialism and atheism are 
detestable from a Christian point of view especially if they have “no regard either for the 
religious outlook directing life to its eternal and final goal, or for freedom, or for human 
dignity.”180 The sole reason behind Paul VI’s assertion is that social organizations are 
established to serve people and to liberate them from desperate circumstances of life. 
Social organizations should work for the enhancement of the human person and dignity.  
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The purpose of natural resources is also the enhancement of the human person 
and human dignity. Individually, nations must work to improve their production both 
quantitatively and qualitatively “to give the life of all their citizens truly human dignity 
and give assistance to the common development of the human race.”181 Paul VI 
advocated that national products must meet the needs of both the nationals and non-
nationals whose life and dignity need to be promoted. Private ownership must give way 
and be rendered powerless when there is excess after meeting the needs of the nationals. 
National private ownership of property including technology and expertise is not an 
absolute right, according to Paul VI. Consequently, he suggested that affluent countries 
should train teachers, engineers, technicians and scholars to serve the less-developed 
people with their knowledge and skill.182 Paul VI linked ownership of private property, 
including professional skills and talents, to human dignity. The right to private ownership 
of property is forfeited in the face of need, precisely, for the sake of promoting or 
protecting human dignity. 
 According to Paul VI the work of experts who move to countries other than their 
own should enhance human dignity. This suggests that the work of both expatriate and 
domestic experts should help change human conditions and improve the quality of life of 
people. Their work should preserve, promote and protect human dignity. This too is the 
reason for the practice of charity and hospitality. It seems right to accept Henriot’s thesis 
that “integral human development requires respect for all human rights and is itself a 
human right” 183 because development is a natural aspiration of all and so it constitutes a 
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right. The logic of this assertion is that human rights are based on the dignity of the 
human person, and this aspiration is directed toward the promotion of human dignity. 
Human person, human dignity and human rights are the enduring principles for 
authentic human development. These are the consistent and recurrent principles of 
Catholic social teaching. Human dignity in particular is central to any teaching related to 
authentic human development. International conferences including the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) of 1994 have given priority to 
people over markets, and emphasized equality of people’s rights.184  
C. Human Rights in Populorum Progressio 
 
Human dignity and human rights are intimately related because human rights are 
based on human dignity; they are affirmations of the existence and recognition of human 
dignity. It must be added that human rights are also protections for human dignity.185 The 
assertion here is that there is a mutual exchange between human rights and human 
dignity. Human dignity is recognized and respected if human freedom and self-
determination are inviolate. 
Populorum Progressio did not treat human rights in depth the way its predecessor 
document, Pacem in Terris, did, but Paul VI did not overlook human rights. In fact his 
treatise on human dignity, the common good, subsidiarity, participation, association and 
justice are a treatise of human rights. However, his treatise on human rights was more 
focused and emphatic on the right to ownership of property. In treating this right there are 
actually two contending rights, the right to free access to use resources of nature and the 
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individual’s right to own property.  
According to Peter Riga, in the thought of Paul VI the right to ownership of 
property is subordinated to the right of the usage of the fruits of one’s talents and the 
protection of health, suggesting that conservation of life comes before the right of 
property.186 Paul VI does not object to the right to own property. He objected to the 
absolute claim for the right and emphasized the limited nature of the right to use 
property; and the obligation to share with those who lack the means of livelihood because 
the resources of nature are destined for the good of all people. Paul VI’s affirmation of 
the universal destiny of natural resources, with his predecessors, sets limits to the right of 
private ownership of property and the exclusive use of property.187 He consistently 
emphasized that the right of ownership of property was limited by other virtues, 
conditions and principles necessary for human growth, including the principle of the 
common good.188 
Apart from property rights Paul VI affirmed other rights such as the right to free 
trade, the right to life and the right to have a family, but he subordinated all to the 
universal destiny of goods of nature. Consequently, with regard to ownership of property 
he insisted that “the absolute right of private property is a grave aberration.”189 Absolute 
ownership violates the real meaning of the the right to private ownership of private 
property. Paul VI treated the right to life, the right of families, “the rightful freedom of 
married people”, and “the most inalienable rights of matrimony and procreation” which 
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Paul VI thought if taken away means the destruction of human dignity.190 Paul VI did not 
elaborate these affirmations enough but his reference to procreation draws attention to the 
divine plan and the means through which human persons manifest the image of God and 
also promote human life and society. In stating that parents have the right to determine 
the number of children they wish to have, he advocated that parents’ human rights go 
with responsibility to the community and their children. Therefore, exercise of rights 
should be in a responsible fashion because they have corresponding duties and they 
should promote human dignity and the human person.191  
Paul VI advocated the right to development of the less developed peoples, and the 
right to development of all peoples as the theme of the encyclical suggests.192 This view 
reflects not only Paul VI’s mind. It was also what the drafters of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights stated and referred to as “full development on the part of 
individual.”193 The evidence that this was what he advocated is to be understood in the 
light of the entirety of Populorum Progressio. The whole document focused on the issue 
of true or complete human development. In terms of rights, its gravity is on the question 
of the right of everybody and all people to develop.  
Riga’s reading of Paul VI, which I think is correct, suggests that the right to 
development is globally to be promoted through international relationships.194 The 
explanation for this affirmation is the social nature of the human person and practical life 
which demands interaction with others. This affirmation calls for international 
                                                 
190 Populorum Progressio, 37, 16. 
191 Riga, 109. 
192 Populorum Progressio, 64, 27. 
193 Johannes Morsink, 210. 
194 Riga, 133. 
  299
collaboration, associations, and participation in human development. It also demands 
world unity and government which promotes “the rights and dignity of the human 
person”195, a body Paul VI strongly suggests and evinces in his support for the United 
Nations. 
Paul VI’s advocacy for development of the peoples sums up his treatise on human 
rights. The right to property is the most extensively treated individual human right in 
Populorum Progressio. However, the issues he addressed in the whole document are 
rights-related because he addressed threats to human dignity, which is the foundation for 
human rights. For instance, there is no doubt that when he addressed the injustices of the 
time he was at the same time suggesting that those who were being treated unjustly had a 
right to fair treatment. 
At the beginning of this chapter I made an allusion to Robert Royal’s claim that 
Paul VI failed to articulate true development in light of the church’s views of the human 
person.196 In fairness to Populorum Progressio, it is questionable whether a critique of 
failure of application of Christian anthropology is well-grounded because Populorum 
Progressio dealt with concerns about people. Paul VI never devoted a section of the 
encyclical to an anthropology necessary for understanding integral human development. 
He was not making an anthropological treatise per se. However, his treatise of 
development was in light of the Christian understanding of the human person. His 
principal concern was the development of peoples and the reasons for lack of integral 
development of peoples, and the requisite principles, virtues and conditions for integral 
human development, although an explicit anthropology would have facilitated his 
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articulation of the question of development. However, anthropology features in his 
espousing of the requisite principles, virtues and conditions for integral human 
development as outlined in the document.  
VI. RECONCILIATION OF NOTIONS: THE NEED FOR AN INCLUSIVE VISION 
 
A. Impediments to Reconciliation of the Concepts 
 
 A number of factors stand in the way of reconciliation between Western 
individualist concepts of the human person, human dignity and human rights, and African 
communitarian notions. This section outlines some conspicuous obstacles to the process 
of dialogue between liberal and communitarian anthropologies. 
 In the first place, dialogue is facilitated by language because it is a real 
communication medium and exercise. One of the difficulties in the dialogue between 
liberal Western anthropology and communitarian Third-world anthropology, particularly 
regarding the notion of human rights, is the language for communication. According to 
Asmarom Legesse, the main problem is that “different societies formulate their 
conception of human rights in diverse cultural idioms.”197 Practically, this makes the 
articulation of the concept of rights problematic. The need to develop a better and 
inclusive language is real. This need is suggested by the shared human nature. Human 
beings are “by nature dialogical creatures.”198 Persons have the ability for mutual 
exchange of views, and because of this ability they can arrive at a consensus. The 
medium of this mutual exchange is speech. Speech itself is “essentially other oriented.”199 
                                                 
197 Legesse Asmarom, “Human Rights in African Political Culture” in The Moral Imperatives of Human 
Rights: A World Survey, Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Washington, D C: University Press of America, 
1980), 124. 
198 Gregory Baum, Essays in Critical Theology (Missouri, Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1994), 19. 
199 Ibid. 
  301
It facilitates this mutual exchange of views through language. A mutually intelligible 
language for articulating the notion of human rights is necessary. 
 Secondly, there is the problem of a distinct individual as opposed to other 
individuals or society/community. In this line communitarian critics of liberalism think 
that the latter needs community only for self-security.200 Uzukwu succinctly states this 
idea:  
While the African social definition of a person displays the human person as subsistent 
relationship - in other words, the person as fundamentally “being with” and “belonging to”- 
Western philosophy lays emphasis on the absolute originality and concreteness of the human 
person, a “being-for-itself”. . . . However, Western systems wish to guard against the dissolution 
of the person in relationship. The “I” is already constituted before it ever chooses to be related. 
The autonomy and the incommunicability of the “I” are fundamental. 201  
 
Uzukwu is addressing the question of a radical separation between the individual and 
community. The problem here is the one of the notion of the human person. He suggests 
that it is the problem of resolving the “I-you”, “I-they” and “We-they” relationships and 
differences. If this is true it is a real problem in the attempt to reconcile the individualist 
West and the communitarian African visions of rights, person and human dignity. It is 
also a problem manifested in co-operative action, especially in pluralistic contexts. In 
light of Uzukwu’s assertion about the Western vision of a person as not emphatically 
related to others it would be questionable how rights could exist in the West if rights are 
claims persons have on other people. This in itself is enough to suggest that the individual 
is not really exclusively autonomous. One would even wonder how organizations or 
associations, that are characteristic of the west as opposed to the communitarian Africa, 
could exist without people relating to and defining themselves in relation to other people. 
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However, Uzukwu recognizes the interaction between the individual and community in 
the Western context. This idea is suggested by his assertion that right from medieval 
times, Western philosophy - phenomenology and existentialism - recognized the 
importance of relationship for self-realization of the individual.202 The issue raised by 
Uzukwu is only the issue of emphasis on community and the individual independently of 
each other. 
Josef Fuchs acknowledges this difficulty. According to him  
the ‘I’ and the Others are personal individuals and not simply identical, with the exception of 
personal dignity in which we are all equal. But the human concreteness in which personal dignity 
is incarnate is not the same in different human beings, even if the dignity itself is the same for all: 
this concrete difference is the source of difficulty.203  
 
The assertion that individuals are different should be acknowledged. It impacts 
their existential relations and claims on one another. Similarly, Mark G. Kuzewski is of 
the idea that “the main problem is liberalism’s voluntaristic notion of a person.”204 Such a 
notion of person creates a plurality of nationalities, personalities and interests with a 
consequent rift between one individual and another or other groups of individuals. To 
argue for a commonly-shared concept of human dignity and human rights on such basis is 
problematic. Consequently, a common denominator for understanding rights and human 
person is called for here. A foundation that unites, modifies and facilitates relations 
between individuals is needed. 
 The third problem, closely related to the second, is the one of the concept of the 
self. Liberal individualism and communitarianism look at the self differently. Walzer’s 
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contention suggests this. According to him, communitarian critics of liberalism think that 
Liberalism . . . is founded on the idea of a presocial self, a solitary and sometimes heroic 
individual confronting society, who is fully formed before the confrontation begins . . . . The 
critics are commonly said to believe in a radically socialized self that can never ‘confront’ society 
because it is from the beginning, entangled in society, itself the embodiment of social values.205  
 
The assertion here is that for liberals the individual comes before society or 
community because society is constituted by individuals while communitarians contest 
such assertion. The issue here is whether the self is predetermined, or at least shaped by 
society or developed in community. The appropriate response is an affirmation of the 
latter - the individual is shaped or influenced by the community, although the community 
is affected by the life of the individual. The liberal tradition of the human person and 
rights recognizes this but emphasizes that the individual comes before society, which is 
right, while the communitarian vision tends to emphasize community more than the 
individual. This suggests why Western individualist notions of human person and human 
rights and African communitarian concepts are contending notions though not mutually 
exclusive. 
 The fourth impediment to reconciliation of Western and African concepts of 
human rights is the difference in the conception of the notion of human freedom. Bujo 
claims that according to Kant  
freedom is the sole, original right, to which every human being is entitled on the basis of humanity 
itself, as long as freedom can exist together with every other freedom in accordance with a general 
law.206  
 
Freedom is part of Kant’s categorical imperative that ought to be respected. This 
seems to be why in the Western context freedom is often conceived as “freedom from 
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interference of the exercise of one’s rights”207or freedom from oppressive systems. It is 
freedom as liberation. On the other hand, in the African conception, freedom is viewed as 
freedom for promoting community. The major difference and problem is the West’s 
laissez faire notion of freedom as opposed to the conservative African notion of freedom 
which is limited by society. 
 The last significant problem in the dialogue between notions of person and rights 
is that of degrees of values so that “when forced to choose between basic values, societies 
rank them differently.”208 This problem is present in the ways the Western world and 
Africans or the third world in general look at the individual and community, value them; 
and outline the nature of the human person and human rights. The difference in visions is 
also manifest in what the two traditions want to protect, what their needs are and the 
circumstances in which individuals and communities find themselves, economically, 
socially and politically. A few problematic enduring questions are inevitable here: Is 
there any culture that can claim superiority for its values? On what grounds can such 
claims be made? Finally, are hierarchies of values important in the dialogue about human 
person, human dignity and human rights?209 These questions invoke further elucidation 
about the place and significance of hierarchy of values in anthropology. They will not be 
investigated here but they stimulate further reflections on the issue of human person, 
human dignity and human rights. 
 From the foregoing discussion there are three areas of differences between the 
Euro-American vision and the African communitarian visions of person and rights. First, 
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there is difference in the starting point of the notion of rights or the human person. While 
the Western notion starts with individual freedom, the African communitarian notion 
starts with the community. Secondly, there is difference in emphasis on the individual 
and community. While the Western liberal vision emphasizes the individual more than 
the community, the African communitarian notion emphasizes the community more than 
the individual. Thirdly, there is difference in limitation of the individual or community. 
While in the Western context the individual tends to limit community, in the African 
communitarian view the community tends to limit the individual. These issues and 
similar problems further raise the question as to whether the notions of the human person, 
human dignity; and human rights from the Euro-American and African communitarian 
points of view can be reconciled. The next section of this work tries to show how and 
how far some of these difficulties can be resolved. It attempts to show the mutually 
inclusive aspects of Western-liberal and African-communitarian concepts. The mediating 
factor is the Roman Catholic understanding of the human person and human rights.  
B. Reconciling Notions: The Roman Catholic Tradition 
  
  Even if there are some differences between the liberal and communitarian 
anthropologies, they can be reconciled. Their reconciliation is a necessary factor for the 
attainment of integral human development. In the attempt to resolve the conflicts between 
the Euro-American liberal notion and the African communitarian anthropological 
concepts Roman Catholic tradition is necessary for mediation. A number of observations 
are, however, necessary at the outset.  
First, the Roman Catholic Church acknowledges that human dignity and human 
rights exist and they initially originate from God. Secondly, the Church looks at herself as 
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a community of the people of God consisting of individual persons. These two statements 
suggest the conviction in the Roman Catholic tradition about the import of both the 
individual and community. From the Roman Catholic point of view, the possibility of the 
reconciliation of the Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of 
rights lies in the proper understanding of the individual, the community, their origins and 
mutual interaction. Other arguments revolve around this conviction. Thirdly, the attempt 
to reconcile the two notions of rights is based on the consistent modern Roman Catholic 
tradition often “dominated by one basic theme - an unshakeable affirmation and vigorous 
defense of the dignity and rights of the human person.”210 David Hollenbach’s remarks 
about the Catholic tradition are significant for acknowledging its mediating role, 
especially in Catholic human rights tradition. He states that  
Catholic rights theory is far removed from individualist or libertarian social philosophy. The 
theory presented in the encyclicals is “personalist”, not individualist, and it recognizes that persons 
are essentially social and institution building beings.211  
 
This statement supports the social and political thoughts of Aristotle, later 
developed by Aquinas, one of the principal architects of Catholic theology based on 
philosophical principles or categories. According to Aquinas the socio-political 
orientation of a person is natural but it does not exclude the individuality of a person. The 
Roman Catholic tradition precisely emphasizes both the individual and society. The 
moral injunction provided by the personalist vision of the human person is close to, if not 
like, the Kantian categorical imperative forbidding the use of the human person as a 
means to an end, but it has also the “positive content (Thou shalt love!),” not only the 
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“negative content, (Thou shalt not use).”212 It differs from other theories of human rights 
by its balanced emphasis on both the individual and the social dimension of the human 
person and its introduction of human dignity, originating from God, into the human rights 
arguments.  
The two visions of human rights can be reconciled. The attempt to reconcile the 
liberal and communitarian concepts of rights is treated under five sub-themes: human 
dignity based on the principle of imago Dei, which is the greatest concern of the Catholic 
documents, the question of the individual versus community, the concept of freedom, the 
problem of language, and the diversity of values. 
1. HUMAN DIGNITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION 
 
 Human dignity is the most important principle in the Roman Catholic human 
rights arguments. Its importance lies in the assertion that  
human dignity is not a concept which derives its meaning from a particular class or genus of 
human action. It has a reality in all situations, independent of the kinds of actions and relations 
which give them structures.213  
 
The dignity of the human person has a transcendent origin, it is an ontological 
reality. This assertion has been the consistent emphasis of the Roman Catholic 
magisterial doctrine since Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891). Besides 
affirming the equality of human dignity in all people, the basic and enduring statement of 
Leo XIII is that “man precedes the State,” suggesting that “the worth of human beings . . . 
is the standard by which political and legal institutions are to be evaluated.”214 The 
priority of the individual and human dignity is stated here. This is not, however, an 
absolute contention that emphasizes only the individual. Leo XIII also invaluably united 
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the two crucial dimensions of the human person - the individual and social dimensions - 
in his formulation of rights and duties. According to Williams, three elements of the 
document account for this fact: human dignity, social interaction and social institutions 
which Leo XIII proposed. This suggests that any claim and exercise of rights is not 
detached from concrete situations and other individuals or groups. Catholic social thought 
preceding Populorum Progressio was based on the affirmation of human dignity and the 
social nature of the human person. Paul VI was aware of this and suggested this 
affirmation in his treatise of the right to private ownership of property. 
 In his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pius XI also emphasized the dignity of the 
human person as the foundation of human rights. Hollenbach says that  
all of Pius XI’s claims about respect for persons’ claims to material, bodily, and even 
psychological necessities are ultimately founded on a characteristic of the person which transcends 
any and all of these needs.215  
 
Rights are claims dependent on and defined in terms of human dignity. They are 
not arbitrary claims. They are claims commonly shared by all on the basis of a human 
characteristic that transcends needs, interests and desires. The assertion suggests that 
human dignity - the transcendent characteristic of persons - comes even before claims 
(rights), needs, desires and interests. There is no authentic human right without human 
dignity. Human dignity necessarily precedes human rights, and the demand for 
satisfaction of human needs, interests, claims and desires. This affirmation explains the 
call for respect for human rights, human dignity and the human person. Robert Audi and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff concur with the affirmation, and state the respect for persons is a 
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central notion in ethics and also for citizenship.216 This suggests that according to the duo 
liberal democracy emphasizes the importance of mutual respect in ethics and human 
relations. 
To acknowledge that human dignity deserves respect demands that it should not 
be arbitrarily abused for selfish interests because it is an honorable quality shared by all. 
Both Western individualist and African communitarian rights advocates need to 
incorporate this idea in order to reach a consensus about the notion of human rights, 
because it creates a possibility of uniting the individual and community. Human dignity is 
an absolutum and a conditio sine qua non for determining human rights. Without human 
dignity there are no human rights even if human rights in turn protect human dignity. To 
reconcile the Western and the African notions of human rights, a common denominator, 
which at the same time is the ultimate foundation for articulating the concept is 
necessary. Without such a foundation any human rights concept is arbitrary and the two 
trends of thought cannot be united because they each argue from different foundational 
determinants of human rights. For individualism and communitarianism to be reconciled, 
the notion of human dignity should be accurately articuated and grasped. 
Robert A. Evan’s contention that human dignity needs to be seen as a quality 
bestowed on all by God, “something that people have, rather than something they earn or 
are granted by family, society or government”217 is crucial for reconciliation between the 
individualist vision of rights and the communitarian vision. Human rights are not 
determined by individuals, community, social structures or institutions. They are 
                                                 
216 Audi and Wolterstorff, 172. 
217 Robert A.. Evans, “From Reflection to Action,” in Human Rights: A Dialogue Between the First and 
Third Worlds, Ed. Robert A. Evans and Alice Frazer Evans (New York: Lutherworth Press, 1983), 247.  
  310
determined by God through human dignity which is an ontological reality. It is only when 
any concept of human rights takes seriously the transcendent dimension and origin of the 
human person that a common notion of human rights is possible. This is what the 
Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts need to incorporate as the 
basis of their explication of the notion of the human person, human dignity and human 
rights in order to arrive at a consensus view of human rights. 
2. PRUDENCE IN THE PRIORITY OF INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY  
 
The main issue addressed in this section is the relation of the individual to 
community. It is partly the problem of the Sitz-im leben of the development of the human 
person or personhood. Although human dignity is, at least in Roman Catholic tradition, 
the ultimate foundation of rights, the understanding of the individual in relation to 
community is crucial for the right understanding of human rights. Therefore, the issues 
are particularity and universality, unity and plurality. 
Pius XI’s encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, emphasized the transcendental origin 
of the dignity of the human person in relation to community.218 Although the document is 
more concerned with issues of social justice, it touches the question of human rights. This 
is evident in its basic contention that “liberalistic individualism which subordinates 
society to the selfish use of the individual” should be avoided because the individual is in 
“organic union with society,” and by mutual collaboration “the attainment of earthly 
happiness is placed within the reach of all.”219 The individual is recognized but not 
independently of community because the two are tied together by a mutual relationship. 
Leo XIII’s emphasis on the primacy of human dignity is reaffirmed and the role of 
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institutions in mediating and shaping human rights is stated by Pius XI too.220 Similarly, 
from a communitarian point of view, Bujo asserts that in the African context  
Although the individual is embedded in the community, he or she is a unique and inexchangeable 
being, who has irreplaceable tasks within a community. The individual has to act in solidarity with 
the lineage, while retaining his/her identity as well as showing the responsibility entrusted to him 
or her.221  
 
According to Bujo, individuality does not get lost, it is not subordinated to 
community. This is a point emphasized by John Paul II in the entirety of Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis, where the individual and community are on par, and viewed as necessarily 
related. Prior to this John Paul II, then Karol Wojtyla, emphasized that when a person is 
viewed in the context of community, humanness should be seriously considered because 
it unites people, it is shared by all people, and "it puts into the forefront man's relation 
and subordination to a given community."222 The individual is a distinct portion of 
community. 
In his attempt to resolve the issue of the relation of the individual to society, Pius 
XII emphasized social morality using the notion of “responsible citizenship.”223 The term 
‘responsible citizenship’ is significant in the reconciliation of the Western individualist 
and African communitarian concepts of human rights because it suggests a notion of 
rights which combines both notions. It shows mutual concern of individuals as well as 
that of an individual and community. A responsible citizen is not eccentric. In other 
words, a responsible citizen does not deviate from community but is an individual 
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conscious about duty toward self and toward others.224  
John XXIII’s emphasis, in Mater et Magistra, on the dual context of human 
dignity and rights is important. In the document he stresses that interdependence is vital 
because “human dignity can only exist within a consciously developed context of human 
interdependence.”225 This means persons need to understand that they are dependent on 
each other and there is something worthy in other people. Unless this conception exists, it 
is difficult to recognize the dignity of other people. This is a reality present in the African 
notion of the human person, but not much deepened by the Western notion of the human 
person. Western anthropology of rights, therefore, needs to seriously consider that “it is 
in the belief in human interrelatedness, human reciprocity, that the key for solving the 
problem of human rights is to be found.”226 It is when people recognize equality of 
dignity and mutual responsibility, that the possibility of global human rights becomes 
real. This assertion calls for a mutual relationship in which there is not an overemphasis 
of distinctions. Instead the distinctions of I and You or They; and the We and They, melt 
into a We relationship and human identity. This suggests that people need to understand 
that they are dependent on each other, and there is no need for tribalism or parochialism. 
This manifests a recognition of the universality of human dignity, and equality of rights 
of all without losing sight of the distinct individual.  
The notion of interdependence reflects the biblical teaching on the equality of 
persons, which is vital in the conception of equality of human dignity. This equality of 
dignity is based on the fact that all are created in the image of God. This is a fact extant in 
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the sacred scriptures (Cfr. Gen. 1: 26-27). Both the Old Testament and the New 
Testament emphasize the equality of the dignity of the human person. This biblical view 
of human dignity is distinct from Western and African communitarian concepts of rights, 
which can be inferred from the contention of Montgomery, who asserts that the 
. . . biblical approach to human dignity cannot he identified with the barren extremes either of 
eighteenth century western liberal philosophy or Marxist-Socialist collectivisms.227  
 
The biblical vision of human dignity can be utilized for reconciling the liberal and 
communitarian visions of human rights because it stands in between the two. What the 
liberal notion and the communitarian notion of rights need is emphasis on human dignity 
as the foundation of human rights. Once this foundation is incorporated into both, their 
reconciliation is less problematic because at this point they have a common and 
transcendent ground for articulating the notion of human rights and the human person. 
The Roman Catholic principle of the common good can also contribute to the 
dialogue between the liberal and communitarian human rights concepts because it places 
rights in both a social and an individual context. As Hollenbach states Mater et Magistra 
defines the common good as “the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby 
men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection.”228 This 
principle is vital for resolving the conflict between the individualist and communitarian 
notions of human rights because it joins the good of each person to the good of all, the 
good of community. It shows that Catholic tradition rejects extremes of individualism 
and communitarianism, but incorporates elements of both to build a tradition of its own. 
The principle combines both elements because the promotion of the common good calls 
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for the promotion of the rights and the good of every individual member of the 
community. It considers both the individual and community important. The Western 
individualist who emphasizes freedom, concreteness and autonomy of the individual, and 
the African communitarian, who stresses the communal character of persons, can feel 
comfortable with the principle of common good, even if not absolutely, because the 
elements of the two notions are included in this principle. The principle is, therefore, 
necessary in the attempt to resolve the conflicts between the individualist and 
communitarian notions because it provides checks and balances in the course of 
articulating the notion of human rights. As Hollenbach suggests, society is necessary for 
founding, supporting, conditioning and limiting human rights.229 Society checks extremes 
of individualism and at the same time protects its individual members. Both the society 
and the individual need one another for a balanced self-conception.  
 The dual emphasis of the value of community and the individual is further noticed 
in two other Roman Catholic documents - Pacem in Terris and Gaudium et Spes. First, 
according to Hollenbach, Pacem in Terris underscores the importance of both social and 
communal rights and acknowledges rights stressed by both the liberal democratic 
tradition and socialism as crucial in the human rights talk. The principal norm for 
acknowledgement of rights emphasized in both traditions is human dignity. Such rights, 
as listed by Hollenbach, include: life-related rights, rights concerning adequate standard 
of living, moral and cultural values, religious activity, family life, economic life, 
assembly and association, freedom of movement, and political rights.230 These rights are 
all claims relevant in both liberal democratic and socialist settings on the basis of the 
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universality of human dignity. The two concepts of rights - the individualist concept and 
the communitarian concept - fall under either of these trends or ideologies. They can be 
reconciled by applying John XXIII’s vision of human rights strongly established on 
human dignity.  
Secondly, the Vatican Council II’s Gaudium et Spes, advocates that “if persons in 
society possess a transcendental worth, then the structures of social organization are 
confronted with claims to serve and protect personal dignity.”231 That the dignity of every 
human individual is important is stated here. Community ought to protect the individual 
dignity and rights. This is an idea that features in both the Western and African contexts 
of human rights, though with a difference in degree of emphasis. In the Western context, 
unlike in the African context, “relationship is not constitutive of the being of humans, . . . 
it is fundamental to human existence.”232 This is where one of the fundamental 
differences between the Western individualist and the African communitarian notions of 
person and rights lies. However, similarity is evident because social relationship is still 
fundamental for human existence.233 Here one notices that the difference between the 
Western and the African notion of the human person, the self and human rights, gets 
more blurred - a signal for the possibility of reconciliation of the two, though the notion 
of the human person as a social entity seems to be more conspicuous in the African 
concept of person than in the Western vision. The document unites the Western and the 
African notions of person by its recognition of the value of “social interdependence and 
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the essential social nature of the human person.”234 The communal dimension of persons, 
which also features in both Western and African contexts, is affirmed though the African 
communitarian vision tends to emphasize the communal dimension more than the 
Western individualist vision which is more concerned about individual rights than about 
society. This conciliar view of the human person points to the possibility of reconciling 
the two trends of human rights arguments because the document presents human persons 
as being in a dialogical relationship. The notion of rights derived from both individual 
and social understandings of the human person projects human rights as being in constant 
conversation. 
One of the fundamental and reconciling concepts in the Roman Catholic human 
rights tradition is the one of solidarity introduced into the rights talk by John Paul II in 
his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. The document affirms the value of solidarity in the 
following terms: 
Solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’- whether a person, people or nation - not just as some kind of 
instrument with a work capacity and physical strength to be exploited at low cost and then to be 
discarded when no longer useful, but as our ‘neighbor’, a ‘helper’ (Cfr. Gen.2: 8-20), to be a 
sharer, on a par with ourselves, in the banquet of life to which all are invited by God.235  
 
Solidarity is closely related to the principle of common good. Its import in the 
human rights dialogue is its emphasis on the individual’s commitment to community. 
Like the notion of interdependence, it stresses the fact that people need each other to be 
and to become better. This point is well taken by the African notion of the human person 
because “the value of life consists in solidarity and participation of the individual entities 
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in the totality of the whole reality.”236 The main issue is that solidarity constitutes the 
essential trait of Africans. The Sitz-im Leben of a fully developed person is community 
and communal relations because community is for meeting the needs of the individual as 
well as the entire society. This is why human need, and it should be added, human dignity 
or right is “the basic criterion of behavior.”237 Solidarity, hence, defines the self in terms 
of society or other selves and vice versa. If this definition of the self and community is 
acknowledged, reconciliation of the individualist and the communitarian notions of rights 
can be visualized because there is no more clear distinction between the individual person 
and the community since they define, or are defined, in terms of each other.  
Finally, the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity is vital for the reconciliation 
of Western and the African concepts of human rights because it facilitates the dialogue in 
human rights. Verbatim, the principle is stated as:  
Subsidiarity is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one 
should not withdraw from individuals what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and 
industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right 
order to transfer from the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be found and provided 
by the lesser and subordinate bodies. In as much as every social activity should, by its very nature, 
prove a help to the members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them.238  
 
The principle of subsidiarity advocates that the independent decisions and actions 
of the individual and the intervention of community are legitimate when it is reasonable 
and necessary for both the individual and society. The individual is recognized as much 
as the community on account of natural competence to decide and to act. In other words, 
society’s interference with the individual’s right to decide or act for the good or 
promotion of his/her dignity is a violation of rights. And the society’s refusal to intervene 
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to save an individual from a violence against his/her rights, when the individual is 
incompetent, is itself a violence against the dignity of the individual. Conversely, the 
individual’s refusal to act for the protection or promotion of his/her rights or dignity, 
when capable, is a self-inflicted violation of dignity and rights, contrary to the spirit of 
solidarity and common good. The individual’s refusal of community intervention, when 
he/she is incapable, is another self-inflicted violation of rights and dignity. 
From the foregoing analysis, the principle of subsidiarity seems to suggest an 
incorporation of both individual and communal exercise of rights. But it does so within 
limits of reason, necessity and competence. It permits both individual and communal 
exercise of rights provided that the consequences do not violate the individual’s rights 
and duties, and the rights and duties of others in community. This is where the liberal 
human rights advocate recognizes that rights are not absolute claims and the 
communitarian rights advocate should not suppress the individual’s exercise of rights 
unnecessarily. The solution to the problem of limits of the exercise of rights seems to be 
extant in the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity. 
With regard to the individual’s relationship with society, in the context of human 
rights, the following points are crucial: An appropriate understanding of the human 
person is necessary to resolve the conflict between the two human rights concepts. The 
human person needs to be understood as “an individual with intellect and will: the 
capacities of insight and judgment, choice and decision, an individual able to inquire and 
to choose.”239 Persons should be conceived both as subjects and objects of experience and 
“the moral subject can be, in a way, a plurality of persons or selves within a single 
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individual human being.”240  
Considering the two conceptions of the human person jointly, it is noticeable that 
both subjective and objective dimensions of a human person are stated. This is what 
explains the interior tensions in an individual in a process of deliberation, choice and self-
affirmation or determination. It suggests that one person ‘co-exists with many persons’ 
within him/herself; there is in each person a community, if not of persons, of views or 
opinions. If this can happen within an individual, there is also a possibility for it to 
happen with an individual in relation to an outside community, even if the opposite is 
also true. This shows that the individual and the community are inseparable, at least at 
certain moments and so the individualist notion of rights and the communitarian notion 
can be reconciled. 
 In an attempt to bring consensus between the individual and the community with 
regard to rights, Kuczewski aptly suggests that “the self regains contents via knowledge 
and participation in the community of which he/she is a member.”241 There is a mutual 
exchange between the individual and the community. As far as there is such exchange, 
the individualist concept of rights and the communitarian notion of rights are not 
radically separated. There is a possibility of the reconciliation of the two on the basis of 
this mutual exchange. Proposing a radical interdependence between the individual and 
society, Kuczewski reaffirms this in the following words: 
We need to define the self as essentially related to community. The community must be a 
constitutive of the individual’s identity. . . . This makes possible, a positive notion of rights. The 
communitarian is able to embrace a value of rights as basic guarantees that enable the individual to 
discover his or her values and higher preferences.242 
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The social element of the human person is again stated here. From this assertion it 
is right to agree with Walzer that “the liberal ideology of separatism cannot take 
personhood and bondedness away from us. What it does take away is the sense of 
personhood and bondedness.”243 This means that personhood is not exclusively an 
individual reality because it is developed and achieved in community. It is personhood 
that unites individuals. The individual and community are inseparable. What separates 
the individual and community is the loss of sight of this fact. In relation to rights, the 
contention is that rights cannot be absolutely individual claims regardless of community. 
This assertion is augmented by the contemporary Roman Catholic notion of the common 
good, which includes both the individual and the community. The individual and the 
community have a mutual obligation of promoting the good and rights of one another 
because an “individual stands in an ultimate relation to the community and vice versa.”244 
In other words, there is a moment of coincidence of both the individual and the 
community or their interests. This is why, in rights claims, both individual or personal 
good and the common good have to be valued equally. This way neither individual rights 
nor the claims of community are given priority. Instead both are placed at the same level. 
Consequently, the problems of individual or communal absolutism and the one of 
overemphasis of only one dimension of the human person and rights disappear.  
 It seems plausible to conclude, as Uzukwu advocates, that an unbalanced view of 
the human person is problematic only when priority is given either to the individual or 
the community alone because overemphasis on either of them makes the survival of the 
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other problematic.245 The point here is that overemphasis of one means the death of the 
other. There is, hence, a need for balanced emphasis on both the individual and the 
community. The solution to reconcile the Western and the African notions of the human 
person and human rights is to strike a balance of emphasis. Jacques Maritain suggests a 
solution, but it is plausible to concur with Thomas D. Williams who says: 
Maritain holds out a paradox for investigation: humans are beings of inestimable and inviolable 
value, transcending any temporal or political order, yet they find themselves and realize their 
dignity only by participating in (and, in so doing, subordinating themselves to) community. The 
human person simultaneously transcends and is subordinate to the common good.246 
 
 This affirmation stands out as paradox because of the mutual dependence of both 
the individual and the community while at the same time subordinating the former to the 
latter. Indeed such a solution is a paradox because it suggests the importance of both the 
individual and the community. As a solution to the problem it shows how important both 
the individual and community are in suggesting a notion for the human person, human 
dignity and human rights. This could be considered one of the core arguments for the 
universality of human rights and dignity. Massaro argues and suggests that Maritain’s 
solution to the conflicting vision of human person and human rights is the human 
person’s “immanent aspiration for transcendence”, and subsequently 
Maritain insists on the ultimate inadequacy of any social, political or economic system which fails 
to acknowledge the spiritual nature of persons, possessing as they do aspirations which surpass 
their temporal needs.247  
 
The insistence of Maritain is credible because of the dual dimension of the human 
person - the material and the spiritual dimensions. The spiritual tends to the communal 
while the material tends to individuation. The two dimensions, therefore, do not need to 
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be radically separated as if they are absolutely independent of one another and do not 
exist in the same person. 
3. A RIGHT CONCEPT OF HUMAN FREEDOM  
 
 A proper notion of human freedom is necessary for a credible understanding of 
human rights. At least from a Christian perspective, rights and duties are correlative 
notions rooted in the social nature of persons. This implies that freedom as a right is 
exercised in the context of society and should be defined in a social context. Rights 
cannot be liberally exercised because “the deepest meaning of freedom is ‘freedom for’ 
engagement with others in society.”248 This is a point also stated by John XXIII who, 
according to Hollenbach, contends that rights are not “a jumble of ad hoc claims.”249 
They are mutual claims. This affirmation is plausible because if human rights are not 
defined in terms of mutual human relationships there would be an endless list of rights. 
Hollenbach advocates that Dignitatis Humanae provides a solution for the 
problem of the foundation of rights, their mutual relationship and institutionalization. It is 
concerned with interaction and relationship of persons. The assertion is realistic on the 
basis of his affirmation that the concern of the arguments in the document is  
. . . for the person and his or her freedom to act in society. The state may not substitute itself for 
the responsible citizen. It may regulate, which is to say it may order, human interaction. For 
Dignitatis Humanae, as for Pius XII, order is an ordering of freedom. Only thus is it possible to 
understand the common root of both personal and social rights and to see their essential 
interrelationship with each other.250  
 
This document offers advocacy for freedom in social context. Its assertion is not 
an advocacy for liberal freedom because the exercise of freedom is limited by society. 
The document suggests a responsible exercise of freedom. The exercise of freedom, and 
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ultimately all rights, should be within the limits of social good and demands. John Paul II 
combines both views by affirming, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, that human freedom and 
respect are related to solidarity on both individual and communal levels.251 Freedom with 
mutual respect is, in other words, important for solidarity.  
 A reconciliation of the African communitarian notion of freedom with the Roman 
Catholic understanding is not a problem because the African notion is not libertarian, it 
emphasizes freedom as “freedom for construction of a better community.”252 Bujo 
affirms this view, in the African context, by stating a view consistently emphasized by 
the Roman Catholic social doctrine as necessary for understanding human dignity and 
rights. He says: 
Freedom has always to keep in mind the communitarian dimension and can only be developed 
within the community. Without communitarian relationship there is no identity for the African 
person. Only together with others can one become a human person and achieve individual 
freedom, which again should be exercised in a communitarian manner.253 
  
A careful reading of this statement, suggests that it is rather hard for the 
individualist rights notion to be reconciled with the communitarian notion and the Roman 
Catholic vision. However, the problem could be resolved because both notions express 
that there is individual human freedom. The main problem is how freedom is exercised 
and the context of its exercise. The possibility of reconciliation of the two views of 
freedom lies in the acceptance of the view that no absolute rights exist - a point noted in 
the African communitarian context and less emphasized in the Western vision of 
freedom. I think this is the aspect of freedom most difficult to reconcile in the two visions 
of freedom and human rights.   
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According to Robert Evans, “human dignity”, and I suggest not human freedom, 
“is the Foundation for nurturing and protecting human rights”254 because human freedom 
is just an expression, or an outgrowth, of human dignity. The self-determination of an 
individual can only be authentic and dignified if it does not neglect the dignity of other 
persons. Any claim for absolute self-determination is excessive. It oversteps the limits of 
freedom and denies that there are actually and often conflicts of rights. Freedom needs to 
be conceived as a relational reality because it is limited by the freedoms of other 
individuals or community. In other words, as a right, freedom is a prima facie right. To 
reconcile the liberal and the communitarian concepts of rights a balance of emphasis of 
individual freedom and the freedom of others ought to be maintained. These observations 
make credible Bujo’s assertion that: 
Because of one’s humanity and independently of “personal conditions, political constellations and 
historical circumstances,” everyone shall claim human rights, whereby one’s self-determination, 
that is freedom, should be “compatible” with that of all others. Freedom which is understood in 
this way could be called the only yardstick of human rights. At the same time, it is apparent that 
freedom, which is shown in autonomy, does not support arbitrariness, but stresses to the highest 
degree reasonable and responsible self-determination. This confirms human dignity which belongs 
to each and everyone in an equal manner.255 
 
The importance of this statement lies in one issue Bujo raises. He raises the issue 
of lack of responsible individual claims in the liberal Euro-American concept of human 
rights. His contention is that any claim by an individual without regard for others 
contradicts the authentic meaning and demands of human rights. Rights are exercised 
with the consciousness that other people also have rights and rights claimants have 
obligations to fulfill towards others and themselves. 
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4. COMMON LANGUAGE AS A SOLUTION 
 
The Western individualist and the African communitarian notions of rights need 
an inclusive language to articulate the notion of rights and, consequently, to eliminate 
some of the prevalent conflicts between them. The two trends of human rights advocacy 
have been influenced by the cultural contexts of the people. This in turn has affected their 
way of thinking. The basic reason for the need for an inclusive language is that the two 
trends of thought use different types of language to describe human rights. Michael 
Novak observes that  
two types of languages are associated with liberal individualism and communitarianism. 
Liberalism’s language is the one of rights and freedom while that of communitarianism is of learnt 
virtues and common good.256  
 
These two distinct types of language create a dichotomy of vision between liberal 
individualism and communitarianism. An inclusive language is needed in the formulation 
of a concensus concept of human rights. This means the languages of individualism and 
communalism should be modified rather than claim precedence. They should both 
constitute elements of the notion of human rights.  
It seems inevitable to conclude from the above arguments that the problem of 
rights language can ultimately be resolved by the use of the Roman Catholic traditional 
language of human dignity - transcendent worth shared by all - solidarity, common good, 
subsidiarity, interdependence, transcendent and equally shared values, dual dimension of 
the human person, individual and social constitution and determination of the self, and 
mutual responsibility. The language of I-you, I-they or we-they ought to be replaced by 
we. This last terminology is crucial because it neither excludes the individual as opposed 
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to other individuals nor community or society as opposed to the individual. 
5. A SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
An uncritical study of the Western individualist and the African communitarian 
concepts of human rights would suggest that the two visions cannot be reconciled. A 
critical analysis suggests that reconciliation of the two notions is possible. The difficulty 
in reconciling them lies, first in the absence of emphasis on a common foundation - the 
dignity or the inherent worth of the human person. Secondly, besides the problems of 
language, understanding the constitution and determination of the self, the concept of 
human freedom and the diversity of values, the problem lies in over-emphasis on only 
one aspect of the human person, discrepant language, and vision of the foundation of 
human rights. The two concepts of human rights, independently considered, emphasize 
different but vital domains of the human person, and ultimately, human rights. These 
emphases seem a dichotomy in such philosophies of human rights. Such a dichotomy 
impairs the right vision of human rights. The solution for reconciling the two visions lies 
in placing the Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of human 
rights on par. An analysis of the two philosophies of human rights and their constituent 
elements suggests a possibility for reconciliation of the two. 
The Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of human 
rights are distinct but not absolutely contradictory because community is not totally 
independent of the individual and vice versa. This possibility is suggested by the Roman 
Catholic human rights tradition, especially as expressed in the doctrines of human dignity 
or the human person as an imago Dei, the common good, responsible freedom, 
subsidiarity, solidarity and interdependence. The Roman Catholic tradition of human 
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rights has consistently avoided extremes of the individualist and the communitarian 
understanding of rights by introducing the notion of human dignity, derived from a 
common transcendent source - God - as the foundation of its arguments about human 
rights. By steadily maintaining that the dignity of an individual is not detached from 
occasions of encounter with other individuals in society or community, Roman Catholic 
tradition suggests a unitary nature of human rights and the possibility of reconciliation of 
the two concepts. The inclusive element of the two dimensions of the human person 
seems to be more manifest in the African concept of human rights than in the Western 
notion. Consequently, it seems easier for the African concept of human rights to fit the 
Roman Catholic tradition than the Western concept. However, traces of the communal 
aspect of the human person are present in the liberal concept of rights. The difference is 
the degree of emphasis.  
 A sound concept of human rights integrates crucial concepts such as human 
dignity, individual, community, liberty and equality. This assertion suggests that the 
individual and the community should not be mutually exclusive. It is plausible to 
conclude a treatise on the theme of reconciliation of Western and African concepts of 
human rights with an inclusive definition of human rights. Relying on various definitions 
of the human person, human dignity and human rights, the following definition seems 
reconciliatory: 
Human rights are mutually responsible, moral and just political, civil, economic, social and 
cultural claims or entitlements, immunities or protections and powers of either an individual or 
other individuals who constitute society, exercised for the sake of the individual and society on the 
basis of their equal transcendent worth which may not be violated by any other individual or group 
of individuals.257 
                                                 
257 This is my suggested definition of human rights arrived at on the basis of my readings about the human 
person, human dignity and human rights. The definition shows that human rights are not absolute. In other 
words, human rights are prima facie because they may be overridden at certain times and under certain 
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  From this definition and the preceding discussion, the following observations are 
noteworthy for the reconciliation of the Western and the African concepts of human 
rights. First, the individualist view of human rights fits well in categories of rights such as 
legal or civil and contractual rights. Secondly, rights are neither egoistic nor suppressive, 
neither considering the individual’s selfish interest only nor the community’s 
conditioning and suppressing of individual identity only. Rather they are just claims of 
individuals or the community that do not harm any individual or the community. Finally, 
in terms of entitlement, rights are not a guarantee of authority for individual claims 
regardless of community and vice versa. Instead, they are claims or immunities of an 
individual and community in dialogue. This dialogue is founded on the transcendental 
worth, the dignity of the human person, which is the common characteristic of all people. 
Therefore, human dignity and the mutual relationship between the individual and the 
society are vital for reconciling Western and African concepts of human rights. Although 
possibilities of reconciliation are apparent, an absolute reconciliation is utopian. It is not a 
guarantee because of differences in the foundations of arguments, dispositions to 
reconciliation, thought patterns and contextual experiences. An inclusive vision of the 
human person and human rights is grounded on the assertion that all people have equal 
dignity. The assertion is founded on the idea that all people have the same origin and they 
are imago Dei. The principle of imago Dei, from which the social dimension of a person 
is derived, forms the basis for the reconciliation of the notions of human person and 
human rights because  
                                                                                                                                                 
circumstances. However, they may not and should not be selfish claims. They should protect and provide 
for the good of people. 
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Personality, that spiritual side of man tends by nature to communion, in virtue of its value and 
dignity and of its needs. The knowledge and love, the freedom and responsibility, that enrich and 
enable the personality require relationship with other persons because personality is identical with 
a creative spirit that wants to communicate whatever treasures it has. Likewise personality stands 
in need of dialogue with others because of its deficiencies derived not so much from itself as of its 
material individuality.258  
 
An individual should be recognized as such, but because the individual person 
shares something with other persons, one remains open to incorporate others in one’s life. 
Human dignity is not an absolute personal claim; it is universal. Human rights cannot and 
may never be absolute personal claims because they require similar responses or 
obligations. There is something mutual and obligatory because human dignity prevails in 
each case which calls for respect because of human dignity. Anderson's view of the 
individual and community is significant for understanding this assertion. He says: 
The determination of humanity in general as being with others does not dissolve individual beings 
into corporate being, but results in a determination of humanity in its singularity as well as its 
plurality. This singularity, however, is expressed as reciprocity of being of one with the other and 
also, to an extent for the other.259 
 
The individual should be recognized as a unique being, but is part of a community 
and exists in community. This contention calls for acknowledgment of uniqueness in 
plurality without destroying the social element or dimension of the human person. 
Human person, human dignity and human rights should be viewed in the contexts of both 
the individual and the community. No context should be given precedence or be more 
emphasized than the other. This claim is supported by Mary Ann Glendon’s vision and 
argument about rights. She says: 
The exaggerated absoluteness of our American rights dialect is all the more remarkable when we 
consider how little relation it bears to reality. There is a striking discrepancy . . . between our 
tendency to state rights in a stark unlimited fashion and the common sense restrictions that have to 
be placed on one person’s rights when they collide with those of another person.260 
                                                 
258 Fichtner, 35.  
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 The argument is that it is unrealistic to claim absolute individual rights. This is a 
strong argument because rights are relational and as such they have both individual and 
communal dimensions, none of which is to be neglected in the exercise or recognition of 
rights - claims, duties and responsibilities.  
There is, however, some paradox in understanding the human person and rights in 
both Western-individualist and the African-communitarian contexts in relation to the 
question of integral human development. Sometimes in the so-called individualistic 
societies, such as in the Western world, a better degree of integral development is 
attained while societies that are acknowledged as communitarian, for example African 
societies, tend not to flourish integrally or cooperatively. This paradox may be resolved 
through acknowledgement and esteem for the human person, and the universality of 
human dignity and human rights. 
C. The Importance of Reconciliation of Notions 
 
 An understanding of the human person, human dignity and rights is vital because 
it is related to all people. Consequently, the principal focus of this section is the human 
person, human dignity and human rights that tend to be variously conceived. An 
understanding of the human person and human dignity are crucial because it is through 
this understanding that human dignity can be viewed as an inalienable (God-given) 
element which forms the foundation of human rights.261 This also helps people to rethink 
their vision of persons, their dignity and rights, and eventually try to work for authentic 
human development. They would, for example, rethink their conception of human 
development and their action plans for human development. The issue of human 
                                                 
261 Reichmann, 213. 
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development would not be just a matter of semantic activity, but a process of 
transforming people’s thinking and practical life.  
Divergent views of the human person make application of principles for integral 
human development difficult because principles may be applied in a relative manner, 
depending on which vision of human person, human dignity and human rights is 
emphasized. For instance, a principle like that of common good may be considered of 
less gravity if human person, human dignity and human rights are individualistically 
viewed. Just as various principles are insufficient, independent of each other, there is a 
need to reconcile the notions of human person, human dignity and human rights because 
they are also defined by each other. Such reconciliation is necessary for integral human 
development since it provides for integration of visions. 
 The communitarian views a person to be social, human dignity as shared because 
of its common origin, and human rights as mutual claims and entitlements. Human rights 
necessitate fulfillment of obligations and responsibilities or duties, and freedom is a 
‘freedom from’, leading to a ‘freedom for’ responsible behavior or action. The 
individualist views a person as an independent or distinct entity, human dignity is not 
necessarily shared but individuals have their dignity, and human rights are claims to 
protect the individual. Rights are more commonly considered as ‘freedom from’ binding 
conditions leading to ‘personal or individual gratification’ without ‘freedom for’ 
obligation towards others. If there are such divergent visions of human rights integral 
human development is difficult to achieve. 
There is need to balance the vision of human persons, human dignity and human 
rights. Any claim of ‘absolute rights’ has the negative consequences of “tending to down-
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grade rights into mere expressions of unbounded desires and wants.” 262 Such claims arise 
if there is exaggerated emphasis on the individual dimension of the human person and 
freedom. The consequence is the tendency to make rights absolute as if the person 
claiming rights does not affect or relate with other individuals. If both individuals and 
community are seriously considered in the question of rights, there is mutual 
responsibility or duty. It is here that the elements of care for others and mutual respect are 
expressed. Consequently, love, justice, peace, care for the common good, application of 
the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, participation and association are possible. These 
principles, virtues and conditions provide fertile ground for integral development to 
flourish. For instance, local, national and global integral development can be achieved. 
Exaggerated political tensions, economic differences, nationalism which breeds hatred 
for non-nationals, tribalism, racism or ethnicity can be tempered. It is possible to achieve 
these for at least two reasons. First, a single vision of the human person facilitates a 
uniform vision of human dignity, human rights and people-related problems. Secondly, it 
facilitates the vision of human rights and duties or responsibilities. It makes easy the 
application of the golden rule or mutual relation and action - do unto others what you 
want done to you - in terms of human rights. 
VII. THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE: ITS RELATION TO OTHER DEVELOPMENT FACTORS 
 
A. Human Dignity: The Ultimate Principle for Integral Human Development 
 
 The ultimate principle for integral human development is human dignity. Any 
social teaching starting with any of the principles as most fundamental, for instance the 
common good, as Todd David Whitmore advocates, is questionable because it falls short 
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of the assertion that human dignity is the ultimate principle.263 Human dignity is the 
ultimate principle because it defines the human person and it is the foundation for human 
rights. Since Catholic social doctrine has the human person as its ultimate goal, principles 
related to the human person are foundational. All other virtues, principles; and conditions 
required by integral human development and emphasized in Catholic social teaching are 
related to each other through human dignity. 
In order to be fair to Whitmore, there is no doubt that the common good is a 
necessary condition for the human person, human dignity and human rights to thrive, but 
it is not what is pursued as an end. The common good is a means or stepping stone to 
protect or promote human dignity. The right and ultimate starting point of any morally 
sound social reflection and teaching and integral promotion of people is human dignity. 
Any Catholic social doctrine is ultimately addressing human issues, and specifically 
issues that affect the dignity of the human person. This is the indispensable principle, 
contrary to Whitmore’s suggestion of the common good. Any talk about the common 
good is ultimately directed to the dignity of the human person.  
It is true that both common good and human dignity are transcendent principles in 
the sense that they are not exclusive qualities of an individual. However, only human 
dignity is the most basic or fundamental principle. This argument is better understood 
from the idea that any attempt to develop or to address a social issue is an attempt to 
solve problems which affect human dignity. The principle of common good creates 
conditions for the success of the attempts to resolve the problems.  
                                                 
263 David Todd Whitmore, “Catholic Social Teaching: Starting with the Common Good” in Living the 
Catholic Social Teaching: Cases and Commentary, Ed. Kathleen Maas Weigert and Alexia K. Kelly 
(Lanham: Row and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 59.  
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Whitmore’s order of priority calls for a rearrangement which first takes human 
dignity more seriously and provides the common good for the enhancement of a dignity 
which already exists. If Whitmore’s argument for starting with the common good is “the 
empirical observation that all persons are social,”264 which is affirmed by many authors, 
he also should note that social nature of people is partly explained by what they 
fundamentally share. The fundamental trait which human persons share is human dignity. 
There is, at least, no ground to affirm that the common good is a quality or an experience 
of every person. Human dignity remains the basic principle around which other principles 
are built, either to protect it or to enhance it. It is for this reason that Milburn Thompson 
argues that the dignity of the human person, realized in community, is the foundation of 
Catholic social teaching and its theory of human rights. 265 
The common good is a significant principle for integral human development 
because it is profound in depth and breadth. It includes many other virtues, principles and 
conditions which Maritain emphasizes as necessary for human thriving.266 The common 
good is a comprehensive notion which appears to subordinate human dignity. It is a 
necessary condition for the human person, human dignity and human rights to thrive but 
it is not what is pursued in social contexts as an end. Instead it constitutes a means, a 
stepping-stone, to an end, which is the promotion or enhancement of the human person, 
human rights and human dignity. It is called for because human dignity demands it. This 
does not contradict the assertion that common good is a relevant starting point to reflect 
on human dignity. In fact the latter affirms the importance of the universality of human 
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dignity. To affirm the common good is to affirm the universality of human dignity. 
 Two visions of human dignity suggest themselves as interesting here, and 
probably account for differences in the vision of the human person. But one vision is 
critical for acknowledging the universality of human dignity. These are the vision of 
human dignity as ontological dignity, which is the dignity common to all human beings 
by reason of their nature, and human dignity as moral dignity which is the reflection of 
the “consistency with which a person lives according to moral truth.” 267 The ontological 
dignity is a requirement for moral dignity because the origin of morality is God, the 
ontological and the absolute being or being itself. The ontological dignity is the ground 
for the intelligibility of moral dignity. From the perspective of believers the ultimate 
principle is called imago Dei principle - namely, the human person created in the image 
and likeness of God, the absolute being from whom human dignity or inherent worth 
emanates. This idea is emphatic in the thoughts of Maritain, according to whom  
the deepest layer of the human person’s dignity consists in its property of resembling God -  not in 
a general way after the manner of all creatures, but in a proper way. It is the image of God.268 
 
The affirmation of the principle of imago Dei consistently points to the idea of the 
universality of human dignity and its ultimate and ontological character. The principle, 
therefore, weakens the moral dignity theory because moral dignity suggests a difference 
between the dignity of one person and another. It denies the universality of human 
dignity and suggests that human dignity is variable or dependent on variable factors. 
Consequently, it defies the idea of the ultimate character of human dignity as the ultimate 
principle for integral human development. It is for this reason that ontological dignity, 
                                                 
267 Williams, 156. 
268 Maritain, 42. 
  336
which expresses the ultimate nature of human dignity is preferable to moral dignity as it 
constitutes what may hesitantly be called human dignity. 
B. The Relationship Between Human Dignity and Other Development Factors 
 
 The ultimate and uniting principle of integral human development is human 
dignity because all other principles of Catholic social teaching protect or promote human 
dignity, and are based on human dignity. Theological anthropology suggests that human 
dignity is the ultimate expression of the divine quality, which is the ultimate principle in 
the human person. Consequently, the interrelationship among the principles for integral 
human development is also based on human dignity.  
Succinctly, the relationship between the principles of human development may be 
stated as follows: All the virtues, principles and conditions for integral human 
development, namely charity, human person and human rights, participation, subsidiarity, 
common good, justice, peace, preferential option for the poor, affirmative action, 
solidarity and association are related to each other through human dignity. However, 
charity or love also plays a vital role in the establishment of this relationship because it 
“constitutes the fundamental content of what is ‘due’ to human dignity” and “it also 
mediates between dignity and particular human rights.”269 Human dignity calls for love 
or charity. Love or charity is expressed in the different facets of the principles for integral 
development of peoples as proposed by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. 
Love, peace and justice are virtues necessary for integral human development. 
One significant observation about their relationship to the common good is that they 
manifest the moral dimension of what is properly called the common good. The 
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significance of their relation is that the common good is based on “justice and moral 
goodness.”270  
Human rights are based on human dignity and they promote or protect human 
dignity. The recognition of human rights is indicative of the recognition of human 
dignity. Charity is a manifestation of the recognition of human dignity. The purpose of 
justice is respect and promotion of human dignity and human rights. Justice is a sign of 
respect and recognition of human dignity. It is at the same time founded on human 
dignity and it also protects and promotes human rights.  
Peace is pursued for the sake of human dignity. It is related to justice because 
justice provides the foundation for peace. Peace is also related to love because it is the 
fruit of true love or charity. It is related to solidarity, common good, and participation 
because its attainment demands joint action of people.  
The principle of subsidiarity, which advocates that bigger bodies should allow 
smaller bodies or individuals to do for themselves what they are capable of, is a 
recognition and promotion of the self-worth of individuals and smaller collectivities 
because it allows them to work according to their abilities. Human person, human dignity 
and human rights are also related to the principle of subsidiarity through the exercise of 
human rights. Rights first suggest the existence of an individual even though rights are 
relational. This also suggests that the individual always comes prior to the family or 
society, and so the individual should be given precedence over any kind of collectivity. 
Human constitution in the divine image and their destiny to eternal life “is the origin of 
those primordial rights which political society must respect, and which it may not injure 
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when it requires the service of its members.”271 Respect for the human person, human 
dignity and human rights is suggested in the principle of subsidiarity but the individual 
who is given precedence over a collectivity is also defined against the backdrop of 
community or collectivity. This links the human person, human rights and human dignity 
to solidarity and common good, and ultimately to subsidiarity.  
Preferential option for the poor is emphasized or called for in order to protect or 
promote the dignity of the poor. It is, therefore, recognition of the dignity of the 
disadvantaged. Similarly, affirmative action or aggressive government intervention on 
behalf of those discriminated against or disadvantaged falls into this category. Any such 
intervention is for the protection or promotion of the dignity of such vulnerable people.  
The principle of the common good is related to the human person, human dignity 
and human rights. Common good implies that there is some shared quality among people, 
and a person is a reflection of the entire community. Such a reflection or mirroring 
depends on the exercise of respect for human persons, human dignity and human rights. 
The common good partially consists in respect for and the promotion of human rights and 
human dignity. Human dignity and human rights contribute to the common good because 
human rights protect human dignity and they are founded on human dignity. They 
mutually help each other and create part of the conditions demanded by common good as 
necessary for human flourishing. 
The principle of common good is also related to solidarity, association and 
participation because all of these suggest that human dignity is recognized. Solidarity 
suggests that there is inner worth in every person, and this is why people need one 
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another to be and to become. Common good is demanded for the promotion and 
protection of human dignity. Association is possible on the basis of recognition of the 
value or worth of the other. Participation by all is also based on the understanding that 
other people have something to offer. They should be given a chance to contribute 
because they have inherent worth. 
 From the above observations, it is proper to make the following assertions: First, 
it is important to emphasize the relationship among the different virtues, principles and 
conditions for integral human development because they are dependent on each other 
directly or indirectly, and thus complementary. To consider the significance of the 
principles absolutely individually is to deny what Paul VI advocated and called integral 
human development. Secondly, the application and functioning of each principle is 
facilitated by and directed to the same purpose or goal, the protection and enhancement 
of human dignity. This constitutes a reason for the assertion that human dignity is the 
ultimate principle and link between all the principles. Each of the principles is based on 
and directed to human dignity. All other principles, conditions and virtues necessary for 
integral human development are related to each other, and should be treated as part and 
parcel of one another. Thirdly, to argue that the various principles for integral human 
development are independent of one another is to fragment and destroy the integrity of 
the human person, human dignity, human rights and integral human development. Since 
all the principles, virtues and conditions are based on and directed to human dignity, they 
are related to each other through human dignity. Therefore, it is realistic to affirm that 
none of the principles, virtues and conditions for integral human development is 
dispensable. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The litmus test for authentic human development is how much the life, the 
dignity, and rights of the human person are esteemed, cared for and protected, both 
individually and collectively. This test depends on a proper understanding of the human 
person, human dignity, human rights and true human development. From the 
investigations in this chapter a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, there are 
diverse anthropologies both secular and religious. Consequently, though difficult, there is 
need for an anthropological consensus if the integral human development advocated by 
Paul VI and the subsequent Catholic social doctrine is to be achieved. If there is no 
unitary vision of the human person, integral human development remains utopian. Paul 
VI did not provide this vision explicitly. He presumed it was already in place, but his 
advocacy in Populorum Progressio suggests that there is one true way of conceiving the 
human person.  
Secondly, the human person is often viewed from both the liberal Euro-American 
point of view and the conservative or traditional African communitarian point of view, a 
representative of the vision of the less-developed nations. These visions affect not only 
the vision of human rights and human dignity, but also the vision of human development. 
There is, therefore, a need to seek a reconciliatory vision of the human person - a 
universal notion based on the origin and nature of the human person - in order to 
guarantee a possibility for integral development of people and individuals. Such a vision 
should embrace the private, individual and the social or public dimension of the human 
person, and the material and spiritual dimensions. The human person should be viewed as 
a two-dimensional reality - as an individual entity and as a social entity. This requires 
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acknowledgment of the mutual subordination of the individual and society, which Jaques 
Maritain refers to as “reciprocal subordination and mutual implication.”272 
Thirdly, acknowledgment of the universality of human dignity is crucial to the 
possibility of integral human development. This acknowledgment calls for a 
reconciliatory notion of human dignity, which may best be described as an ontological 
dignity because this description is inclusive and captures the transcendent aspect of 
human worth. On the basis of the ontological character and the universality of human 
dignity, integral human development may alternatively be defined as the promotion of the 
human dignity of all people or the universal promotion of human dignity. 
Fourthly, just as it is the case with human dignity, human rights should be 
acknowledged as reciprocal claims and entitlements with reciprocal or mutual 
obligations. A reconciliatory notion of human rights is also necessary for integral human 
development. If such an understanding or notion of rights is lacking, the consequences 
are conflicts of rights and the practical impossibility of integral human development. 
Human rights have universal dimensions but not all human rights are absolute.273 If rights 
are viewed as being absolute they remain subjective claims lacking a binding or 
compelling force. 
Fifthly, in the context of general Christian anthropology and the anthropology in 
the Catholic doctrine, Populorum Progressio is less explicit in its anthropology, but its 
teaching suggests an anthropology which is consonant with the rest of Christian 
anthropology, especially the Roman Catholic anthropology. Paul VI's anthropology could 
                                                 
272 Maritain, 65. Also see pages 61,73 and 75 of the same work. 
273 Michel Perry is of this view too, but suggests that some human rights as moral and legal international 
rights should be absolute. Cfr. Perry, 7, 88 and 105. 
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not be more explicit than what Populorum Progressio suggests because his treatise was 
not fundamentally anthropological. However, his concern was anthropological because 
he treated the development of the human person. 
Sixthly, there are obstacles in reconciling the different visions of the human 
person, human dignity and human rights. These difficulties can be overcome and need to 
be overcome, if integral human development is to be attained. The human person, human 
dignity and human rights should be defined in terms of their origin, freedom and intellect. 
Human persons are ends in themselves, not just means to an end. However, it is necessary 
to observe that people are intermediate ends in relation to God because God is the only 
absolute end and only God can make absolute claims. 
Seventhly, the question of the universality of the notion of the human person, 
human dignity and some human rights is significant for integral human development 
because such a vision offers the possibility for the recognition of every person. Paul VI 
never got directly into the question of the universality of the notion of the human person 
in Populorum Progressio. However, his advocacy for integral human development 
suggests that he understood the universal nature and dignity of the human person. Human 
dignity is precisely why he advocated integral development. There should, therefore, be 
universal validity to the notion of the human person, human dignity and basic human 
rights. Human dignity, without exception, should be conceived universally as a valid 
claim. The distinction between ontological dignity and moral dignity facilitates the 
understanding of the universality of human dignity fully expressed in the ontological 
dignity. 
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Eighthly, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a relationship between the 
different principles for integral human development. No principle for integral human 
development is independent. This relationship needs to be established, stated and 
explained so that the application of one principle of integral human development is done 
according to how it is related to other development principles. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to suggest that the solution for reconciling the 
different notions of the human person, human dignity and human rights is a holistic 
anthropology. This conclusion suggests an anthropology which establishes both the 
individual and social dimensions of the human person, and how they relate and operate 
within the same person. It is on account of a holistic vision of the human person that there 
is a possibility of integral human development. This is what Paul VI suggested as 
fundamental for integral human development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
   
INTEGRAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO: 
CHALLENGING UGANDA’S DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter investigates the extent of the challenges of the doctrine of Pope Paul 
VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio to Uganda’s development claims, especially since 
its independence from British colonial rule on October 9, 1962. Until very recently the 
World Bank and other western organizations, the protagonists in the attempts to help 
African and other less developed countries to develop, often include Uganda among their 
development promotion success stories, especially since 1986.1 Whether the claims 
originate from Uganda or from outside Uganda they stand to be challenged by the 
doctrine of Populorum Progressio and some current observations about Uganda. A recent 
African survey of Uganda’s development claims contradicts and questions such claims. 
Economically, Uganda is currently “classified as one of the 26 poorest countries in the 
world where more than half of the households live below the poverty line.”2 According to 
“the African Development Report 2005, compiled by the African Development Bank,” 
Uganda is rated as “eleventh from the bottom among African countries with less than 
$300 per capita.”3  
The chapter attempts to establish how much the development principles, virtues 
and conditions stated in Populorum Progressio have been integrated into Uganda’s 
                                                 
1 George B.N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, (New York: St. Martin Griffin, 1999), 11-12. 
2 Arthur Bainomugisha, “The Empowerment of Women” in Uganda’s Age of Reforms: A Critical 
Overview, ed. Justus Mugaju, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999), 95. 
3 Martin Luther Oketch, “Uganda is not a Medium Income Country- Report,” in Daily Monitor, (Kampala, 
Uganda, Thursday, February 2, 2006), 22aa. This statement suggests that Uganda is the eleventh last 
country among countries with a per capita of less than $300.00. In other words, Uganda’s per capita is 
better than of only ten African countries that have a per capita of less than US $300.00. 
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development endeavors. It attempts to demonstrate successes and failures of development 
in Uganda. In line with some of Paul VI’s contentions in Populorum Progressio 
Josephine Bweyale strongly suggests that development in Uganda 
has been deterred in all dimensions of life. Even morals have degenerated drastically, cherished 
cultural values have been suppressed under the guise of modernity. One wonders whether 
development means immorality and loss of one's identity.4 
 
The above statement of Bweyale, the preceding claims and the subsequent 
statements about development help one to make a provisional claim about Uganda at the 
beginning of this chapter. Uganda’s development claims, since its independence in 1962, 
are in many ways below the standards set by Populorum Progressio, which advocates 
integral human development.  
The loci of the arguments and contentions in this chapter are human life, the 
human person, human dignity and human rights as consistently implied or explicitly 
stated and emphasized in the three preceding chapters. These are the critical principles 
around which human development revolves. All other principles of integral human 
development Paul VI advocated in Populorum Progressio are grounded in and linked to 
these fundamental principles.5 They shall be and should always be emphasized and 
acknowledged.  
Denis Goulet, a development ethicist, contends that “development is an 
ambiguous term used both descriptively and normatively to depict a present condition or 
                                                 
4 Bweyale Josephine, “The Christian Churches and the Peace Building Process,” in Developing a Culture of 
Peace and Human Rights in Africa: African Peace Series, Volume One, ed. Nkrunziza, R.K Deusdedit and 
Mugumya Levis, (Kampala, Uganda: Konrad Adeenauer Stiftung (KAS), 2003), 57-58. 
5 A number of paragraphs in Populorum Progressio allude to these basic principles for integral human 
development. Cf. Populorum Progressio, 1,1-2; 5-6,3; 14-17,7-9; 20-23,9-11; 28,13; 30,13; 32, 14; 36-
37,16; 39,17; 42,18; 48,20-21; 50,21; 64-65,27 and 71,29. 
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to project a desired alternative.”6 When the term development is applied to Uganda and 
yields magnanimous conclusions about the development level in the country, those who 
draw such conclusions have not cared about the idea that there is ambiguity in the notion 
of development. This is why it is realistic to acknowledge what Goulet states as an often 
mistaken notion of development.  
Development is equated to aggregate economic growth, the creativity of modern institutions and 
the spread of consumer aspirations and professional ambitions. In the most fundamental sense, 
however, none of these is development; at best they may be social changes capable of facilitating 
genuine development.7 
 
Authentic development is not just a socio-economic and political change. Diverse 
notions of true human development and the human person were advocated in history 
because of uncritical considerations. It seems right to construe that “most economic or 
political paradigms of development define it as a process of structural change in which 
external forces shape and transform people’s lives.”8 This claim about development is 
supported by the assertion that “during the early 1960s there were competing notions of 
development . . . .”9 However, the question to be investigated in this chapter is partly 
whether development is from without or from within a person, community (society) or a 
nation.  
Several authors, institutions and governments have differences of opinion 
regarding the notion of human development, the requisite principles and their challenges 
to, and practicability in the diverse human situations. A majority of these claims are 
                                                 
6 Dennis Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, (New York: The Apex Press,1995), 
1. 
7 Ibid. , 141. 
8 Susan Reynolds Whyte and Michael A. Whyte, “The Values of Development: Conceiving Growth and 
Progress in Bunyole,” in Developing Uganda, ed. Bernt Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, (Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, 1998), 227. Also see Marvin Krier L. Mich, Catholic Social Teaching and 
Movements, (Mystic, Connecticut: Twenty Third Publications, 1998), 155. 
9 Marvin Krier L. Mich, Catholic Social Teaching and Movements, (Mystic, Connecticut: Twenty Third 
Publications, 1998), 155. 
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based on limited reflections, examination and interpretations of the notion of 
development and the human person. They have not adequately expressed and emphasized 
the most fundamental elements for authentic human development - the human person, 
human dignity and human rights. This factor ultimately makes the achievement of true 
human development difficult. These assertions also suggest why integral human 
development is not readily possible and cannot be practically achieved in most, if not all, 
countries including Uganda.  
The meaning of development has been misconstrued by many people in Uganda, 
in the same way Paul VI suggested in Populorum Progressio as presented in Chapter 
Three. Mahmood Mamdani suggests that there is misunderstanding of human 
development in Uganda. He states:  
It used to be that the analysis of a politics of underdeveloped countries was informed solely by the 
dualism of the traditional and the modern . . . . The traditional was retrogressive, the modern was 
progressive.10  
  
Mamdani’s statement reflects the way development is conceived by the majority 
of Ugandans. In contemporary Uganda development is also conceived differently among 
the various ethnic groups as Twaddle and Hansen suggest by acknowledging that there 
are “conflicting models of development which continue to influence Museveni’s 
Uganda.”11  
It is critical to note that the “starting point and term of reference” of the Fathers of 
the Second Vatican Council “was the kind of economic development to which 
governments all over the world were committed,” and because they were discontented 
                                                 
10 Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, (New York and London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1976), 1. 
11 Michael Twaddle and Hansen Holger Brent, “The Changing State of Uganda,” in Developing Uganda, 
ed. Bernt Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 10 and 12. 
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with the notion of development at that time they “set out to correct and expand this 
conception, to produce a more integral and balanced conception of human 
development.”12 Paul VI’s doctrine of integral human development in Populorum 
Progressio continued the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, and suggests a persistent 
challenge to a failure of authentic development in Uganda and other countries. 
Therefore, the fundamental thesis in this chapter is that the development claims in 
Uganda, though not excluding other nations, fall short of authentic human development 
because the notion of integral human development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum 
Progressio presents pertinent challenges to the status quo in contemporary Uganda. Paul 
VI’s vision of human development includes all dimensions of a person and all people. 
This is evident in his core statement and challenge in Populorum Progressio.  
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be 
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of 
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we 
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart 
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each 
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.13  
 
Paul VI was convinced that, if this vision of development is seriously taken and 
applied, it could transform people’s thoughts and attitudes, and eventually their practical 
life situations. The transformation advocated by Paul VI is holistic. Such a vision and 
transformation is particularly necessary in the Ugandan context. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one treats the statement of the 
problem in a general way, and in fact it is a precis of the Ugandan situation. Part two is a 
                                                 
12Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching, (New York: Orbis 
Books, 1992), 180. 
13 Paul VI (Pope), Populorum Progressio, On the Development of Peoples (Washington, D C: United States 
Catholic Conference, 1967), 14, 7. The eminent source and specialist Paul VI is quoting here is L. J. Lebret, 
O.P, Dynamique concrete du developpement, Paris: Economie et Humanisme, Les editions ouvrieres, 1961, 
p.28. 
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study of the situation of Uganda in the light of the development principles, virtues and 
factors or conditions in Populorum Progressio, as treated in Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three. Part three offers some recommendations for Uganda’s development. 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT: A PRECIS OF THE UGANDA CONTEXT 
 
 The problematic situation in Uganda is at once realized when one traces the origin 
of the name of the country. “The name of Uganda was derived from the ancient kingdom 
of Buganda.”14 When the British wanted to name their protectorate which included 
Buganda and other ethnic or tribal groups the Baganda wanted the country to be called 
Buganda. The British refused because the dominance of Buganda was already causing 
tension. Moreover, Buganda was Britain’s favored ethnic group of what would later be 
called Uganda. To make it a neutral name and avoid further tension, the letter ‘B’ was 
simply omitted, hence the name ‘Uganda’ emerged as the name of the British protectorate 
and has remained the name of the nation to date.  
Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962. Justus Mugaju suggests that at 
that time it was relatively developed compared to other third world countries in the 
world, but “shortly after independence, the country degenerated into tyranny, chaos, 
violence, war, economic collapse and moral degeneration.”15 He states that in most of the 
period from 1971-1986 there was widespread lawlessness although lawlessness pre-dates 
1971. About a million people lost their lives, many were imprisoned, and some others 
went into exile. This was hardly a period of human development in Uganda. It is 
                                                 
14 Richard Nzita and Mbaga-Niwampa, Peoples and Cultures of Uganda, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 
1997), 1. 
15 Justus Mugaju, “The Historical Context” in Uganda’s Age of Reforms: A Critical Overview, ed. Justus 
Mugaju, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999), 10. Also see George B.N. Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The 
Blue Prin6t for Africa’s Future, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 204-206.  
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necessary to note that the development referred to here is integral or authentic 
development which, Alice Tuyizere, like Paul VI, has suggested “is people centred and 
guided by values of peace, justice, equality and genuine participation in a democratic 
way.”16 It is correct, however, to say that the critical statement regarding the situation in 
Uganda is that, to a significant extent, true or integral human development has not been 
evident in Uganda since its independence. This claim is supported by the following 
observation by Adrian K. Ddungu which shows the recurrent situation in Uganda since 
independence. 
The endemic obstacles to integral development in Uganda are very well known, namely: 
ignorance, disease, poverty, exploitation, instability, political manipulation, greed, selfishness 
among those who control power and money, gross injustices and corruption in most sectors of 
society, and the absence of a clear and correct people and life-centred vision of development.17 
 
The national disparity of development in Uganda may also be explained by the 
people’s division along “religious, regional and ethnic lines, and the colonialists’ 
politico-administrative way of doing things,”18 which emphasized these divisions and 
made them the basis of their administration. Hence, there is need for unity in the country 
and care for the common good of the people of Uganda. The dual principal elements of 
Uganda’s national anthem and national motto, namely: For God and My Country and 
United Free for Liberty together we will always stand, are constant reminders to the 
                                                 
16 Tuyizere Alice, “Introduction of Peace Education in Secondary Schools: A Strategy for Promotion of 
Peace in Uganda,” in Developing a Culture of Peace and Human Rights in Africa: African Peace Series, 
Volume One, ed. Nkrunziza, R.K Deusdedit and Mugumya Levis, (Kampala, Uganda: Konrad Adeenauer 
Stiftung (KAS), 2003), 74. 
17 Adrian K. Ddungu, “Church - State Cooperation in Promoting Integral Development – A Supplement” 
in Church Contribution to Integral Development, ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. 
Zabajungu, (Eldoret, Kenya: AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1989), 24. This element has continued to date 
when, unfortunately, many unsuspecting Ugandans believe that the country has advanced so far. Also see 
Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998), 
116.  
18 Ondoga Amaza Ori, Museneni’s Long March: From Guerrilla to Statesman, (Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 1998), 223. 
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people about the need of their efforts towards this unity and common good.19 Integral 
human development is possible in a country if there is national unity. Unfortunately, 
disunity is one of the issues Ugandans have to wrestle with in order to advance together 
as citizens of a nation. Since its independence, and even prior to that, tribal or regional 
allegiances militated against any nationwide nationalist movement in Uganda. The people 
could not come together as a consolidated or united front. There is no doubt that “deep 
north-south divisions”20 have characterized the history of post-independence Uganda. 
This is reminiscent in the persistent disunity in the country today. This element of 
disunity which recurs in the relationships among Ugandans to date pre-dates Uganda’s 
independence. Paul Gifford says of pre-independence Uganda that 
in the run up to independence, the rise of any properly nationalist movement was hindered because 
the Baganda, seeking a separate state, refused to countenance any proposal which treated Buganda 
as an integral part of greater Uganda.21 
  
There is a tribalism or there are tribalisms, as some would suggest, which tend to 
impede national unity and, consequently, integral human development.22 The tribal 
constitution of the country compounds the difficulties in applying the principles Paul VI 
offered in Populorum Progressio. In treating the question of integral human development 
in Uganda one deals with a heterogeneous context - “the three main groups of Eastern 
Africa - Bantu, Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic - all meet in Uganda.”23 Other than this, 
                                                 
19 George W. Kakoma and Peter Tynard, “Uganda” in National Anthems of the World, ed. T. M . Cartledge, 
W.L. Reed, Martin Shaw and Henry Coleman, (New York: Arco Publishing Company, Inc. , 1978), 456. 
20USAID, Democracy and Governance Assessment: Republic of Uganda, 2005, (Burlington, Vermont 
(USA): ARD, Inc., November 2005), vii. 
21Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
1998), 114.  
22 Vincent, Okot Oburu, “The Church’s Role in Promoting National Unity,” in Church Contribution to 
Integral Development, ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. Kabajungu, (Eldoret, Kenya: 
AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1989), 101. 
23 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Uganda 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), 6. 
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“political parties tend to divide the people along ethnic, religious and such other non-
political lines resulting in unnecessary conflict,”24 a reason for which the NRM 
government denied multi-party politics for Ugandans for twenty years. Such a denial 
could be considered a genuine political reason because it helped to temper the political 
situation in Uganda but it is opposed to democracy and freedom of association and 
infringes on the human, civil, social and political rights of Ugandans. 
The Commission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, on the request of the Uganda government, emphasized the gravity of the 
ethnic division in the country by asserting that there is still evident division that runs 
across Uganda between the Bantu-speaking people, who are mostly in the south and 
central lake region of the country, the Nilo-Hamitic speaking people to the north-east of 
the country, and the Nilotic-speaking people of the north, and the Sudanic-speaking 
people west of the river Nile in the north of the country besides the Hamitic-related 
pastoral class, the Bahima, in the western part of the country. Uganda consists of 24-34 or 
more ethnic groups within these major divisions.25 It seems correct to suggest that 
religion or Christianity in particular and the claims of Uganda’s so called broad-based 
government have not overcome this effect of ethnic diversity.  
The pluralistic context of Uganda is suggested by the diversity of cultures 
exemplified in the different languages spoken all over the country and the diverse vision 
                                                 
24 Ondoga, 201. 
25 Tarsis B. Kabwegyere, Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 1995), 19. Also see Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role, (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), 133. The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda indicates that 
Uganda’s indigenous communities as at 1st February 1926, numbered about 56. Cfr. Government of 
Uganda, Constitution  of the Republic of Uganda (Entebbe: Uganda printing and Publishing Corporation, 
22nd September, 1995), 189-191. 
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of human, social, political and economic relations and trends of thought. “There are 
diverse cultural groups speaking more than thirty-three languages”26although other 
authors give lower figures. The issue of language is outstanding and needs a careful and 
critical consideration.27 A real mutual understanding is necessary because of the ethnic 
diversity in the country. Besides the people of African descent there are people of Indian 
and European descent. Although the latter two groups constitute a small percentage of the 
population, they are economically and politically more influential and powerful than the 
indigenous people and a significant force to reckon with.28  
Kabwegyere suggests such a pluralistic social constitution by acknowledging that 
there is “diversity in terms of social scale and social organization.”29 At the advent of 
colonialism some of the groups were socially, economically and politically powerful 
while others were not, and the social organizational structures varied in magnitude - some 
were organized on a small scale while others were organized on a large scale. The 
advantaged positions were further strengthened by the Colonial administration and 
continued to the post-independence period. They are partly responsible for the conflicts 
that started soon after independence.30 They were, principally, tensions between 
superiority and inferiority. These tensions and other diversities suggest difficulties of 
achievement of integral human development, a real challenge to Uganda today. 
                                                 
26Nzita and Mbaga-Niwampa, ii. 
27 Franz, Pfaff, “People’s Participation in Development” in Church Contribution to Integral Development, 
ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. Kabajungu (Eldoret, Kenya: AMECEA Gaba Publications, 
1989), 155. 
28 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 6. 
29 Kabwegyere, 19. 
30 Ali A. Mazrui, Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa, (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1969), 148-149. Also see Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role, (Bloomington, Indiana: 
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Another problem is uneven development in and among individuals, contrary to 
the consistent teaching of Populorum Progressio in the global context.31 This disparity in 
Uganda’s development is the effect of overemphasis on the diversity in the country. 
Consequent to the political, ethnic, religious and language diversity, there is conspicuous 
tribalism, ethnic animosities, persistent political division, segregation, discrimination, and 
factionalism.32 There have been and there are, for instance, still “post-independence and 
political factions” like “pro-Baganda” and “anti-Baganda” 33 factions. At this point it is 
important to reflect on the observation of Ali Mazrui, a renowned East African scholar. 
He thinks that  
ethnic pluralism, in much of Africa, tends to be among the most politically sensitive of all the 
social issues. The risk of violence between tribes is at the centre of Africa’s twin-crises of identity 
and integration.34  
 
Mazrui is contending that division is imminent and unity is hard to achieve 
because of ethnic differences and tensions. This is a problem to be addressed if African 
nations, including Uganda, which have such characteristic tribal or ethnic diversity, are to 
achieve integral development. The cattle-rustling by the Karamojong and the frequent 
conflict between them and their neighbors, a problem that demands some solution, is a 
testimony to this fact.35 The problem here is one of cultural differences which require 
mutual education, understanding and acceptance of cultures, especially those aspects of 
                                                 
31 Populorum Progressio, 8, 4; 29, 13; 34, 15 and 76, 31-32. Also cfr. Peter Riga, The Church of the Poor: 
A Commentary on Paul VI’s Encyclical On the Development of Peoples (Illinois: Divine Word 
Publications, 1968), 67.  
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Mari Tripp, “Local Women’s Association and Politics in Contemporary Uganda” in Developing Uganda, 
ed. Bernt Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 120. Also see 
Vincent, Okot Oburu, 102. 
33 Twaddle and Hansen, 12. 
34 Mazrui, 155. Also see Okot, 98. 
35 Bruno Novelli, “Church and Development for Nomads” in Church Contribution to Integral 
Development, ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. Zabajungu, (Eldoret, Kenya: AMECEA Gaba 
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culture which are enhancing to the human person and human dignity and promote human 
development.  
Considering the fact that even neighboring ethnic groups are in frequent 
disagreement and tension, the issue remains serious for both the church and state to 
resolve. Caution is needed here because the Karamojong, for example, may have to be 
approached and treated according to their background, without imposing certain values 
on them. For instance, a political system which centralizes activities is contrary to their 
socio-political set up which is acephalous and even “the very word chief does not exist: 
because among them nobody can impose on others his or her will.”36 Other than 
corruption, injustice, ignorance and illiteracy, exploitation of the poor and the weak is 
another problem, which compounds the social distinction of the elite. 37 Also featuring 
clearly in Uganda are problems such as: poverty, unemployment, prejudice and social 
stratification, dependence syndrome, an ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor, 
recurrent wars and political instability.38 In 1994 Uganda was unable to meet 50% of its 
debt service obligations because of its inadequate foreign currency earnings.39 It was 
“among the world’s five poorest countries” in 1991 and in “1998 when Uganda sent 
troops into DRC”40 (Democratic Republic of Congo) the economy was much affected.  
                                                 
36 Ibid. , 144.  
37 Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
1998),115-116. Also see Twadle and Hansen, 2 and 5. Also see Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class 
Formation in Uganda, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1999), 233-235. 
38 Susan Dicklich, “Indigenous NGOs and Political Participation” in Developing Uganda, ed. Michael 
Twaddle and Bernt Holger Hansen, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 149. Also see Twadle and 
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39 Nalugala, Reginald and Richard Mutua. “A practical Approach to Empowerment of the Poor in Kenya” 
in The Poor Discover Their Own Resources: A Practical Approach to Poverty Reduction in Urban and 
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40 Legget, 12. Also see “Uganda” in Oxford Encyclopedic World Atlas, 6th edition, (New York: Oxford 
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There has also been a considerable violation of human dignity and rights which 
are central to Paul VI’s thoughts on human development. Uganda’s additional crucial 
historical problems are: a bad education system, cultural superiority and inferiority; and 
socio-economic and political confrontations and “mutual suspicions.”41 Corruption, 
which is one of the aspects of NRM’s target in the ten-point program which aimed at 
elimination of corruption is also a great force to reckon with and major factor yet to be 
overcome in Uganda today.42 Contrary to NRM government’s initial plans to overcome 
corruption, George B.N. Ayittey offers evidences of Uganda’s escalating corruption. 
Acording to him the corruption in Uganda permeates all levels of Ugandan society, and 
the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) recently reported that  
Uganda has been ranked among the most corrupt countries of the world . . . 80 percent of business 
in Uganda pays a bribe before accessing a service. . . . In the year 2000, transparency International 
ranked Uganda as the third most corrupt country in the world. . . .43 
 
While the police, judiciary and the health department are rated most corrupt 
inmstitutions in the country, the World Bank Mission sent to investigate Uganda in 1998 
pointed accusing fingers to President Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, the then Vice 
President Specioza Wandira Kazibwe and, even President Museveni himself 
collaborating with the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to plunder the resources of the 
DRC.44 The simplest conclusion here is that it is not a development to move from the 
goal of fighting corruption to being part of the efforts for the promotion of corruption – 
an evident self-defeating (contradictory) development plan or prophecy. 
                                                 
41 Ondoga, 183. 
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Anthony J. Regan, like many authors, states that “Uganda is divided along 
overlapping complex religious, ethnic, regional and economic lines.”45 Divisions and 
conflicts are sometimes consequences of multiculturalism or ethnic diversity. In 
themselves multiculturalism and ethnicity are not bad, as Gregory Baum contends as he 
addresses a similar problem in a Canadian context.46 Neither does Paul VI condemn 
cultural diversity in Populorum Progressio. He actually encouraged the promotion of 
culture and respect for other cultures. However, the contentions of Paul VI and Baum 
also call for a critical reflection about the problematic aspects of multiculturalism or 
ethnicity, at least from a Christian perspective. Dominant groups in a diverse community 
may not overlook people of the same community with different cultural, racial and ethnic 
backgrounds because they all have dignity before God who created all of them. Baum 
suggests this point in his critical and crucial statement, a statement still more crucial for 
Uganda, a nation characterized by “religious, ethnic, regional and economic”47diversity:  
Since God has created humanity made up of different peoples and different traditions, it is 
intolerable that the dominant group in a country should despise the less successful groups and 
make some people feel badly about their ethnic or racial background. To expose children to a 
climate in which they are made ashamed of their own heritage is a grave social sin.48  
 
Baum’s vision is socio-culturally and psychologically important for authentic 
integral human development. Families, institutions and ethnic groups contribute, socially, 
culturally and psychologically, towards integral human development. It is the 
responsibility of all these social groups to impart to their members, that “every human 
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person is distinct from every other, yet at the same time all are truly human.”49 This 
responsibility depends on good and proper personality development, which is the duty of 
the government, the religious institutions, families, ethnic communities and educators. 
The individual human person is ultimately decisive, but this is impacted by the primary 
educators and formators. Reichmann confirms this view by his affirmation that 
. . . one’s racial, cultural and educational backgrounds function as a significant influence on the 
kinds of decisions one will make, but they do not determine these decisions, nor is their influence 
ultimately decisive.50  
 
One of the greatest challenges to Uganda’s development claims is Peter Henriot’s 
assertion that “integral human development anywhere requires integral development 
everywhere.”51 This contention suggests that what Paul VI affirms in Populorum 
Progressio is that a true development is not fragmented. Dorr’s reading of Populorum 
Progressio rightly shows that “Paul VI provides a basis for integrating personal 
development with community development and reconciling national development with 
global development.”52 According to Paul VI integral human development is both 
individual and communal. 
Nationally, integral development calls for national participation besides other 
requisite factors. Such participation is possible when there is a common medium of 
communication. Unfortunately in Uganda there is the problem of language differences 
because at least thirty-three languages are spoken. On March 31, 1967, because of 
cultural and language diversity, Apollo Milton Obote, the then President of Uganda, 
                                                 
49 James B. Reichmann, Philosophy of the Human Person (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), 252. 
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adopted the position of the British and reiterated that English shall be the national or 
official language used for education, politics and economics.53 This was an attempt to 
solve the problem of language but another problem has been created, namely the problem 
of a majority not knowing the national and official language of the country. This means 
participation of the majority is curtailed because the official language favors the minority. 
Political participation since Uganda’s independence has always been the privilege of 
powerful minorities.54 This is explained by the fact that change of government has always 
come through coups. A slight change developed in the 1990s when people started 
electing representatives to parliament and government offices. However, whether 
everybody who participated in these elections understood what it is all about is still 
questionable. 
Uganda’s political history shows that the country never had a smooth transition of 
governments. From the time of Benedict Kiwanuka to the time of President Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni in 1986 there were successive coups.55 Each time change of 
government occurred by force of arms. It has mostly been a traumatic history as some 
people describe it.56 When Prime Minister Milton Obote took over power from Kabaka 
Edward Mutesa, the King and President or Head of State at independence, by force of 
arms in 1966, he abolished the four kingdoms - Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Buganda - 
forcing Buganda which had an apparent federal status to come directly under the control 
of the central government of Uganda. He abrogated the 1962 constitution, introduced a 
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new constitution in 1967, and in 1969 he banned “all opposition parties.”57 Obote’s 
popularity continued to sink among the different institutions and categories of people in 
Uganda.58 One coup after another continued to occur in Uganda from then on.59  
In 1971 Milton Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin Dada who expelled all Asians 
from Uganda in 1972.60 He attempted to invade Tanzania and annex part of its territory in 
and around Kagera to Uganda, and he was in turn overthrown by a coalition of Tanzanian 
forces and Ugandan exiles who formed themselves into the Uganda National Liberation 
Army in 1979.61 A provisional government was established under the Military 
commission headed by Paul Mwanga who was assisted by Yoweri Museveni. Yusufu 
Lule and Godfrey Binaisa were leaders shortly: each one was overthrown, eventually, to 
pave way for Milton Obote to return to power when rigged elections were held in 1980,  
and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party under the presidency of Milton Obote, was 
declared the winner. He soon was overthrown by the army under the leadership of Tito 
Okello-Lutwa in 1985.62  
While Tito Okello-Lutwa attempted negotiation with the opposition forces, the 
most significant of which was National Resistance Army/National Resistance Movement 
(NRA/NRM), the latter refused, but pretended to be in favor of the negotiations then 
taking place in Nairobi, Kenya.63 As talks continued the NRA was making its way to 
Kampala, the capital city, to capture power, and they did so under Yoweri Kaguta 
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Museveni in 1986 when they captured Kampala and dissolved the Military Council.64  
The NRM established what it called a broad-based government with 
representatives of all groups; elections were held in 1989 to the Constituent Assembly, 
dominated by Museveni’s supporters, to write a constitution, which was published in 
1993 and promulgated in 1995, and the constitution allowed only no-party democracy.65 
This was actually a one-party system of government, and that one party was NRM. 
Technically, all other parties were banned and there was no multi-party democracy for at 
least 20 years. There has been political unrest and instability, with its brutality, in the 
north and northeastern part of Uganda during these twenty years, and it is likely to 
persist.66  
The political system used in Uganda since independence shows similar patterns 
with just slightly modified differences. There has been consistent failure of democratic 
governance, a dictatorship of one kind or another, and expression of self-interest. This 
claim can be substantiated by the ardent request and plea of the Catholic Bishops of 
Uganda in their appeal to the members of parliament when they say: “the ‘self-seeking 
politics’ that has characterized Uganda’s politics for several years since independence 
should be shunned.”67 This is not just a statement defying the past. It is also addressing 
the currently prevailing situation in the politics of Uganda. 
Prior to independence, the economy of Uganda was flourishing but not controlled 
by the natives in much the same way the political system was not in their control. It was a 
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66 Ibid. , 116.  
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situation where much of the economic destiny of Ugandan nationals was not in their own 
hands. There was simply no economic and political participation of the indigenous people 
or it was minimal. Paul Gifford has properly stated this case.  
Within the Protectorate, Indians - normally called ‘Asians’ and originally brought in to build the 
East African railway - were encouraged and assisted to engage in business and trade; Africans 
received no such assistance. Asians were given a place on the Legislative Council, something 
denied to Africans until after the Second World War when Britain had accepted that 
decolonization was inevitable.68 
 
From the point of view of education in Uganda, for a long time too much 
emphasis has been laid on academic education instead of practical training. Much of the 
education people have received is not related to practical or actual daily life situations 
and needs, although recently emphasis is being made on the significance of vocational 
institutions and the study of practical Sciences.69 This more theoretical and less practical 
system of education has been a persisting pattern since colonial times. 
In conclusion, the principal factors impeding or causing development difficulties 
in Uganda are: cultural diversity, social-economic and political variations, religious views 
and general disunity. All of these may be explained in terms of limited anthropology. 
These factors have often made it difficult to implement or apply the necessary virtues, 
conditions and principles for integral human development. The lack of application of 
these virtues, conditions and principles primarily presents pertinent challenges to the 
Church, the state, and to individual citizens and groups of people living in Uganda, 
although the challenges go beyond this limit. 
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III. CHALLENGING UGANDA’S DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS: THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
CONFRONTATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT 
 
 The overarching challenge of Paul VI’s teaching in Populorum Progressio to the 
socio-economic, religious and political context of Uganda, according to Benedict XVI, 
was “the scandal of underdevelopment as an outrage against humanity,”70 and the very 
concept of authentic development, which he articulated in the document. The principal 
and durable challenge is the respect for human dignity. True development is the moral 
growth of the human person and all possible dimensions of growth for each and 
everybody – a concept whose practical manifestations are lacking in Uganda, even 
spiritually, but also socially, politically, economically and culturally due to 
marginalization of some sectors of the population.71 The fundamental challenge is, 
therefore, the respect for the human person, human dignity and human rights expressed in 
the complete growth of an individual and all people. This challenge is manifest in the 
different facets of human life. Addressing Uganda’s development problems Adrian K. 
Ddungu reaffirms Paul VI’s  idea of development. 
Integral development is opposed to dichotomized development. The former aims at enabling all 
men and women to be inspired, directed and assisted in developing, as fully as possible, in various 
dimensions of life: educational-physical, socio-personal, moral-cultural, economic-political, 
spiritual-religious. Integral development should appropriately take into account the fact that a 
human being is made up of body, soul and mind. To develop integrally, people need to plan for all 
their material and spiritual needs in an holistic manner, without undue imbalances.72 
 
Ddungu’s contention is clearly the reiteration of the doctrine, especially the 
definition of true development in Populorum Progressio. He suggests that both Church 
and State leaders should serve people without dichotomizing their lives - without 
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separating the spiritual and the material dimensions of the human person. This is one of 
the general challenges of the document. However, the document challenges the Ugandan 
context in the various facets of the life of the nation as explained below. 
A. The Anthropological Challenge: The Challenge of Mutual Respect 
 
The main challenge here is to respect and protect people’s dignity. In dealing with 
the anthropological challenges we deal with the most crucial elements of the question of 
human development. Human development is directly related to the human person who 
has dignity, free will, rationality, rights and eternal destiny.73 The gravity of the 
anthropological challenge ought to be seen in the light of peace, the fact that the 
anthropological challenge underlies all other development principles, virtues and 
conditions suggested by Paul VI, and finally the situation in which people of Uganda as 
citizens of the secular society and members of the Church live. In relation to issues 
affecting the people of Uganda the Executive of the Association of Major Superiors of 
Religious Institutes in Uganda (AMSRIU) made the following challenging statement 
about the situation of the Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the war-torn northern 
Uganda and northeastern Uganda: 
This appalling situation in the camps is a crime against humanity! It is a big challenge to each and 
all of us. We have to do all that is possible to bring it to an end.74 
 
  The challenge in this case is not only the need to recognize the human person, 
human dignity and human rights but also to respect them. The human person, the respect 
for human rights, and ultimately human dignity with which every person is gifted by 
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God, whatever background the person comes from, should be acknowledged and 
respected. These areas constitute the challenge of mutual respect which Populorum 
Progressio consistently suggests, and which was emphasized in Chapter Three of this 
work. Similarly, in a global context, Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest that 
it is significant to have an appropriate anthropology in order to have the possibility of an 
integral human development.  
One hopes for the advent of an era in which an authentic world community can be created in 
which the dignity of each one and the fundamental rights of all are recognized and in which every 
nation understands that it cannot think of its own welfare without interesting itself in the welfare 
of all nations.75 
 
 Human dignity and human rights are the consistently challenging anthropological 
principles for integral human development. Mutual respect for them is tantamount to 
mutual human development. In the Uganda context we are dealing with what the 1995 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda also clearly acknowledges as being beyond the 
control of any person when it affirmed that “fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual are inherent and not granted by the state.”76 While the constitution aptly 
affirms the fundamental character of the human person, rights and dignity, the challenge 
to the government is to help people to protect and enhance these elements.  
One specific challenge, among others, to the Uganda government and to the 
Church is the 2000 Kanungu tragedy77 where people of a religious sect, the Movement 
                                                 
75 Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi, Tolerance: Towards an Ethic of Solidarity and Peace, Trans. 
Edmund C. Lane, (New York: Alba House, 1995), 60. This is a reference to Pacem in Terris paragraph 68. 
76 Government of Uganda, The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, (Entebbe: Uganda Printing and 
Publishing Corporation, 22nd September 1995), 20. 
77 Kanungu is a place in Western Uganda in the Archdiocese of Mbarara. The Kanungu tragedy is an 
incident that happened on March 17, 2000 when many people belonging to an apocalyptic religious group 
called the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God, founded in Mbarara 
Archdiocese in Western Uganda, were killed by a fire deliberately ignited by the leadership of the group, 
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for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (MRTCG), burnt to death and the 
government issued arrest warrants for the culprits; but after more than four years, or more 
now, no arrest has been made.78 The local governments in the areas where the movement 
had establishments were not negligent or careless about the people, their rights and 
dignity. Indeed they attempted to make arrests of the propagators of this religion on 
discovering that they were promoting dangerous ideas but the arrests were condemned by 
higher government officials.79 This is one of the significant anthropological challenges to 
the citizens, and above all the government of Uganda, which has the duty to protect the 
citizens from being harmed. A government that cares about its citizens should have 
prevented such a tragedy by enforcing laws through national security agents. It should 
have pursued this case and informed citizens of the findings. Both the Catholic church 
and the Protestant church made vain attempts to thwart the growth of the religious 
movement.80 Their efforts needed to be supplemented by the government. This is where a 
healthy Church-state relationship is invaluable to resolve issues affecting people’s dignity 
and rights. 
The constitution of Uganda suggests that the Ugandans are equal in some regard 
and should recognize each other as such. Vincent Okot Oburu also speaks to this effect in 
an attempt to explain the role of the Church in promoting national unity in Uganda. Unity 
can only be attained if there is mutual recognition among the citizens of Uganda.   
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Many Ugandans have not fully recognized people from other tribal or ethnic groups, as being 
fellow citizens, with equal rights and duties: in the social, political and economic life of the 
country.81  
 
The above statement is consonant with what Ali A. Mazrui construes as a crucial 
challenge to Africans and others, including African intellectuals. It is what he calls self-
contempt which must be conquered prior to recognition of this invaluable human dignity. 
The African can begin to recognize human dignity in a fellow African if (s)he can  
recognize and appreciate her/his own dignity and culture with the values that it contains 
and reach out for a self-accepting attitude. Mazrui emphasized this issue of mutual 
respect for human dignity and culture in the following words: 
This in turn requires the growing toleration of some of the least respected, in western terms, of 
those aspects of indigenous culture. If an African intellectual can begin to concede dignity to the 
physical nakedness of the Karimojong men, or to the use of red ochre on the skin of the Masai, or 
invocation of supernatural forces to help determine election, the African intellectual is on his way 
to transcending his own cultural self-contempt.82 
 
 The ordinary African and African intellectuals ought to acknowledge that all 
people have dignity and overcome degradation of their own cultures. Respect for human 
dignity and culture are at the center of Mazrui’s advocacy. The Karamojong,83 who are 
pastoralists, are some of the sectors of Ugandan population that have not developed 
much. They are very much like their Kenyan and Tanzanian counter parts, the Masai, 
who are also pastoralists and some of the least developed groups in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Mazrui actually construes that this fact about these people and their culture does not 
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constitute them into people with less dignity than the so called developed ethnic groups. 
The greatest challenge here is to respect culture and recognize human dignity, human 
rights and the person of every Ugandan and of people beyond Uganda. 
Another principal anthropological challenge is to recognize a “common 
understanding of man and woman, and of their dignity, human rights and needs, and their 
final destiny.”84 The anthropological dimension of the human problem, therefore, 
concerns the way human persons view a human being. This is the central challenge in 
every human relationship. When the human person is misunderstood and there is no 
consensus in the definition of the human person, conflicts are inevitable, and integral 
human development is at stake. It was essentially the question of slavery which violates 
the essential aspects of the human person, which caused the troublesome split and civil 
war in one of the world’s greatest nations - USA - for about a decade beginning in 
1860.85 This further shows the gravity of the anthropological challenge. 
The violation of human dignity is a universal problem, and Uganda is not an 
exception. In the Uganda context this problem is aggravated by the diversity of ethnicity 
in the country. The different ethnic groups have their own philosophies and world vision, 
and in particular unique visions of the human person. This accounts for the variation of 
social and political relations among the ethnic groups in Uganda. 
The most dominant ethnic group in Uganda is the Bantu group who constitute 
over fifty percent of Uganda’s population.86 Although there are different names of Bantu 
tribes, this ethnic group covers the area in the whole of southern Uganda, parts of eastern 
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Uganda, and western Uganda. They constitute a group that has a distinct cosmological 
and anthropological vision though similar in many ways to the ethnic communities that 
occupy the north-western, northern, north-eastern and some eastern parts of Uganda 
because there is some shared vision of the human person.87 However, there are variations 
in the vision of the human person in the context of the entire human family. In light of 
this fact one of the challenges of Populorum Progressio to the Uganda context is the 
vision of the human person. To illustrate this point in the context of Uganda it is relevant 
to consider two examples, the Bantu vision of the human person, and that of the Lugbara 
of West Nile, which are not extremely different from the vision of other ethnic groups in 
Uganda and African ethnic communities. 
Placide Tempels studied the Bantu, not those in Uganda but the Baluba of the 
Belgian Congo (Current Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC) in Central Africa, who 
are akin to the Bantu of Uganda. According to him the study was exclusively from the 
Bantu philosophy of life, not from a western point of view. He asserts that among the 
Bantu a person, muntu, is a full, lofty and vitalistic force or personal force, part of 
creation, in relation with family, clan brethren, descendants, patrimony of his/her land, 
creation and God but above created material or visible beings, and a causative agent that 
exercises vital influence.88 This description of the human person shows the relational and 
social character of the human person. According to Tempels the Bantu think that this 
personhood grows or increases with acquisition of material goods and diminishes with 
loss of possessions.89 The reason is that the person is a vital force and this force depends 
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on what the person owns, contrary to the strong notion that human dignity is invariable 
under all circumstances. This notion of the human person is, therefore, questionable; it 
contradicts Christian anthropology which upholds the view that human dignity is not 
contingent upon any temporal circumstances or factors. 
The muntu is an individual being distinct from other people. The marks of 
distinction are the native name of the person which expresses the “very reality of the 
individual” and the “visible appearance”90 of the person. These traits of a person are 
shared by other ethnic groups. However, these definitions of the human person were, 
initially, limited to each ethnic group as Benezet Bujo suggests, and I would like to agree 
with Bujo that there has been a development in the vision of the human person in most 
African contexts. 91 This suggests that the extension of the term person beyond blood or 
tribal relationship with the same connotation was a later vision of the human person 
which was probably influenced by Christianity and western philosophy.  
Often those who belong to ethnic communities other than one’s own are 
considered foreigners and at most not considered as human as those in one’s ethnic circle. 
Consequently, they may be treated differently from those who belong to one’s ethnicity. 
This is the probable explanation for strife, discrimination or segregation in African 
communities including that of Uganda. For example, the traditional Lugbara of 
northwestern Uganda categorized some people as juru or anyi’ba, foreigners, which 
means one who does not fit exactly in the immediate definition of people related to 
oneself by blood, though considered ba or person worthy of respect but not exactly the 
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same as the immediate people.92 This suggests that the human person is defined 
according to the degree of the relationship of the person being defined and according to 
the one defining the human person. 
Many ethnic groups in Uganda, and elsewhere, view the human person in a 
similar way, meaning that they view the human person in limited contexts. These ways of 
conceiving the human person contribute to the preferential treatment of people and 
constitute problems in understanding and achieving integral human development. The 
definition of the human person according to ethnicity or relationship contributes to a 
fragmented vision of the human person. The various visions are limited to the ethnic 
groups. Historically, this can be explained by limited world-views that people had 
because the world basically consisted of their immediate environment. Their world-views 
never went far beyond their ethnic groups. This is why persons tend to be those 
belonging to one’s ethnic community.93 Consequently, all others are either less-persons 
or non-persons. They may be treated fully humanely or less humanely. This is a problem 
and challenge to national solidarity, the common good, unity and integral development. It 
is an aspect of the human problem to be addressed, especially by government, religious 
leaders and educational institutions in the country. 
One of the principal concerns of colonial states, including Uganda, emerging from 
the colonial era was “nation building” and “national integration” but once this was 
achieved the problem after independence was “the elite/mass gap.”94 Kabwegyere rightly 
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affirms Binder’s contention that the key issue for national integration in developing 
nations is “the relationship between a modernizing elite and a traditional mass; the point 
being that there exists a gap which must be bridged if countries are to be integrated. To 
him national integration requires that the gap be closed.”95  
Uganda has been a victim of this kind of elite-traditional mass gap since 
independence and continues to be subject to such a situation. There is a gap between the 
elite who constitute the minority and the majority of the population that is not formally 
educated or not educated at all. This gap has continued to create tension between the 
traditional vision of life and the modern vision, which is often considered a foreign vision 
or life-style. Consequently, the notion of human development is affected too. It is also 
here that there is a failure, in the Ugandan context, of the right notion of human 
development in the light of Populorum Progressio which advocates the promotion of 
cultures and different cultural values emphasized in chapter two of this work. The 
principal argument for this assertion is that every culture has some value and no culture 
may claim total superiority over other cultures. Each ethnic group and culture should be 
considered in its own context and right. 
The cultural issue calls for discretion. Some aspects of two cultures may not be 
able to blend well while other aspects may be able to blend well, but no culture should be 
branded and dismissed as absolutely irrelevant, as advocated by Paul VI.96 The crucial 
social challenge here is the possibility of integration of different cultures, which demands 
                                                 
95 Ibid. Here Kabwegyere quotes L. Binder, “National Integration and Political Development,” American 
Political Science Review, September 1964, pp.624 and 627. 
96 Populorum Progressio, 41, 18. 
  373
a critical study.97 This is a process that facilitates the growth of solidarity in the country, 
and ultimately solidarity with cultures outside the country. An adaptation of cultures is 
insufficient to build social bonds between people because it may not facilitate a unitary 
vision of the human person, human dignity and human rights. In light of the teaching of 
Populorum Progressio Uganda’s plural cultures, tribal or ethnic diversityare real 
challenges to integral growth.98 The document never mentioned tribalism as a bad 
practice but in the global context it considered racism and exaggerated nationalism as 
opposed to integral development. However, by interpretation and inference, tribalism 
which displays the negative elements of exclusivity and discrimination, characteristic of 
racism and nationalism, belongs to the latter categories. As Kabwegyere rightly suggests, 
it is an “enemy to national integration.”99 In Uganda it is perhaps this fact which accounts 
for the extant difficulties in social interaction, inappropriate mutual ethnic visions and 
discrimination in economic and political activities, except where there are personally 
vested interests. 
One of the major challenges in the political field is the role of government to 
protect the citizens, to promote all the people of the nation and protect or promote their 
rights and dignity. Promotion of justice and peace, and the implementation of affirmative 
action and preferential option for the poor all contribute positively to human 
development. They are significant indicators that the anthropological challenges to 
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human development are being addressed. A political system that does not provide for 
such possibilities and the care of people is called into question because it neglects human 
needs and thwarts development. This has been and still is a challenge to all governments 
of Uganda since its independence in 1962.100 There is discrimination on the basis of 
tribes or ethnic communities whenever a new government takes over, of course often by 
force of arms meaning that there were/are often regional, economic, religious and 
political marginalization or discrimination, and human rights abuses.101  
Currently in the northern part of Uganda the socio-economic and political 
atmosphere is not supportive to the respect for human persons. This is evident, not only 
in the twenty-year old ongoing war in the region but also in the fact that many people are 
living in dehumanizing conditions created by the dual fighting factions.102 The challenges 
to be addressed here are to help both sides to understand and accept the values and 
dignity of human life and the consequential significance of peace. The process calls for 
cooperation from both the indigenous people and those supporting the course of peace. If 
no change is made it is either because the indigenous people are not developed enough to 
understand the value of their dignity as persons, or they are intentionally suppressed. In 
either case it is also the duty of the state and the Church to perform, though the Church is 
doing the best according to her capacity. The two institutions need to ceaselessly address 
issues like arbitrary arrests, detentions without court trials, and obstruction of justice. 
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 Another critical anthropological challenge to religious institutions, the 
government, and cultural and social sectors such as education, is to explain and help 
people understand the human person, human dignity and human rights. It is the challenge 
to educate people about these basic values or principles. The mutual relationships 
between people regardless of religion, ethnic or racial origin and political affiliations 
needs to be understood if people are to respect one another. Education about the human 
person and human dignity ought to be a continuous pastoral imperative for religious 
institutions as much as it should be a priority in socio-cultural, educational and political 
institutions.  
In the field of religion a number of issues also require attention. Religion or the 
Church has a duty, like the state, to protect and promote the human person, human rights 
and human dignity. There is no doubt that the Church in Uganda has consistently and 
frequently taken this responsibility very seriously. This is evident, especially in the case 
of the Catholic Church, in the 18 pastoral letters that the Catholic bishops of Uganda have 
written since independence, beginning with Shaping Our National Destiny which was 
issued on the occasion of Ugandan independence from the British, October 9, 1962, to 
Towards a Democratic and Peaceful Uganda Based on the Common Good published in 
November 2005.103 For example, one of their most extensive pastoral letters, namely 
With A New Heart and A New Spirit, which was issued in 1986 at a very critical time in 
the history of Uganda, devoted “nearly a whole chapter on the need for respecting human 
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rights”104 and on the whole covers many human issues which are critical, even, to Uganda 
of today. They present enduring challenges to the political system in Uganda, and have 
been the reason for some of the improvements in Uganda's economic and political 
systems in the past few years. However, one serious question to ask, and a retrospective 
challenge to the Uganda Catholic hierarchy, is why there was a lapse in their address of 
national social issues from the time of the pastoral letter Shaping Our National Destiny, 
published in 1962, to 1979 when Reshaping Our Nation was written.105 This was a lapse 
of seventeen years of not addressing Uganda’s intense socio-economic and political 
problems, during very stormy years in the history of Uganda. 
Religious institutions also stand to be challenged where there is no respect for 
human life. Killing or fighting is sometimes encouraged by some religious leaders. 
Outstanding examples are the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments 
of God (MRTCG), a break-away religious sect which, on March 17, 2000 and earlier, 
killed at least 893 people in the name of an apocalyptic vision that was to be realized 
imminently.106 This and armies like Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) of Alice 
Lakwena and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony that claim to fight for 
the moral, political and economic rehabilitation of the people in the name of the Lord are 
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serious challenges to religious institutions.107 They show that to some extent religion is a 
failure. They question how effective religion is in the life of our people.  
 There are different religious denominations, and it is not infrequent to notice 
religious discrimination. In fact, just before independence Ugandans were already divided 
along religious lines because the main political parties were formed along the lines of 
religious denominations.108 The questions to grapple with are two. Either the teaching of 
the church or different religious denominations has bounced against people who call 
themselves believers or Christians, but actually they are not, or the teaching has been 
inadequate, especially about human dignity, its universality and equality. This failure is 
seen not only when different religious denominations encounter each other. It is also 
evident in politics and general social interaction involving the same people who are 
believers. The anthropological challenge is tied to the challenges of solidarity, justice and 
the common good, and to all other development principles, virtues and conditions or 
factors. In a context like Uganda they should always be addressed simultaneously.  
 One of the greatest challenges to the church in Uganda is to help people express 
God’s love for all people. This love for people is partly expressed through the church’s 
active participation in fighting unjust social structures, economic organizations and 
political systems that humiliate people and subject them to misery. This is a constituent 
dimension of the church’s true mission and what makes the church relevant to 
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humankind.109 This perspective suggests that one of the significant challenges to religious 
institutions, the government and individuals, especially Christians, is to remain relevant 
to people by protecting their fundamental rights and helping them to meet their needs. 
B. Universal and National Charity: The Challenge of Authentic Love  
 
At the outset it is important to note that, similar to human dignity, the issue of 
charity or love is a crucial one and ties together all other development principles Paul VI 
advocated in Populorum Progressio. What ties charity and human dignity together is the 
fact that they are directly related to the human person. Although both justice and charity 
are compelling virtues, charity must always come first because every person is “the 
object of charity.”110 Benedict XVI re-emphasized the centrality of love, asserting that in 
a global context and interdependent world, economic, social or political projects cannot 
substitute “that gift of self to another through which charity is expressed.”111 In other 
words, the sincere gift of oneself and one’s talents is the climax of the expression of love. 
The testimony to this is God’s sacrificial self-gift in the person of Jesus Christ. A brief 
treatise of the theme of charity anticipates the fact that the treatise on virtues, conditions 
and other principles for integral development touches the question of charity.  
Universal charity is a love “without discrimination of tribe, religion and 
nation.”112 This claim is consonant with the theological summary of Paul VI's advocacy 
for integral human development. Integral human development should be manifested in 
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physical and public love. This is possible if individuals are receptive to all people of 
different backgrounds, regardless of mutual or personal knowledge and evenness of 
development in the country. The challenge to Uganda is the observable continued 
segregation and discrimination, initiated by its successive leaders, with consequent 
irregularity in development and social interaction.113 In a context such as Uganda the 
challenge of love is compounded by what David M. McCarthy suggests as true love. 
According to him "love requires that we will what is good."114 Love is not only an 
emotional feeling, it is a duty and expressed in a rational or deliberate good action. In the 
context of Uganda its principal challenge is that people deliberately act to stop 
segeragation and discrimination. This, in other words, should be the good they will - love 
should have what McCarthy calls the "critical elements of willing and the good."115  
McCarthy suggests that it is the rational and deliberate character which makes 
love an authentic human act and thus gives it its moral dimension. True love ought to be 
viewed against the backdrop of "both doing good and having good reason for what we 
should do."116 This contention suggests that much as it is difficult to define love, true love 
can be seen expressed in genuine action that is gratifying to both the agent of love and the 
object of love. The challenge for Ugandans is to grasp this fact and appreciate it in order 
to show national and universal charity. 
One of the greatest challenges of the call to universal charity is the questioning of 
people’s apathy. This challenge is directed in a special way to Catholics, and other 
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Christians, because they constitute the majority of Uganda’s population and contributed 
much to the formulation of the motto of the country – “For God and My Country”.117 
Showing love in the most critical or difficult moments is indicative of the authenticity of 
love. Patriotic citizens stand by their agonizing fellow citizens in times of trouble. The 
political situation in northern and northeastern Uganda reveals the contrary. Parts of the 
country have quietly watched these affected regions suffer for many years. In a bid to 
break this silence John Baptist Odama had this to say: 
I want to remind the indifferent world that the people of Northern and North-Eastern Uganda, 
Acholi, Langi, Teso, Karamojong, Lugbara, Madi, Alur, and many others subjected to such 
atrocities are part of Uganda and the whole humanity who should enjoy equal rights, responsibility 
and dignity. 118 
 
The named peoples constitute a segment of the country whose people are of 
Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic origin, distinct from the rest of the Ugandans, most of whom 
are Bantu speaking people. Even if the statement of Odama were not broadly interpreted, 
it is still tantamount to the assertion that there is lack of national charity. This challenge is 
still more compelling to Catholics who, denominationally, constitute the majority of the 
population of Uganda – 40 to 50 percent of the population.119 The challenge is prompted 
by the apathy manifest in the silent observation of many who do not care about what 
some parts of the country are suffering. This claim is supported by the observation of Ian 
Legget: 
There is remarkably little national concern about the atrocities that are being perpetrated against 
the people of the north, and an apparent lack of understanding among southern Ugandans about 
the sheer scale of the humanitarian and economic crisis that has evolved.120 
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This statement shows the gravity of the situation in northern Uganda, a portion of 
one nation. The challenge of the statement is again compounded by the reality of the 
“predominantly Christian character or constitution of Uganda’s population.”121 Uganda is 
a nation that boasts of being at least 86% Christian (48% Catholic and 38% Protestant) 
and a religious or a God-loving nation expressed in Uganda’s motto: “For God and My 
Country.”122 Where is the love of God and concern and care for fellow children of God in 
this case? Uganda is a nation that proclaims, partly, in its national anthem:  
. . . united free for liberty, together we’ll always stand. Oh Uganda the land of freedom, our love 
and labour we give, and with neighbours all, at our country’s call, in peace and friendship we’ll 
live.123  
 
The national anthem rightly expresses, in resonance with Christian anthropology, 
de facto the end of true love as "sharing our lives" with others and our "fulfillment in the 
love of God."124 Just considering the fact that citizens of Uganda are spread from north to 
south and from east to west of the country, an attitude of indifferrence as stated (above) 
by Legget is one of the greatest challenges to the government and the religious leaders of 
Uganda, and to every Ugandan, in the context of the true end of love. It ought to be 
overcome. In light of the stated end of love, the motto and the national anthem have no 
meaning or they are just decorations and words to be proud of but not lived in real life. 
The Catholic church in particular has tried to be an instrument of love in many 
different ways, though it needs to do more. For instance, the efforts of the Uganda 
Catholic bishops to establish the Centenary Rural Development Bank (CERUDEB). This 
is one of the best serving, if not actually the best serving local bank in the country. It 
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serves people without discrimination in terms of employment and economic sevices, 
expressed in its motto: “Unite, Love and Serve.”125 This is a symbolic and traditional 
Catholic expression of universal love besides what the Catholic church practices in other 
services such as schools, orphanages, hospitals or health care services and other areas. 
Political representation should be a testimony of true and national or universal 
love in the country, but this again is a failure. True love shows itself in many ways but 
the challenges of true or universal love are seen in the results when there is universal 
love:  
social life will be peaceful, mutual help will be given more freely, dialogue and consequent mutual 
understanding will pave way to friendship, to a real culture of heart and civilization of love. Such 
love, it is abundantly clear, cannot be confined to attraction towards others, nor simply to good 
feeling. These may be only the beginning of the process towards real love. Real love is above all a 
decision of the will controlled by reason.126 
 
The real challenge of love to anyone is to build a civilization or a culture of love. 
This is something not forced upon a person or groups of people. It is a deliberate action 
consequent to a reflection and a realization of the value of people and the obligation to 
love them. Such a love is indiscriminate, goes beyond any borders, shows in mutual 
recognition and peace. 
The challenge of charity or love is the invitation to love indiscriminately, meaning 
that love be extended even to one’s enemies as Jesus Christ taught.127 In addressing the 
problem of socio-economic and political instability in northern Uganda, John Baptist 
Odama had this to say to the people of the region about the mission of the Church:  
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Every Christian faithful and every God-fearing person knows that our faith is a mission we are to 
accomplish. This mission for us is strictly peaceful, loving and respectful of the dignity in human 
persons of all walks of life.128 
 
 The reason for this advocacy is simply the imperative nature of the Christian 
mission because of the centrality and universality of human dignity. Universal love is, 
therefore, called for because of universality and equality of human dignity. Besides this 
“love is the badge for all Christians” and its “social expression”129 is solidarity. Teaching 
or preaching and practicing charity is one of the principal functions of religion. There is 
no doubt that church or religious leaders often like to do acts of charity.130 In fact the 
practical expression of charity in the church is evident in the social services that the 
church renders through education, hospitals, orphanages, baby care homes, homes for the 
elderly and the blind. However, one other challenge to the church in preaching and living 
charity is that it should always take into account the socio-economic and political 
situations in which people live. It is good to preach universal love but it is also significant 
to let the masses know their rights and the injustices that are perpetrated by other people 
against them; if the church preaches love without considering different circumstances, 
she can also prepare ground for injustice, abuse of human rights and human dignity.131 
The attempts the Uganda Catholic Bishops’ Conference made to resolve the crisis in 
Kabale Catholic diocese symbolized their collegial spirit and love for each other and the 
church in Uganda.132 The efforts of the bishops towards resolving the problem also shows 
that they were determined to thwart the cause of injustice resulting from abuse of human 
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rights and human dignity. They would not have acted immediately to resolve the issues if 
this were not the case. 
C. Universal Destiny of Natural Resources: The Challenge of Private Ownership 
 
 The study in chapter two treated the basis on which Paul VI argued about 
ownership of property. It spelled out that his teaching was founded on the creation 
theology. God created the earth and its resources for the good of all people, and this 
mandate was given to the first people when God told them to “be fruitful, multiply, fill 
the earth and subdue it.”133 The articulation of the principle of ownership of property as 
indicated in the chapter suggested that ownership takes into consideration the work of the 
property owner and the needs of those who gravely lack the basic resources for their 
livelihood. This understanding of ownership is based on the interpretation and meaning 
of the quotation from the book of Genesis. Concisely, the text suggests that the mandate 
or command to conquer the earth through work is a fulfillment of a divine precept, and 
even though people earn property by their labor they should not forget that they are only 
God’s ambassadors and custodians – they are stewards of divine property originally 
intended for the benefit of all.134  
When property owners have met their basic needs and have extra resources, the 
universal destiny of the resources of nature demands that they help those who do not have 
resources to meet their basic needs out of the surplus. Much as the owner of the goods or 
natural resources has the right to own these goods by virtue of having worked for them, 
(s)he has at the same time a duty to meet other people’s needs after meeting her/his own 
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because these resources are meant for the good of all people according to divine design. 
However, if the person lacking the basic goods neecessary for living is capable and has 
possibilities for acquiring them, but is negligent or simply lazy, the application of the 
principle should be made with care and caution. Such persons could be denied such 
support except when in danger or under threat to their life. Merely supporting the needy 
without critical consideration of their abilities and possibilities available to them would 
also contradict participation, solidarity and the common good to which everybody should 
contribute. 
The principle of ownership of property challenges every citizen to live in a spirit 
of universal charity, solidarity, and preferential option for the poor. One of the issues 
raised by this principle is how socio-economic and material resources of a nation are used 
or shared among the citizens. Some critical observers have suggested that  
if the religious, political, and ethnic divisions which have proved to be so destructive in Uganda 
are to be reduced and replaced with a stronger sense of nationhood and national identity, the role 
of economic and social developments as a means of minimizing differences rather than 
accentuating them will be critical.135  
 
The principle touches the issue of human equality and socio-economic justice. It 
challenges the church, government and the people of Uganda about the poverty of certain 
people and parts of the country, and the widely-growing gap between the rich and the 
poor. The claimed economic growth of Uganda does not mean that all Ugandans are 
beneficiaries of the currently prevailing policies and resources. It is noticeable that “there 
has been growth in inequality, and an increasingly common feeling that some people and 
some parts are doing very nicely, while others are being left behind.”136 An example for 
citation is the comparison between Karamoja or any other place in the north and north-
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east and Kampala in the south or any other lake region area such as Mbarara in the West 
of the country.137  
Any visitor to Uganda who has the opportunity to go to the north, as well as to spend time in 
Kampala and the fertile crescent around Lake Victoria, would be struck by the remarkable contrast 
between the two. Kampala and the towns of the south and west are thriving. Business is good, and 
the signs of growth and wealth are evident all around: in the houses being built, the goods 
available in the shops and markets, and the number of vehicles on the roads. Kampala is one of the 
safest and most pleasant cities in Africa. Travel north for four to five hours to the town of Gulu, 
however, and the landscape changes completely. Gulu has experienced growth in the last ten 
years, but it is an expansion of cheap investments and hurried construction, signs of flight from an 
unsafe and increasingly abandoned countryside.138 
 
The quotation above evinces the disparity of socio-economic and political 
development in Uganda. Gulu is referred to here because it is one of the outstanding areas 
affected, similar situations prevail elsewhere in the country. All of these support the 
claim that there is no integral development in Uganda. 
The problem of private ownership of property in Uganda dates back to the early 
1950s when cooperative unions and other business organizations were established but 
they were dominated by the rich farmers “who controlled the committees and thus the use 
of surplus funds”139 and grossly mismanaged corporate resources. They denied poor 
people the right to use resources of nature. This behavior contradicts the limited nature of 
the right to own private property as espoused in chapter two.  
One of the principal challenges of the right to ownership of property is to ignore 
the fact that ownership of land is an ownership of the source of human livelihood. The 
problem of ownership of land was aggravated by the 1975 Land Reform Decree, which 
created opportunities that undermined customary ownership of land, especially in 
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northern and northeastern Uganda, which was formerly considered Crown Land in the 
colonial times and later called Public Land after independence.140 The consequences of 
this decree were undesirable and resented by those who are educated about the value of 
land because the “customary land tenure system has been seriously eroded by the middle 
class gaining advantage over the ‘ordinary people’.”141 The system opened the way for 
the rich who can afford to buy land from the poor and to do so at will. Such a system not 
only disfavors the poor and illiterate populace, it is unjust or immoral because it deprives 
them of their source of living. 
The Land decree is disadvantageous because it opened way for the use of the land 
“in northern and northeastern Uganda to capitalist relations of production,”142 as 
suggested by Amaza Ori Ondoga. Ondoga suggests that people in these regions, and 
other regions of Uganda confronted with similar situations, were denied the right to own 
land; they were unjustly treated and discriminated against by the prevailing laws. Similar 
discrimination is also observable in the unjust traditional system of land ownership where 
women who are “childless, widowed, disabled, separated/divorced, or with only girl 
chidren often have little or no recourse to land since they cannot even rely on men for 
access to land.”143 The fact that there is no preference for them as poor people in need of 
the support of government and because they are human beings means a denial of their 
dignity and rights. This deprivation and injustice to women is also expressed in the 
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practice that even if a woman and the husband jointly acquired land, the woman cannot 
claim ownership because the land titles are registered in the name of the husband.144 
The above system of the ownership of land recurs to date. It has compounded the 
problems of poor people when the rich continue to purchase the land of the poor, 
depriving them of ownership of their livelihood. As Aili Mari Tripp states, “land is the 
most important resource in Uganda because much of the population depends on it for 
their livelihood.”145 Moreover, many of those who sell their land are not aware that they 
are depriving themselves and their future generation of a precious ownership and life, or 
they are unable to anticipate the grave and eminent danger into which they are heading. 
Such “commodification of land”146 poses a grave threat to the poor people who own 
nothing but their plots of land. People, therefore, need to be educated about the value of 
land, and this is a challenge to be confronted by the government, religious institutions and 
the educational institutions in the country. 
The economic system was unjust because economic activities were controlled by 
Asians until 1972 when Idi Amin expelled them from Uganda, and some of them were 
unjustly deprived of their citizenship and their property.147 The Asians had earned what 
they were deprived of through their own hard work. The indigenous people had the right 
and duty to meet their economic needs. The Asians were deprived of resources they had 
earned by working for them. It was a vicious circle of injustice – a deprivation of either 
party of the right to own property. The Asians should not have been forcefully deprived 
                                                 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. The gravity of this statement is compounded by the fact that 86% of Uganda’s population is rural 
and majority of these people live in abject poverty 
146Commodification of land is used here, negatively, because customary ownership of land gives people 
freedom to own land but it also allows people to sell it to anyone willing to purchase it. This is unfortunate 
for the poor who easily lose land, their major source of survival. Also see Ondoga, 198. 
147Mamdani, 236. 
  389
of their property but they also needed to realize and acknowledge that the indigenous 
people required necessities for survival, and had the right to participate in their own 
development.  
One test for true development of a nation is the number of beggars in the nation 
and their distribution according to regions or the number of poor people and their 
distribution according to the regions of the country. The 86% of the population of 
Uganda which live in the countryside constitute the majority of the population and they 
are actually the poor of the nation.148 Those who own businesses, especially in the urban 
areas, are called to question whether their businesses are exclusively for themselves or 
also for the benefit of their needy neighbors, who might be haunting the rich deeply in 
their consciences. Kampala has more beggars today than ever before, yet Uganda is said 
to be developing faster than ever before. Such claims are not tenable because one of the 
litmus tests for the development of a nation is the number and care for the poor people in 
that nation. 
The challenge of ownership in a political context is how government uses the 
resources of the country. It can also be seen in how widely spread economic development 
is in the country. Though partly the legacy of pre-colonial economic differences and the 
colonial reinforcement, while the southern, southeastern and western parts of Uganda are 
developed and have good socio-economic infrastructure, the north, northwestern and the 
northeast are not.149 This disparity makes the use of government grants or foreign aid to 
Uganda questionable in terms of its distribution for developing the country. The proper 
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use of resources is demanded by just social and economic order and it is required by the 
sense of responsibility expected of anybody in public service because (s)he is 
“accountable not only to the nation but also to God, and God will be the final judge.”150 
The challenge of integral development to the government of Uganda and the nation’s 
economic planners is that the ownership of the wealth of the nation means provision of 
better opportunities and solutions to problems confronting the poorest regions of Uganda. 
Matthew Habiger has rightly pointed out that ownership is important for the 
stability and confidence or security of society: “it is inherent in the nature of men and 
women that they have some claim to material goods for a sense of security for themselves 
and for all their dependents.”151 The principle of ownership of private property also calls 
to question the ownership of property in both Christian institutions and other religious 
institutions. Many times conflicts between religious leaders and members of the groups 
arise over resources and their distribution. The challenge to religious institutions in this 
regard is about sharing or use of personal property and donations given to members, 
community leaders, priests, religious, bishops and pastoral agents or whoever is entrusted 
with such responsibility. Such a state of affairs further challenges one to reflect on why 
churches split and why there are many independent churches, radical or fundamentalist 
religious sects even within Christian institutions. The problems are sometimes doctrinal 
or ideological, but they are also related to ownership of property.152 There are sometimes 
squabbles about the wealth or property of religious institutions. The examples Gifford 
gives of the crises in the churches in Uganda suffice as adequate testimonies to this 
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assertion, though there are other examples besides these.153 It is the problem of ownership 
or access to property, and the question goes beyond this to the self-concern of 
individuals. The temptation to high standards of living is one of the factors that forces 
religious people to “live above their means.”154 It contributes or leads to dishonesty and 
corruption, not only in religious institutions but above all in civil or political institutions. 
One of the challenges of the right to own property is, therefore, the challenge to shun 
undue self-concern, and hence a challenge to think of the common good. This is a great 
challenge because people always want a mutual determination of allocation of resources. 
At the same time each person aspires to receive a share and members of the institutions 
also question whether government is the owner and the one in charge or the people, 
whether the superior of the religious community or his/her delegate or members of the 
religious institution are the owners and custodians. 
D. Subsidiarity: The Challenge to Promote Initiatives 
  
As stated in chapter two, the principle of subsidiarity is crucial for social order. It 
is a principle Paul VI considered necessary for resolving conflicts of rights between 
individuals and communities.155 It is necessary in both secular and religious institutions. 
The challenge of the principle of subsidiarity is threefold: the issue of the priority of 
government versus the priority of intermediate groups or institutions, the priority of 
intermediate groups or institutions versus that of families, and the priority of families 
versus individual family members. The main issue in each case is who does what and 
when. The principle of subsidiarity demands that smaller groups or individuals should do 
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for themselves what they are capable of without the interference of the bigger bodies; and 
when they are not capable the bigger bodies should intervene, which means smaller 
groups or individuals should not expect larger bodies to do for them what they are 
capable of doing for themselves.156 Families and small groups are challenged that they 
can only be helped when they are incapable of fruitfully helping themselves in carrying 
out their missions. “Even the United Nations” and other aiding organizations should be 
helpful and function according to the principle of subsidiarity and promote “the 
autonomy of single states”157 and the states respect the principle of solidarity and 
subsidiarity.  
The main problems here are government or state control of development projects 
and services, which people could otherwise manage on their own. For instance, if people 
or regions are able to provide or raise funds for building power stations they should be 
allowed to do so. Secondly, there are certain things towards which people could 
contribute but some people simply do not cooperate. Such attitudes also exist where 
people expect to be given things or expect that things should be done for them. To give is 
often the expectation of people from the state or government, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), the Church or religious institutions or individuals people imagine 
are rich, while they would be able to do some of the things themselves using personal or 
local resources. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s call for participation in poverty 
eradication is crucial to any development endeavors: “But Government does not work 
alone. Poverty-eradication is the business of all the citizens of Uganda. We all contribute. 
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. . .”158 
The political development of the different regions of a country depends on the 
ability of the local regions or government intervention when the regions are 
incapacitated. This means that a proper application of the principle of subsidiarity is 
crucial. In the political arena, a similar attitude as in the socio-economic fields is one of 
the main problems affecting other aspects of development in some parts of Uganda. For 
instance, the promotion of political efficiency depends on creation of a conducive 
situation in the country or the particular region. Peace is one of the relevant factors and a 
typical example of a factor whose promotion demands coopertion. Its promotion depends 
on all people besides the government.159 Government may contribute but the support of 
the indigenous people who know the mentality and the culture of the region is equally 
necessary. In addressing such a situation in northern Uganda, the bishops of the affected 
areas had this to say: 
Above all the Acholi themselves, each and every one of them, must help and join the efforts for a 
peaceful solution of all the violence and insurgency. We ask all citizens of Uganda to share our 
difficulties and understand us.160 
 
The bishops suggest that there is sometimes some regional and individual 
indolence where many people are expected to contribute towards a given course such as 
peace making. The main challenge is that sometimes people expect government to make 
peace. At other times government expects the local people to provide conditions 
necessary for peace. The problem is that both the local people and government are 
equally in dilemma. There is a fine line between the role of government and that of the 
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local people or agents of peace. Consequently, the expectation of peace is uncertain 
because there is no clear definition of who does what.161 The local people look toward the 
state or government to solve all the local political problems and vice versa. This is a 
difficulty in the application of the principle. It is one aspect of the challenge of 
subsidiarity in the political context and it needs to be clarified. 
Another political challenge in the application of the principle of subsidiarity is the 
situation where there is a possibility of conflict between church and state regarding 
development projects. While history has shown that the church and state have cooperated 
in helping to meet the needs of the citizens who are also members of the religious 
institutions as President Yoweri K. Museveni stated: “We in government commend 
serious development efforts, and we will do all that is possible to assist the church in such 
endeavours,”162 the possibilities of conflicts of interest cannot be ruled out completely 
because there is no fine definition of limits of responsibility. Secondly, such conflicts 
often arise when there are personal interests or ulterior motives involving particular 
projects. However, the principle is favorable for advancement because it clearly stipulates 
that what smaller groups can do for themselves should not be taken over by larger 
bodies.163 For instance, if a religious institution is able to manage a particular project for 
its people, who constitute part of the nation, the state or government should not thwart its 
efforts. It is helping the state and relieving it of some of its responsibilities to care for the 
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people, though this is also a responsibility of the church. The church cares for both the 
spiritual and material needs of the people, and it has done this consistently in the past, 
and even to date.164 It is for this and similar reasons that Museveni’s contention is 
significant and should be taken seriously by any political leader. Moreover such efforts 
contribute to solidarity and the common good of the nation. 
In the religious field people have sometimes failed to handle local religious 
problems effectively. The principal reason is also the difficulty in drawing the line 
between the roles of individuals, local religious institutions and national or regional 
authorities. The second difficulty is autonomy, which is often given to the individual 
local religious authorities. The limit of their authority is not clear and it is difficult to 
explicitly know whose responsibility begins where. Two examples of this challenge can 
be cited here. 
The first example of the difficulty or challenge in the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity was apparent in the crisis in the Catholic diocese of Kabale in western 
Uganda in the 1990s when the diocese was split into two major factions – those who were 
pro-bishop Barnabas Halem’Imana, the then ordinary of the diocese, and those who were 
opposed to him.165 The dispute in Kabale Catholic diocese was about the management of 
the resources of the diocese and the relationship of the bishop to priests of the diocese 
and of some of the priests (Rwandese Tusi and Hutu) to the Rwandese Patriotic Front 
(RPF) – apparently it was an ethnic dispute and the bishop’s relation to the security 
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forces of Uganda.166 The application of the principle of subsidiarity was an apparent 
failure. The bishop of the diocese, the priests, religious and pastoral agents could not 
resolve the division and strife among themselves and the people in the diocese. Neither 
could other people in the diocese resolve the problem. The alternative option was the 
Uganda Catholic Bishops Conference but they could not resolve the problem 
immediately and radically because, according to Catholic Church law (Canon Law), 
though the ordinary of a diocese is in collegiality with other bishops,167 he is still 
autonomous as the ordinary of that diocese.168 Consequently, the crisis dragged on for a 
substantial period of time.  
Rome did not intervene to handle the crisis directly or personally. It expected the 
people of the diocese together with the ordinary, or the Catholic Episcopal Conference of 
Uganda, to resolve the crisis. It was not until a commission of inquiry consisting of 
canonists from among the Uganda bishops and one priest-canonist was sent to look into 
the issue, make a report to the bishops’ conference; and “in mid 1994 the report was 
completed and outlined four options. It was considered at a plenary meeting of the 
Catholic bishops, and Halem’Imana himself chose the option that he resign.”169 This 
technically shows that he was not dismissed by the episcopal conference or his opponents 
or the bishops’ conference.  
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One thing again to be observed here is the difficulty or challenge of drawing a 
clear line between the intervention of the superior body and the freedom of the smaller 
body. The lines remain fine and unclear. This is often the difficulty in applying the 
principle of subsidiarity. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest that the 
Church’s central administrative authority  
should avoid presenting itself as a suffocating central organization which takes everything on 
itself, controls everything and gives directives to every part of the world, to the detriment of what 
the local and synodal authorities can decide for themselves.170  
 
Since there is a fine line between authorities in as far as the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity is concerned the contention of the duo should be taken with a lot 
of caution too. While people should or can be left to do for themselves what they are 
capable of, it is sometimes not easy to know who is capable of doing what. Conversely, it 
is not always easy to determine when a superior body should intervene to help a smaller 
group or if it should not. The greatest challenge of the principle of subsidiarity is the 
difficulty of its application because of the fine lines between the ability of smaller bodies 
and that of larger bodies.  
The second example is the Church of Uganda (COU) crisis, which happened in 
the Diocese of Busoga, beginning on August 20, 1992, when the dean of the Cathedral 
resigned on several grounds including corruption and irresponsible leadership.171 The 
community was also split into two – those who supported bishop Bamwoze, the then 
bishop, and those who wanted him out of office. Just as in the case of the Catholic 
diocese of Kabale, Bishop Bamwoze could not resolve the crisis, and neither could the 
Church of Uganda community in the diocese do it. They appealed to the Archbishop, 
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Yonah Okoth, who found it hard to resolve the issue because he was himself subjected to 
violence in the same way bishop Bamwoze was.172 There was no way of resolving the 
conflict except to try to employ some extra-ecclesial organs or agents. Consequently, 
government or state organs and agents were involved to curb the problem.173 In the 
context of the nation the principle worked but not within the limited context of the 
administrative structure of the Church of Uganda. The bid to involve state organs or 
agents was indicative of the difficulty of the application of the principle of subsidiarity 
within COU as an institution. 
Another challenge of this principle in the religious field is economic. There is 
often, as Yoweri K. Museveni remarked in 1989, three years after coming to presidency, 
the tendency of expectation of help from elsewhere as if Uganda does not have resources 
that could be tapped for its development.174 This is a real problem with religious 
institutions.This problem is also real with the government of Uganda which depends on 
“the international community for 55 percent of its bugget.”175  Many national, regional 
and local seminaries and individual dioceses have for years expected to be helped by the 
churches or religious institutions in the developed world. This is the seemingly enduring 
dependence syndrome. It considerably challenges the plans, initiatives and efforts of the 
churches or religious institutions in Uganda in over one hundred and twenty years of 
Christianity in Uganda. The Catholic church’s expectation of funds from Propaganda 
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Fide 176 and other organizations or associations for several decades suggests needs that 
are more than just the support for crucial things. The need is apparently for daily and 
annual financial support. Such needs suggest rather an extremely loose interpretation of 
subsidiarity, universal charity and the right of ownership of property, which leads to a sit-
down-and-wait attitude. It also undermines the principle of participation or involvement. 
This challenge is critical because it invites all to further reflect about living within one’s 
own means. It is sometimes the wish to live beyond one’s personal means that makes 
people behave unethically in order to achieve what they want. This is the case, especially 
when the expected aid is not forthcoming as it initially was. 
E. Common Good: The Challenge of the Requisite Conditions for Development 
 
The principle of common good challenges us to acknowledge the social character 
of human beings. It is closely related to social justice, solidarity, option for the poor and 
affirmative action, not withstanding the fact that it is also intimately connected to 
universal love and human dignity. As the sum total of conditions necessary for fostering 
the well-being of every member of community, it challenges every person to contribute in 
various ways to creating this situation.177 Common Good challenges everybody that 
development is not possible without other principles, virtues and conditions required by 
integral human development. In every context, including that of Uganda, it challenges all 
to embrace universal love, social justice, peace, subsidiarity, preferential option for the 
poor, association, participation and education. 
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The challenge of the common good in the social and economic context is well 
expressed in the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda but it needs to be actualized 
in the socio-economic life of the people. The constitution aptly suggests that the citizens 
of Uganda should be patriotic and loyal, “engage in gainful work for the family and the 
common good, contribute to the national development and the well-being of the 
community. . . .”178 As the supreme law of a country it is fitting that the constitution 
incorporates the idea of the common good because as law the constitution is meant to 
foster the good of the people. It creates an orderly situation and gives people a sense of 
direction. That law is for the good of people is an idea consistently asserted by 
outstanding legal students including Thomas Aquinas.179 The stipulation of the 1995 
constitution is, therefore, a positive theoretical contribution that needs to be actualized. 
The actual positive contribution is real if corruption, discrimination and marginalization 
of some people or regions of Uganda are eradicated. Although these are serious 
challenges, as Lisa Cahill Sowle suggests, despite human weaknesses one can entertain 
hopes that "the common good can become a reality and not merely a utopian illusion 
because humans have an innate capacity to build a just society"180 although not without 
commitment and serious efforts. Secondly, people are rational and have the ability to 
know the requirements of common good or social life, and to establish "certain important 
values from their moral and social experience."181 However, the challenge here is the one 
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of the proper use of intellectual capacities. The intellectual capacity has sometimes been 
deliberately and wrongly used. This misuse is the problem to guard against. 
Another challenge of the principle of the common good is that “in a society of 
persons, the common good is for each individual an end which (s)he must serve and to 
which one must subordinate one’s particular life or interest.”182 Any service for the cause 
of the common good demands that people of the community are considerate or less self-
concerned. It means each person renders service for other people. This is a great 
challenge because the human tendency is often first to try to satisfy the ego. On the basis 
of such demands of the common good, one of the challenges of the common good 
presented by the Catholic bishops of Uganda is that “politicians and political parties 
should desist from sacrificing the common good for selfish ends.”183 This is a critical 
challenge because it touches the idea that if Ugandans are only self-concerned, they 
cannot attain the common good. Common good is achieved when people know that they 
need each other to survive, grow and develop. The Uganda bishops aptly emphasized this 
need of unity and solidarity in the following words:  
unity in diversity should be among important ingredients of pluralistic political dispensation that 
Uganda has embraced. With unity as a starting point and the pursuit of the common good for all 
citizens of Uganda as a fundamental political principle, we can be assured of a peaceful political 
transition and greater future prosperity as a country.184 
 
The principle of the common good presents a special challenge to the government 
which has a unique role. According to Ddungu “the state exists for promoting the 
common good of its citizens and other residents.”185 This means the role of the state is to 
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create conditions that help all people and groups to fully develop themselves. Such 
conditions include all kinds of justice - commutative, social, distributive and legal - 
peace, efficient public service, good will, education, unity, truth, responsibility, the spirit 
of sharing and love.186 
The principle of the common good is, therefore, a common challenge to all people 
of Uganda. Politically, the challenge of the principle of common good to Ugandans may 
be viewed in the light of what the Bishops’ conference stated recently: 
All of us should unite in solidarity adhering to the values and principles of the common good. 
Political diversity should be rooted in this common good around which all party  programmes 
should revolve.187 
 
Common good demands solidarity of the people or their unity in action despite 
the ethnic differences in Uganda. The statement of Uganda Catholic bishops is significant 
when interpreted in relation to the significance of the colors of the Uganda flag. The 
Uganda flag has three colors – black, yellow and red, in this order. Black is the color of 
the skin of the people and shows that Uganda is a black African nation; yellow stands for 
the abundance of sunshine which Uganda enjoys as an equatorial country because of its 
location, 4 degrees north and 2 degrees south of the equator; and red stands for oneness 
or brotherhood/sisterhood in blood. 188 All three colors symbolize what the people of 
Uganda commonly share. Besides the colors of the Uganda flag there is one similar 
symbol of unity - the motto of Uganda: For God and My Country.189 The motto suggests 
a selfless commitment to the cause of Uganda. All these symbols strongly suggest and 
point to the common good of the nation. 
                                                 
186 Ibid. Ddungu is quoting GS, No.76.  
 187 Catholic Bishops of Uganda, Towards A Democratic and Peaceful Uganda Based on the Common 
Good, 4. 
188 “Uganda” in Oxford Encyclopedic World Atlas, 222. Also see McKnight, 366. 
189 Catholic Bishops of Uganda, With A New Heart and A New Spirit, 70. 
  403
The challenge of the principle of the common good is that it imposes on people - 
believers and citizens alike - the responsibility to care for others. The principle imposes 
on people an ethical or moral responsibility they must fulfill as their conscience directs 
them. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest to this effect that “the ethical 
category of responsibility obliges me not to bury talents I have received but to multiply 
them for the advantage of all.”190 The challenging obligation is to use one’s talents for the 
benefit or good of the community. In this spirit the church has made great contributions 
to the common good of Uganda through its spiritual and social services to the people of 
the nation. Ddungu has carefully observed and affirmed this in the following words: 
In fulfilling its mission, the church here in Uganda, as elsewhere, has from the very beginning 
been laying emphasis upon assisting in providing the following services: education and health 
care, assistance to the needy and the disadvantaged, integral evangelization, which makes people 
holistic in their thinking and acting; promotion of the means of social communication for 
educating people’s consciences and attitudes; and improvement of food production, water, shelter, 
environment, family and community life for all. The church has provided personnel and structures 
for the realization of most of the above services.191 
 
If there are any institutions in Uganda that give priority to the common good, it is 
the religious institutions that are ranked among the first, especially the Christian 
churches. The Catholic church and the Protestant churches have consistently shown 
concern for the common good and done what it requires, from the time of the first 
Christian missionaries up until today. If they are to be commended for their work this is 
one of the areas where they should be complemented. If the Churches have done so much 
to contribute to the common good, others are also capable of doing the same. However, 
the final challenge I would like to adopt from Cahill is what she describes as "James 
Hanigan's diagnosis of 'the human problem', namely as 'not that we do not know what we 
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should do, but that we do not want to know and do not want to do it'."192 It is not that 
nobody knows the right things to do and how to do them. The problem and challenge is 
simply human obstinancy or negligence – people deliberately refuse to know and do the 
right things. This is the reality of the immoral or sinful dimension of human character. 
F. Justice and Equality: The Challenge of Equality and Fairness in Social Diversity 
 
Justice is one of the most challenging principles for integral human development. 
It is called for by the human need to co-exist, it requires and at the same time leads to 
human co-existence which is often complicated by individual interests. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr suggests, the difficuty of human co-existence is a perennial one and human 
society will always have to deal with the question of justice necessary for “the 
preservation and fulfillment of human love.”193 In treating the question of justice in this 
section our concern is about people who suffer injustice, but it should be noted that in 
reality the main concern is about the attitude of those who do injustice. The best 
explanation or supportive assertion in this case is what the Nichomachean ethics which 
resonates with the Christian view suggests. Namely, it is worse to do injustice than to 
suffer injustice because the latter does not involve vice and so it is not blameworthy 
while the former involves some form or degree of vice and is blameworthy.194 
Paul VI was clear in his expansion of the notion of justice, from being a national 
social justice to international social justice, that the virtue is based on the principle of 
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human solidarity.195 As some of the preceding sections of this work espoused, Uganda is 
a nation that has a pluralistic ethnic constitution. The virtue of justice is both a significant 
value and a challenge in such a context, at least on the basis of understanding justice as 
fairness or giving each person his or her due, though what is due to each person is often 
difficult to determine. Justice and its pursuit is, nonetheless, a moral imperative to both 
religious institutions and the civil society.196 The moral obligation that at once confronts 
the church leadership, the Christian community, the Uganda government, the citizens, 
believers and leaders, in relation to justice, is the recognition of and respect for the equal 
dignity and freedom of all people. This idea is also clearly stipulated in the Ugandan 
constitution and stands as a serious challenge to all. The constitution states that “all 
persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social 
and cultural life and in every other respect . . . .”197 The real challenge is that it is not 
enough to verbalize the equality of people while in real life there are critical differences 
in treatment of peoples or regions, as has been the case in the history of Uganda and still 
persists. A typical example here is that since the establishment of British protectorate 
West Nile  
was used as a labour reserve, gazetted as a ‘closed area’ from which outsiders were excluded and 
systematically underdeveloped in favour of the cash-crop agriculture of southern Uganda.198  
 
This is a problem that also affected some parts of Uganda as indicated in some of 
the subsequent paragraphs of this sub-section. This differential treatment recurs in West 
Nile to date, and the evidence is what Mark Leopold has stated. Namely, that “the 
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economic, social and political marginality of Arua has persisted.”199 
From socio-economic and political points of view the issue articulated here is, 
therefore, that of the recognition of the rights of people, the equality of their dignity and 
treating them according to these rights and needs in a fair manner. Justice can only be 
achieved if people understand and accept that they have mutual rights and obligations. 
The demands of justice may be imposed by religious or civil law. This means that justice 
sometimes demands some form of coercion as Reinhold Niebuhr also suggests.200  This 
view was also upheld by Martin Luther King, Jr., according to Deotis J. Roberts who 
observes that  
King believed in a strong and aggressive leadership by government authorities to sponsor civil 
rights and social justice. However when government is on the side of injustice, King believed 
Christians had the responsibility to apply moral pressure to compel unwilling authorities to yield 
to the mandates of justice. Government has a responsibility to help control antisocial and immoral 
behavior through the process of law. . . .  For King the state is fulfilling the divine purpose for its 
existence when it reflects love and justice, when it creates and preserves the well-being of humans 
intended by God in Christ. This, in King’s judgement, would be a community where integration 
has replaced segregation where economic justice has eliminated poverty, where a just order has 
supplanted violence and chaos. On the other hand, a state is evil and sinful when it formulates and 
sponsors policies that are divisive, unjust and violent.201 
 
Here the state is portrayed to be potentially both good and evil, which is right 
especially from a Christisn perspective in light of the history of secular states. Religion 
should be its corrective counterpart. However, King suggests a non-violent pressure. 
According to me, it seems good to argue that King also advocates that from a Christian 
point of view a true act of justice does not demand physical coercion because it is 
motivated by love. Justice demands that mutual responsibility and obligation are 
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recognized and accepted as such by all.  
Viewing justice in reference to the salaries of the public or civil servants, justice 
remains a significant challenge to Uganda. The challenge is compounded by the legal or 
constitutional claim that 
Under “the rule of law,” every citizen has the right to receive a just return for his labour: whether 
manual or mental. In conducting economic, and cultural affairs of the state, every government 
must realize that the rights of the individual, include provision for just and favorable conditions of 
work, fair and adequate renumeration [sic] which can ensure the worker and his family a standard 
of living worthy of human dignity. It is the duty of the government to take all possible action to 
promote the economic and social welfare of the people and of the nation as a whole.202 
 
Such issues have not been raised for nothing. Neither are they new, even in 
modern Uganda. Although Levis Mugumya claims that teachers’ salaries are in 
accordance to the service they render, there is a poor salary scale for teachers in 
particular.203 For example, currently Primary school teachers are paid, monthly, UShs 
150,000/= (an equivalent of US $ 82.00), Secondary (High) School teachers receive, 
monthly, UShs 200,000/= (an equivalent of US $ 110.00).204 This salary scale suggests 
that the average annual income of a secondary school teacher is about UShs 2,400,000/=  
(US $ 1,320.00). On average, excluding children in the primary schools, a family takes 
care of the education of 3 children in secondary schools with an estimated term average 
expenditure of UShs 120,000/= for tuition, UShs 25,000/= for stationery and 30,000/= for 
pocket money and transportation, in a rural area. This means a year’s expenses on the 
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three secondary school students amounts to a total of UShs 1,575,000/= (US $ 875.00), 
leaving a balance of UShs 825,000/= (US $ 458.33) for the rest of the family needs, viz. 
feeding, health care, school supplies of children in primary schools, clothing, etc, for a 
whole year.  
The annual estimates suggest that these salaries cannot sustain the teachers and 
their families for a month. Though government has attempted to raise the salary of 
teachers by UShs 20,000/= (an equivalent of US$ 11.00) after their peaceful 
demonstration in 2005, the teachers still clamor that the salary increase is “still below the 
average cost of living.”205 The challenge to the government is to ensure that these 
teachers, and all employees, are paid a living wage – not “a killing wage as it is often 
called in Uganda”206 because the meager salaries are incapable of sustaining employees 
and their families or dependents. The Uganda National Teachers Union (UNATU) study 
in April 2005 made interesting revelations. Precisely, it  
showed that 71% of teachers spend their very meager salaries on feeding and educating their 
children; . . . 69% of Uganda’s teachers do not do any other job to supplement their abysmal 
incomes. The teachers “survive on debts and handouts. They live as beggars . . . .”207  
 
It is unjust to treat civil servants the way these teachers are treated, just because 
they have no alternative opportunities for their livelihood and that of their families. The 
gravity of the injustice to the teachers is aggravated by the fact that money is drained by 
the defense ministry, sometimes encouraged from without, there are ghost soldiers and 
                                                 
205 Gerald Walulya, “Government to Raise Teachers’ Pay to Shs 200,000” in Daily Monitor, (Kampala, 
Uganda, Wednesday April 19, 2006).  Also cfr. www.monitor.co.ug/news). 
206 Vali Jamal, “Changes in Poverty Patterns in Uganda,” in Developing Uganda. (Ed.) Bernt, Holger 
Hansen and Michael Twaddle, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 83. 
207 K. Mulera Muniini, “Raise Teachers’ Salaries” in Daily Monitor, Kampala, Uganda, Sunday April 30, 
2006). Also cfr. www.monitor.co.ug/news. 
  409
ghost teachers or people are paid when actually not teaching or even out of the country.208 
The real challenge is to pay workers a just wage. Here a just wage is understood to be 
. . . the way of responding to the economic rights of every person which lay claim to adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, education, working conditions, health care, retirement protection - all that 
is needed for the full and integral development of the human person.209 
 
The just wage is what provides for the barely comfortable life of the workers, 
their families and dependents. In other words, as Frank D. Almade suggests, it helps the 
employee to meet just the basic necessities of life. It is the minimum pay and “equal pay 
for equal work done.”210 
While the evil of injustice is perpetrated against Uganda’s civil servants, the level 
of corruption is also growing. The statement of AMSRIU is a testimony here: 
“Corruption continues to be rampant and it is ineffectively challenged.”211 Economic and 
social justice demands that the resources of a nation are used for the benefit of all and 
especially the needy or less fortunate citizens. Unfortunately, as Ronald Kassimir states, 
Ugandans  have transformed “in popular parlance their national motto from ‘For God and 
My Country’ to ‘For God and My Stomach.’ ”212 The expression typically depicts the 
politics and mentality of corruption and self-concern. In light of this assertion the 
inevitable challenge for the Uganda government, the citizens, rich regions and, civil or 
public servants is to undo the colonial legacy of the uneven distribution of the country’s 
resources.213 While the central region, especially around the capital of Kampala, and the 
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Lake region have reasonable infrastructure and economic standing, and a few other parts 
are wealthy, other areas are not.214 Even the so-called wealthy regions have beggars, and 
the majority of the country lives in dire poverty. The challenge here is that many of the 
poor are unaware and not concerned about the differences between their conditions and 
that of the well-to- do. They need more and real education, a further challenge to a 
sincere government and civil or public servants, and religious institutions. 
Labor for large estates or plantations of tea, coffee and sugar are obtained from 
the poor regions of the nation, a routine which was arranged during the colonial times. 
For instance, those from Kigezi and Ankole, in western Uganda, and West Nile, Acholi, 
Teso and other northerners were considered strong and courageous, hence, good fighters 
and thus good candidates for the military and any hard labor.215 These regions have been 
and are some of the poorest regions of Uganda. Consequently, in the subsequent years the 
recruitment and employment at Kakira and Lugazi sugar estates was provided by the 
western, northern and northeastern regions of Uganda. Such were, and are still, some of 
the factors that contribute to “ethnic animosities and prejudices, which eventually became 
stereotypes of the ‘developed’ south and the ‘backward’ north,”216 which suggest or are a 
testimony to the regional imbalances in the country. Vali Jamal is of the same view when 
he affirms that there is “the North-South divide”217 in terms of income distribution or 
economic differences. 
The unaware and unsuspecting people thought, and some still think that going 
down country Uganda is getting to heaven. To date some of the civil servants or 
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government agents, who should be at least slightly enlightened, in some of these regions 
encourage the youth to get recruited for these kinds of work, either out of ignorance or 
because the agents and the youth are bribed. Uganda is historically known for 
government intimidation of and bribes to politicians to silence them and any religious 
leaders who raise sensitive political issues.218 It is not a surprise that the responsible 
people are bribed to contribute to such unfair treatments of certain sectors of the country. 
This constitutes an actual injustice. 
This practice of labor recruitment occurs mainly in specific political regions of 
Uganda while there are capable people in the regions where the estates are located and 
they need money too, as the general poverty situation in Uganda suggests, and they too 
could work in these estates.219 Two conclusions are inevitable. First, the poor regions are 
discriminated against and targeted for use as instruments of development in some regions 
of the nation without being remunerated adequately. This is social and economic 
injustice. Secondly, every able citizen is expected to contribute to the progress of the 
nation as demanded by solidarity, justice, common good, and participation but surely not 
at the expense of the respect for human dignity. No citizen ought to be subjected to such 
unfair treatment. 
In any unjust political and economic system or process people are often 
disgruntled and sometimes fight each other. Injustice has caused the decline of many 
nations and regimes or governments. Justice is, hence, a crucial virtue for government, 
public servants, and every citizen. Where it is lacking there is no peace. Reinhold 
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Neibuhr speaks to this point in his assertion that in addressing injustices in society 
“violence can therefore not be ruled out on a priori grounds.”220 He suggests, as Paul VI 
did in Populorum Progressio, that violence is not desirable but it is an inevitable 
consequence regardless of the rightness or the morality of the purpose to be achieved. 
Otherwise, where there is justice, there is peace and stability.  
In the context of Uganda, Okot observes that “instability, insecurity, war and 
various other forms of violence that have been suffered in this country have largely been 
consequences of economic imbalances.”221 The imbalances reflect the degree of injustice 
in Uganda. These imbalances suggest that governments in the past did not create  
conditions to promote development of the nation. While it is necessary to acknowledge 
that there are differences in circumstances and abilities of the people, it is also good to 
accept that certain conditions can be corrected and they should be corrected or improved 
for the sake of the growth of the people. This is a challenge to both the former and the 
current government of Uganda. 
Three types of justice that challenge the Ugandan context must be delineated 
because all of them are part and parcel of the question of justice as a virtue necessary for 
human growth. First is commutative justice which requires that when people make private 
contracts or agreements, they should keep the contracts and there must be equality 
between the goods and the services or work offered and the reward given for them.222 
This type of justice presents a challenge to business people, who cheat with weighing 
scales and the quantity of work done by employees and the remuneration paid to them for 
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the work done. It puts into question the deceptive advertisements through any 
communication medium. 
The second type of justice is distributive justice which demands that public goods 
of a country “such as its natural resources, be used to satisfy the basic needs of all the 
people, especially the under-privileged[sic], the poor and the powerless.”223 Distributive 
justice is a challenge to the government of Uganda in relation to lack of hydro-electricity 
in the West Nile region, Karamoja and any region in that country that is not supplied with 
hydro-electricity despite exporting electricity to Rwanda or other neighboring nations.  
Finally, there is legal justice which “demands that all citizens contribute 
according to their ability to the promotion of the welfare of society: by supporting public 
institutions, which serve the common good of all the citizens.”224 This aspect of justice 
again challenges the rich regions of Uganda such as Kampala or the central region, and 
the lake region in general, to respond to the needs of the poor regions which receive less 
of the resources of Uganda, including electricity already referred to above. 
Heroism is one of the challenges of the virtue of justice to the religious 
institutions and leaders in addressing the issue of injustice in both civil and religious 
communities. The challenge for anyone addressing questions of injustice is to accept to 
be heroic and exercise the virtue of courage, even when the cause being pursued is 
unpopular to the government or civil society, and their sympathizers. A challenging 
example suggested here is the difficult time during the reign of Idi Amin as president of 
Uganda. While his reign was marked by lots of injustices, persecutions, and confiscation 
of the property of Asians and their expulsion, including those who were Ugandan 
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citizens, no church authority dared to confront him or government organs to demand 
justice.225 One of the main challenges of that time, and during similar moments in our 
time, is that of accepting the consequence of the fulfillment of one’s prophetic mission or 
to be a Christian hero.  
According to Gifford only the Makerere University students of that time dared to 
protest the expulsion of the Asian-Ugandan citizens and the confiscation of their property 
when they marched into the city.226 They proved to be more prophetic and heroic than the 
religious leadership in the country at that time - a country dominantly Christian. This was 
a real challenge and a failure of the religious leadership or the Christian churches’ 
prophetic leadership and mission at a time when it was most needed. They constitute the 
majority of the population and needed to pool their efforts together early enough to 
address issues.227 Whether it was fear or prudence, the challenge was the one of the 
choice between love and hatred, justice and injustice, between mutual respect and 
confrontation. This, unfortunately, is a frequently neglected responsibility. Peter 
Kanyandago alludes to such assertion when he affirms that  
We have to acknowledge, especially, we the church leaders, that in the past, sometimes, we have 
feared to expose and endanger ourselves individually, or as an ecclesial community and 
institution, that we have been too prudent.228 
 
However, one has to acknowledge that it was the church, especially the Christian 
churches, which remained the only formidable and unbroken institution providing 
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support and strength, and the best place of refuge for the populace at the difficult times 
during the reign of Idi Amin and later, even to date.229  
The problem of the need to address the issue of injustice affects not only the civil 
society, but also religious institutions. This assertion is suggested by the fact that the 
church is not only a divine institution, it is also a human institution – it is both holy and 
sinful. However, this is not a justification to excuse or exempt the church from being 
affected by the problem of injustice.The church has also treated this issue of just pay in 
parts of several of her social teachings and documents.230 On account of this assertion the 
question that the church needs to address is also whether in practice she offers just or 
living wage for her employees or not. Peter Kanyandago suggests that to this question, in 
the context of Uganda, the dominant answer is no because the majority of church 
employees are paid meager salaries.231 They are often expected to render service as their 
Christian contribution. The fact is, however, that they and their families or communities 
need material resources to live. This fact is often minimized or neglected. The greatest 
challenge in this regard is that if the church or religious institutions are not just, “our 
action and call” to people “for a more just world”, our function as religious leaders and 
institutions, “will not be credible.”232 In other words, the mission and ministry of the 
church or religious institutions become obsolete. 
Another challenge of the virtue of justice to religious institutions in relation to the 
commitment to be examples of justice for the civil society or other people and institutions 
is that of re-examining our life style. Above all it important to note that “every just social 
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order can be judged according to the service it provides for the people who live under 
it.”233 This challenge confronts the civil society as well as religious institutions. In 
relation to such a situation Peter Kanyandago strongly charges:  
if we are honest with ourselves, we will recognize: that there is concentration of wealth to 
particular areas of the church, mainly in clerical circles. Justice calls for an equitable sharing of the 
goods of the world. Failure to share and distribute the wealth of the world is to disregard the will 
of the Creator. It is also an offence to the poor, which can provoke reactions of frustration and 
violence, which can hamper the church’s mission, as happened during the French revolution.234 
 
Religious leaders and institutions are challenged here to reflect on their attitude 
toward possession of natural resources, their attachment to these goods and their 
application of the principle of ownership of natural resources. This is a critical challenge 
because the religious, not just religious by profession of the vow of poverty, but all 
members and leaders of religious groups or institutions, are the very teachers or 
advocates of these principles. This challenge also invokes the application of the 
principles of preferential option for the poor, affirmative action, common good and 
solidarity.  
The challenge of justice or its opposite, injustice, is equally critical to religious 
institutions, governments, various groups and individuals because the question of justice 
or injustice involves lawlessness, greed and unfairness or their opposites. The 
Nicomachean ethics which, in my judgement, is in line with Christian ethics says it all 
about justice in relation to law and fairness: “. . . what is just will be both what is lawful 
and what is fair, and what is unjust will be both what is lawless and what is unfair.”235The 
real challenge here is to be just and to act lawfully. 
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G. Preferential Option for the Poor: The Choice between Priority and Self-interest 
 
The question of the preferential option for the poor is and has always been one of 
the principal concerns of the Church. The Church in Uganda has also been the champion 
and protagonist of the teaching and application of the principle.236 The 2006 Lenten 
message showed the gravity of the option for the poor. After frequent references to 
Populorum Progressio in his 2006 Lenten message, Benedict XVI alluded to the 
statement of Blessed Teresa of Calcutta, that “the worst poverty is not to know Christ.”237 
His message shows the significance of the option for the poor especially when he states 
that to care for the poor is to live the Christian message because Christ identified himself 
with the poor; liberating the poor means Christ is recognized in them. 
As treated in chapter two, option for the poor is a principle that Paul VI would not 
have overlooked because, in Populorum Progressio, he was addressing the problem of 
the poor peoples of the world. It was the issue of the degradation of human life and 
dignity.238 The principle is necessary for a poor country, purportedly said to be 
developing, like Uganda. In Uganda there are economic disparities.239 These disparities 
demand or call for the Uganda government, the Church and organizations capable of 
providing assistance to apply this principle of positive discrimination in favor of the most 
disadvantaged people of Uganda. 
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Yoweri K. Museveni acknowledges this fact and states that “the poorest part of 
the country, the North, has made much slower progress than other areas, mainly because 
of insecurity.”240 The poverty due to insecurity in  northern Uganda is a challenge to stop 
fighting but it is also a challenge to ceaselessly help war-ravaged, and consequently poor 
regions in parts of northern and western Uganda that have been affected by “chronic 
insecurity, resulting in social dislocation and economic underdevelopment.”241  
Despite their critical financial situation the economically poor often shoulder 
more financial burdens than affluent people. They pay for the basic needs of life more 
expensively than the rich. The majority of the rich live in urban areas and the poor live in 
the rural areas or in the countryside. Over 66% of Ugandans live below the poverty line, 
“on less than US $ 15.00 per month”.242 While cultural practices and individuals 
contribute to such a pathetic situation, the situation demands that government allocate 
more development funds to help the poor address their needs. It calls for the government 
and the Church to educate people and to create enduring systems that can create 
conditions for the poor to improve their lives. The government attempted to address the 
problem through its Poverty Eradication Plan, introduced in mid-1990s after an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was “designed to wipe out 
poverty within 20 years;”243but the conditions of the majority of the people remain poor.  
The results of the Poverty Eradication Plan are hardly noticeable on a general 
observation of the situation in Uganda. In the urban areas, where there is more money in 
circulation and there are more possibilities for employment, basic needs are less 
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expensive than in the rural areas where there is less money; and there are no lucrative 
businesses and employment opportunities. Vali Jamal’s testimony about the situation, at 
least up to 1998, supports this contention. He states that “around 35 per cent of the rural 
population and 16 percent of the urban population are now shown to be in poverty” but 
because “the rural areas comprise over 88 percent of the total population, poverty is very 
much a rural phenomenon in Uganda, with over 90 percent of the total poverty.”244  
The rich are often in serious pursuit to purchase the land of the poor, which is 
their livelihood. They try to do so at give-away prices. There is a challenge here because 
rich people, who could improve the situation of the poor, neglect the poor, forfeit their 
responsibility to help the poor, contrary to Paul VI’s exhortation in Populorum 
Progressio.245 The neglect of the poor is not only an injustice. It also shows that the rich 
are motivated by self-interest and do not recognize the dignity of the poor. 
Politically, governments have not come up with feasible projects to help promote 
poor citizens. Even if Uganda’s poverty reduction strategy has well outlined plans for the 
reduction of poverty in the country as indicated by the 2000/2001 development report, the 
results are far from reaching the desired goal.246 The weak and the poor are consistently 
neglected or marginalized. They are not listened to politically. Yet they are the people 
whose votes are often sought by politicians. They seem to exist as citizens only when 
elections are close and during elections. They are often promised heaven on earth before 
and at the time of elections. Once elections are over politicians do not deliver on their 
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promises. Their votes are solicited with money which is not even suffieient for a decent 
meal. This is not what the poor would opt for if they had bargaining powers. Neither is it 
an option that promotes their life, dignity and rights. Instead of giving precedence to the 
needs of the poor over the rich, the rich give precedence to themselves over the poor.247 
The problem here is that of distortion of the order of priority of values. Even if “poverty 
eradication is the central objective of the Government of Uganda”248 and it were 
achieved, Uganda would still be far from being called truly developed if the poor are not 
part of human development. I would like to appropriate the suggestion of Anna Mary 
Kayonga to help us understand and improve the condition of the poor. She suggests that 
to help the poor we need to  
enter into solidarity with the poor in concrete ways: by sharing their lives, sorrows, joys,  hopes, 
and fears. . . . Solidarity with the poor also means that we must break complicity with those who 
oppress the poor, and that we must oppose the causes of evil. This calls for the transformation of 
the unjust structures, which institutionalize destitution.249 
 
The poor are often the victims of corruption by government and civil leaders and 
individuals who are self-concerned. While external aid and loans are solicited for them 
and in their name, they almost never benefit from the foreign aid. All they receive 
depends on the political giants. This is precisely why the forgiveness of debts of Uganda, 
which was forgiven 67% of its debts in 1995, makes no sense for a country where there is 
rampant discrimination, injustice and corruption.250 Uganda claims that corruption is now 
minimized, but actually proportionately it has been aggravated. The 2003 World 
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Development Report shows that 39% of the total number of the known and reported 
bribes were paid.251 Since the corruption is prevalent in Uganda, forgiving its debts 
aggravates corruption. It encourages more corruption on the part of those who administer 
the funds, and adds to the marginalization, exclusion and misery of the poor. It promotes 
an option for the rich, not an option for the poor. This is where the request of African 
bishops during the African Synod, and the later advocacy of John Paul II in preparation 
for the jubilee year, that debts of poor countries should be forgiven seems rather 
ridiculous and may be accepted reservedly.252 As pastors their request makes sense 
because it shows their concern for the needy and poor. The forgiven debts are intended to 
relieve governments so that they may help unfortunate citizens. The concern of the 
bishops and the pontiff is the dignity of the human person. It was this kind of concern that 
attracted the African bishops to propagate the idea of an “uncompromising solidarity with 
the poor and to make their cry known.”253 However, in reality those who are forgiven are 
the corrupt officials who are beneficiaries of loans and grants that the government 
receives. They make forgiveness of debts problematic and perhaps even immoral, 
especially if those who forgive the debts are aware of the prevalence of corruption. 
Uganda is a religious country and dominantly a Christian one - 48% Catholic and 
38% Protestant, though some authors suggest that Catholics constitute 49.6% and 
Protestants are 26.2% of the population of Uganda.254 Religious institutions have been the 
chief protagonists of the principle of the preferential option for the poor. The poor have 
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often been a priority of religious institutions because they understand that they are one of 
the reasons the Church was instituted. The Christian Churches are perhaps the more 
leading religious institutions in this regard since the colonial times. They built and 
continue to build schools, colleges, formation houses, hospitals, orphanages and other 
development institutions that meet the needs of the poor.255 They are the ones that speak 
more strongly on behalf of the poor, and try to educate the poor to come out of their 
situations. Adrian K. Ddungu affirms this assertion when he states that 
The church in this country is committed to community development, with special emphasis upon 
women, youth, and rural people’s development; and upon uplifting of the condition of the poor 
and the oppressed.256 
 
The initiatives of the church in making a preferential option for the poor are 
definitely a noble cause. Ddungu’s statement is true but it is also questionable whether all 
churches or religious institutions, used here as a generic term for believers, are committed 
to this cause. Secondly, option for the poor may also have negative consequences and 
present extra challenges. This suggests why, recognizing and citing Laurenti C. Magesa’s 
very significant view, Kanyandago alludes to the possible danger of helping the poor, as 
“aggravating their dependence.”257 He specifically states that according to Magesa “true 
generosity liberates unto freedom, enabling individuals and peoples to take charge of 
their own life.”258 In other words, any help rendered to the poor should improve their 
condition but at the same time help them to be self-reliant. The danger of perpetual 
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donation or assistance is that it can lead to perpetual dependence. This is counter 
productive to authentic development. 
After independence in 1963, the state took over the management and the policies 
of schools, and a majority of schools became public or government aided schools.259 It 
was too expensive for poor people to educate their children because they could not afford 
the costs of education, previously much subsidized by the church. The quality of 
formation also declined and continues to decline. In 1997 Universal Primary Education 
(UPE) was introduced in Uganda to help the poor attain at least a primary education but 
this meant “only four children per household benefit”260 would be given free education 
though in practice UPE remained open. This was a positive implementation of prior plans 
for the future development of Uganda, but its implementation was not ready for 1997 or 
the implementation was either poorly planned or unplanned. Consequently, the standard 
of education has worsened and UPE cannot be considered a favorable option for the poor. 
Education is a crucial factor in development. It is for this reason that some people send 
their children to schools where they can receive relevant, well-founded and profitable 
education, even if that means paying very expensively for it.  
The study in this section shows that the “poverty in Uganda is a development 
problem” and it calls for a “development strategy involving all sections of the 
population.”261 This is a critical challenge to the government of Uganda, religious 
institutions and, especially the planners of development strategies in the country. 
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H. Affirmative Action: The Challenge of Genuine Government Intervention 
 
One of the priorities for any good government is to address the past injustices of 
discrimination and marginalization. This priority is significant because if not addressed 
violence or disharmony may creep into society. In Uganda different categories of people - 
women, disabled people and minorities for instance - have suffered and many of them 
still suffer injustices. The government of Uganda (NRM government, in particular) has 
tried to address some of these issues.262 The challenge which confronts the nation and the 
church or religious institutions persistently is that women need to be included and 
promoted more than ever before. As Mary Mugenyi states 
Developing Uganda takes men and women. Gender should therefore be on the agenda of 
development dialogue more so in Uganda where women constitute a 53 percent majority of the 
population; they contribute 80 percent of agricultural labour and 90 percent of domestic labour and 
are almost exclusively responsible for the health and nutrition of their families and 
communities.263 
 
There is no doubt that in the field of education there has been promotion of 
women. Government has done so by providing opportunity for female students to go on 
to higher institutions of learning with poorer academic grades than male students. The 
problem with this effort in the positive discrimination or affirmative action is that “if 
access is not open to all at the lower levels, then affirmative action of affording females 
to enter higher institutions of learning” will not achieve its goal of “eliminating equality 
and injustice.”264 The academic requirement for admission to higher institutions of 
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learning is less for female students than for the male students in terms of their academic 
performances. This arrangement merely perpetuates the vicious cirle of discrimination 
and injustice. It has helped promote female students who often perform poorly in subjects 
like mathematics and the physical sciences. The number of women admitted to higher 
institutions has grown since the inception of this program. However, the problem the 
program could create is that of encouraging female students to be lazy. They may become 
reluctant to fully apply themselves in studies. Positively, the plan helps male students to 
work hard in order to perform extremely well so as to be admitted to the higher 
institutions of learning. The arrangement still contributes to a difference between female 
students and the competing male students in terms of how much they learn or accomplish 
in their education.  
Uganda’s education system has also been discriminating on the basis of subjects 
taught in schools. Some subjects are traditionally considered too hard for female students 
and so become mainly the prerogative of male students, and other subjects are considered 
fitting for female students only. For instance, mathematics, carpentry, construction and 
experimental sciences in general are still considered male subjects while home 
economics, needle work and tailoring are considered women subjects.265 This 
discrimination has not been adequately addressed. In addition to this this difficulty, 
certain cultural values and practices need to be examined, evaluated and remodeled or 
abandoned altogether to help improve women’s situation in relation to men. This 
suggests that there are still many obstacles to be overcome if women’s level of 
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development is to match that of men.266 
Paul VI’s proposal of the significance of the principle of affirmative action 
emphasized the importance of bodies or organizations like the United Nations (UN) as 
presented in chapter two. However, the implementation of the principle is not without 
challenges as Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest. 
. . . the United nations still does not have the power to impose its will, nor does it have a legally 
authorized and authoritative representative. The time has not yet arrived to courageously propose 
such a world authority because up till now the narrow concept of the sovereignty of the Nation 
State still holds.267 
 
This state of affairs does not help a nation like Uganda, which has problems it is 
unable to resolve by itself. A typical example of this is the twenty-year-old war which has  
ceaselessly continued in northern and north-eastern Uganda. Another challenge besides 
the apparent weakness of the UN currently is that should it happen that the organization 
becomes legally authorized and has an authoritative representation, there would be an 
absolute power or body that would impose its ideologies on people regardless of cultural 
differences in the world. The UN decisions in this case, would override the positive 
elements of cultures which, Populorum Progressio suggests as indicated in Chapter Two, 
are necessary values and constituent elements for human development. If a feasible 
world-body or authority that moderates global life and activity is to be established, it 
must be by “virtue of free consent” and promote the “spirit of liberty and of co-
responsibility.”268 This consensus is not easy to achieve, whether globally or nationally, 
because of differences of tribe, race, ethnicity and ideologies.  
Politically, in the history of Uganda from independence up to 1980s, women, 
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disabled people and youth less actively participated in Uganda’s politics. However, since 
the NRM government took over the administration of Uganda, women, the disabled 
people and youth have been given opportunities for political participation. They are all 
represented in the parliament. The integration of women into political positions with men 
is one of the greatest positive achievements of the NRM government in the field of 
affirmative action.269 In Uganda’s political history the first woman Vice President, 
Wandira Kazibwe, was appointed in the period of NRM, and the number of women 
ministers and members of parliament and, in general, women’s involvement in political 
affairs increased during this time.270 This is a positive innovation by the NRM 
government – it was not just an affirmative action, it was also an option for the poor. 
The innovation is a positive attempt at the promotion of women and enforcement 
of affirmative action. However, in the context of true development based on the dignity 
of the human person, at least a problem remains unresolved. While women are definitely 
recognized to have the same dignity as men, there is a social discrimination which 
penalizes men or places some artificial barrier in the way of men who qualify for certain 
jobs or educational levels but are left out because of such affirmative action policy. 
Although the implementation of the principle of affirmative action is the 
responsibility of the government, religious institutions can contribute to the 
implementation of the principle by way of suggestions to the government to formulate 
and effect practicable affirmative action policies. The rationale here is that the Christian 
churches have often strongly spoken and acted on behalf of women and marginalized 
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people based on the equality of human dignity. This is, however, questionable regarding 
Islam, which differs in its tradition about women from the Christian denominations. 
Religious institutions need to contribute toward implementation of affirmative action 
because it is the responsibility of religious institutions to act as a conscience to the nation 
by reminding government of the existence of situations that need to be aggressively 
addressed by the state, and in particular “religious leaders should be concerned about the 
overall needs of the people they lead.”271 If the Church, its members and organizations do 
not fight to change the evil conditions under which humankind lives, “it will become 
identified with injustice and persecution.”272 When the church or religious institutions 
and communities identify with injustice and persecution they are obsolete and 
questionable. 
I. Solidarity: The Challenge of Non-fragmented or Segmented Solidarity 
 
 Solidarity is a necessary and “an urgent moral imperative”273 and a challenge to 
humanity created by God out of God’s love for all people. One of the critical challenges 
of the principle of solidarity is the challenge to transcend self, family, tribe or ethnicity, 
race and nationality. In view of this perennial problem the idea that human beings are 
social, they have an affinity to unity and they are co-responsible for one another has been 
persistently emphasized.274 The gravity of the challenge of the principle of solidarity is 
founded on love and the universality of the principle of human dignity, much emphasized 
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in Chapter three, which is shared by all people, and human affinity to unity and co-
responsibility. To many people this is an unquestionable assertion. Human dignity is the 
concern of the Association of the Major Superiors of Religious Institutes in Uganda 
(AMSRIU) when reflecting on the situation in Uganda. They allude to people being 
wounded because their dignity has been affected, and they affirm that these wounds 
“presently hinder us from forming a family where, each in spite of our tribal, religious 
and political differences recognizes the other as a brother and a sister to love and 
respect.”275 Similarly, Denis Goulet also contends that 
All agree that beyond differences of race, nationality, culture, or social organization a common 
“human-ness” is present. This factual unity of a shared humanity is the first ontological basis for 
solidarity among humans.276 
 
Solidarity is an outstanding challenge to Uganda. One of the programs intended 
for Uganda’s development since 1986 or earlier is the consolidation of national unity and 
elimination of all forms of sectarianism as advocated in one of NRM’s ten point 
programs for Uganda.277 The program suggests the significance of the principle of 
solidarity. However, the practical application of the principle remains questionable in 
Uganda. In spite of the historical fact that one of the significant paragraphs in the national 
anthem of Uganda is “United free for Liberty together we will always stand,”278 a critical 
observation reveals flaws in how Ugandans actually live this significant verse of their 
national anthem. This verse of the anthem initially suggests unity, thus solidarity among 
the people of the nation as expressed in the phrase “together we’ll always stand.” A 
further challenge of the principle of solidarity in light of this verse is that every Ugandan 
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needs not only be tolerant to others but needs a true spirit of unity. Every Ugandan who 
seriously craves solidarity should adopt and apply the suggestion of Bernard Haring and 
Valentino Salvoldi that “every search for unity between human beings implies first of all 
that this unity be accomplished within self. . . .”279 Unity with others or love for others is 
a consequence of integrity within oneself and love for oneself, and subsequently within a 
small group or community. This is an interior challenge to love all and to be in solidarity 
people. It is not an advocacy for selfishness or self-concern. The contention suggests that 
self-acceptance and self-love are positive steps towards acceptance of others. 
 In the Ugandan social and economic context there is some kind of solidarity but it 
is a fragmented or segmented solidarity. Solidarity in Uganda, like in African and other 
contexts beyond Uganda and Africa, is in most cases fragmented because it is often based 
on ethnic or similar backgrounds.280 Even within people of the same ethnic groups there 
are often micro-groups based on classes or social, economic and political status. An 
example to illustrate this fact is the statement of the Catholic bishops of Gulu 
Archdiocese, Nebbi, Arua and Lira as they addressed the problem of the war in northern 
Uganda. They state: 
The Acholi are divided among themselves: there are the fighters, their supporters, their 
sympathizers, the profiteers of this situation and the peace loving people (90%). Moreover there 
are the Acholi soldiers in the UPDF who fight Acholi fighters (LRA) and they themselves join 
other societies who in different ways oppress civilians in Acholi territory.281 
 
This disunity within the same ethnic community could be predicated of other 
ethnic groups in Uganda and beyond. In such cases the kind of solidarity expressed may 
be called segmented or stratified solidarity, which is unchristian and opposed to what 
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Paul VI advocated in Populorum Progressio, and which was re-emphasized by John Paul 
II in Solicitudo Rei Socialis. In Uganda fragmented solidarity has been exacerbated by a 
lack of a common or mutually intelligible language. This is an added challenge to 
Uganda. 
 Solidarity has also been negatively impacted by differences in economic 
development. Long before the current standing problems of lack of solidarity in many 
ways the commission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
observed in 1960 that 
. . . in order to cement unity of the country and to maintain stability, the Government cannot afford to 
neglect the economic and social developments of certain areas where the yields to investment in purely 
economic terms, may not be the highest available. The Government has also to avoid neglect of certain 
fields of investment such as the law and order services, where economic returns tend to be unduly 
discounted merely because they cannot be measured.282 
 
 Questions about enforcement of justice and absence of discrimination, tribalism 
or regionalism are directly cited here by the commission set by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. If some regions or people of the country are not 
discriminated against and justice is allowed to take its course, the possibility of peace and 
unity is high, but if justice is at stake, peace, unity and, consequently, solidarity are also 
at stake. This is in the spirit of Populorum Progressio that affirms these principles, 
conditions and virtues as being crucial for integral development. What the commission 
advocated was integral development in the regional dimension of Uganda. Consequently, 
the commission further suggested that 
. . . a balance must be struck between positive measures to develop the economy as rapidly as 
possible and measures to conserve the conditions essential to such development, the chief of 
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which are the unity of the country and the maintenance of law and order and good relations with 
neighbouring countries.283 
 
Rapid economic development ought to go with the possibility and development of 
the means to sustain it. The principle of the common good is also partially invoked here 
as necessary for economic and social growth. Secondly, solidarity which is necessary for 
economic growth goes beyond the solidarity of the nation. Uganda’s challenge is to show 
this solidarity with its neighbors, instead of fighting with them as has been the case with 
Tanzania and Kenya at Idi Amin’s time, and Rwanda, Sudan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) during the reign of Museveni’s NRM government.284 
The notion of solidarity is neither necessarily Christian nor exclusively socio-
political. Solidarity is also an expression of responsible attitude and action extended 
towards others, but it has a more theological or Christian overtones than socio-political 
one because God is the Christian ethical foundation of the principle of solidarity.285 God 
is the creator of all people, and all people are created imago Dei. Consequently, because 
God is also a family or a solidarity of three persons, the ultimate source of solidarity is 
God. This ought to be recognized. However, in a pluralistic socio-political context like 
the one of Uganda the real challenge of the principle of solidarity is what the 1995 
constitution of the Republic of Uganda expressly states: “Every effort shall be made to 
integrate all the peoples of Uganda while at the same time recognizing the existence of 
their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity.”286 The constitution 
rightly advocates that there should be unity in diversity. The constitution’s teaching in 
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this regard is in line with the Catholic social tradition and Paul VI’s teaching on the 
respect for culture, and the dignity of all. The critical national challenge is the one to 
implement what Populorum Progressio and the constitution of Uganda stipulate. 
In Uganda the political arena is one of the areas where the principle of solidarity 
is much violated. National political solidarity is, at its best, an apparent failure in Uganda. 
This is manifest in the political history of the country. For example, the West Nile region 
has been in a marginal position - at the periphery - since the inception of colonial 
administration in the region and continues to be so.287 The different ethnic groups have 
struggled and fought for political power, and one political party has often stood in strong 
opposition to the others. The existence of political factions since independence are not 
unfamiliar to the majority of Ugandans. 
One of solidarity’s greatest challenges to religious institutions is that “religion has 
frequently contributed to making . . . conflicts ‘holy’ ”288 thus justifying divisions, as 
Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi contend. Uganda is a religious, and especially a 
“Christian Country”289 – about 48% Catholic and 38% Protestant. The Muslims constitute 
about 8-10 % of the population. The contention of Haring and Salvoldi has proved to be 
true in the religious history of Uganda. At the initiation of Christianity in Uganda, there 
were conflicts between these religious denominations.290 Even if open religious wars 
occurred between Christians and Muslims, and even between Catholics and Protestants in 
the 19th century (1880s) there has been a fairly good balance and harmonious co-
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existence and relations between the different religious denominations. However, this has 
not been without flaws in the subsequent years. Around the year 1976 there was 
“Muslim-Christian violence in Ankole,”291 the home place of President Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni, in western Uganda.  
There is often stronger solidarity according to religious affiliations than 
interdenominational solidarity. This is an issue president Yoweri K. Museveni has often 
cited and emphasized as negative since 1986 when he came to power, probably because 
of his 1976 personal experience of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ankole. He sees 
religious differentiations as one of the divisive factors in the country, an idea that 
challenges all Ugandan believers about the true meaning of religion. Museveni’s view is 
not different from the above concession of Bernard Haring and Valentio Salvoldi. 
Religion needs to be conceived, principally, as a reunion with God and fellow human 
beings. The word religion is derived from the Latin word religare, to reunite what was 
once united with God but has since been disunited.292 Religion should and must be an 
instrument of justice, unity, reconciliation and, consequently, solidarity. The critical 
challenge at this juncture is for Ugandans, especially Catholics and Protestants, to 
reconsider the Christian and moral character of solidarity and desist from using the 
historical idea that colonialists sowed seeds for Catholic and Protestant conflicts and 
disunity as scape-goat.293 Ugandans now have a moral responsibility and obligation to 
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correct the mistakes of the past of which they are aware. 
However, ecumenical efforts have made possible the establishment of joint 
Christian activities. One clear example of positive interdenominational solidarity is 
Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC).294 The UJCC which was founded in 1964 
consists mainly of Catholic, COU and Orthodox representatives.295 It needs to be 
expanded to include other Christian religious groups which are not part of the Council. 
This kind of association and solidarity has not been readily possible with the Muslims 
because of some significant differences in religious doctrine and practice, and structural 
organization. These phenomena show yet another aspect of the failure of solidarity 
among the religious denominations in Uganda.  
There were, however, times in Uganda’s religious and political history when all 
the three major religious denominations – Catholics, Protestants and Muslims – have 
worked together. A typical example, according to Paul Gifford, was when, during Idi 
Amin’s presidency, the situation in the country was at its worst and the leaders of the 
three religious denominations, especially the COU Archbishop Luwum and Emmanuel 
Cardinal Nsubuga convened a meeting and invited all the bishops and senior Muslim 
leaders to meet and share their concerns with Idi Amin.296 This is an evidence of a joint 
heroic and prophetic action of leaders of different denominations in a spirit of mutual 
support and solidarity, although according to Paul Gifford the death of the Protestant 
archbishop, Luwum, as a consequence of a joint prophetic and heroic action of the 
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religious leaders dulled the Catholic-Anglican relation because the latter thought the 
former were not sincerely ready to confront the government squarely. 
Mazrui observes that in most African countries including Uganda, which he cites 
as an example, Muslims have been ready to accept Christians democratically elected to 
be heads of states but Christian countries have been less ready to accept a Muslim who is 
democratically elected to head Christian countries.297 Perhaps this is an area that needs a 
critical study. General Idi Amin Dada, a Muslim, though not democratically elected 
served for eight years as the head of state of Uganda that is predominantly - about 86% - 
Christian. However, here there is need to consider the fact that he came to power through 
a military coup and ruled with brutality and an iron hand.298 This was the reason he was 
able to hold power for so many years.  
The issue raised by Mazrui should be critically studied, weighed and considered. 
Though it is not the intention of this study to go deep into that, the issue is intriguing to 
Ugandan Christians. Are they being discriminatory against the Muslims or is it because 
the Muslims have not provided capable leadership for Uganda or the Muslims themselves 
are discriminatory? The precise answer is the Christian constitution of the population of 
Uganda and the, historically, different religious ideologies reflected in the political 
leadership of Uganda. There is certainly a significant difference in the vision of 
Christians and Muslims. Consequently, there is not much religious and political solidarity 
between Christians and Muslims. 
Ugandan Catholics seem to have a greater sense and degree of unity and national 
solidarity than the Anglicans and the Muslims. However, this sense of solidarity has not 
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always been consistent in the Catholic Church as pointed out by Paul Gifford. 299 Gifford 
correctly states that when Martin Luluga was appointed an Auxiliary Bishop of the 
diocese of Gulu, he was welcome. Later as the Ordinary of the diocese he was held in 
suscipicion and resented; Bishop Emmanuel Wamala received a cool reception from the 
Baganda of Kampala Archdiocese in 1988 when he was appointed the Archbishop of 
Kampala because he was a Muganda from the diocese of Masaka. However, despite such 
phenomena there is Catholic solidarity. There are four Catholic national major seminaries 
in different regions of Uganda, and Namugongo, the Uganda martyrs basilica and 
national shrine, is a national centre for pilgrimage for all Catholics in Uganda and 
beyond.300 
Within the internal ordering of the mainstream churches or religions in Uganda - 
Catholics, Protestants and Muslims - there have been, to this day, elements of tension and 
division too. These show a failure of solidarity in the different religious denominations. 
Muslims, including those in Uganda, are often characterized by fighting and divisive 
behavior, even among themselves.301 In the 1990s Catholics and Anglicans were no 
exceptions to similar conflicts and divisions. A Catholic example is the diocese of Kabale 
in Western Uganda, where the community was divided into two factions - those who 
were pro-bishop Barnabas Halem ‘Imana and those who did not support him.302 The 
episode was based on ethnic and political differences, and allegations of some corruption. 
The consequence was that “the entire diocese became polarized and, when all Church 
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groups ceased to exist, effectively collapsed.”303 In 1992 a similar event occurred in the 
COU (Church of Uganda), in the diocese of Busoga. The Christian community was also 
split into those who were pro - bishop Bamwoze, the then bishop of the diocese, and the 
anti - Bamwoze because it was alleged that he was dysfuntional or irrelevant, and had 
practically forfeited his role and position as bishop and pastor by not fulfilling his duties, 
and so another bishop should be elected.304 
Despite these episodes, there are elements of solidarity among the religious 
institutions in Uganda, especially in the Catholic and the Anglican churches. A clear 
example of the expression of solidarity is the fact that there are a good number of bishops 
in Uganda, both Catholic and Anglican, who serve among people who are of ethnic 
backgrounds other than their own. In the Catholic Church the following dioceses have 
bishops from outside their ethnic backgrounds: Nebbi, Gulu, Lira, Kotido, Moroto, 
Kasese and Jinja. This is nearly half of the number of Catholic dioceses in Uganda. In the 
Anglican Church the outstanding example is the Archbishop of Kampala, Joseph Orombi, 
who is an Alur from Nebbi in northwestern Uganda but is serving among the Baganda in 
the south of the country, although also in a national capacity as an archbishop. 
From the foregoing treatise on solidarity the following conclusions can be made:  
First, true solidarity is all-embracing and it demands mutual openness. This can be a 
spontaneous process based on the virtue of universal charity and recognition of the 
universality of human dignity. Secondly, where spontaneous and inclusive solidarity is 
not forthcoming, especially in the political context, some form of coercion may be 
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necessary as the situation in Kabale Diocese and Busoga diocese.305 Niebuhr suggests 
All social co-operation on larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of 
coercion. Where the factor of mutual consent is strongly developed, and where standadized and 
approximately fair methods of adjudicating and resolving conflicting interests within an organized 
group have been established, the coercive factor in social life is frequently covert, and becomes 
apparent only in moments of crisis and in the group’s policy toward recalcitrant individuals.306 
 
The normal way of building unity and solidarity is the spontaneous one but there 
are certain moments when force is necessary to complete the process of solidarity, 
especially in the case of those who are simply stubborn. Such measure of force is 
inevitable to hold a state or an institution together. In such a case it is a matter of 
choosing between two evils – use of force to bring people together or escalating disunity 
among people. In a situation where people are informed and cooperative force is not 
necessary. Therefore, people need to comprehend and accept their own situation as well 
as that of other people in order to build solidarity. Therefore, education for peace, unity 
and solidarity is a crucial endeavor. This suggests that force is sometimes an inevitable 
part of the building of social cohesion because of  
the limitation of the human mind and imagination, the inability of human beings to transcend their 
own interests sufficiently to envisage the interests of their fellowmen as clearly as they do their 
own.307  
 
J. Peace: The Most Delicate Challenge to Uganda 
 
The term peace is used here in the Jewish and Christian sense of shalom or 
general well-being and harmonious life in human community as explained in chapter two. 
In this sense peace also implies security. It is in this context that the condition or factor of  
peace remains an impending and delicate challenge in Uganda and shows the failure of 
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yet another claim of Ugandan government to provide security to all people in Uganda, 
and to their property as stipulated in the ten-point program of the NRM.308  
While peace is the desirable thing and what human persons often seek, human 
history has consistently shown violent moments. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi 
have rightly argued that human history has recurrently been filled with conflicts, even if 
people have loved to live peacefully.   
. . . from ancient times human beings have struggled to live peacefully side by side, having 
recourse for the most part to the exclusion or marginalization to keep under control whole social 
groups or “castes” defined on the basis of their economic activity, their wealth, their ancestry or 
their race.309 
  
This is true to a great extent in various societies. One evidence in Uganda is what 
Mark Leopold suggests of the West Nile people. He contends that the real expectation of 
the people is that government has to deliver or be relevant to them by meeting their needs 
or expectations.310 This is a demand, not only relevant for the people of West Nile or 
marginalized regions of Uganda, but for any person who cares about human life and 
human dignity. Paradoxically, despite the fact than human beings are social and have the 
affinity to unity, they also have the tendency to strive to dominate and to resist 
domination. Consequently, there are conflicts and a noticeable absence of peace among 
people.  
Considering seriously what Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest, peace 
is the most delicate challenge to efforts towards integral human development because ‘‘it 
represents per se the moral progress of humanity decisively oriented towards unity. Unity 
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and peace, when liberty unites them, are sisters.”311 If there is unity amidst expression of 
human freedom there is real peace. Peace is crucial and demands factors such as concern 
for the common good, justice and love, and it is a consequence of these significant 
factors. The challenge of peace is compounded, in the Ugandan context, by the prevailing 
ethnic, political, economic and religious diversity. Peace is the brain - child of justice and 
love - because justice and love lead to peace. However, charity ranks higher than justice 
and true Christian justice is a consequence of charity.312 Any violation of justice is a 
violation of charity. 
Peace is a result of just and charitable mutual action. While justice precedes 
peace, some integral education is necessary for attainment of peace. It is not until all 
people understand, accept and live the true meaning and value of peace that it can 
actually prevail. This is why peace is a delicate principle or condition for integral human 
development in Uganda.  
If asked whether people are economically and socially peaceful in Uganda, the 
fair answer to the question is both yes and no. The rich have economic peace of mind and 
heart but not social peace because they always live under the fear of the attack from the 
poor. Consequently, all they tend to do is build physical and social walls instead. On the 
other hand, the poor are economically, and even socially, not peaceful because they lack 
the necessities for a comfortable life. Besides that, if they are poor because of the 
injustices in society or because of the rich people, deep in their hearts the poor cannot be 
comfortable at all. The evidence is to be seen in what has been happening in the north and 
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northeastern part of Uganda where, according to AMSRIU 
After twenty years the government has failed to resolve this scandalous conflict! Meanwhile, 
nearly two million of IDP (Internally Displaced People) are obliged to live in desperately inhuman 
conditions. About 1000 IDP people die every week to the shame of the Government and all of us. 
In their desperation, some commit suicide! Concerning the IDP, we find the letter of Mahmood 
Mamdani (Daily Monitor of 4-12-05) quite appropriate.313 
   
One of the principal challenges of peace as a necessary condition for true or 
integral development is human confrontation with the dignity of other people. We ought 
always to keep in mind that every person is important, everybody matters, because of 
their human dignity.314 The question of justice and equality are also significant because 
true peace is founded, not only on the respect for human dignity, it is also founded on the 
respect for human rights, and on justice and equality.315 All principles, virtues and 
conditions necessary for human development are related to human dignity. Violation of 
any one of them is an automatic violation of human dignity. 
Since its independence from the British in 1962 the transition of government in 
Uganda has consistently been through armed force or wars. There is yet no hope that it 
will ever happen peacefully. After each new government comes to power it claims to be 
working for peace but time has proven them to be public liars because authentic national 
peace has never been achieved at any time in Uganda’s history since independence. One 
part or some parts of the country may have just relative or apparent peace but other parts 
of the country are at war either physically, with neighbors or the wrong ethnic groups, or 
interiorly in their minds and hearts of people because they are not in harmony. They are 
disgruntled because of what is actually happening in the country. 
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The years 1966-1967 were characterized by the strife between Milton Obote and 
the Kabaka of Buganda and led to the eventual invasion of Kabaka’s palace at Mengo, 
and ultimately to his flight into exile in England.316 Soon thereafter was the strife 
between Obote and Idi Amin who eventually took over power from Obote by force in 
1971.317 From 1971-1985 when Amin, Obote II, the Military Commision, Yusufu Lule, 
Godfrey Binaisa and Tito Okello Lutwa, were in power and Museveni launched a 
guerrilla war (1980-1985) in the Luwero triangle, there were untold sufferings and 
killings in Uganda. In these years the affected people were in Lango, Acholi, West Nile 
and Luwero. During this period Archbishop Luwum, an Anglican, was killed (by Amin’s 
men), the home district of the Anglican Archbishop Silvanus Wani was vandalized (by 
Obote’s men);318 and from 1980-1985 (during the reign of Obote, Tito Okello Lutwa and 
Museveni), there were untold massacres in the Luwero triangle. From 1987-1995, as 
George Ayittey records, there were also many killings and assassination attempts of both 
Ugandan nationals and expatriates. For example, Hussein Musa Njuki, a newspaper 
editor was killed in 1995, Andrew Lutakome Kayira, a political activist was killed in 
1987, Charles Owor, District Administrator of Nebbi, was ambushed and killed in 1993, 
“Peter Forbes, a Canadian Reseacher and his colleague John Ongom were murdered by 
government security men, and Monsignor Fredrik[sic] Drandua, a Catholic bishop of 
Arua,”319 providentially escaped an assassination attempt in 1994. These are just some of 
the known indicators of violence in post-independence Uganda. 
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Paul VI’s message of peace from Populorum Progressio persistently challenges 
Ugandans. According to Vincent Okot Oburu, Paul VI in one of his messages on the 
World Day of Peace, insisted that peace depends on everybody and is, therefore, a 
challenge to everybody.320 In this context the struggle for peace is a challenge to all 
Ugandans. People should not be apathetic because a region where one comes from or 
lives is not affected by any fighting or anything that affects the peace of the residents of 
that place, region or nation. In fact any knowledge or news of fighting, hunger, 
epidemics, or any form of discrimination and injustice in any part of the country should 
be enough to disrupt the relative peace within every Ugandan citizen and beyond. It is on 
the bases of such assertions that the words of Paul VI, as stated by Vincent Okot Oburu, 
become more forceful:  
Peace will never be without a hunger and thirst for justice; it will never forget the effort that has to 
be made in order to defend the weak, to help the poor, to promote the cause of the lowly. Peace 
will never betray the higher values of life, in order to survive.321 
 
Currently there is the dilemma and uncertainty among the people of Gulu, 
Kitgum, Lira, parts of Soroti and Karamoja, and sometimes people of West Nile region, 
about their security. Who provides security for them, and who is their enemy – the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) or National Resistance Army (NRA) or Uganda People’s 
Defense Forces (UPDF). These people question themselves about who commits atrocities 
in their region. The challenge to the current government is whether they are human 
beings deserving peace, at least, if not citizens or part of Uganda. Lack of peace has 
affected their political, social and economic output or contribution to the country. Since 
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1986 they have been, and perhaps they will continue to be, dependent. A government that 
claims to be the protector of people ought to do something for the peace of all its citizens. 
This is also the real demand of common good as Jacques Maritain affirms.322  
There are “more than 300,000 Acholi who are displaced in Acholi land itself and 
living in protected camps and in other parts of Uganda.”323 They are refugees on their 
own land and in their own country. To claim there is peace in Uganda is false. With 
regard to peace what is true about Uganda is to affirm that there is only relative or 
fragmented peace. 
There is no doubt that the government has tried to fight for peace and tried to 
protect some of the people in the named regions. The so-called protected camps have 
been created to keep people safe and provide some measures of peace. However, it is 
questionable whether these camps are actually protected because sometimes people have 
been attacked and abducted from them or they are subjected to untold sufferings.324 In 
other words, the camps are unprotected and unsafe to a very considerable extent. Besides 
these factors the camps are undignified habitations because people are not able to work 
for themselves. They cannot fully exercise their human rights. While to some extent a 
relative peace has prevailed, critical caring and loving people who have witnessed the 
actual conditions of the people living in the affected parts of the country are still 
apprehensive about the possibility of continuous disharmony and the reversal of the peace 
process.325 This is not a far-fetched apprehension because peace processes have failed 
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many times in the history of Uganda.  
Religious institutions in Uganda are often confronted by, and they have also 
frequently confronted, the challenge of peace. The Catholic Bishops of Uganda have 
consistently done this. In two consecutive years, 2004 and 2005, they have reiterated the 
importance of peace for Uganda’s development, not only now but also in the future.326 
While the bishops acknowledge positive developments in Uganda since they issued their 
pastoral letter, A Concern for Peace, Unity and Harmony in Uganda, they repeated their 
appeal for peace in the 2005 pastoral letter, Towards a Democratic and Peaceful Uganda  
Based on the Common Good, in the following words: 
We must all build peace in our hearts as individuals; we must build peace in our families and 
communities and then we shall be able to build peace in our nation. This is a big call we want to 
make to our pastoral agents, all leaders in the country to build a culture of peace, security and 
tolerance among all individuals and communities in Uganda.327  
 
The real challenge of peace is the challenge of united efforts to create peace, as 
was discussed in Chapter Two. It is also a challenge to love, to foster solidarity and to 
work for the common good. The challenge of peace is a call to all people to contribute 
toward the tranquility and harmony of the country, socially, politically and economically. 
Deusdedit R.K. Nkurunziza has rightly observed that the NRM government has not 
“given the civil society and NGOs their full participation as key stakeholders of peace 
keeping, peace-making and peace building,”328 yet in the past twenty years the 
government has provided no feasible solution to the problem of insurgency in northern 
and northeastern Uganda. This challenge also confronts these groups to which 
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government has consistently denied participation, and the entire nation. The involvement 
of the civil society in the peace-building process and good governance in any part of 
Uganda is fundamental for far reaching results and ought not to be neglected.329 
One of the considerable challenges the question of peace poses for religious 
institutions is their failure to achieve the goal of effective preaching of the gospel of love 
and peace. While most of the churches have often intervened to negotiate for peace 
between warring factions, they have often not been successful because the powers that be 
or the warring parties have not cooperated adequately. Instead they have often fought for 
their own, and often selfish, interests. To date the seeming failure of the efforts of the 
religious leaders in Uganda can be seen in the last twenty years of war in northern and 
northeastern Uganda, particularly in Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apach, Soroti and Karamoja in 
the northeast of the country. There is only a minimum success. The real failure is 
suggested by the frustration of the Catholic bishops of Uganda about the failure of 
government to resolve the situation in these regions. This is evident in their plea: 
We once again reiterate our call to Government to do all it can to end the war in the North without 
any further delays. We do understand that significant achievements have been recorded in terms of 
security of people and property - reduction in abductions, security on roads and the surrender of 
many Lords resistance army (LRA) fighters - thanks to the government and to the Amnesty Act 
and the efforts of Ms. Betty Bigombe and the different religious and political groups in northern 
Uganda.330 
 
While the bishops acknowledge the successes so far recorded, they are still 
emphatic that more needs to be done to improve the situation in the region. There is still a 
significant degree of desperation, insecurity and suffering among the people of Northern 
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and Eastern Uganda.331 This again consistently demands a concerted effort of all parties. 
In relation to the situation in northern Uganda, another challenge to religious 
institutions is to embody what true religion teaches. The LRA who have fought since the 
NRM government came to power in 1986 claim to be a religious faction that wants to run 
Uganda according to the ten commandments of God – thus claiming the fight to be a 
religious war.332 They have killed many, abducted and raped women, and subjected many 
people to torture. By so doing they denied that the commandments advocate love of all 
and care for all, and harmonious coexistence. One would question this type of religion, 
and its authenticity. This is a challenge to religious institutions because they are to unite 
people to God and to one another. Here is again a failure in understanding what religion 
is. In this case religion is also practically an utter failure because it has not united people 
but divided them instead. This same failure can be ascribed to the killers at Kanugu, who 
are believed to be the religious leaders,333 a story which the government ceased to follow 
and which makes one question whether the government is there to protect the people of 
Uganda, and whether it cares about the life and dignity of its citizens.334 The challenges 
of peace in Uganda are: development of a real culture of universal love, justice, mutual 
understanding, and consideration for the common good of the country. However, the 
critical challenge in the actual pursuit of peace is that true peace is durable, not restricted 
to a few people and not a temporary cessation of violence, “peace must be pursued and 
rights defended within moral restraints and in the context of defining other basic human 
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values.”335 The methodology for pursuing peace should always take into account the 
dignity of the human person and the desire to care for everybody. 
The attainment of peace requires some specific strategies. One strategy is peace 
education which promotes tolerance and mutual trust among people of different 
backgrounds.336 The principles of this education are: respect for and defense of human 
dignity and rights, that the individual is not subordinate to the state, stewardship of 
natural resources and their destiny, defiance of discrimination, participation in social, 
religious, cultural and political life of people and the understanding of solidarity, charity, 
sense of dialogue and negotiation, common good and justice.337 This education ought to 
be carried out nationally and to the different categories or classes of people. It should 
constitute part of the education curriculum of Uganda from the lowest level to the 
highest. It should, as in the real sense of religion, be part and parcel of the obligation of 
all religious institutions. 
K. Association: The Challenge of laissez faire or Restricted Association 
The principal problems related to freedom of association among the people of 
Uganda, both nationally and locally at the level of ethnic groupings and similar smaller 
groupings, is the inability to transcend culture, religion, ethnicity and political 
differences.338 These had partial roots in the colonial administration that favored some 
sectors of the population and disfavored others. There are a few associations such as the 
Farmers Associations and Co-operative Societies but they are neither widespread nor 
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viable institutions. On the whole there are few credible economic associations or 
organizations. 
When Uganda got independence from the British it immediately imprisoned itself 
consistently in a system of one-party politics, though nominally there were political 
parties in the early post-independence years. The first Ugandan leaders after 
independence seemed never to believe in democracy and its attendant values such as 
justice and the respect for human rights and the common good.339 One of the greatest 
political challenges and difficulties regarding association in the history of Uganda since 
independence has recurrently been that of not giving opportunity for a multi-party 
political system. One regime after another resented multi-party politics for extensive 
periods of time. This was most observable in the eight years of Idi Amin’s military rule340 
and twenty years of Yoweri K. Museveni’s partly military rule and the later years of a 
seeming civilian administration.341 Freedom of political association in the form of 
political parties was banned. The second regime of Milton Obote and recently that of 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (February 2006) were perhaps the only ones that allowed 
different political parties to function. Nonetheless, all the presidents of Uganda since 
independence have used the army as personal machinery for limiting the activities of 
other political parties. 
On a positive note from 1986 or in the last twenty years the government of 
Uganda has been careful in following any attempts by groups of people to form new 
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parties. Radical groups that have tendencies to disrupt the smooth functioning of the 
government and the nation have been restricted, especially radical political groups with 
evil ideologies. President Museveni has particularly feared the formation of new political 
associations or parties formed along lines of religion. Muslim parties are among some of 
the dreaded ones, probably because of their character and the experiences during Idi 
Amin’s regime. Mazrui’s explanation is perhaps one of the best to understand 
apprehensions about some Muslim groups. He suggests that radicalism in Islamic politics 
is because Islam “has not only a tradition of submissive following but also, paradoxically, 
a tradition of rebellious leadership.”342  
Since the role of government and religion is to help people to meet their needs 
and to protect or care for them, any political party that does not meet such standards or 
goals is, prudently speaking, not permissible because it defeats the purpose of these 
institutions. This has basically been the fear of the NRM government. However, the 
banning of political parties by the NRM government in the last twenty years is not 
democratically positive.343 The preceeding argument is a support only for the prevention 
of the development of radical political groups that would create unrest, not for the 
banning of political parties per se. The legislative branch of the government (the 
parliament) and the constitution of the country, which is the supreme law of the country, 
should be invoked, though not manipulated to satisfy individual interests. 
The challenge of the principle of association is that of the choice between liberal 
freedom for association and conservative limitation of freedom for association. If people 
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are allowed too much freedom to form associations the consequence could be anarchy or 
lawlessness. If they are too much restricted from associations the consequence could also 
be a violent explosion of anger and revolution. The historical reaction of the “anti-
Buganda sentiments” 344 of Non-Baganda, created by the colonial administration, better 
illustrates the possibility of such reactions. In either case the consequences are negative 
and undesirable. This is the dilemma and challenge to the political situation in Uganda. 
There should, therefore, be a balance or moderation. 
There is freedom of religion and freedom of associations. Religious institutions 
are themselves associations. An authentic religious association ought to promote the 
human person, dignity and rights, and universal charity. The principal challenge to 
religious groups is that they should establish micro-associations within the same larger 
group. In Uganda the Catholic church has perhaps performed better than other religious 
institutions in this regard.345 Its structural organization provides for different associations 
and movements for people of various categories or different age groups in order to meet 
different needs of people. The structural organizations of the associations run from the 
lowest level of the church through the diocesan level to the national level. Other Christian 
denominations have made attempts to do the same but they have not matched the level of 
the structural organization in the Catholic church. Muslims have associations of their own 
but they are more fragmented because of the various sects extant within the religion. 
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L. Participation or Involvement: The Challenge of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 
 
Participation suggested in this section means involvement of all people in the 
development project. It means that every person including people who are not experts in 
decisions and actions related to issues affecting them is part and parcel of every decision 
related to their life, as Goulet suggests.346 If people, including non-experts, do not 
participate in deciding what affects them, they may even have no enthusiasm for practical 
action necessary for their development. Depriving them of participation in determining 
their own fate constitutes an injustice – namely, social, economic and political injustice. 
Participation is important because not only one person or a group of few individuals or a 
party has all the right answers and solutions to problems.347 The more people are 
involved the more easily solutions can be sought to problems, and the more ideas can be 
enriched. 
 Paul VI underscored the significance of the principle of participation. He 
emphasized that “every person and all people are entitled to be shapers of their own 
destiny.” 348 As treated in chapter two he advocated that all people need to be involved in 
the development process. Museveni similarly states that “government does not work 
alone. Poverty-eradication is the business of all citizens of Uganda.”349 Though Museveni 
does not state it clearly or explicitly, in a way he suggests that participation is a right.  
The exercise of this principle or right is problematic in pluralistic contexts, not 
only because people have no opportunity but also because people are sometimes passive. 
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Mark Leopold has remarked this of the Lugbara and the Alur in their historical past 
where he suggests that they have been “passive victims,” 350meaning that for a long time 
they have faced problems without getting involved in confronting them. They observed 
situations without doing anything about the prevalent problems while they should have 
been part of the problem-solving process. This kind of attitude is a challenge to people 
who do not care to participate in confronting issues affecting them or society in general. 
While every time one thinks of a nation one, at least theoretically, thinks that it is 
an independent entity with united citizens. Most countries either think this is what they 
are or this is what they want to be or they are working to build. However, the actual 
situation is often different on close observation. This is true even of the most 
homogeneous community. Uganda is no exception to such a phenomenon, especially 
considering its ethnic and racial diversity. It is for this reason that one of the greatest 
challenges to the people of Uganda, the Church or religious institutions and the state is 
that “development should involve the participation of the broad mass of the people and 
not only of a few. People have to be involved in the work of their development. . . . man 
can only develop himself. He cannot be developed by another.”351 
 For a long time, in the economic history of Uganda, economic activities were 
dominated by expatriates or naturalized citizens. Trading merchandise and industrial 
activities were, for instance, dominated by the Asians while the indigenous people were 
economically and even socially marginalized.352 When Idi Amin became Uganda’s 
president in 1971, he expelled all the Asians in 1972 regardless of whether they were 
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Ugandan citizens or not, confiscated their property and entrusted it to the custodian 
board. Idi Amin declared what he called economic war and decided to Africanize 
economic activities.353 This in itself was cruel and unjust. However, Amin’s intention 
was to entrust the economy of the country to the indigenous Ugandans. It was an effort to 
give indigenous Ugandans the opportunity for economic participation. It was at this time 
that Ugandans started to, more closely and critically, learn to do business and manage 
their economy. 
This was an effort towards economic participation, although often uncritically and 
negatively viewed by many outsiders and some Ugandans. It was a clear message to the 
indigenous Ugandans that they could and ought to do business or take care of their 
economy just like the expatriates. This action is, however, opposed to James P. Bailey’s 
contention that “economic activity is one way people participate in, and benefit from, the 
community; barriers to participation in the economy are to be challenged.”354 In this 
context a careful observation suggests that Idi Amin is not exclusively to blame for the 
expulsion of Asians from Uganda and economic businesses. Those who established an 
economic system that excluded the indigenous people of Uganda - precisely the British 
colonial masters355 - are also to blame. However, the injustice of Idi Amin was that of 
confiscating the property of the Asians and expelling even those who were Ugandan 
citizens. Amin’s Africanization of the economy was also a failure because it led to what 
came to be known as the Magendo economy which “was characterized by speculation, 
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hoarding, smuggling and black marketeering.”356 This means customers paid high prices 
for commodities, not because the commodities were worth the prices charged but, 
because business people created shortage of supply in order to raise prices and reap high 
profits. This was also injustice to the citizens who offered the market for the business 
people involved in the promotion of such economy.  
Another notable challenge with regard to the application of the principle of 
participation is that participation is determined by the type of development required or in 
question. Certain areas of development require specific skills or technical knowhow 
while others do not. As Goulet suggests  
different kinds of development require different forms of participation. A “people-centered” 
development requires participation which assigns priority to satisfaction of basic needs among the 
poor, to job creation, self-reliance, and the active preservation of cultural diversity obviously 
requires a form of participation in which non-elites play an active role in the diagonosis of their 
own problems. If on the other hand, a top-down, growth oriented approach to development is 
adopted by a particular country, it is most likely that whatever participation does occur will not be 
generated by the people themselves from below. Rather, participation will be imposed by the 
government for the purpose of rallying the populace to implement activities planned for it. In this 
case bottom-up participation will generally be confined to resistance against imposed plans and 
projects, or to micro “do-it-yoursel”activities.357 
 
The critical challenge is to determine what kind of participation is needed in 
different development projects. The frequently-made mistake is to impose on people that 
they should be involved or for the people to think that they do not have to be involved in 
a particular development project. This squares with the difficulty of applying the 
principle of subsidiarity. The solution to this problem ought to be sought in appropriate 
education that provides for the requisite expertise. 
From a political point of view, at the outset it is necessary to note that one of the 
main challenges of the principle of participation is that no person, no government or 
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political system should ever be considered irreplaceable or indispensable.358 Each person 
or system contributes in its own way. Each one has advantages and disadvantages, 
weaknesses and strengths.  
The question of political participation in Uganda is of profound importance 
because the political history of the country shows how much, to date, true political 
participation was lacking in one regime after another. It has consistently been a 
questionable issue from the time of independence to the present time.359 The colonial 
masters designed the political administration in such a way that the Baganda, the most 
dominant ethnic group in Uganda, and the first to encounter and interact with the 
international world, would be more involved in and take charge of political 
administration. From then, and especially from the time of independence from the British 
in 1962, this trend of limited political participation has persisted. What Thompson 
Gardener affirms is perhaps one of the strongest assertions that testify to this claim. He 
says: 
participatory democracy based on political parties has been no more welcome in the latter period 
than in the former. At both times political parties have been seen as the tool of individual 
opportunists, and of interest groups based on ethnicity and/or religion, if not class. First Cohen and 
colonialism, then Museveni and the Movement: each has sought to manage political aspiration and 
pressure, while inhibiting the growth, exercise and significance of parties.360 
 
When Milton Obote forcefully grabbed power from Kabaka Edward Mutesa with 
the help of Idi Amin, the then military commander, it was a reaction to the lack of 
involvement or the limited involvement of the people who were marginalized, especially 
people of northern Uganda. The consequence was that when Obote himself took over 
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power he allied more with the northerners, particularly people of his tribe: the Langi, the 
Acholi and the Luo in general.361 This was one of the reasons for Idi Amin’s overthrow 
of Obote and his promise to unite all Ugandans. It was welcome news to most Ugandans 
but soon frustrated when Idi Amin decided to ally with and mostly involve the Kakwa, 
Nubians and Sudanese and alienated the rest of the people of Uganda.362  
Disgruntled by this state of affairs Ugandans in exile reorganized themselves to 
expel Idi Amin with the help of Tanzanian troops. No sooner was this successfully 
achieved than one overthrow after another occurred between 1979 and 1980, from 
Yusufu Lule through Godfrey Binaisa to Obote II.363 When Obote returned to the 
presidency for a second time in 1980, a clique of Luo and a few extra-luo supporters took 
control of Uganda. However, they were soon divided among themselves – a division of 
the Acholi against the Langi, leading to the overthrow of Obote, a Langi, by Tito Okello 
Lutwa, an Acholi.364 The latter was overthrown by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, a 
Munyakole from Western Uganda, in January 1986. He promised to make a fundamental 
change, establish what he called a broad-based government, which would provide for the 
participation of different categories and ethnic groups of people.365 He did this and it 
seemed to work satisfactorily in the first five years of his regime, but as he clung to 
power the spirit of participation continued to wane, especially from the point of view of 
ethnic representation, religious representation and participation of political parties. 
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One of the positive contributions of the NRM government that captured the idea 
of participation was the constitutional review and writing process. This involved the 
election of representatives from different areas or regions of the country, and different 
walks of life to the Constituent Assembly.366 The result was the review of the 1967 
constitution, and the writing and promulgation of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda. This was a positive achievement. However, this constitution has posed a 
challenge of its own. The implementation of the constitution has already been questioned. 
Thompson Gardener has doubts of its actual use. According to him many written 
constitutions, including the current one of Uganda, have not been lived and only “few if 
any written constitutions achieve the iconic status of the American.”367  
What one observes in Uganda is political association or participation based on 
ethnicity, religion or political convenience and political parties. One of the challenges 
Populorum Progressio presents here is that ethnic or any other type of discrimination is 
opposed to the spirit of integral human development, universality of human dignity, 
solidarity, the common good, justice and universal charity. A similar trace of 
discrimination is also reflected in the number of politicians according to religious 
denominations. From the time Muslims lost in the religious wars in 1889, long before 
Uganda’s independence and even before a proper establishment and consolidation of 
colonialism, they have at best remained at the periphery of Uganda’s political, economic 
and social life.368  
Compared to Catholics and Protestants, Muslim politicians are very few but 
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according to Gifford “there are far fewer Catholics in top political positions”369 than 
Protestants. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Catholic leadership has been 
asking pastoral agents such as priests, religious, catechists, and justice and peace 
commissions in the country to educate people and be prudently and impartially involved 
in political affairs, and to help people to adopt just ways of being part of the political 
process.370 The Protestant practice of discrimination is believed to have originated in the 
pre-independence days when Catholics thought that Anglican politicians, the Church of 
England and the Archbishop of Canterbury cheated the Catholics, and the Church of 
Uganda (COU) is intimately tied to the state - a feeling of discrimination, which lasts up 
to the present day.371 
 Participation in the political process is important because each citizen has civil or 
political rights to exercise. When political participation is lacking, something has not 
been done by those responsible for the public good. Precisely, people have either not 
been adequately educated or their participation has been deliberately curtailed or 
prevented by state/government agents. It is for similar reasons that the Catholic bishops 
of Uganda and other people have insisted that the government should create a level 
ground for all to participate and compete favorably, political activities should be fully 
demilitarized, people should be provided full civic education so that they can freely and 
fully participate in the political process in Uganda.372 In other words, human freedom for 
political participation should not be limited by any external coercion. These requests have 
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been emphasized because the vital principle of participation has been gravely neglected 
or abused by the political systems in Uganda. They are a call to radical change in the 
systems. It is also for the same reasons that citizens are urged to “avoid passivity or ‘I do 
not care’ attitude.”373 They are being reminded of what many have neglected in the past, 
even up to recently, namely, their rights, their civic or political duties or responsibilities 
to their country and particularly the need to work for the common good of the nation.  
The reminder of the Catholic bishops of Uganda is significant, especially to the 
Catholic community, because for long in its history Catholic involvement in politics has 
been minimal. The observation of Gifford is a testimony to the significance of the 
encouragement of the Catholic bishops of Uganda to the Catholic population to 
participate in politics. He says: “The Anglican church is smaller, but is much more 
powerful politically. All Uganda’s heads of government (except Amin) have come from 
Anglican background.” 374 It is possible that Catholic political passivity in the course of 
Uganda’s political history is responsible for their lagging behind the Anglicans or 
Protestants politically. It is now time for the Uganda Catholic population to realize, as 
Sean P. Kealy says, that: 
. . . it seems clearer than ever, that there is no real choice between political involvement and non-
involvement for the church. All questions are ultimately religious and in need of theological 
reflection in a never-ending circle.375 
 
This challenging issue raised by Kealy is real. The issue or suggestion has been 
exemplified in the ceaseless teaching of the Uganda Catholic bishops from the time of 
Uganda’s independence until today. The Uganda Catholic population faces this challenge 
in a real and special way because of the fact that it is behind the Protestant population in 
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participation in politics. The previous and recent advocacy of the Uganda Catholic 
bishops also amounts to some very crucial issues in the church-state relationship. They 
are suggesting, as Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff contend, that “concentration of 
power in a religious group as such easily impairs democracy, in which citizens should 
have equal opportunities to exercise political power on a fair basis.”376 Beyond this fact, 
Christian mission and duty call all Christians to the fulfillment of this mission. They 
should learn from the example of Jesus Christ’s mission in the world of his time with its 
attendant problems. Jesus himself was “far more politically minded and far more 
concerned with the political life of his nation in relation to God’s all-embracing purposes 
than many pious Christians have often supposed.”377 
Within the individual religious institutions the question of participation needs to 
be addressed. The challenge here is people’s participation in the religious life or activities 
in the country. We mentioned earlier that Uganda is dominantly a Christian country with 
Catholics leading numerically. There are also other religious denominations. The 
question at this juncture is the one of the representation of the religious denominations 
and their involvement or participation in Uganda’s political and religious sectors. The 
Catholic bishops of Uganda have raised in their pastoral letter With A New Heart and A 
New Spirit that some Christians think that the call to holiness is for priests and 
religious.378 This issue should also be extended to people’s general participation in the 
country. The civil population ought to be encouraged to participate and should participate 
in the life of the nation. Unfortunately, the civil population in Uganda often looks to the 
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government or head of state for solutions to their problems, thinking that “power belongs 
to the head of state” and forgetting that the power of the head of state “is delivered by the 
people” because in a truly democratic system “real political power rests with the people, 
the governed and not with the governor.”379  
The populace of Uganda should be educated to know that participation in the 
affairs of the country affecting them is their right. For any Christian and person who 
values morals, participation as Goulet suggests, should be seen as “a moral incentive that 
empowers hitherto excluded non-elites to negotiate new material incentives for 
themselves.”380 The suggestion of Goulet is not merely a motivation or an encouragement 
of people’s involvement but also a statement of fact about the significance of 
participation in personal and communal development. The ultimate participation is one 
where people whose life is affected by decisions related to their life are part of the 
decision-making process. 
M. Education: The Challenge of Universal, Integral and Relevant Education 
 
The significance of education was much emphasized during the second Vatican 
council on the basis of human dignity. The council members were clear that “all men of 
whatever race, condition or age, in virtue of their dignity as human persons have, an 
inalienable right to education.”381 A correct understanding of education is crucial to the 
understanding of its significance and application. While education may be equated to 
instruction, teaching, guidance, inculcation, indoctrination, initiation, and similar terms, 
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the definition and significance of education suggested by the Catholic bishops of Uganda 
suffices for our purpose here: education is “a means to develop the character, intellectual 
abilities and moral stature of individuals” and “the civilization of a society is a product of 
education.”382 There is no development without education whether formal or informal 
education. 
At the outset it should be observed that the formal educational system in Uganda 
was initiated by the Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and also Muslims.383 They are 
the true protagonists of formal education in the history of education in the country. They 
continued administering schools until 1960s when the school system was taken over by 
the government of Uganda, and “since the mid-1960s, church influence in education has 
been significantly reduced through the nationalization of the school system.”384 This 
government initiative was not without some negative consequences in the educational 
system and management in the country, yet education is one of the crucial factors for 
human development. Post-independence Uganda witnessed a significant change in the 
education system and administration when government assumed direct responsibility for 
financial adminstration of schools because finincial initiatives of the churches 
declined.385 This was not, however, only a miscalculation on the part of the government, 
it was also negligence on the part of the churches that were aware of the importance of 
education. 
The purpose of education as a strategy or factor for integral human development 
is that it makes the public aware of their conditions and alternative possibilities. 
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Education promotes this awareness “in order to win their intellectual and political support 
for a normatively better future.”386 Education helps people to improve their life-style 
because to change a people’s way and standard of living, one needs to influence their 
thoughts, understanding and convictions or vision of life. Effective education can do this. 
Since 1970 higher education has rapidly grown in Uganda but the growth has only 
been in terms of the number of people enrolled, not the nature and the structure of the 
education system adapted to the needs of the country.387 A significant indicator of post-
independence decline in Uganda’s educational growth or development and standards is 
what George B.N. Ayittey has stated: “In the 1950s Makerere University in Kampala, 
Uganda, used to be proudly called ‘the Harvard of Africa.’ Today it is in a state of 
dilapidation.”388 Although ranked as one of the 11-15 top African Universities today, 
Ayittey’s observation does relate the inside story of Makerere University which is the 
first, and actually the biggest of the four State universities where the leadership of the 
nation is educated. The dilapidation he has mentioned should be further read beyond 
physical dilapidation of the structures to the moral or ethical decay of the university as 
told by numerous students and many administrative staff members including some of the 
former academic staff like Mamood Mamdani. If the future leadership of a nation is 
educated in and by such an institution, the future of development in the nation is also at 
stake, and the nation’s claims for development are questionable, to a great degree. As the 
conciliar fathers suggested, education should help people “to develop harmoniously their 
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physical, moral and intellectual qualities.”389 This is the kind of education integral human 
development calls for. 
From 1970-1995 “government commitment to funding education was fairly 
consistent.”390 However, the educational system and curriculum in Uganda since 
independence has remained traditional in the sense that it has not been oriented to the 
formation for integral human life. Education is dominantly helping people to be literate 
and informed socially, scientifically, religiously, historically and politically. Even this is 
not adequately done. The suggestion of the International Bank Committee that more work 
needs to be done to “widen the range of human knowledge about Uganda’s physical and 
human resources and how they can best be developed”391 is a recommendation to be 
noted. Often times, even today, the country relies on the expertise of expatriates to try to 
understand itself and its needs better. This is a significant sign that there is still much 
work to be done. However, some of the new Universities are attempting to address the 
needs of the country. For instance, “Nkumba University offers a variety of programmes 
that are linked and related to the job market.”392  
For the first time in Uganda’s education history, the Catholic bishops’ conference 
of Uganda was able to think more aggressively of integral education for living a good 
life, in accordance with their stipulations in the 1997 education policy.393 The Uganda 
Catholic bishops decided to open Uganda Martyrs’ University. The relevance of the 
University is based on its philosophy. A.B.K. Kasozi states 
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The philosophy of the Uganda Martyrs’ University is derived from Catholic Christian philosophy 
of the human person. Accordingly, its aim is to develop individuals who combine career 
competence with a sense of moral responsibility both at the individual and social level.394  
 
The Catholic bishops of Uganda decided to establish Uganda Martyrs University 
(UMU) to counteract the immoral atmosphere in the country – an atmosphere that 
militates against crucial virtues and principles such as love, justice, peace, participation 
the common good, the human person, human rights and human dignity. It seems to be a 
success story of education in Uganda’s history because the graduates of the university are 
doing well in real work situations. They constitute some of the best and relevant 
personnel in institutions where they work. They provide some of the labor force the 
moral situation in Uganda calls for. The Institute of Ethics and Development Studies is 
particularly oriented to help students live a decent life. The relevance of UMU is also 
seen in the fact that it has designed a curriculum that attempts “to address social 
concerns” and it delivers “quality higher education with a moral emphasis”395 to pursue 
the goal of relevance, and moral as well as academic excellence. Its emphasis on moral 
development is evident in what Kasozi states: 
The teaching of moral values is integrated in and is part of the curriculum of all other disciplines. 
It is core to UMU teaching. Acceptable moral values and their seeping into the general society, 
particularly the educated elite, is a legacy that UMU strives to contribute to the Ugandan society 
through higher education.396 
 
This is the kind of education system Uganda needs today if it is to develop 
integrally. Hence, UMU offers for the education system in Uganda a model of education 
to emulate, even at the level of primary and secondary school education. From a social 
point of view a challenge that confronts Uganda’s education system is the unequal access 
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to higher education. This is a problem that can be traced to the early times in the history 
of Uganda. It should be considered a critical challenge because  
it was the means by which southerners, particularly Baganda, came to dominate the affairs of the 
country. The education system had been started by the missionaries and the first schools were 
located in Buganda.397  
 
Traditional attitudes toward education have also often favored men more than 
women, who are often considered more resourceful in making wealth, good for marriage 
and domestic work.398 In such cases from a Christian anthropological point of view the 
female gender is discriminated against, and the understanding of human dignity and 
human right is flawed. This is gender inequality or discrimination in education in terms 
of gender. To achieve integral development is difficult because of the traditional or 
cultural attitude about the education of women. It is this attitude which creates this 
gender inequality, a fundamental social injustice that must be eliminated before a positive 
step can be made toward increased education of women. This cultural factor also 
militates against the promotion of the common good and the operation of the principle of 
participation or involvement which were much encouraged by Paul VI as crucial for 
integral development, and especially recommended by the Second Vatican Council.399 
The education system in Uganda provides for little socio-economic and political 
education. It is only in the higher institutions of learning that political science is taught. 
At lower levels civics is taught but does not address real or serious political issues and 
problems. For instance, serious questions like those of human rights, human dignity and 
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peace which are important for political stability, are not part of the education curricula.400 
Even in the higher institutions of learning these issues are taught to people who have 
specialized in political sciences. This means that a large sector of the population grows 
up to be politically ignorant. If politicians triumph over the populace during elections it is 
because they prey on the ignorance of the masses. 
There is no question that “education is primordial in the development of a 
country; it is a prerequisite for civilization and a progressing society can be judged by the 
quality of its education.”401 Consequently, one principal challenge to the Uganda 
government is to ensure that the whole population is educated. Education would help the 
nation to achieve its enduring goals since independence, namely the fight against disease, 
poverty and ignorance as advocated first by Milton Obote and continued by the majority 
of the successive leaders. Without good, relevant and integral education it is difficult to 
achieve these goals.  
In 1997 Uganda government introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE).402 
This innovation was partly a solution to the problem of ignorance, sickness and poverty 
and partly to promote the political or personal agenda of the NRM government. 
Nonetheless, the attempt seems to be an utter failure because the products, in the form of 
quality education, are extremely poor. This is basically because there are no adequate 
rooms, school supplies and other necessary facilities for the students. Pedagogically, this 
is not right because in such circumstances students do not receive the badly needed 
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integral education or formation. When there are too few teachers the students cannot be 
assisted adequately. For example, in the year 2000, there were 59 students for every 
primary school teacher.403 In such a case there is no adequate follow-up of students. 
Consequently, they cannot be adequately and effectively helped. Compared to the 1970 
ratio of teacher to students, which was 34 students for every Primary school teacher, there 
is a much better opportunity to help students than in times UPE came into effect about 
thirty years later.404 The UPE program is relevant and necessary but its implementation 
started without sufficient planning and resources. At most it only contributed to some 
political successes for certain individuals, not the nation, because it was used for political 
propaganda. 
Equal participation in provision of education according to different religious 
denominations is significant. Uganda’s history has revealed that some religious 
denominations have been deliberately discriminated against for religious and political 
reasons. Justus Mugaju observes that “the Anglicans became the de facto established 
church in Uganda” and Catholics have often felt “outsiders in the politics of their own 
country.”405 The attempt to close some Catholic Teachers’ Training colleges, especially 
Lodonga Teachers’ Training college, on March 31, 1999, even if equal opportunity for all 
districts was one of the explanations for the closure of some teachers’ training colleges, is 
a sign of the failure of implementation of the principle of equal participation or 
                                                 
403 World Bank, World Development Report, 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor, (Washington, D.C: 
World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 259. 
404 World Bank, World Development Report, 1994: Infrastructure for Development, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 216. 
405 Mugaju, 15. 
  471
opportunity.406 Yet the same year the best performing Teachers Training College was the 
Catholic-founded Lodonga Primary Teachers’ College (PTC), one of the teachers’ 
training colleges slated for closure together with Mbarara, while Kalangala and Ajumani 
that were not viable were favored by the policy of closure.407 In the year 2006 the same 
college has been the best performing teachers’ college in the whole of Uganda with 
79.9% of the students passing their final national examinations, and the best student of 
the nation’s PTCs emerging from the same Lodonga PTC out of the 47 PTCs 
nationwide.408 This is a challenge the ministry of Education never adequately addressed 
until the Catholic bishops questioned the prevailing events. 
Church contributions to education in Uganda have been invaluable. Ddungu notes 
that “since Vatican Council II (1965), the church in Uganda has made significant efforts 
to promote ‘development education’ in order to conscientize people to social and 
economic development.”409 This contribution has been through formal and informal 
education which the church worked hard to promote wherever it was possible. 
One of the principal educational challenges to Christian religious institutions in 
Uganda is the teaching of Christian Religious Education (CRE). This has declined since 
the government took over the administration of most schools and a joint syllabus was 
established. Religious institutions need to ensure that the standard of religious education 
taught in schools improves to that of 1963 when government took over the management 
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of schools from church institutions.410 This has meant that some aspects of the Christian 
faith where there are differences, especially between the Catholics and Protestants or 
other Christian denominations, are either not taught or not adequately emphasized 
because the syllabi are ecumenical, although this in itself is positive in the sense that it 
shows some element of solidarity among religious groups. 
Another critical challenge in the field of education, especially to Catholics, is the 
problem of educational monopoly. The Protestants should be commended for their 
ecumenically forthcoming attitude and shrewdness, founded in the colonial period 
because the colonial masters of Uganda were dominantly of Protestant background.411 As 
referred to earlier in this chapter, one issue remains challenging to religious institutions 
and political leaders of Uganda. It is the Protestant attitude of insistently and consistently 
trying to dominate both the political and the educational sector in the country. A typical 
example is already cited above, the attempt by the government ministry of education or 
parliament, coincidentally or otherwise dominated by Protestants, to close some targeted 
teachers’ training colleges in the country. An analysis of the event showed that most, if 
not almost all colleges slated to be closed, were Catholic-founded. The challenge to 
Catholics in such a case is to question how genuine ecumenical endeavors have been in 
the past and whether government is not violating the equalitarian principle according to 
which “the state may not give preference to one religion over another”; and also to some 
extent the neutrality principle which states that “the state should neither favor nor 
disfavor a religion as such or give positive or negative preference to institutions or 
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persons simply because they are religious.”412 In either case the Catholic church is a 
victim. If a parliament or a government ministry discriminates against certain sectors of 
the nation’s population, its sense of justice and respect for this principle is questionable. 
The Catholic church and other Christian churches, emphasise that Religious or 
Moral education should be compulsory in Catholic schools, especially on the secondary 
school level.413 However, Christian churches in general face the challenge that in many 
schools CRE is neglected or not emphasized enough. Even if churches can have their 
programs for catechesis, one thing to be remembered is the constant or ongoing need for 
practical catechesis. The continuity of such a progressive process of religious education is 
interfered with in schools if their directors do not consider the question of religious 
education seriously, whether they are primary schools or institutions of higher learning. 
As a conclusion of the various critical challenges of Paul VI’s vision of integral 
human development to Uganda, I would like to adopt what Luke Mbefo Nnamdi states 
about Ghandi’s vision of some of the great challenges or evils that confront humanity, 
and actually obstruct true human development. He states: 
To Ghandi has been ascribed the seven-fold catalogue of deadly sins, namely: wealth without 
labour, religion without sacrifice, politics without principles, commerce without morality, pleasure 
without conscience, education without character and finally science without humanity.414 
 
The reason for the appropriation of Ghandi’s vision as stated by Mbefo is that the 
statement captures the challenges I have outlined in light of Populorum Progressio. It 
also captures some of the recommendations that feature in the subsequent section. 
Finally, the vision of Ghandi as stated by Mbefo points to the real sources of dishonesty, 
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corruption and lack of true human development. 
IV. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. Integral Education 
 
Education is perhaps the most crucial social factor of human development. The 
significance of education is seen in the fruits of human activity and in the quality of life 
of people. The criticial statement made by Adam Smith, as quoted by Reinhold Niebuhr, 
is significant reminder and summary of the contributions of education towards human 
development.  
An instructed and intelligent people are always more decent and orderly than a stupid one.They 
feel themselves each individually more respectable and more likely to gain the respect of their lawful 
superiors. . . . They are disposed to examine and are more capable of seeing through the interested 
complaints of faction and sedition, and they are upon that account less apt to be misled into any wanton or 
unnecessary opposition to the measures of government.”415 
 
The principal concern of this section is to make some suggestions for Uganda. 
One of the greatest challenges for educational development is whether education is 
relevant to people’s development needs.416A relevant formal and informal education 
helps people to critically see other people’s conditions and their own situation, their 
needs and their roles, and to compare their own situation with that of other people and to 
realize that they have a dignity that deserves respect and a certain standard of living. It 
helps people to reflect and strive to find alternative ways of living. The knowledge of 
good and evil or right and wrong is at the foundation of any moral or ethical behavior and 
reflection.417 Uganda’s educational institutions, whether public or private, religious or 
secular, should emphasize education about moral or ethical values, help students to 
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differentiate what is evil and detrimental to society from values that promote society. Any 
suggestions for education should attempt to meet these and similar standards. 
Integral education suggested here means the complete education of the student. 
The education recommended here is what Levis Mugumya describes, after the example 
of Paul VI, as an appropriate education to which all people have rights, the type of 
education which aims at “developing an individual’s personality, talents, mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential.”418 It facilitates attainment of the goals of the 
type of education (integral) suggested. Integral education is a comprehensive education 
for human enhancement and promotion of society, an education that helps people feel 
comfortable almost everywhere. Such education incorporates or integrates the history, 
geography, cultures, politics, economy, and religions of peoples and should help students 
“to develop a sense of civic responsibility”419 as is the goal in most North American 
countries. J.C.B. Bigala affirms this as the goal of education when he states that 
Integral education should promote the welfare of individuals and of society through providing 
intellectual, occupational and professional skills, social, moral and spiritual development.420 
 
The significance of education for national integration and development is 
invaluable. As Matthew Habiger states, “education to solidarity is an urgent necessity of 
our day.”421 It is one of the first factors necessary to achieve peace and national unity or 
integration. It helps develop “in the heart of every individual and in the activities of every 
society a true sense of stewardship and solidarity.”422 Besides being a necessary factor to 
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achieve peace and national unity, education is a “driver of development.”423 
Consequently, the leadership of the Churches should help the government to ensure that 
from the lowest level to the highest level, education continues to provide for the 
possibility of peace, unity and development. 
 While universal primary education is a positive or relevant innovation because it 
benefits not only individuals but all categories of people, the ministry of education ought 
to improve the UPE program in Uganda. The ministry should improve and expand plans 
for primary education by providing the requisite conditions for effective universal 
education, viz. adequate housing, adequate and regular payment of teachers’ salaries and 
any necessary pedagogical resources or requirements.  
Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Report suggests that “the introduction of UPE with 
free education for four children in every family has transformed the situation of 
enrollment”424 in primary schools since 1997. Universal primary education is a positive 
proposal of the education system for Uganda because for a long time over 50% of 
Uganda’s population was illiterate. The theoretical and practical significance of the 
system is compounded by the necessity of education as a basic factor for authentic human 
development. It would meet the need of education for all or the development of all. 
However, the eminent question is whether UPE meets such needs and the requisite 
standards. 
Even if UPE is at the lowest level of education, it needs to be planned well for a 
solid educational foundation. To date UPE seems a failure because of the poor products 
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in terms of students as stated ealier, even if some 60% of parents are said to be “satisfied 
with the quality of their children’s education” while “40% are not.”425 The intriguing 
question this survey prompts is: Who were the respondents in the survey - the rich or the 
poor, politicians or ordinary citizens, the educated or the uneducated? Where and with 
whom the survey was conducted determines the validity of the above results. It is not the 
purpose of this work to investigate this but it provokes further thinking, especially in light 
of the real observable fruits of UPE.  
UPE has pushed many people to school because tuition is not required. Those 
who had no hope to reach a primary seven standard are now attempting to do so, and 
attempting to assert their right to education.426 This seems to many people to be a 
success. Unfortunately, the success is only in the quantity of students not the quality of 
their education. UPE’s failure is real because education does not meet its real ends stated 
above – peace, national unity and development in general. The input in terms of teaching 
and formation is poor and consequently the output in terms of the quality of students or 
their performance is also poor. For instance, it is incredible and shameful that some 
students complete seven years of primary education and they are not capable of fluent 
reading in their local languages, let alone in English which is their second language. In 
other words, the transformative consequence of UPE is minimal. While government 
advocates improvement in “both quality and quantity of primary education”427, in reality 
it is a failure. Some of the propagators of UPE are reluctant to send their children to 
public/government schools. They prefer to send them to private or well-managed schools, 
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sometimes not just within Uganda but outside Uganda.428 This says volumes about 
whether UPE is really helpful to the people of Uganda, though it is a relevant innovation. 
 Teachers have not been well paid and are not promptly paid. Where does 
motivation come from? It is not only the question of motivation. Justice demands that 
they ought to be given what they and their families need to survive. The challenge for the 
government is to recognize and enforce education, without prejudice, as the propelling 
force behind people’s development.429 The challenge to teachers is to contribute to the 
development of Uganda through the education they provide. Teachers ought to teach 
students what can transform their life and the condition of the nation. Uganda’s 
development depends on the kind of education they provide, the process it involves, what 
the education contributes and does not contribute to the nation and its citizens. 
The idea that the first goal of education is to “prepare people for life”430 is very 
significant; and it should direct the process of education. Education needs to be oriented 
towards development because it is one of the crucial factors for the development of 
people. It is for such a reason that Kasozi thinks that university education and universities 
in Uganda “must direct curriculum changes that address national needs”431 of Uganda. 
Their curriculum should include development ethics and any development related themes 
as core subjects of study. The need for education that helps enhance and integrate human 
development challenges the human mind that  
there is also the urgent need to generate on a greatly expanded scale those human skills and 
knowledge that are essential to increase productivity and hence to accelerate economic growth. 
This is a problem for education and training. Increased productivity is not of course the only goal 
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of education. Another essential goal is equipping people with knowledge to advance a country’s 
entire cultural, economic, and political level.432  
 
A critical study of the context intended for development is crucial for 
development planning. Education should, therefore, help people to accomplish 
knowledge needed for development. This need calls for “co-operative education”433 and 
adaptation. Education should be adapted to the real needs of people. Adaptation of 
education is necessary for the progress of people and a nation but it demands a critical 
study of contexts to be developed. There are other crucial requisites for development, 
which education for development should incorporate. Lawrence Harrison has aptly stated 
this: 
What makes development happen is our ability to imagine, theorize, conceptualize, experiment, 
invent, articulate, organize, manage, solve problems, and do a hundred other things with our minds 
and hands to contribute to the progress of the individual and humankind. Natural resources, 
climate, geography, history, market size, government policies and many other factors influence the 
direction and pace of progress. But the engine is human creativity.434 
 
Education for development should first help people to develop their potential and 
be creative. It should help people think in a practical fashion and be able to construct 
practical solutions from the pieces of information they have been able to lay their hands 
on. This is very crucial to integral human development, and should be promoted by all 
educational systems. Creativity is at the root of every development and “the society that 
is most successful at helping its people – all its people – realize their creative potential is 
the society that will progress the fastest.”435 A co-operative education system is one 
where industries and educational institutions work together in training students. It is both 
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theory and practice - a type of internship or apprenticeship. Human creativity for 
development should also be expressed in the different sciences and arts as Rose-Marie 
Rychner suggests: 
Art needs to be more than aesthetics; it focuses on its potential to shape people’s characters both 
as individuals and as social beings. Artists in Uganda see their role primarily in the promotion of 
peaceful development of political order and stability.436 
 
Fine art is not just something to be enjoyed or a beauty to be beheld. Much as it 
has the capacity or power to affect or shape people’s vision of reality, it should be used to 
influence people’s developmental process by providing powerful teaching aids. The 
Ugandan pedagogy should make a maximum use of the gifts of fine art by involving its 
talented fine artists. Education in fine arts should continue to be vigorously rejuvenated 
and used to fight ignorance, poverty and diseases such as HIV/AIDS that has tarnished 
the image of the health of Uganda since the 1980s.437 Media and all literature should not 
be colored by or used for the realization of some personally profiteering objectives. It 
should be at the true and disinterestsd service of the nation. Media ought not to be used 
merely for propaganda or promotion of individual or personal interests.  
Positive objectives can be achieved through an education system that drills people 
in upholding and living according to moral values such as already stated of and 
propagated by UMU.438 This means that part of what education should do is to teach 
people to be honest and sincere in and with the media. Those who communicate should 
be sincere and recipients of media information should be critical, not naïve as to take 
what they read and hear for gospel truth. The integrity of media should be manifested in 
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what they communicate to the public. Ugandan media should be used for true, 
responsible moral, political and socio-economic formation of the citizens. It should be at 
the true and disinterested service of the nation. 
Education should help people to grasp the true meaning of development. The 
actual purpose of education is the development of peoples. It aims at helping people to 
aim at “struggle against illiteracy, support of political, social and moral development 
process, improving the general state of health, stimulation of economic development and 
improve the material living conditions of the individual.”439 Human enhancement 
demands a critical vision of development and development theories, even questioning the 
understanding of development as promoted by the developed nations because often times 
they do not have a full view of development. Denis Goulet makes a critical and important 
observation to this effect when he observes that: 
It is not a case of sound development being exported to sites unsuited to receive it, but rather that 
the very conception of development transferred is itself distorted at its point of origin.440 
 
Education systems should adopt methodologies that foster participation of the 
people that are practically relevant depending on the contexts in which a particular 
category of people find themselves. In other words, “participatory pedagogy, including 
techniques that encourage more initiative and cooperation at lower levels” of the system 
and emphasize seminars and case-method at upper levels” 441 of education and society 
should be encouraged in the school systems. This helps people adapt their approaches 
according to the type of community they deal with.  
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Continued Church involvement in education and educational institutions is 
necessary for an integral education. Religious institutions have a long tradition of 
providing education in Uganda and other countries and they should continue this spirit or 
mission of providing education. The Church should, therefore, continue to be present in 
educational institutions on all levels – universities, higher institutions of learning, 
secondary schools and primary schools.442 Parish priests should also be personally 
involved in teaching Christian religious education even in primary schools. This is even 
more significant than elevating the educational standards or knowledge of those who 
have already received substantial or adequate religious education - those in higher 
institutions and universities, especially if their religious education has already been well 
catered for. Training in character, morality or ethics should help reinforce “practical life 
skills.”443  
The education needed for integral human development is one that helps people to 
live decent, moral or responsible practical life which shows true faith and civility. 
Education detached from God breeds broken relationship with God, other people and self, 
and ultimately, as Deotis J. Roberts asserts, it is the “foundation for sinful – evil-ridden 
community.”444 In the context of Uganda, this demands that the education curriculum 
should be revised; both quality and quantity of education should be critically considered 
so as to produce people who are well prepared for life.445 It ought to be noted that 
education can become a menace if not well directed. Much as it can be a powerful 
instrument for creating peace, for example, it can also be used as an instrument for 
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creating disharmony. As Niebuhr contends, “when the educational process is 
accompanied by a dishonest suppression of facts and truths, it becomes pure 
propaganda.”446 Education can be used to meet the needs or achieve the goals of 
educators. This indicates that education can be used as an instrument for conflict making 
and conflict resolution. Consequently, Niebuhr suggests that educational process alone is 
inadequate to resolve conflicts, its established goals ought to be moral or ethical and 
adhered to. Therefore, the value of education and its moral dimension ought always to be 
judged according to the purpose it serves, especially the enhancement of human dignity.  
B. Practical Political Democracy 
 
 Democracy is new to Uganda and perhaps does not really exist in its true sense. 
From the time of Uganda’s independence up to today democracy has been ignored by one 
leader after another. After Museveni’s address to the Catholic Bishops of Uganda in 
1986, just five months after he came to power, the Bishops responded after three weeks 
by writing the pastoral letter With A New Heart and A New Spirit, suggesting among 
other statements of support to cooperate in the development of Uganda with clear 
guidelines, that even if they would not identify with any particular political grouping 
Uganda should return to parliamentary democracy, universal suffrage, general elections 
and multi-party politics which guarantees “freedom of assembly and association.”447  
 However, there were moments when Ugandans had a glimpse of democracy. For 
instance, the process of the review and re-writing of the 1967 Uganda constitution is 
generally acknowledged to to have been democratic in terms of presentation and the 
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process of electing representatives.448 However, there is much to be desired from 
Uganda’s democratic processes. The principal reason for apprehension about practical 
political democracy is well stated by George B.N. Ayittey, twenty- one years after NRM 
came to power: “Uganda is a defacto ‘one-party state’ with the political arena dominated 
by Presudent Museveni’s National resistance Movement.”449 Uganda needs the following 
things for true democracy: 
1. TOLERANCE 
 
In a practical political democracy tolerance should be understood as unconditional 
mutual acceptance despite differences and undesirable factors. The basis of tolerance has 
been articulated by Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi as being the recognition and 
respect for the equality of people, but they also affirm state:  
The concept of tolerance to which we are referring is based on that positive attitude as opposed to 
others which draw from nonviolence the strength to endure evil rather than to inflict it on 
others.450  
 
Tolerance demands nonviolence among people. To have democracy tolerance is 
necessary. In a pluralistic context like Uganda tolerance leads to peace but peace is also a 
necessary condition for tolerance to flourish. This suggests that peace education should 
also be given to the citizens. Peace education “is an indispensable strategy” not only for 
promoting tolerance but also “mutual trust of people belonging to different 
backgrounds.”451 There should be mutual political acceptance, an acceptance embraced 
for more than the sake of avoiding conflicts and hostile exchanges. The notion of 
tolerance suggested here is tantamount to Paul VI’s advocacy for peace where he rejected 
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violent reactions to situations of injustice as explained in chapter two. There should be 
ungrudging and sincere mutual political acceptance and exchange of views or ideologies. 
Tolerance is a relevant and necessary suggestion for a country like Uganda that 
has been war-torn for years; a country struggling to attain some solidarity which has been 
hard to achieve because of its ethnic, religious, social, economic and political diversity. 
All these diversities demand some tolerance. Political tolerance, in particular, demands an 
end to Uganda’s many years of apparently one-party system, rule of military juntas, and 
so called “no party democracy.”452 
The tolerance suggested here should be based on the most fundamental principle 
for integral human development much emphasized in this study and especially in chapter 
three, namely the human person and human dignity. That is, “the basis for tolerance is the 
equality of all people by nature and their aspiration to the same destiny, 
‘happiness’.”453There should be a mutual understanding and nobody’s rights should be 
trampled upon by anybody. 
2. IMPARTIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
A well-defined, understood and applied democracy is necessary. However, I 
would not suggest a new definition. The word democracy comes from the Greek word 
demos which means “people” and kratos, “strength” or “power”, people power or 
government by the people.454 The traditional definition of democracy as: government of 
the people, by the people and for the people, serves the purpose of achieving integral 
human development, which has been stated in Chapter Two as a democratic process 
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itself. It should be a democracy that provides for a less self-seeking service and a more 
selfless attitude of the political and civil leadership.This notion of democracy is also 
preferable because it fits well in the federal system of government I suggest for Uganda 
in this chapter. As Oskar Wermter suggests, true democracy is and should always be 
“based on deeply-held convictions of the fundamental equality of all human beings, the 
unity of the human race and the value and dignity of the human person.”455 
Democracy demands service in accordance with the stipulations of the national 
constitution, which is the supreme law of a nation, without changing the constitution for 
personal convenience or interests. The Catholic Bishops of Uganda have hinted at such 
whimsical changes of the constitution as a possible enduring contentious issue in the 
history and future of Uganda.456 They need to be avoided by all means because a 
constitution, as the supreme law of the country, should be a lasting ordinance. Moreover, 
by its very definition a law is not for personal convenience, it is “an ordinance of reason, 
for the general good, made by whoever has the care of the community, and 
promulgated.”457 What people ought to guard against is that all these conditions may be 
fulfilled in a law-making process but they may also be initiated and imposed by a few 
powerful people for their personal good, not the good of the entire community for whom 
the law is intended. Other than this issue another challenge is that laws may be made and 
promulgated by the responsible people but their correct application may be inhibited by 
just a few others or an individual. 
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Impartial democracy demands that government function according to 
constitutionally just laws.458 It should always be kept in mind that while the government 
is established to take care of the people - the citizens - and to promote their good and 
protect them from any external aggressions, the authority of government is derived from 
the people through the constitutional law of the country, which determines “what a 
government can or cannot do.”459 Therefore, the constitution should always be 
acknowledged and respected as the supreme law of the country. It should not be 
manipulated at the whim of a president or anybody who assumes authority or may be 
entrusted with the responsibility of the care for the nation. The laws of the nation, 
including those which govern the behavior of public authorities or servants, should be 
fair, not oppressive and arbitrary, because the government is an instrument of service to 
people, it is “the trustee of the public interest of its people,”460 not an institution and 
instrument for the oppression of its citizens. 
 Another characteristic of an impartial democracy is expressed in the role of the 
army in the life of the nation. Amaza Ori Ondoga claimed that the National Resistance 
Army (NRA), now called Uganda People’s Democratic Forces (UPDF) is “a peoples’ 
army.”461 This claim is questionable because honest Ugandans would agree that Ugandan 
leaders have been notorious, since independence, for using the military for personal 
political interests. The evidence is the series of coup d’etat that have occurred in 
Ugandan history and have been effected by the army. While the current constitution of 
Uganda is clear that the army should be and is a neutral body, not owned by the head of 
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state, any political party or the president, even if he is the commander in chief of the 
armed forces, Uganda’s leaders have consistently and in a very protracted way used the 
army to achieve their personal ends.462 This is contrary, not only to Christian-ethical 
norms but also contrary to the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which  states that 
The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, 
professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as established under 
this constitution.463  
 
Election contestants are aware that if they contest the results of any election, they 
and their supporters could be in trouble. This is so, especially if the incumbent president 
is proclaimed winner and they and the populace are dissatisfied about the atmosphere of 
fear and force created by the army at the time of elections. This has been the consistent 
reason for those who lose elections to run to exile or to seek refuge in the bush. They 
have no defence because the Commander in Chief owns the army. This constitutes 
injustice, lack of participation, violation of freedom of speech or human rights and an 
absence of a minimal democracy. The 2005 USAID assessment of democracy and 
governance in Uganda provides a clear evidence about the ‘ownership or personalization 
of the army’ when it states that 
Despite the constitutional provisions that require the UPDF to answer to Parliament and the people 
of Uganda, in practice the separation of military and Movemnet as political organization is 
ambiguous, and the top military command is drawn predominantly from the southwest. The role of 
the army is inextricably linked to the president who is the chairman of the Movement and the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The army has become an integral part of politics, 
evidenced in the manner in which the Movement leadership has used it for different political 
interventions beyond Uganda’s borders without Parliament’s approval, such as the case in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). . . . 464 
 
It is probably for the gravity of the need to nationalize the army that the 
November 2005 Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of Uganda expressed the bishops’ 
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gratitude about parliamentary resolutions to limit the role of the army, though USAID 
assessment is suggesting that it does not happen in practice. The November 2005 report 
of the Uganda bishops states in part: 
With Uganda’s nasty past the destructive role of the army in politics cannot be taken lightly. We 
are happy that the army will no longer be represented in the Parliament. This is a positive 
development especially in the era of multiparty political dispensation.465 
 
The religious leaders should help the populace to understand such critical issues. 
They should also help people and the government to understand and ensure that there is 
equality before the law, the legislative and the executive wings of government support the 
judiciary system and functions, the judiciary is independent in executing its functions, 
rights of individuals should be respected, and “government must be the representative of 
the majority of the citizens.”466 The question of equality before the law is closely related 
to the anthropological principle treated in depth in chapter three of this work. The Legal 
equality is and should always be based on the principle of imago Dei. All people are 
created with equal dignity. It is precisely for this reason that the rights of individuals - 
civil, political and human rights - should be respected. Similarly, Abraham Kiapi 
contends that justice and true democracy demand that 
The just laws . . . must be impartially administered. All people are, and must always remain, equal 
before the law. The law must be consistently and equally applied to all citizens. The status: 
whether by birth, marriage, social standing, political importance or economic opulence, must not 
be allowed to interfere with the administration of the law.467  
 
The independence of the judiciary is crucial because it is the overall controlling 
force in the country. It is not above the law. It is and should always be the custodian and 
the authoritative interpreter of the law and its application. Secondly, justice condemns 
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bribery as unfair and a discriminatory practice. This in turn suggests that 
. . . the legislative and executive arms of the state must not interfere with the decisions of the 
judiciary in the courts of law, over particular cases. The administration of justice must be the sole 
prerogative of the courts of law. . . . Judges and magistrates must not be influenced by extraneous 
matters, foreign to the facts established from the submitted evidence and in accordance with the 
applicable law.468 
 
The question of political participation is also suggested by the people’s choice of 
whom to entrust with the authority to care for the needs of the nation. Governments 
should not be chosen by only a handful of people. There should be a general consensus of 
the citizens about the government of the state. The issue confronting Uganda, as 
Nkrunziza suggests, is “to create a self-sustaining and empowered civil society that does 
not depend on handouts from the state.”469 The challenge is to create a civil society that 
detests bribes from government, and a state which is founded on truth, universal charity, 
justice, option for the poor, affirmative action, subsidiarity and common good. 
3. A FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR UGANDA 
 
A federal system of government would be helpful to the integral human 
development in Uganda. Ugandan political discussion introduced the notion of 
federalism, but the type of federalism under debate was the type of government which the 
Buganda government of Mengo wanted and actually referred to as federo 470– not in the 
ordinary sense of federalism. It is the type federalism to which Milton Obote was 
opposed, and which led him to abrogate the 1966 constitution and introduce his 1967 
constitution. 
According to the 1966 constitution of Uganda 
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only one region-Buganda-was given separate and substantial powers independent of the center. 
The Buganda Lukiko controlled public services, local government, its public debt, and had 
separate powers of taxation; furthermore, its revenue was supplemented by grants from the state, 
as specified in the constitution. It had its own court system, and subject to the control of the 
Uganda inspector-general, its own police force. It selected its assembly indirectly, through the 
Lukiko rather than by popular vote. None of these powers could be altered by the Uganda 
parliament without the two-thirds concurring vote of the Lukiko.471  
 
This is the type of federalism Buganda demanded in 1993 from the NRM 
government. The Buganda region was denied this privilege precisely because such 
demands do not provide enough executive powers for the central government over 
Buganda. Neither is the federal system advocated here one which provides for too much 
power to the central government at the expense of the lower structures.472 It would also 
be an injustice to grant this only to Buganda while other regions never enjoy similar 
privileges and power. The term federo as understood by the Baganda, and officially 
introduced, probably to distinguish it from federalism generally understood, is disputed 
and the meaning untenable in the pluralistic context of Uganda.  
The federal system of government suggested here is one which provides for all 
regions of the country equally. This should be debated and agreed upon in the parliament 
after intense consultation with the masses. It should be a system accepted by consensus 
because it does not discriminate against any region or ethnic group. The federalism 
suggested here is one that is unitary. It should provide for true unity in diversity. It is the 
United States and Canadian systems that I suggest.473 The framers of the American 
federal system aimed at strengthening the national government but they also aimed at 
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“the division of power between the national government and the states.”474 The type of 
federalism understood by the majority of the Baganda, which is evidently different, 
undesirable and not accepted by majority of the people of other regions of Uganda, is not 
feasible in Uganda because the latter is a pluralistic society. The model of American or 
Canadian or German and other federal systems, independent of ethnic understanding of 
federalism is much more suitable for Uganda. The American federal system was intended 
to ensure that “government would not be dominated by any one group and that there were 
adequate safeguards to protect individuals and states.”475 This is a democracy relevant for 
a nation with people of diverse ethnic groups and divided along ethnic lines. 
This is one of the critical and unresolved problems in Uganda’s political system 
and structures. However, it should be addressed. In their November 2005 Pastoral letter 
the Catholic Bishops of Uganda are very clear about the contentious nature of this issue 
and speculate that the controversy over federalism is “likely to remain so for an 
unforeseeable future.”476 The federalism suggested here is not only for the Baganda or 
certain sections of the country. It should be one uniformly designed for the whole of 
Uganda, and work according to the same general or national stipulations. In other words, 
the federalism suggested here is that which is amiable to people of the different parts of 
the country, and helps to promote national unity. 
This kind of federalism helps the promotion of even development in a country. 
Decentralization that has been introduced by the NRM government cannot be equated to 
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federalism and it does not adequately meet the needs of the different regions.477 
Federalism suggested here should not be according to the traditional claims of the 
kingdom or monarch beneficiaries. It should not be equated to an instrument or a way to 
return to the so-called traditionally owned things, ebyafe or our things which contradicts 
the very principle of ownership of property, because nobody has absolute ownership of 
resources of nature. The notion of federalism presented by the Mengo government also 
contradicts the principles of universal charity, option for the poor, common good, justice 
and equity; and the principle of solidarity advocated in Populorum Progressio. To suit 
our purpose federalism should be defined anew. It ought not to be seen as exclusivity as 
the Mengo government suggests because Uganda is one country. In any case unity would 
foster participation or involvement, regional responsibility built on personal 
responsibility.  
Federalism should not be equated to monarchies. For example, federalism 
understood as “the act of unity in a league by agreement of each member to subordinate 
its power to that of the central authority in common affairs”478 suffices to be a starting 
point from which we can build our own federal system, although not without invoking 
the insights, support and understanding of other nations, especially those who have 
already established the system and it has so far worked well. Here we maintain our own 
autonomy as an independent nation to choose what suits us best as a nation. We should 
also not just duplicate the western federal system but use it to help us develop our own. 
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4. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES 
In the context of the discussion here, what is suggested as affirmative action is an 
aggressive government intervention and action on behalf of those historically 
marginalized or discriminated against. This is a notion akin to the American vision that 
initiated the notion of affirmative action in the question of political democracy and social 
justice.479 The government and the religious institutions should together develop policies 
that help people who have been gravely marginalized or discriminated against in the past.  
The care for groups that have been marginalized or oppressed in the past has to be 
effected, for instance, for the benefit of women, some parts of western Uganda, northern 
and northeastern regions of Uganda that have experienced discrimination since the 
colonial times, and especially in at least the last twenty years. Specific minority 
communities such as the Lugbara, Alur, Kakwa, Madi, Karamojong, Banyarwanda, 
Pokot, Basamia, the Bakonjo; and the Muslim community in Uganda should be given 
some preferential treatment owing to their past history of being marginalized or 
overlooked.480 They should be more adequately supported, especially economically.  
The first four tribes named here are often not counted or immediately thought of 
when talking about northern Uganda. To many people northern Uganda consists only of 
Gulu and Lira or the Acholi and the Langi. West Nile region is often excluded and only 
considered labor reserve as from the colonial times, although it is not the only region 
marginalized this way.481 The Baganda have been, politically, viewed with great 
suspicion because of their privileged position and being instruments of the expansion of 
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colonial administration in Uganda before and after independence. 482 Politically and 
socially they should also be integrated and treated without further suspicions. The 
affirmative action in progress, especially in relation to women and their education and 
involvement, should be continued with more emphasis. It should more powerfully and 
ceaselessly address the bad influence or effect of cultures that perpetuate discrimination 
against women and any disadvantaged groups.483  
Affirmative action policies and application of the principle of the preferential 
option for the poor should be applied in such a way that there is room for those who are 
helped to exercise their abilities and not be recipients only. Government and the Church 
have the responsibility or duty to help the poor and marginalized, and to create 
possibilities for them to function for their well being, but the former have no obligation or 
duty to do everything for the latter. The citizens should also be helped to understand and 
acknowledge this and the fact that they have also responsibility to meet their own needs 
instead of waiting for handouts. 
5. HEALTHY CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP 
 
This sub-theme provokes the question whether the church is a political institution 
or trying to be one. The answer to such a question is what Sean P. Kealy suggests: “No 
church can completely escape a political dimension to its activities and its influence”484 
though this is not its primary role, even if other churches have made politics their primary 
concern. For true development which is integral to occur the cooperation between the 
church and the state is crucial. Consequently, it demands that the relationship between the 
                                                 
482 Ibid. , 13-14. 
483 Bainomugisha, 89ff. 
484 Sean P. Kealy, Jesus and Politics, (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 17. 
  496
two institutions is healthy and good to promote human persons both as citizens and as 
people who belong to religious communities or institutions. They should have a close 
working relationship because they are for the promotion of the same people. This 
contention suggests that, though distinct from one another church and state are 
necessarily related and should not be radically separated. They can be separated as 
institutions, but not when it comes to dealing with certain individual issues affecting 
people. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff suggest that the two are necessarily 
related because “there is no sharp distinction between moral and political issues.”485 The 
suggestion is relevant because the duty of both the state and the church is to help people 
to live upright lives, be responsible citizens and believers. I think it is right to suggest that 
while the church promotes Christian or religious morality the state promotes political or 
civil morality. The equivalent word, which captures the notion of morality in both 
religious institutions and civil society, is responsibility. The church and state try to make 
and expect people to be responsible. 
Paul Gifford states that “since Museveni’s accession to power church-state 
relations have been of less importance.”486 Gifford suggests that the church-state 
relationship has not been emphasized since 1986. While this is not a positive observation, 
the assertion is only theoretically correct. Practically it is not correct because the two 
institutions have often, whether expressly indicated or not, demonstrated their need for 
each other in certain critical moments. Gifford himself noted that Museveni and some 
government agents were involved in resolving the crisis in the COU Diocese of Busoga 
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and in other issues.487 According to Ronald Kassimir in his address to the Catholic 
Bishops of Uganda in 1986, five months after his ascendance to power, Museveni made 
explicit that 
The National Resistance Movement is not opposed to the role of the churches and religion, if they 
can be used positively. The Movement expects the Churches to assume their rightful place in the 
development of nations and is indeed committed to the support and encouragment of the spiritual 
and moral rehabilitation of our society. This direction is exactly in consonance with the 
programmes of the National Resistance Movement which is concerned, among other things, with 
the restoration of morality and human dignity.488 
 
The initial statement Museveni made about church-state relations is a crucial one. 
If church-state relationship continues to evolve in this line there are good future prospects 
for the joint efforts toward the development of the people of Uganda. To ignore this 
relationship is to divide the nation because both institutions work for the good of the 
same people. That the church and state are each autonomous should always be in sight of 
the leadership of either institution, thus maintaining the autonomy of the sphere or power 
of each. However, the spirit of dialogue and conversation between the two institutions is 
always crucial. They also need to be mutually supportive. The cooperation between 
church and state helps to effectively promote and achieve the common good in the 
different contexts of time and place.489 There are times the church needs the support of 
the state and vice versa. There are also times when the two institutions correct each other 
or assist one another with suggestions. If there was a reasonable relationship between the 
government and the MRTCG (Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments 
of God) the March 2000 tragedy might have been avoided.490 Here the proper application 
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of the principle of subsidiarity is also vital.  
It is important to note that, working at odds with each other or independently, 
neither the church nor the state can achieve much in liberating the people of Uganda from 
their problems and lead them into true development. Consequently, the struggle to help 
develop Uganda should be done in unity and solidarity between the church and state. 
Ddungu has emphasized this point of view by stating that 
The state and the church in Uganda have a joint responsibility, based on common interest and 
mutual obligation for reshaping the present and the future of this nation. The shared responsibility 
should promote harmonious coexistence, effective dialogue and cooperation.491 
 
Church-state relationship should be characterized by mutual understanding of the 
goals of both institutions and the needs of the people they serve. There should be no 
deliberate antagonism. Instead there should be dialogic relationship evidenced in 
harmony between church and state. Ugandan heads of state should learn from the nasty 
experiences of church-state relationship in the history of the country; for instance, the one 
that led to the murder of the Anglican Archbishop Luwum by Amin and the invasion of 
the Anglican Archbishop Silvanus Wani in October 1981 by Obote’s Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) and created tensions and animosities.492 There are other similar 
incidences of strife between civil leaders and religious leaders but they have not been 
documented or may not be known. All such cases do not give a picture of love, solidarity, 
concern for the common good and development of the state and religious institutions.  
This issue remains crucial in the history of the relationship between the two 
institutions because of the radical attempt to separate church and state. The significant 
separation emphasized here is often the separation of powers or domains of 
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action/function. However, one should also carefully consider the issues Mazrui raised, 
namely that, “it is too often taken for granted that to separate Church and State is also to 
separate religion and politics. In practice this conclusion is seldom sustained.”493 
Mazrui’s contention that although church and state may be separated, religion and 
politics have refused to be separated up to today is sound.494 Two questions need to be 
answered in order to understand Mazrui. Who constitutes the church and who constitutes 
the state? In many instances those who constitute the state also constitute the church or 
religious institutions. If the same people constitute both institutions, though functioning 
in different capacities, and at the same time they have to be faithful to their commitments, 
how is it possible to separate religion and politics? This actually forces one to ask 
whether the two institutions are not for the good of those who constitute them, which 
indeed is why they exist.495 If they are for the good of people, then they are meant to 
procure a due good - the good they owe to people - for people who should be viewed as 
spiritual and material in constitution. This affirmation is not a denial that there are certain 
things that differ in the two institutions. It is an affirmation against a radical separation of 
religion and politics, church and state, which is often advocated by political leaders to 
secure their position when they feel threatened. 
C. Balanced Socio-Economic and Political Policies 
 
1. SELFLESS INTERESTS AND RELEVANT DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS 
 
First, Uganda needs promotion of disinterested development innovations. This 
means development projects should be well directed according to government policies 
                                                 
493Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, 143.  
494 Ibid. , 144. 
495 Gerald O’Collins and Edward G. Farugia, A Concise Dictionary of Theology: Revised and Expanded 
Edition, Paulist Press: New York/Mahwah, 2000, 43. 
  500
that help people to understand that whatever they want to do privately or publicly is not 
entirely for their personal interests. The intentions of development projects should not be 
self-concern. Self-concern was one of the reasons for economic and political disaster in 
Uganda’s efforts in the DRC.496 The reason for the failure of most projects is that as soon 
as they are started everybody wants personal benefits immediately. This attitude should 
be discouraged through moral education. People who undermine development projects 
should be prosecuted for the sake of the common good even if the projects are private 
establishments. Government should ensure that development enterprises undertaken by 
foreign organizations or countries are not established for ulterior motives. The 
responsible people and the entire nation should also be educated about such policies. 
According to Denis Goulet there is a high possibility for vested interests to dominate 
socio-economic and politcal development because the investing nations or organizations 
correctly perceive that alternative development strategies are a threat to their own power, wealth, 
social status, and global mobility, all of which depend on their partnership with foreigners.497 
 
This suggests that government agents or the state should be disinterested in the 
way they look at private development initiatives or innovations. Government should not 
consider private individuals and private institutions as threats to its general control or grip 
of the country as long as these innovations or initiatives are not merely for personal 
interests; and these individuals or groups can make development innovations for 
themselves and the people. This question is tied to the one of the principle of subsidiarity 
which permits smaller bodies to do for themselves what they are able to and prohibits 
larger bodies from interfering with such initiatives. 
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Relevant innovations must be the priority in domestic development strategies, not 
just idealistic innovations. Laurenti C. Magesa suggests “a distinctive African vision of 
development.”498 He proposes here a vision of development as liberation, not just some 
model adopted from outside. This should, according to him, be based on the 
understanding and cherishing of the human person, human rights and human dignity. It is 
precisely in these areas that Ugandans need some form of liberation. Denis Goulet 
cautions about wholesale importation of development ideals or models in the following 
words: 
. . . strategies were exported from industrially advanced countries to societies where cultural, 
psychological, social, and political soil was uncongenial to them. Most Western agents of change 
were insensitive to these differences. Introducing the wage system and the commercial mentality, 
for example, to people who for centuries have lived on the edge of subsistence, shatters their 
fragile social cohesion.499 
 
Denis Goulet rightly cautions nations as they make development strategies. It is 
good to make innovations or strategies according to models of foreign nations. However, 
what is adopted by the countries struggling to develop should be feasible. This of course 
demands that there should always be a team that is able to make critical feasibility studies 
before strategies are made, confirmed and implemented. 
2. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OR INVOLVEMENT OF THE EXPLOITED AND OPPRESSED 
 
Hard work is one of the significant recommendations for human development. 
This is well summarized in the Lugbara proverb: “Alio oraa okpo ni.” (Alio ma aroo okpo 
ni.), translated as “the medicine of poverty is strength,” and meaning that 
The remedy for a state of poverty is strength, namely, strenuous work; this is the antidote that will 
cure poverty. The proverb suggests that hard work is also preventive medicine to avoid falling into 
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the painful condition of poverty. By envisaging work as the genuine cure for poverty, the proverb 
implicitly condemns other deceptive surrogates like begging or relying on the property of others, 
which do not really relieve one’s poverty.500 
 
Poverty is a serious challenge to the apathy of those who think they may or should  
not contribute to development by every means. It is still a more serious challenge if there 
are people who think that they have nothing to offer. This indeed is a negative attitude, 
which unfortunately, many ordained ministers, religious leaders and lay people have 
cultivated and maintained in both political and socio-economic fields.501 Enlightened 
religious and civil leaders should help such people and all oppressed people to appreciate 
self-involvement in their developments as individuals and as groups, and to discover the 
value of self-reliance and especially to do away with the “survival mentality.”502 
In Uganda lack of development is sometimes blamed on or “traced to overt 
colonialism, economic exploitation, racial discrimination, or less overt forms of social 
control.”503 To a great extent such blame merely serves polemical purposes. Development 
is possible when people are aware of their own current conditions and convince 
themselves that they can actually come out of such conditions using their own efforts and 
available resources. Therefore, all people including the disadvantaged and the poor 
should be educated that the evils that confront them are no longer tolerable, there is a 
better alternative for them, and “large numbers of oppressed people must become 
convinced that changes proposed to them can succeed.”504 Such a conviction cannot be 
achieved from the blue. People must be taught or educated, whether formally or 
                                                 
500 Dalfovo, A. T. Lugbara Proverbs, (Rome: Comboni Missionaries, 1990), 56. 
501 Pfaff, 161. 
502 Patrick Kutu, “The Rural Poor: Protagonists of Their Empowerment,” in The Poor Discover Their Own 
Resources: A Practical Approach to Poverty Reduction in Urban and Rural Areas in Africa (Nairobi: 
Pauline Publications Africa, 2002),  36. 
503 Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, 189. 
504 Ibid., 189-190. 
  503
informally, depending on the learning and understanding capacity of the people in 
question. Secondly, as Goulet contends “great leaders must appear at the horizon to help 
the weak to overcome their passivity and accept risk,”505 although such leaders are rare.  
Participation or involvement of the poor and oppressed also demands education 
about the value of hard work. The Lugbara proverb; ‘Nga bori nya bori’ already done, 
already eaten” 506 says much about the value of work and should be invoked for a further 
understanding. It means when a person has worked hard that person has also assured 
himself or herself of food and sustenance. The poor and weak should be helped to realize 
the importance of hard work, especially if they are capable of being productive.  
Therefore, it is important that the poor, weak or handicapped people are helped to 
develop “positive-thinking about life and self.”507 They ought not to develop a crippling 
attitude, surrender to fate and think that they are useless and incapable of anything. 
The oppressed or exploited people are those who suffer because of injustice or 
they are mentally or physically or materially incapacitated. Their incapacity may be no 
fault of theirs but due to unjust structures or sicknesses. When they have the ability to be 
productive it is necessary to involve them and strengthen their participation.508 Such 
involvement and participation could be through establishment of institutions. Such 
institutions could be organizations or associations of such people, especially when they 
are mentally capable or institutions established and managed with the assistance of 
capable people who help involve them in decision-making so that they have a say in 
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improving their life and they can protect themselves against those who are intent on 
exploiting them.509 
3. STRONG AND HEROIC LEADERSHIP.  
 
Achieving development demands formidable leadership. Without people prepared 
intentionally for supervision of national, regional, local and private development projects 
the attainment of development remains a mere dream. This requirement is necessary 
especially at the grass roots. Goulet suggests relevant and significant qualities, which I 
think serve the need for Uganda to promote effective development leaders. First, 
development leaders should have “an intuitive grasp of the larger historical dimensions 
latent in local struggles.”510 This means the leader must be aware of the explanation 
behind the persistent struggles of the people in the past and the present. This is a 
significant quality because a leader should be informed since (s)he sometimes acts as the 
conscience of the people. A leader determines the will of the people towards the 
achievement of the general good of the people.511 Secondly, a leader has “the ability to 
reconcile multiple class alliance.”512 This means that a good leader has the ability to 
influence people across ethnic, regional and professional categories and bring them 
together for positive purposes which are for the good of these different categories. This 
means a good leader is one who has the ability to foster universal love and solidarity. 
Thirdly, a trait of a good development leader is moral and physical courage.  
Courage enables them to run risks, to persevere in the face of defeat, to reject temptations to 
compromise along the way, and to face death unflinchingly. At the very least, symbolic death 
must be faced in the form of politically suicidal decisions necessary to preserve integrity.513 
                                                 
509 Ibid. 
510 Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, 190.  
511 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. 6. 105, 3. 
512 Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, 190. 
513 Ibid. 
  505
 
A true leader should be ready to make serious sacrifices so that good may be 
achieved not just for oneself, but for all. Frederick Drandua notes that if good is to come 
out of an evil situation there is need for heroic leadership.514 Drandua has argued that in 
order to change a bad status quo one should also be guided by one’s conscience and 
remain faithful to the demands of divine law. This is one of the greatest challenges 
imposed upon Christians if not all believers. It is a real challenge in the sense that 
“heroism is sometimes called for in order to remain faithful to the requirements of the 
divine Law.”515A Nigerian proverb supports the significance of the suggestions and 
arguments of Goulet and Drandua. Luke Mbefo Nnamdi quotes the proverb as stating that 
“the possibility of losing one’s life is not a sufficient reason for refusing to fight for a just 
cause.”516 The trio emphasize that the virtue of courage is necessary in the efforts towards 
true development. They also suggest as Mbefo explicitly states that the ultimate human 
concern must be the care for the human person who has a God-given dignity. 
An observation is necessary here in the light of the doctrine of Populorum 
Progressio. This advocacy is not encouraging violence. It is in line with Paul VI’s 
teaching because of its emphasis of moral courage. Just as Paul VI and Martin Luther 
King Jr., the 1960s-protagonists of development, love, justice and peace, were opposed to 
violence as a solution to face injustice, Drandua, Mbefo and Goulet call for a pressure 
that is governed by Christian values or moral principles and common sense. A critical 
reading of their texts implies that they do not think or suggest that a good leader is violent 
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and violence is a moral means to achieve any objective.  
The fourth quality of good development leaders is the ability to effectively and 
tacitly “communicate their own vision of possible success to less imaginative or less 
experienced masses,” and the final quality of a good leader “is the ability to learn quickly 
from their mistakes.”517 A good leader for development should be capable of articulating 
his/her ideas and plans in an intelligible fashion, and should be quick to realize or 
discover why mistakes happened in the past and what should be done to rectify or avoid 
them.  
4. INNOVATIONS THAT AIM HIGHER 
 
Uganda has had some poverty reduction goals, especially from around the year 
2000 or a little earlier. For instance, reduction of the under-five mortality rate, universal 
primary education, reduction of the rate of infection in Humano Immuno Virus/Acquired 
Immunity Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and the reduction of fertility or births, but 
so far the results are not conspicuous.518 In Uganda asset development policies for the 
nationals, with greater emphasis upon the poor, is necessary for any development. In 
particular, it is more important for integral development in a context such as that of 
Uganda where development is absolutely fragmented; there are critical economic 
differences between people. As James P. Bailey infers from the teaching of Leo XIII, this 
is the way for closing the gap between the rich and the poor.519 The poor should be 
helped to save money and to build assets. The significance of this suggestion is 
compounded by Bailey’s assertion that  
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income-based approaches to poverty reduction help address the injustice of economic 
arrangements, but they need to be complemented by asset-development policies that help give the 
poor greater access to the economy and greater control over their lives.520 
 
Development demands that capital is derived from income but it also demands 
that part of the income is saved for future development or any eventualities. It is for this 
reason that Bailey’s suggestion that a combination of both asset-based and an income-
based approaches to the problem of poverty are more preferable and in line with Christian 
ethics than the exclusive use or application of an income-based approach to the problem. 
Any strategies or policies that the government or any development institution attempts to 
make for uplifting the condition of the poor should consider this suggestion seriously. 
The suggestion provides two alternative options to be applied jointly, although the asset-
based approach is more reliable because of enduring results and advantages, and the 
possibilities it offers, especially in moments of economic upheaval.521 
The government should, therefore, employ and engage experts to develop and 
articulate policies that facilitate the savings and asset development of the poor people. 
Assets are valuable things owned by a person or group of people or business, namely the 
resources such as cash, machinery, equipment and estate as opposed to one’s income that 
is used for the daily running of affairs.522 The policies would particularly help people 
who live on resources from hand to mouth, and perpetually lack the basic necessities of 
making livelihood. This is the main problem confronting the majority of Ugandans. For 
instance, in 1993, 55% of the Ugandan population lived below the poverty line and in 
1992 about 36.7% of them had lived on an income below US $ 1.00 a day and 77.2% 
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were below an income of US $ 2.00 a day.523 It is difficult to envision how people in a 
situation of poverty would save money or purchase and develop assets on their own, 
especially in a situation as in Uganda, where the majority of people are not well educated. 
However, some authors suggest that with support and incentives from institutions, such 
as the state and other organizations, there is a possibility for the poor people to 
“substantially increase their savings.”524 While it is true that the state is instrumental for 
people’s development, the development of people should be based on individuals and 
smaller groups. This is also in line with the development principle of subsidiarity. The 
grass-root growth, however, ought to move towards including a larger number of people. 
The suggestion of Denis Goulet that there should be transition from micro to 
macro arenas of action stands as a strong suggestion in support of the fact that 
development is a progressive process, which he states in the following words: 
Grassroots movements must not become mere havens for disenchanted anti-modernists, a kind of 
parallel counter-culture, and no matter how self-sufficient or viable. On the contrary their goal is 
to serve as an alternative development paradigm for the entire nation, to lead it into a new way of 
being modern, one which safeguards national culture and traditional values.525  
 
5. POPULATION POLICIES 
 
The rate of development of a country partly depends on the number of people who 
constitute it. The Governments of Uganda have not been consistent in following 
demographic changes, even from the time of colonial administration.526 Negligence about 
population growth is sometimes counterproductive to any socio-economic and political 
planning and development because development processes or people’s needs cannot be 
monitored well.  
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From the moral standpoint the church has the duty to address the population and 
family issues, at least in a pastoral letter and articulate clearly the stance of the church as 
she has done on several other social issues. The Uganda Catholic Bishops should, 
therefore, emulate examples offered in history regarding population and family issues. 
Historically, from Pius XII to John Paul II, popes have “stepped into the picture of family 
planning and population control.”527 The religious leadership in Uganda should help the 
government, in conjunction or consultation with religious leaders and educational 
institutions, not to attempt to stipulate radical demographic policies. As Herbert F. Smith 
proposes, the recommendation offered by John Paul II urging the “the development and 
the teaching of NFP” (Natural Family Planning) in his Apostolic Exortation on the 
Family, and inviting “married couples, doctors and experts”528 to help in instructing all 
married people and young adults, before marriage, should be seriously considered. A 
frequent or constant oversight in demographic changes, the reasons for the variation and 
facilitating the knowledge of the government, the church and people and assessment of 
their condition; and planning for the promotion of a dignified life for the people of 
Uganda are necessary priorities in demographic matters.  
One of the challenges for the government and the church or religious institutions 
in Uganda, and the citizens, is the question of opposing views about population as 
suggested by Edward K. Kirumira who states that  
It is worth noting that the population debate in Uganda is also peculiar in that, much as the 
emphasis may be placed on the stand of the churches, for example, it is virtually impossible to 
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characterize opposing views. The churches, government and public opinion are equally likely to 
adopt pro-natalist as anti-natalist positions.529  
 
This is a pertinent problem that needs to be resolved because of the differences in 
the stance about population growth – the pro-life group and the anti-life group. The 
former is the position the churches ought to maintain. The Catholic church is clear on this 
and stands for life, and this position endures until today. The validity of the position is in 
the fact and value of human life and human dignity. Life is the greatest gift of God to be 
protected and nourished. It would also be logically correct to recommend that the 
Catholic church, in particular, should help the government to understand and adopt the 
same position because every government has the duty to create conditions that favor the 
flourishing of its citizens. Creating conditions that protect life should be the priority of 
Ugandan government. This is what the churches or religious institutions should foster in 
their various communities. Like the government they are to safeguard people – created in 
the image of God with both biological and spiritual values - and help create conditions 
that promote the God-given dignity of people in their care.530 
Population explosion is one of the main problems hindering human development. 
It was also one of the concerns of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. His concern, as 
presented in Chapter One, was the rapid demographic growth but principally it was 
human dignity.531 This concern developed out of Paul VI’s historical experiences in the 
less developed countries or world – namely, Asia, Africa and Latin America. These parts 
of the world had similar concerns. The experiences and concerns testify that rapid 
population growth in low income countries is a serious issue in human development. This 
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experience is more evident in the majority of large-size families in the rural areas.532 It 
does not only hinder human development, it also causes human suffering. Overpopulation 
is a serious problem that affects the well-being of the human person. 
The experience of the past decade offers convincing evidence that if low income countries are to 
develop rapidly they must avoid or extricate themselves from the “population trap,” by which we 
mean rates of increase in population growth so large that they approach the feasible rates of 
increase in economic output, thus preventing significant growth in per capita output.533 
 
The rate of population increase should not out-pace the ability to comfortably 
maintain the population. The Committee for Economic Development was definitely not 
making suggestions for population control from a religious perspective. The concern of 
committee about population growth is growth in the per capita output of the nation, “yet 
human resources are the key to unlocking all resources”534as Smith suggests. In other 
words, production is not possible without human labor. Our concern here is the 
maintenance and enhancement of human dignity and the human person. However, the 
Committee’s contention should not be considered just from a secularistic point of view. 
The suggestion has in view the dignity of the human person and the value of human life. 
This assertion is better explained by the contention of Dietrich von Hilderbrand which 
suggests the divine intention with regard to procreation and demographic growth. He is of 
the idea that when necessary or if there is a compelling reason to avoid conception, it can 
only be by means of natural birth control. He states  
It is clear, therefore, that in the intention itself of avoiding another child for serious reasons there 
is not a trace of irreverence toward the mysterious fact that God has entrusted the birth of a person 
to the spousal love. We see that only during relatively brief intervals has God himself linked the 
conjugal act to the creation of a man. . . . The fact that conception is restricted to a short time 
implies a word of God. It not only confirms that the bodily union of the spouses has a meaning 
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and value in itself, apart from procreation, but it also leaves open the possibility of avoiding 
conception if this is desirable for serious reasons.535 
 
von Hilderbrand is apparently suggesting that life may not be brought into the 
world to experience or cause needless suffering. His suggestion has, however, to be taken 
with caution. There is possibility of making every reason to control birth a serious one. 
This is where the church or religious leadership of Uganda ought to intervene as a 
conscience of the nation to define or outline the serious reasons in a pastoral letter as 
suggested earlier in this section. They should make it abundantly clear that the aim of 
family planning is to help parents to “rear their families in dignity and happiness”536 as 
suggested by Mother Teresa. 
Most of Uganda may not yet be overpopulated in the real sense, but some parts 
are experiencing demographic explosion. Kigezi is one of the regions consistently 
affected by population growth since the colonial times. This was a consequence of over 
propagation of children, immigrants from Rwanda due to famine, and because of 
ecncouragment from the chiefs whose salaries depended on the number of people under 
their jurisdiction at that time.537 This has resulted in land shortage in Kigezi or the Kabale 
region in Southwestern Uganda where some people are migrating to neighboring areas 
which are less densely populated. As early as 1946 some of the people from the Kigezi 
region settled in Ankole after negotiations and agreements with the chiefs in the latter 
region.538 As the population continued to grow in Kigezi further negotiations were made 
with the leadership in Toro and some of the people of Kigezi moved to Toro, and even 
                                                 
535 von Hildebrand, 47. 
536 Mother Teresa, “Planning Something Beautiful for God” in Natural Family Planning: Nature’s Way-
God’s Way, Ed. Anthony Zimmerman et al. , (St. Cloud, Minnesota: De Rance, Inc., 1980), 2. 
537 Paul Ngologoza, Kigezi and Its People (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 76-77. 
538 Ibid. , 96. 
  513
until recently they have been migrating to Toro.539 It is good to take precautions before 
the situation worsens but the measures taken should conform to moral values, not just 
economic values as suggested by the Committee for Economic Development, which 
states that 
So long as unrestricted population growth continues, resources that might otherwise be available 
for investment will have to be used for current consumption. The expanded outlays for food and 
for basic health services will limit the resources available for education and for improving skills . . 
. . Clearly, the fundamental purpose of economic development – to raise living standards and 
broaden man’s opportunities for a more enriched life – is being put in jeopardy.540  
 
The concerns of the Committee are real but they lack balance of emphasis. The 
critical issue addressed by the Committee is that unrestricted population growth does not 
allow investment because the immediate daily needs of people ought to be satisfied. This 
concern is related to the question of asset development treated earlier in this chapter. 
When material resources are limited, provision for education and eventually 
improvement of skills is also affected. Consequently, development is also affected 
because improved skills, which are actually acquired through education, are lacking, and 
there are no savings or assets for further development. The validity of this assertion is 
founded on the fact that family expenditure is always proportionate to the size of the 
family. The more people there are in a family the higher the expenses and vice versa. It is 
right to conclude from this assertion that “large family size tends to increase poverty over 
the generations.”541 This is one fundamental fact about which population-study and 
religious institutions should inform the government and educate the masses. It is 
encouraging to know that government has taken keen interest in issues of population 
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increase and quality.542 However, in a context like that of Uganda which is affected by 
the AIDS pandemic, restricted population - just from a secular, not moral point of view - 
affects labor force negatively. AIDS needs to be checked because the “size and quality of 
labour force”543 are particularly affected by it. The government concern and interest in 
population issues should yield a dignified life of the population of Uganda. It ought to be 
in a manner that promotes both moral and material development of individuals and of the 
nation.  
The question of population has often been controversial in Uganda because of 
ethnicity and religion.544 The church leaders in Uganda should through the populace, 
ensure that the government does not exploit the controversy for political purposes. It 
should explain the real significance of censuses, namely for integral development 
planning and human promotion. It is significant to emphasize here that church 
institutions, especially the Catholic church, should ensure that addressing the question of 
population does not undermine the fundamental principle of human dignity. Human 
dignity and innocent human life should always be protected by any laws of Uganda. 
Uganda should not be developed materially at the expense of human life, human dignity 
and morality. 
The church or religious institutions ought to be, and have the challenge to be 
informed of the demographic issues of Uganda. They also have the duty to disseminate 
such information and their judgement and recommendations about such knowledge to the 
masses. They should regularly and squarely confront national population problems. This 
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is necessary because radical secular solutions may be suggested in the name of human 
development. The Committee for Economic Development, for instance suggested that 
to meet the population problem effectively, programs of family planning must play a part. Parents 
should have access to family planning information services. Such access is not merely 
indispensable to producing desired results with respect to economic development but is consistent 
with human dignity and the right of men and women everywhere to be aware of the problem and 
contribute to its solution.545 
 
Though seemingly relevant, the type of family planning advocated by the 
Committee is not specific while from a Catholic perspective the recommended method is 
Natural Family Planning (NFP). The main concern in family planning should be about 
the rural population which constitutes the majority of Uganda’s population. About 86-
89% of Uganda’s population lives in the countryside.546 Of this percentage the majority 
are young people, less educated, and who marry when they are not prepared for marriage 
and the implications of family life. The countryside is where the church or religious 
institutions should intervene aggressively to stipulate and explain relevant population and 
family planning procedures. The guidelines should, however, be morally justifiable or 
desirable. It is for this reason that the church in Uganda, especially the Catholic church, 
should spearhead this endeavor of addressing demographic issues and articulate its 
position regarding family planning clearly in the course of this endeavor. The following 
reminders are of grave importance: 
First, Uganda’s Poverty Eradication policy states that “family size is an individual 
choice”547 but people need to be helped to make choices responsibly and morally, and 
they should be assured of a minimized infant mortality rate. Secondly, as Anthony 
Zimmerman states, while we may not and “we do not sit in judgement on which family is 
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better or more heroic,” it ought to be made abundantly clear that “in regard to family size 
couples are not subject to arbitrary government interference.”548 Parents should propagate 
children according to the possibilities of caring for them. As Zimmerman further 
suggests, “when parents omit family planning and accept children as they come, they act 
laudably so long as this is within the bounds of prudent human foresight.”549 This 
assertion is reasonable and does not contradict the position of the Holy See. 
Thirdly, the responsible parenthood recommended by Paul VI in Humanae Vitae 
which, among other elements of responsible parenthood, suggests that parents should 
propagate children knowing that they will be taken care of, should be seriously 
considered.550 It is immoral and against human dignity to propagate life that is subjected 
to suffering or dehumanizing living conditions. 
Finally, Uganda has so far been blessed to a great extent with regard to population 
issues. Michael Twaddle and Holger Bernt Hansen correctly state that “successive 
governments have been keen not to antagonize religious groups, especially the Catholic 
Church, with regard to methods of population control and prevention of AIDS.551 
Catholics, as well as Protestants, should maintain their stance on population policies and 
keep developing deeper and convincing explanations and the underpinning reasons for 
their explanations and stance. Consequently, it is important that Catholics and Catholic 
leadership and institutions, in particular, hold onto and articulate the Catholic position   
which Matthew Habiger quotes from Archbishop Renato R. Martino.  
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The position of the Holy See regarding procreation is frequently misinterpreted. The Catholic 
Church does not propose procreation at any cost. It keeps on insisting that the transmission of, and 
the caring for human life must be exercised with an utmost sense of responsibility. It restates its 
constant position that human life is sacred; that the aim of public policy is to enhance the welfare 
of families; that it is the right of the spouses to decide on the size of the family and spacing of 
births, without pressures from governments or organizations. This decision must fully respect the 
moral order established by God, taking into account the couples responsibilities toward each other, 
the children they already have and society to which they belong. What the Church opposes is the 
imposition of demographic policies and the promotion of limiting births which are contrary to the 
objective moral order and to the liberty, dignity and conscience of the human being.552 
 
6. UGANDA’S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION 
 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a charter to be 
followed by all nations, including Uganda, which is a member of the United Nations, is 
one thing that comes to mind when thinking of international laws. What the UN 
advocates in its charter is conspicuously present in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda.553 What Uganda has incorporated from the UN should not just remain 
theoretical. It needs to be studied again and again by the citizens through both formal and 
informal education. By virtue of being a member of the international family it is 
suggested that Uganda needs to ensure that its citizens are duly educated about their 
rights, and this is an essential aspect of the education of the citizens in and out of schools. 
They should have a distinctive vision of human dignity, know and understand human 
rights and civil rights and any other freedoms.554 These should always be explained and 
understood in a social context as well as the context of an individual based on human 
dignity as the principal and commonly shared foundation. 
The government should always ensure that there is “respect for international 
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law.”555 This contention is significant in the context of integral human development. 
Development cannot be achieved in isolation. No person or nation is self-sufficient as 
Lebret observed, according to George Higgin’s reading of the former, as stated in 
Chapter One of this work. The respect for international law is a mutual demand on 
nations. Uganda is not an exception if it is to develop with the help or support and 
cooperation of other countries. This call is particularly important with regard to Uganda’s 
relationship with her immediate neighbors. While the government of Uganda has the duty 
to protect the citizens of the country from external aggression, it should not invade 
neighbors or other nations for selfish economic and political interests under the guise of 
protecting the people of Uganda. This is clearly stipulated in the 1995 constitution and it 
should be respected.556 It ought always to be kept in mind that both domestic stability and 
the stability of the global community depend on the spirit of universal charity, mutual 
respect and a serious consideration for international law because “events in one country 
can affect other nations or even the whole world”.557 
One factor that guarantees national dignity and good reputation in the global 
context is peaceful or amicable co-existence of a nation with its neighbors and other 
nations. Amaza Ori Ondoga, a deceased staunch NRM propagandist, contends that 
Uganda’s relationship with the neighboring countries was stormy before 1986.558 He did 
not categorically state the fact that thereafter its relationship with the neighboring 
countries continued to be sour until today. For instance, Uganda is the context in which 
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the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 can be better understood.559  
Uganda has had a series of wars that have drained its meager resources and cost 
her lots of lives. This is a trait of the nation since independence with just a few interludes 
of quiet periods in its history. Another evidence that remains a challenge and contradicts 
or refutes Amaza Ori Ondoga’s implication that after 1986 Uganda had good relations 
with other countries or its neighbors is what has recently been cited by AMSRIU in their 
strong statement:  
According to the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UPDF committed in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) horrendous inhuman acts of torture and killings, incited 
ethnic conflict, trained child soldiers and looted the Congo to the tune of 10 billion dollars. This 
debacle has ruined the reputation of our country and has brought enormous shame to the whole 
nation! The government is answerable to all this.560 
 
 Uganda should work hard and maintain a status that befits a nation that claims to 
be developed or developing. Uganda ought to become conscientious about the human 
person, human life, human rights and human dignity, regardless of sex, age, state of 
health, ethnicity, nationality and social, religious and political affiliation and status. For 
instance the provision of material support to the RPF to return to Rwanda without coming 
back to Uganda was near to, if not an active participation in, the invasion of Rwanda.561 
Above all it never took into consideration the dignity and the value of the lives of those 
who would eventually suffer. It was an undignified support. Peaceful co-existence with 
neighbors ought to be taken seriously. This issue has been repeatedly emphasized by the 
Catholic Bishops of Uganda in many of their pastoral letters but especially in the 1986 
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letter, With A New Heart and A New Spirit.562 
The tendency to be at war with neighboring countries has colored especially the 
reign of Idi Amin and the NRM government.563 This tendency should stop and Uganda 
should radically change its foreign policy of fighting in order to secure resources for the 
country or certain individuals, and provide peace for the neighbors and its citizens instead 
of fear and unrest. Peace would also provide both the opportunity to get to work and to 
develop. The sum total of our being created in the divine image and not to be used as 
objects should be maintained in our international relationship. Neither should we use 
other nations and peoples, and their resources for our selfish interests as it, unfortunately 
happened in the DRC where, according to George B.N. Ayittey 
President Museveni himself, together with the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, were directly 
accused by a United Nations panel of taking advantage of the civil war in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and engaging in systematic plunder of the country’s mineral resources. The United 
Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of Congo . . . found ‘mass scale looting’ of stockpiled minerals, coffee, timber, livestock, 
and money by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.Military and government officials then 
exported the diamonds, gold, and a composite miniral called coltan to line their own pockets and 
enrich a network of shell companies owned by well-connected associates. . . . 564 
 
The same report continued to show how these countries had increased exports in 
minerals which they had in little deposits or they were not known to be producers of prior 
to the civil war. For instance coltan, niobium and diamond which Uganda does not have 
were being exported by Uganda. Policies for international relations should be clearly 
articulated, and provide for a sincere and uncompromised autonomy of the nation and its 
neighbors. Any foreign policies that are costly to domestic policies in terms of affecting 
the development of the people of Uganda should not be encouraged or executed. 
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The 1995 Constitution of the republic of Uganda suggested that in terms of 
international relationships Uganda would promote “the national interests of Uganda.”565 I 
would like to strongly suggest here that the national interest should not be liberally 
interpreted to mean the invasion of other nations, and designed to ransack or deplete their 
economic resources to enrich Uganda or a few individual Ugandans.566 This is a violation 
of the right to own private property, it is injustice and uncharitable. The national interest 
proposed here should be understood to be selfless national interest. 
A dignified nation respects, promotes and protects the rights of its citizens and 
resident aliens, not just the personal interest of a few individuals. This picture is partly 
reflected through the political processes at home. A country where there is coup d‘etat 
occurring with alarming frequency, where leaders cannot relinquish power without 
physical or armed force, where foreign nationals rush out of the country before or during 
elections, and elections are rigged, where the legal system is broken and losers cannot 
concede their defeat with dignity and must escape to the bush to begin again the vicious 
circle, is not dignified at all. This is one area where concerned Ugandans are always 
apprehensive before, during and after elections.567 This is not the type of nation anyone 
would like to be part of. Neither can it be respected internationally nor represent the 
dignity of a true nation. 
D. Relevant and Sound Religious Policies 
 
Religion is perhaps the most fundamental element or aspect of education   
contributing toward integral human development because the climax or fulfillment of 
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integral development is realized in the religious dimension and life of the human person. 
Religion contributes greatly to the moral fibre of society.568 Its contributions need to be 
positively effective to achieve complete human progress. For this reason I concur with 
Bujo who points out what he thinks John S. Mbiti rightly observes, namely that 
religious beliefs, values, rituals and practices are directed towards strengthenening the moral life 
of each society. Morals are the food and drink which keep society alive, healthy and happy. Once 
there is a moral breakdown, the whole integrity of society also breaks down and the end is tragic. 
(The last point does not apply to Africa alone) This is why communities in Africa are very much 
interested in the individual ethical conduct. And the individual’s growth in wisdom depends on the 
ethical health of the community as a whole.569 
 
1. INTERDENOMINATIONAL COOPERATIVE ACTION 
 
Uganda’s religious institutions need a more genuine faith, love and cooperation. 
They also need sincerity, honesty, transparency, and less time-wasting in the name of 
diplomacy, which easily ends in lies and flattery. The good example which religious 
leaders set is crucial for the different denominations and the rest of the nation. Such 
cooperative actions are already in progress in the Uganda Joint Christian Council 
(UJCC), which is important in the follow-up of political processes in Uganda and should 
be encouraged to continue its work.570 However, such cooperation needs to be extended 
to other spheres of human life and activity, and should include more people than so far 
accommodated. In other words, a more broad-based cooperation is suggested here. 
Any cooperative action demands some tolerance between the different 
denominations too. I would like to adopt the three levels of tolerance suggested by 
Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi. These are “the personal sphere, the micro-social 
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sphere and the macro-social sphere” 571 of tolerance. By the personal sphere they affirm 
that one should first be able to forgive oneself before pardoning other people. Secondly, 
one should be able to tolerate those with whom one relates closely or intimately on the 
level of the smallest groups such as family. It is precisely this ability one translates into 
larger social relations. Finally, by macro-social sphere they suggest that one should be 
able to tolerate or forgive people who are furthest in terms of social and blood relation 
and interaction - those in the larger social setting or sphere such as people of other tribes, 
races, socio-political and religious ideologies and nationalities. 
2. LEADERSHIP FORMATION AND PROMOTION 
Leadership formation referred to here is both religious leadership and civil 
leadership. The Catholic church can be commended for the formation of her religious 
leadership in the country – no church in Uganda matches her efforts in this regard. The 
Anglican church or, in general, Protestant churches in Uganda are to be praised for being 
aggressive in the preparation of civil leaders - a real challenge to the Catholic church.572 
The Catholic church needs to do much more in this regard and learn more from the 
Protestant counterparts. While the Catholic church has the means and ability to educate 
people, and actually excels in this regard the, de facto numerically and otherwise, inferior 
Protestants unquestionably tower over Catholics in the political arena of Uganda. The 
Catholics and Muslims ought to question their own planning for preparing leaders in the 
future.  
There is no doubt the Catholic church has done a lot in the field of education but 
we need to ask if this has been done with very specific intentions and orientations, 
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especially in preparing people for the crucial areas of economics, civil service and 
politics. The religious preparation of leadership has, no doubt, been well done though not 
without flaws. For instance, good planning for the aggiornamento, especially of priests as 
recommended by the Catholic church law, and of religious and other crucial pastoral 
agents and church employees has often not been well implemented.573 
 The Second Vatican Council suggests differences in the formation in the Catholic 
Seminaries, both minor and major, religious institutions and universities, according to the 
levels or ages and circumstances. However, formation should help students to be more 
aggressive in combating the harsh situations of poverty, injustice and any situations of 
immorality. The conciliar fathers were explicit concerning seminary formation that it 
ought to be a pastoral oriented formation but also a comprehensive training where all 
elements of seminary formation - spiritual, intellectual and disciplinary - “should be 
coordinated with this pastoral aim in view.”574 The Uganda Martyrs University was 
established for such a purpose and should be commended for what it is doing but other 
institutions should emulate this example as well.  
The curriculum designed and followed in religious institutions should help them 
prepare to face difficulties and to live decently; and help them to understand that this is 
demanding in terms of preparation and their personal input. The imperative value to be 
strongly inculcated in all participants in educational or formation programs should be the 
value and dignity of work and of the value of the human person. This contention points to 
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the suggestion that there is an inevitable need for an integral education of the candidates 
to priesthood and religious life because their impending future ministry is the service of 
people and this demands a spirit of hard work and an appreciation of the human persons 
they encounter is various sorts of problems.  
In this vain the Second Vatican Council fathers were explicit that students 
preparing for priesthood should be helped to cultivate openness of “their hearts in a spirit 
of charity to various needs of fellow men.”575 The ability to freely accept to do humanly 
undesirable physical work should, therefore, be one of the main conditions for promoting 
a student intending to be a priest or religious, not just excellent theoretical academic 
performance. The fundamental reason for the emphasis on the value of work is that the 
majority of people are apparently addicted to free handouts. Ronald Kassimir has rightly 
observed this of the Catholic church:  
The relative wealth of the Church, enhanced greatly by its access to international Catholic donor 
community, has led to dependence on transnational Catholic networks, and to patronage relations 
with the laity that are not conducive to mobilization.576  
 
Formation programs ought to help candidates to be self-reliant, and to prepare a 
leadership that is not patronizing to the people it serves. This is the grave mistake of the 
past still being perpetuated. Many also think that education is only for those doing white- 
collar jobs. This indeed is one of the critical challenges to white-collar-job seekers, 
perpetual dependents, bishops or religious leaders and superiors of dioceses and 
congregations in terms of attitude and the requisite formation for pastoral agents.577 
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Continued teaching of practical subjects or sciences should be encouraged as part 
of leadership preparation, even in seminaries and formation houses of religious and other 
pastoral agents, not just studies in humanities. A more all-round formation than what we 
have today is necessary for the formation of future leadership in the Church and the civil 
society. Good leadership needed by the church and society today does not just consist in 
humility and charity. Charity should help people to relentlessly pursue the cause of 
justice, respect for the dignity and rights of people, peace, reconciliation, option for the 
poor and affirmative action. Many examples from the Scriptures suggest how Christ 
either changed values or invigorated them, and overturned the undesirable situations of 
his time aggressively.578 The leadership of people today should do likewise.  
Catholics and Muslims in Uganda have lagged behind for a long time. This is not 
necessaily because they, especially Catholics, are incapable but because there was not 
critical planning on their part. It is appropriate and right to suggest that Catholics and 
Muslims, and other religions that are in this category in Uganda have to try to live up to 
this challenge while their Protestant counterparts who have done much better in this 
regard should continue with the same spirit. However, all groups other than Catholics 
need to do much more to improve their formation of religious leadership, because they 
are far behind Catholics. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the majority of the dioceses, entertaining such thoughts is a dream and really utopian because of the 
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3. EFFECTIVE BASIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: RELEVANT ONGOING CATECHESIS 
 
Small Christian or religious communities provide an ideal opportunity for easy 
interaction, practical living of faith and for sharing experiences - joys and sorrows - and 
for mutual encouragement. Historically, they have played a significant role in the life of 
the Church, especially in proclaiming and developing love of God and mutual love of 
people.579 Therefore, they can provide an avenue for the promotion of integral 
development of people. Consequently, I suggest here basic religious communities, not 
only basic Christian communities, because it would be good if all religious institutions 
organize themselves in small groups too. It is African and easier for people to interact 
freely and act more responsibly in their small groups. This kind of organization leads to 
an easy possibility for practical action. Small Christian communities have been and are 
fundamental pillars of the church.580 The idea of small/basic Christian communities was 
first initiated in the early church in the Acts of the Apostles, but it was activated in East 
Africa in 1976 by the AMECEA bishops, and it was to be considered a priority.581 
However, it needs to be more emphasized in the current situation of the Catholic Church 
in Uganda because not every diocese and religious institution in Uganda has effectively 
established such communities as required. Neither has it remained a priority in every 
diocese. If it does, its effectiveness needs to be emphasized in every local situation. 
A strong community and development foundation depends on strong basic 
communities or individuals.582 As part of their on-going formation program church 
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leaders or religious institutions should incorporate the social teachings of religious 
institutions, emphasize the notion of authentic human development, and encourage 
people to study the social teachings of the church. The social teachings of the of  Catholic 
church treat a diversity of themes critical to social, economic, political, and cultural 
matters, all of which affect people directly. The people should be informed of these 
issues. These should no longer be down played as Peter Henriot and others suggest.583 
They should be part and parcel of evangelization and on-going catechesis.  
Small Christian communities are ideal places for educating people and for helping 
them to implement their education. Churches or religious institutions should use these 
small communities to inculcate religious values and the requisite ideas for true human 
development. Significant themes already treated, e.g. population policies, democracy, 
tolerance, the value of the human person, human dignity, human rights and all necessary 
principles for human development should be taught to members of the SCCs/ BCCs. This 
is the way to empower them, and to make them to realize that they are spiritually, 
economically, socially, culturally and politically effective instruments, and above all 
invaluable for the promotion of general human society.  
4. FAMILY AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION 
 
The family is a significant basic institution; good parents and good family provide 
good foundation for the education of children and their eventual personality 
development.584 Family is where love and peace begin and are nourished. Developed 
people and families contribute to personal and general human development. The family, 
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also a foundation for small Christian or religious communities, is “an intimate 
communion of life and love” 585 and hence fundamental for human development. This is 
an issue parents ought to consider carefully. However, education is not one moment of 
achievement, and nor is it a responsibility of one person or a few groups of people. As a 
point of reflection for all, not only West Nile, it is worth pondering on Mark Leopold’s 
suggestion that “Amin was at least as much a creation of West Nile’s past as he was a 
shaper of its future.”586 His past upbringing affected his life and the future of West Nile. 
Precisely, the life of one person affects others and their future too. Hence, education of 
one person affects other people too and is the responsibility of all in the society to ensure 
that people are offered moral education. 
Education involves as many people as can provide for a needed education. A 
comprehensive education involves parents, teachers and religious agents - precisely, it 
involves parents, the church, government and society.587 Such education should above all 
emphasize moral values and the significance of hard work in human life as a dignified 
activity or an activity that promotes the dignity of the human person. This means any 
institution or nation needs a coordinated education system. It demands cooperation from 
leaders at different settings, spheres and levels.  
Parents, teachers and the church’s pastoral agents and community need to 
cooperate in the education of young people as suggested by the conciliar fathers.588 They 
should do so through collaboration in various ways, not independently. They should 
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promote mutual exchange of information about the children’s behavior. They should 
sincerely share their personal experiences and knowledge of the children so that at every 
moment and stage of their life the children are assisted where there is need. This is 
necessary because discontinuity in the formation process causes flaws in the education 
process and frustrates the efforts and enthusiasm of interested education agents.  
Parents, teachers and religious agents need to follow or apply such significant 
development principles as solidarity, participation and more especially subsidiarity. They 
should recognize their need for one another. They, each, should do their part in 
formation. Where their counterparts are responsible and capable, they should avoid 
unnecessary interferences or transfer of responsibilities to other people. This means 
parents should not leave the burden of bringing up children entirely upon teachers or 
religious leaders and vice versa. Neither should the latter two think that their colleagues 
in formation should do it by themselves. The trio - teachers, parents and religious agents - 
should not take over the burdens or responsibilities of the children when the latter are 
capable. As Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest: “in the family parents must 
educate their children not to have recourse to them when they can obtain by their own 
efforts a determined result.”589 Parents should intervene to help their children only when 
it is absolutely necessary. Children should be given education for independent living 
rather than for dependence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 A number of conclusions may be drawn from the study in this chapter. First, one 
of the principal challenges to Uganda is that its successive leaders since independence 
                                                 
589 Haring and Salvoldi, 59. 
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have neglected, to a great degree, human dignity, human rights and human person, 
universal love and justice as basic principles and virtues. These principles and virtues 
would supplement feasible strategies for developing the country as a unit. The leaders 
assended to power with divisive mentalities and prejudices. The people need to be helped 
to be sincerely, mutually intelligible and united in their view of life, and especially the 
crucial principles for true human development. These are: the human person, human 
dignity, human rights, democracy, justice, participation, affirmative action, option for the 
poor, subsidiarity, common good, and ownership of property, charity, peace and 
association. 
 Uganda needs a theology, sociology, economics, education and politics of human 
development, which makes the dignity and the rights of the human person central, and 
recognizes and acknowledges human dignity as the most fundamental principle for true 
human development.  
The question addressed in this chapter was whether Uganda’s development claims 
face the challenges of Paul VI’s vision of human development. Populorum Progressio’s 
challenges to Uganda are suggested by the claim that  
Populorum Progressio does not give a privileged position to the economic dimension of human 
development any more than to the cultural, psychological, political, ecological or religious 
dimensions. Rather it challenges Christians to take full account of the non-economic elements - for 
instance to recognize the value of different cultures and of basic human rights.590  
 
Paul VI was cautious about limiting the number of criteria for true human 
development. He advanced the thoughts of Lebret to clarify his point of view. They are 
thoughts that question development claims, including that of Uganda.  
                                                 
590 Dorr, 182. 
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Growth expressed in terms of increased national income per inhabitant can disguise an increase in 
the incomes of the rich and a corresponding impoverishment and regression in the incomes of the 
poor.591  
 
The challenge and concern of Lebret and Paul VI is that development should be 
judged from different perspectives. Imbalances in the distribution of resources and the 
growing gap between the rich and the poor are indicators of lack of true development. He 
suggested that “the greatest evil in the world is not the poverty of those who are deprived, 
but the lack of concern on the part of those who are well off.”592 Balanced distribution of 
resources is consequent to love, care or concern for the needs of all, regardless of tribe, 
socio-economic and political status, cultural background and political or religious 
affiliation. From the study in this chapter this is the very opposite of the status quo in 
Uganda where there is inadequate psychological, social, cultural, political, economic and 
spiritual human development, properly called integral human development. 593 A further 
challenge to Uganda is that  
. . . progress or development takes place when freedoms can find their expression in institutions, 
norms of exchange, patterns of social organizations, educational efforts, relations of productions 
and political choices which enhance the human potential. What is ultimately sought are basic 
conditions under which all persons may fulfill themselves as individuals and as members of 
multiple communities.594  
 
Common good, freedom, education, harmonious social relations, mutual respect, 
and relevant or democratic political systems are indicators of real development. The 
Ugandan context does not adequately provide for the requisite conditions that facilitate 
the enhancement of the lives of individuals as well as communities. It is such a state of 
                                                 
591 Louis Joseph Lebret, The Last Revolution: The Destiny of Over - and Underdeveloped Nations, trans. 
John Horgan, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 150. Also see Populorum Progressio, 8, 4. 
592 Ibid, 204. Also cfr. Populorum Progressio, 66, 28 and 9, 4-5. 
593 Aidan Southall, “Isolation and Underdevelopment: Periphery and Centre” in Developing Uganda, ed. 
Bernt, Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 254. 
594 Denis Goulet, A New Moral Order: Studies in Development Ethics and Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 40. 
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affairs that the central aspects of Populorum Progressio challenge.  
Paul VI was concerned about the development of the entire person - spiritually, 
economically, culturally, politically, psychologically and socially, and of all people in a 
similar fashion. The development of all is also the responsibility of all. According to him 
true development is realized in a spirit of solidarity and participation, which are not so 
much the Ugandan spirit as the study in this chapter shows. This assertion was 
emphasized in Paul VI’s claim: 
But each man is a member of society and therefore belongs to the entire community of men. 
Consequently not merely this or that man, but all without exception are called to promote the full 
development of the whole human society.595  
 
The statement evinces that the human person is a social being. It is also an 
evidence of the crucial need for a right understanding of the human person and human 
responsibility. The fact that there is always an intimate relation between persons remains 
challenging to Ugandans. 
  In the context of integral human development, such a claim challenges the 
practice of dependence, segregation, discrimination, tribalism, regionalism and division, 
which are some of the characteristic problems of Uganda.596 These practices suggest a 
misguided understanding of the human person, an understanding which radically 
differentiates one person from another and, consequently, leads to a misconception of 
human dignity and human rights. They also explain why one of the core problems of 
Uganda, a challenge of Populorum Progressio, is insufficient respect for the human 
                                                 
595 Populorum Progressio, 17, 8. Paul VI made this point clear right from the opening section of the 
document stating: “…we earnestly exhort all men today to strive by united planning and joint action for the 
full development of each individual and the common progress of all mankind.”, 5,3. 
596 Whyte and Whyte, 12. Also see Regan, 161 and Mari Aili Tripp, “Local Women’s Association and 
Politics in Contemporary Uganda” in Developing Uganda, ed. Bernt, Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, 
(Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 120.  
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person, dignity and rights. At the heart of the document is “the concern for the human 
person and all people.”597 All the arguments and principles of the document suggest this 
assertion or gravitate towards it. 
The study in this chapter attempted to demonstrate that the practical application of 
the doctrine of Populorum Progressio, to a great extent, is questionable in the case of 
Uganda. The document calls for an acknowledgement and respect for the value of human 
life, the dignity and the rights of the human person. The principles, virtues and conditions 
that enhance the human person and dignity are necessary for the promotion of the human 
person as Paul VI advocated in the document. The major concern of this chapter was to 
establish that he status quo in Uganda does not, to a great extent, reflect the doctrine of 
Paul VI in Populorum Progressio because Uganda condones attitudes, practices and 
behaviors inconsonant with the teaching of the document, and many of the prevailing 
attitudes, practices and conduct in Uganda are counterproductive to complete human 
development.
                                                 
597 Populorum Progressio, 1,1-2; 5-6,3; 14-17,7-9; 20-23,9-11; 28,13; 30,13; 32,14; 36-37,16; 39,17; 
42,18; 48,20-21; 50,21; 64-65,27 and 71,29. Also see Henriot, 219. Henriot argues that integral human 
development is anywhere and everywhere. This suggests that uneven development as in Uganda is not any 
close to being called integral human development. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
In this study the forces that influenced Pope Paul VI’s vision of true human 
development, which he called integral human development, the development principles in 
Populorum Progressio were outlined, interpreted and applied to the context of 
development in Uganda. The overarching conclusion from the study and application of 
the principles is that the development claims of Uganda do not meet the standard of 
development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. This conclusion is based 
on an anthropology relevant for integral human development – precisely, a critical notion 
of the human person and human rights, and an understanding of and respect for human 
dignity. Such an anthropological vision implies what Denis Goulet calls ethical 
rationality which, he suggests  
takes as its goal the creation, nurture, or defense of certain values considered worthy for their own 
sake – freedom, justice, the inviolability of persons, the “right” of each to a livelihood, dignity, 
truth, peace, community, friendship, or love.1 
 
I suggested in the study that, in the context of Uganda, education for development 
is imperative for attaining integral or authentic human development. The scope and 
challenge of education about human dignity and moral principles is that it must respect 
and promote human dignity. This ought to be emphasized and accepted as one of the 
most crucial challenges of Populorum Proressio to Uganda. The doctrine of human 
development in the document is a perennial challenge to all individuals, groups or 
institutions, tribes, races and nations. 
The study grappled with a number of questions in the context of Uganda and Paul 
VI’s vision of integral human development in Populorum Progressio. The principal 
                                                 
1Denis Goulet, Incentives for Development: The Key to Equity, (New York: New Horizon Press, 1989), 
150-151. Values are considered more important than practical results because what matters is whether 
actions are right or wrong, or if they are just or unjust. 
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questions addressed in Chapter One of the study were: Why and how Paul VI conceived 
of development the way he did. The answer to this question is his childhood experieces, 
encounters with people of different life experiences, and his international trips and 
professional experiences all shaped his understanding of human development as 
presented in Populorum Progressio. 
In Chapter Two I grappled with the problems Paul VI was addressing and 
attempting to resolve and what he suggested about true human development in 
Populorum Progressio. Precisely, I outlined such problems as poverty, avarice, inequality 
and injustice, cultural development, population explosion, nationalism and racism or 
tribalism – all of which affect humankind. There was also a misconstrued notion of 
human development, which had gained ascendancy, and Paul VI thought should be 
reconstructed or corrected and replaced. Consequently, he suggested a notion of human 
development that considers everyone as the subject and object of development. He called 
this integral human development. It was this very notion, which I applied to Uganda’s 
development claims to ascertain whether Uganda’s development claims match the 
standards set by Populorum Progressio. To attain this kind of development Paul VI 
suggested principles such as solidarity, the common good, right to private ownership of 
goods, universal charity, aid to the weak and equity in trade relations. He proposed other 
development principles and conditions such as: peace, option for the poor, subsidiarity, 
affirmative action, association and participation. He identified education as a necessary 
means for development. I used the principles to interpret the situation in Uganda and 
discovered that some attempts were made to apply them, but few attempts were 
successful and many principles for authentic human development have been violated. 
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In Chapter Three I dealt with the core principle for integral human development, 
namely human dignity as related to human person and human rights. Paul VI’s teaching 
about integral human development and the principles for integral human development are 
relevant, but he presumed that the understanding of the human person, the value of 
human life, human dignity and human rights did not need to be emphasized and related to 
other development principles. This argument was necessary and inevitable as suggested 
by Peter Henriot’s reading of Gaudium et Spes.2 Paul VI mentioned and many times 
referred to human dignity, human rights and the human person in Populorum Progressio 
but loosely or implicitly related them to other principles for integral human development 
in the said document.3 
The principles need to be explained, related and emphasized because they are 
fundamental starting points for arguing for and developing an authentic understanding of 
integral human development.4 They are a means to a focused view and comprehension of 
integral human development and efforts toward its achievement. The importance of 
underscoring the understanding of the human person, rights and dignity can never be 
emphasized too much because a relevant political, social, economic and religious system 
is the one that provides “goods and services essential to a life of human dignity.”5 
Consequently, I contended that human dignity and a proper understanding of the human 
person and human rights is the foundation from which integral human development can 
                                                 
2 Peter J. Henriot, “Who Cares About Africa? Development Guidelines from the Church’s Social 
Teaching” in Catholic Social Thought and the New World Order: Building on One Hundred Years , ed. 
Oliver Williams and John H. Houck (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 211. 
Also see Austin Flannery, ed. “Gaudium et Spes” in Vatican II Council: The Conciliar and Post-conciliar 
Documents, (London: Costello Publishing Company, 1981), 63, 968-970.  
3 Populorum Progressio, 1,1-2; 5-6,3; 14-17,7-9; 20-23,9-11; 28,13; 30,13; 32,14; 36-37,16; 39,17; 42,18; 
48,20-21; 50,21; 64-65,27; and 71,29.  
4 Henriot, 211. 
5 Charles Avila, Ownership: Early Christian Teaching (London: Sheed and Ward, 1983), 154. 
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be explained, understood and achieved. However, human person, human dignity and 
human rights need to be understood both individually and collectively. This is significant 
because 
To recognize the social nature of the human person is to recognize that human beings need one 
another in order to be what they are - human. Human life is not possible in isolation…. Human 
development cannot take place apart from a human community.6 
 
This vision and similar notions situated the understanding of the human person, 
and integral development, in the context of both the individual and community. 
Development is, exclusive and inclusive, individual and communal. In the study I 
reiterated that the principles for integral human development such as charity, justice and 
equity, participation or involvement, common good, subsidiarity, solidarity, preferential 
option for the poor and peace as presented by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio should 
be explained in relation to an appropriate understanding of the fundamental principles - 
human person, human dignity and human rights - without which they are superficial and 
do not make much sense. This is a call where the real need for an understanding of the 
human person or a relevant anthropology, is necessary for integral human development.  
Since Paul VI’s basic intention in Populorum Progressio was not, fundamentally, 
to suggest an anthropology for development, a relevant anthropology needed to be 
constructed from his frequent references to the human person, human rights and human 
dignity in Populorum Progressio. The anthropology facilitates a practical application of 
his advocacy for integral human development. The human person, human dignity and 
human rights were the center of my arguments against Uganda’s development claims. All 
other principles stated or implied in Populorum Progressio are necessary for human 
                                                 
6 James P. Hanigan, As I Have Loved You: The Challenge of Christian Ethics (New York and Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 1986), 77. 
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development but human dignity is the de facto basic principle to be recognized, 
underscored, understood and acknowledged as the genesis of integral human 
development. This is the monumental task and challenge of Paul VI’s teaching on 
integral human development in Populorum Progressio. 
That the basis and focal point of all arguments in the work is human dignity is 
evident, and consistent from the first chapter to the last chapter. In the study I postulated 
that all arguments about integral human development should protect or promote the 
human dignity of all people. Consequently, on the basis of human dignity integral human 
development is consistently and emphatically presented as the development of the entire 
individual and of all individuals regardless of age, sex, socio-economic and political 
status, tribe, race and color.  
In Chapter Four the fundamental and recurrent issue I addressed was whether or 
not the development initiatives and efforts undertaken in Uganda respect, protect and 
enhance human life, the human person and, human dignity and rights. To some extent 
certain government and church initiatives promote the human person and human dignity, 
but they do not reach the extent suggested by the notion of integral human development 
according to Paul VI’s doctrine in Populorum Progressio. I showed in Chapter Four that 
the teaching of Populorum Progressio regarding integral human development is relevant 
and offers enduring pertinent challenges in the Ugandan context. I applied the principles 
in the document to the context of Uganda. A conclusion from the application of the 
principles yielded the suggestion that the development claims of Uganda do not meet the 
standards of development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. This 
conclusion is based on the understanding and respect for human dignity – the overriding 
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human development principle in Populorum Progressio and any Catholic social doctrine. 
The most fundamental principle for integral human development is human dignity, but 
the most fundamental factor is the practical education about human dignity and all other 
development principles. 
In the study I made suggestions for the context of Uganda. Education about 
human dignity and moral principles that respect and promote human dignity is, among 
other suggestions, to be emphasized and accepted as the most crucial challenge if Uganda 
is to measure up to the doctrine of human development in Populorum Proressio. The 
challenge of the document is, however, a perennial challenge to all individuals, groups or 
institutions, tribes, races and nations. 
The document is current, relevant and challenging to the status quo in Uganda. 
The notion of integral human development presented in Populorum Progressio and its 
application to Uganda showed the challenges of the document to the context of Uganda. 
The prevailing situation in Uganda guarantees the need for implementation of the 
teaching of the document to interpret and confront the social, political, economic and 
religious, structures or systems in the country. 
Paul VI provided excellent principles for integral human development and 
appealed to the altruism of the agents of development. The wealthy nations have the 
liberty to support the poor nations. I have argued in the study that in the Ugandan context 
the most crucial and effective action is relevant and effective education, and 
empowerment of smaller groups and individuals in addition to the responsible actions of 
top administrators and managers of institutions and structures. As Louis Joseph Lebret 
argued, development is a simultaneous responsibility and action of individuals, those at 
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the grassroots and those in the topmost administration and management of institutions 
and structures.7  
Institutions and structures that can counteract or combat prevalent evils need to be 
created, well established and supported. The operation of existing structures should be 
improved. This demands that both individuals and groups are conscientized about their 
mutual rights and responsibilities. Conscientization contributes to creativity and enables 
people to raise appropriate questions in the proper context - those in charge of institutions 
and structures. Educational programs and systems are crucial in this effort. All of these 
need careful research and planning, which is possible only with relevant education. As 
Denis Goulet contends, development process demands a clearly articulated plan in terms 
of goals, analysis of development process, comprehensive guidelines for the various 
sciences and a coherent theoretical framework.8 This is a process that demands more than 
a fickle, shallow and irrelevant education. The needed education ought to be centered on 
the human person – a challenge to individuals, the church and state. The church, the state 
and individuals are a failure if they cannot defend and protect the human person, human 
dignity and rights. Both institutions and individual members belonging to them are for the 
good of the human person.  
Finally, it is important to note that the notion of integral human development 
presented in Populorum Progressio sets extremely high standards of the notion of human 
development. It is the litmus test for authentic human development. Any claims of 
development, even by the most developed countries, fail to measure up in terms of 
                                                 
7 Louis Joseph Lebret, The Last Revolution: The Destiny of Over-and Underdeveloped Nations, trans. John 
Horgan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 211. 
8 Denis Goulet, A New Moral Order: Studies in Development Ethics and Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 18-19. 
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reaching the standards set in Populorum Progressio because each society has elements of 
the abuse of the human person, human rights and the human dignity. However, this does 
not mean that the document is utopian; nor does it excuse continued efforts to work for 
the integral development of all people. The standard is an enduring challenge to 
individuals, peoples, groups and nations to, ever faithfully, try to strive to do better in 
developing themselves and others. The standard of development advocated in Populorum 
Progressio will always stand in strong opposition to development claims and it will be 
judged and challenged, only by whether people have become more human beings and less 
non-human beings than ever before – whether there is a “qualitative human 
enrichment”9or not. This is a challenge to governments, religious institutions, any human 
society or grouping and to both those who have adequate material possessions and those 
who do not. 
 
 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Denis Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, 6-7. 
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